THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS

A Quarterly Devoted to the Advancement of Ethical Knowledge and Practice

---

Managing Editor, JAMES H. TUFTS
Associate Editor, T. V. SMITH

EDITORIAL COMMITTEE

FELIX ADLER, Ph.D., New York
CHARLES M. BAKEWELL, Ph.D., New Haven
C. DELISLE BURNS, London
JOHN DEWEY, LL.D., New York
G. C. FIELD, Liverpool
L. T. HOBHOUSE, London
HAROLD HÖFFDING, Ph.D., Copenhagen
M. JOURDAIN, London, Eng.
J. S. MACKENZIE, Litt.D., London, Eng.
J. H. MUIRHEAD, LL.D., Birmingham
ROSCOE POUND, LL.D., Cambridge, Mass.
FRANK THILLY, Ph.D., Ithaca
JOHN H. WIGMORE, LL.D., Chicago

VOL. XXXV
1924-25

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN, LTD., London
THE MARUZEN-KABUSHIKI-KAISHA, Tokyo, Osaka, Kyoto, Fukuoka, Sendai
THE MISSION BOOK COMPANY, Shanghai

Digitized by Google

Published October, 1924,
January, April, and July, 1925

Composed and Printed By
The University of Chicago Press
Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A.

Digitized by Google

Gen. Walker

CONTENTS FOR VOLUME XXXV

ARTICLES

	PAGE
BARTLETT, F. C. Group Organization and Social Behavior	346
BROGAN, A. P. Moral Valuations about Men and Women	105
BROTHERSTON, BRUCE. Society, an Original Fact	24
BURNS, C. DELISLE. The Old Religion and the New	82
DEPAULEY, W. C. Beccaria and Punishment	404
DUCASSE, C. J. Liberalism in Ethics	238
GEISER, KARL F. America and World-Co-operation	60
GRAVES, W. BROOKE. Codes of Ethics for Business and Commercial Organization	41
HOLLANDS, EDMUND H. Nature and Spirit	329
LODGE, RUPERT CLENDON. The Platonic Value-Scale	1
LUI, CHI FUNG. The Ethical Implications of Moh Tih's Philosophy	72
MEAD, GEORGE HERBERT. The Genesis of the Self and Social Control	251
REID, GILBERT P. Revolution as Taught by Taoism	289
SCOTT, J. W. Liberty Education and the Making of Character	150
SMITH, T. V. The American Doctrine of Equality in the Light of Evolutionism	377
The Transcendental Derivation of Equality in America	164
SWABEY, MARIE COLLINS. The Rational Character of the Democratic Principle	140
TAEUSCH, C. F. Fees and Charges as an Index of Professionalism	368
THORBURN, JOHN M. Analytical Psychology and the Concept of Individuality	125
WIEMAN, HENRY NELSON. Objectives Versus Ideals	296
WILLIAMSON, C. The Ethics of Three Russian Novelists	217
WOODS, ANDERSON. The Greatest Happiness Regardless of Number	413
YARROS, VICTOR S. Age and Youth in Social Ethics	278

BOOK REVIEWS

BABBITT, IRVING. *Democracy and Leadership.* By T. V. Smith	194
BENNETT, CHARLES A. *A Philosophical Study of Mysticism.* By Edwin A. Burtt	200
BERNARD, L. L. *Instinct: A Study in Social Psychology.* By J. R. Kantor	429
BOSANQUET, HELEN. *Bernard Bosanquet: A Short Account of His Life.* By M. J.	196
BURNS, C. DELISLE. *A Short History of International Intercourse.* By M. J.	198

Digitized by Google

PAGE

CHIROL, VALENTINE. *The Occident and the Orient.* By Philip Marshall Brown 308
CONGER, GEORGE PERRIGO. *A Course in Philosophy.* By E. S. Ames . 440
CROCE, BENEDETTO. *The Conduct of Life.* By C. F. Taeusch . . . 316
CUNNINGHAM, G. WATTS. *Problems of Philosophy.* By E. S. Ames . 440
DAWSON, MILES MENANDER. *The Ethics of Socrates.* By Paul Shorey 316
DEVISSCHER, CHARLES. *The Stabilization of Europe.* By Philip Marshall Brown 308
FINOT, JEAN. *Race Prejudice.* By Erle Fiske Young 192
FOLLETT, M. P. *Creative Experience.* By J. H. Tufts 189
GHOSE, J. C. *The Positive Religion.* By A. Eustace Haydon . . . 95
HOBHOUSE, L. T. *Social Development, Its Nature and Conditions.* By C. D. B. 195
KANTOR, J. R. *Principle of Psychology.* By Edward S. Robinson . . 432
KRAUS, HERBERT. *Germany in Transition.* By Philip Marshall Brown 308
LAIRD, JOHN. *The Idea of the Soul.* By C. D. B. 315
LEVINE, ISRAEL. *Reason and Morals: An Enquiry into the First Principles of Ethics.* By C. D. B. 315
MACKENZIE, JOHN. *Hindu Ethics.* By E. J. Thomas 199
MACKENZIE, J. S. *Ultimate Values in the Light of Contemporary Thought.* By J. W. Scott 435
MCDOUGALL, WILLIAM. *Ethics and Some World Problems.* By M. J. 191
MERRIAM, CHARLES EDWARD, BARNES, HARRY ELMER, AND OTHERS. *A History of Political Theories: Recent Times.* By T. V. Smith . 312
MILBURN, R. GORDON. *The Theology of the Real.* By E. A. Burtt . 437
MILLER, HERBERT ADOLPHUS. *Races, Nations and Classes. The Psychology of Domination and Freedom.* By Erle Fiske Young . . 438
MUIRHEAD, J. H. (ed.). *Contemporary British Philosophy.* By C. D. Burns 93
OTTO, M. C. *Things and Ideals.* By A. W. Moore 310
PATRICK, GEORGE THOMAS WHITE. *Introduction to Philosophy.* By E. S. Ames 440
RATHBONE, ELEANOR F. *The Disinherited Family.* By M. J. . . . 94
RYAN, JAMES H. *An Introduction to Philosophy.* By E. S. Ames . . 440
SUKUMAR, DUTT. *Early Buddhist Monachism.* By A. Eustace Haydon 95
TSANOFF, RADOSLAV A. *The Problem of Immortality: Studies in Personality and Value.* By G. Watts Cunningham 428
WILDE, NORMAN. *The Ethical Basis of the State.* By George P. Adams 426

IN MEMORIAM

James Edwin Creighton. By G. Watts Cunningham 214

NOTES

BUTLER, NICHOLAS MURRAY, AND ARMSTRONG, A. C. Sixth International Congress of Philosophy 104

Digitized by Google

THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS

Volume XXXV OCTOBER 1924 Number 1

THE PLATONIC VALUE-SCALE

RUPERT CLENDON LODGE

Among the value-comparisons which occur so frequently in the Platonic *Dialogues*, we find a great variety which partly overlap and are almost entirely included in longer formulations of what is stated to be a scale of values. The most inclusive of these formulations is officially adopted in the *Laws* as a pattern to be used in guiding legislation, and is thus of fundamental significance for Platonism. Starting with wealth, i.e., with money and material possessions, the scale proceeds upward to muscular strength, then to good looks, then to bodily health, then—with some recognition of the magnitude of the step—to courage, then to justice, then still higher to temperance, and finally to wisdom or philosophical insight.[1] The object of the present paper is, in the first place, to investigate the grounds on which each of these values is assigned to its position on the scale, and, in the second place, to discover the principle or principles which govern the composition of the scale as a whole. Finally, in the light of all the evidence, we shall attempt to determine the ultimate meaning and value of such a scale for Platonism in its deeper aspects.

Beginning, then, with wealth, we ask why it is ranked as lower than strength. Physical strength, for Plato, is largely a matter of bodily fitness, and is conditioned chiefly by diet and methodical exercise in the gymnasium and in field sports. It is one of the "excellences of the body," and is almost universally regarded as a value in itself. At its lowest, when unac-

[1] *Laws* 631*b–d*.

Digitized by Google

companied by much intelligence, it still has a definite market-value in the community which depends upon labor,[1] and at a higher level of development its value for athletic and military contests is so well understood that every Greek city maintains its professional strong men, who make the cultivation of physical strength one of their main ends. Plato disapproves, however, of the professional regimen which develops the muscles at the expense of bodily and mental health, and substitutes for it a training of a more wiry and military type, in the spirit of service of the community as a whole.[2] This training is given, not to a few champions, but to every member of the guardian caste.

Money and material possessions are of value, primarily *qua* providing for this caste the leisure, the food, and the gymnasia for this training. Apart from this, they are not only valueless, but are regarded as a source of danger, and the military caste is not permitted to own private property in any shape or form. The value of material possessions is thus, at best, secondary. It is admitted only so far as such possessions are instrumental to the development of the approved type of strength, in due subordination to physical well-being and to mental and moral progress.

The next highest "good" on the value-scale is good looks. This physical beauty is often mentioned in close connection with physical strength. The same general conditions control the development of both these bodily excellences. Apart from the turn of a nose or ear, which is largely accidental, good looks, like strength, depend upon general bodily fitness, i.e., upon proper food and proper exercise and rest, and Plato's treatment of these is the same in the case of good looks as in the case of physical strength. The use of a principle of balance and symmetry is advocated in the exercises which are to develop the

[1] *Rep.* 371*e*. It might seem that, because it is for money that the laborer works, that money is more valuable, more of an end-in-itself, than strength. But the superior personal value of strength is brought out in other contexts, e.g., *Rep.* 556*b* f.

[2] *Lach.* 181*e* f.; *Rep.* 403*e* f.; *Laws* 830*a* f.

Digitized by Google

body so that it will be good looking,[1] but in all other respects the bodily conditions are identical.

Why should good looks be ranked higher than physical strength? The answer is nowhere stated in so many words, but seems to be implied beyond reasonable doubt in the *Phaedrus* and *Symposium*. Good looks have a certain emotional appeal which does not attach to strength, as such. They awaken affection and love, the desire to create, in community with the beloved, objects of beauty. Symbolic of ideal beauty in a sense surpassing in the directness of its appeal the ideal symbolism of other material copies of the ideas, they stimulate and develop the innate idealism of the soul to an especial degree, with an intensity and at the same time a universality which has no equal.[2] Practically everyone reaches the level of "opinion" at which he loves beautiful objects as such, and a few are stimulated to advance still farther, and in the end apprehend the idea of beauty itself, which transforms the whole meaning and value of life. About good looks, then, there is a peculiar charm, a poetry, which kindles the idealistic fires of the soul, and thus initiates a process of development which may lead to the loftiest heights attainable by humanity. It is this which renders it of greater value than physical strength, although both have a similar physical basis in bodily fitness.

The next good on the scale is health, physical well-being as such. Like strength and good looks, this is dependent upon proper nourishment, exercise, and rest, and, where necessary, also upon medical treatment, in the form of emetics and cathartics, cautery and surgery, etc. Health and its consequences are often spoken of together as perfections of the body, and as opposed in value to mere money-making, but of the three goods —health, beauty, and strength—health is universally regarded

[1] *Phileb.* 26*b*, 64*d–e*.

[2] In virtue of the reflected power of love, this applies also to the beloved, whose charms first awakened the idealism of the lover, for enthusiasm is catching. *Phaedr.* 250*d* ff.; *Symp.* 210, 211; cf. *Rep.* 476*b* f.

Digitized by Google

as a higher kind of good, not only by the other interlocutors in the *Dialogues*, but also by Socrates and other representatives of philosophic insight.[1] What, then, are the grounds upon which physical well-being is thus regarded? In the first place, Plato seems to be influenced by the fact that strength and good looks are, in Aristotelian terminology, accidentally rather than essentially connected with physical well-being. Professional devotees of muscular development tend to sleep too long and eat too much for perfect health, and the culture of a beauty which is only skin-deep[2] is accompanied by temptations to activities and passivities which are not calculated to develop the wiry endurance of which Plato approves. Health is thus a deeper and more universal sort of thing than muscular strength and an attractive appearance. Consisting essentially of a balanced harmony of the various bodily elements, it contains a principle of self-continuance,[3] and is thus in a high degree self-sufficient, i.e., possesses a characteristic which belongs to higher rather than lower goods.

In the second place, he is very much influenced by the fact that a sound bodily constitution is of fundamental importance for the higher development of the mind. The judgments of sick men tend to be unsound, even in matters of simple sense-perception, and the physical pain which so often accompanies disease is perpetually attracting attention to bodily concerns, and thus effectively interferes with philosophical contemplation of pure being by means of pure thought. Physical well-being is of permanent value, precisely because it eliminates the occasion of such interference with the higher studies in which philosophical living largely consists.[4] On both these grounds,

[1] *Gorg.* 451*e* f., 467*c*; *Rep.* 267*d*; *Laws* 661*a*. The philosophical representatives criticize the value placed upon health by the patient and his medical adviser (*Lysis* 217 ff., *Lach.* 195*c* f.; *Phaedr.* 286*b–c*; *Rep.* 583*c–d*), but this is in relation to higher goods, not in relation to such goods as strength and good looks.

[2] *Phaedr.* 239*c–d*.

[3] *Meno* 77*a*; *Tim.* 87*c*, 88*b*,*e*; *Phileb.* 26*a*, 31*c–d*.

[4] *Rep.* 591*c–d*. The case of Theages (*Rep.* 496*b–c*) is exceptional. Cf. Steinhart, *Platons Werke*, V, 172.

Digitized by Google

then, physical well-being appears to be a more valuable possession than physical good looks or muscular development.

The goods so far considered are frequently grouped together as "goods of the body," and are somewhat sharply contrasted with the higher goods which remain to be studied, or at least to the principle of these higher goods. It is denied that the bodily goods are valuable in their own right. Money, strength, good looks, health, even life itself, may be employed in the furtherance of purposes which are vicious rather than virtuous; in which case it is pointed out that, on the principle of *corruptio optimi pessima*, the possession of such "goods" leads directly to ruin. In any average social environment, such excellences are accompanied by inherent tendencies toward misuse, and their value is thus plainly of a secondary character. As Plato puts it, such excellences are really valuable only when their possessors are men of character and intelligence, who convert them into organic portions of the philosophical life.[1] These lower goods "depend upon the soul, and the soul depends upon wisdom," so that it is only when the higher goods, symbolized by "wisdom," are present, that the lower goods become of genuine value.

Among these higher goods, the lowest in rank is courage. Physical courage consists of instinctive impulses which concentrate the bodily powers in the direction of removing or destroying by violence any aggressor, i.e., it is what is nowadays called the instinct of pugnacity.[2] Enlightened by social experience, these pugnacious tendencies assume the form of morale, and are directed mainly against the enemies of the community, in the orthodox channels of military and police service in defense of the social group and its ideals. As controlled by reflection and directed toward the support of ideals which have a value of their own, the pugnacious impulses begin to assume something of the nature of value, and are recognized as a "good."

[1] *Meno* 87 f.; *Euthyd.* 281*a–b*; *Rep.* 491 f., 495*b*, 586*d–e*.

[2] *Lach.* 196*e* f.; *Prtg.* 350; *Tim.* 70; *Laws* 963*e*.

Digitized by Google

It is, however, emphasized that they belong, not to goods of the primary kind, which are valuable per se, but rather of the secondary, instrumental kind, which receive their value from the ideals supported and maintained.[1] When yet further enlightened by reason, these same pugnacious impulses take their place in that resolution and strength of character which supports every cause recognized by reason as worthy, and keeps down whatever is regarded as unworthy, whether in the world of brute force without, or in the world of brute desire within, the organism. Courage, in this sense, represents the reorganization of all the bodily forces so that they rally, with one accord, to the support of the idea of good in the ideal life.

So far as courage is regarded at all as a good, i.e., at the two higher or enlightened levels of social and philosophical excellence, this virtue is consistently treated as a higher kind of thing than physical health, or indeed any of the bodily goods, from wealth up. The distinction seems to be almost one of kind. The higher goods generally, from courage up to wisdom, are regarded as "divine," i.e., as inherently valuable, while the lower or "human" goods are of value only to persons who already possess the higher goods.[2] On further examination, however, we can see that the distinction is, after all, only one of degree, if we remember that courage, no less than health, has a definitely physical basis. Without the pugnacious dispositions which constitute physical courage, the higher virtue simply cannot be developed,[3] and to that extent, while neither health nor pugnacity possess value in themselves, both are at least *sine quibus non* in relation to the higher development. So, too, it is only when enlightened by wisdom that physical courage, no less than physical well-being, becomes of genuine value. The distinction seems to depend mainly upon the fact that, while health, resulting from the right amount of eating, drinking, exercising, and sleeping, is a

[1] *Rep.* 412*c* ff., 429*b* f., 518*e*; *Polit.* 309*c*.

[2] *Laws* 631*b*, *d*. [3] *Ibid.* 963*e*.

Digitized by Google

sine qua non of the higher development, the activities of which it is the resultant can hardly be idealized beyond a certain point. These activities remain primitive, and cannot quite take on the higher attributes which would make them an integral portion of the life of pure reason.[1] Courage, however, although largely a corporeal affair, seems capable of further idealization. It can readily be converted into morale, and can indeed gradually be transmuted, without much remainder, into force of character, and thus undoubtedly takes on more of the spiritual nature and significance of the idea of good. Thus transmuted by wisdom, it becomes an organic portion of the higher life, and thus assists positively, and not merely (like health) negatively, i.e., as a *sine qua non*, in raising experience as a whole toward the higher, more ideal level. This seems to be the chief reason why it is ranked consistently as a higher kind of thing than physical well-being.

The next good to be considered is justice. At its lowest, this is what we nowadays call "gregariousness," the herd-instinct, a consciousness of kind, i.e., a somewhat undiscriminating sense of the value of group living, with only a slight feeling of what this involves in the way of conduct. Under the continued pressure of social living, it becomes a relatively enlightened respect for the laws and the government in its outward and visible aspects, and thus becomes associated with the virtues of courage and temperance, at this social or conventional level.[2] As enlightenment develops still further and finally reaches the level of wisdom or philosophical insight into values, justice becomes the social virtue par excellence, the virtue which realizes the highest possibilities of social living. Courage and temperance, which were still, at the conventional level, antagonistic to each other, become synthesized and transmuted in the service of the new community ideal. In fact, Plato gives as a formula for justice in this sense, "wisdom *plus*

[1] *Tim.* 71*a*; *Phileb.* 65*c*.

[2] *Prtg.* 322*c* ff., 326*c* ff.; *Crito* 50*c* ff.; *Polit.* 305*b* f.

Digitized by Google

temperance *plus* courage."[1] Each citizen is to develop all his potentialities to the utmost and to realize fully his idea, as farmer, carpenter, merchant, student, soldier, or statesman. But further, he is to contribute the results of his activities to the community, receiving in return the results of the activities of other citizens. As Plato puts it, justice is to be found somewhere in the mutual exchange of the products of these activities. And finally, having reached the level of reflective insight, the citizen is to realize that only by dedicating himself to the service of the ideal community does he develop fully his own potentialities. His function as a man thus consists in realizing on earth, in the social environment to which he owes his education and all his opportunities, the main characteristics of the ideal city which he envisages as "in heaven" and of which he now conceives himself to be a citizen. With equally reflective determination, he reproduces gradually in his own character, as far as possible, a structure and organization patterned upon the same model, so that justice in the higher sense is realized when the individual and the community, no less than the starry heavens controlled directly by God's hand, come to express the ideal principle of the maximal consistent development of potentiality, the idea of good.[2]

Thus understood, justice is inevitably ranked above courage in value. Like courage, it has a physical basis developed into social virtue largely by habituation, i.e., by the unremitting pressure of the social environment.[3] But it is of a less one-sided and more universal nature than courage; so much so that it is only as comprehended within justice that courage reaches its highest and most valuable level of development. Justice, then, is the most comprehensive of the virtues hitherto discussed. Courage, at best, becomes indeed an organic portion of the ideal life, and is the natural ally of justice. But justice is the ideal life itself, considered on its social side, i.e., it is a

[1] *Polit.* 309 ff.; *Laws* 631*c*.
[2] *Rep.* 462 ff., 590*e* ff.
[3] *Prtg.* 323*c* f.; *Rep.* 518*e* f.

Digitized by Google

far more comprehensive portion of this ideal life, if not the whole of it.

On the scale which we are considering, temperance or self-control is the next highest step. At its lowest, this is the natural disposition toward quietness and sobriety, toward minding one's own business and avoiding excitement and the rough-and-tumble side of life. It thus contains an element of timidity as well as of refinement.[1] Under the steady pressure of social living, it develops into the docility inseparable from obtaining the benefits of education, an attitude of acceptance and obedience toward duly constituted authority, whether spiritual or temporal, what has been called "followership" in relation to leadership, the ideal attitude, from a certain point of view, for the average citizen. It is thus sometimes regarded as the virtue par excellence of the civilians who devote their lives to mercantile pursuits,[2] but, on the whole, it is treated by Plato as an essential element in the character which is to attain to the highest human development. As the insight which comes from the higher education begins to control the organism, the somewhat feminine qualities which belong to temperance at the level just considered become tinged with something of the more robust and manly qualities of character, and the student seeks in himself and his own reason the authoritative source of rules for the direction of life, rather than in the stronger wills of aggressive personalities or in the organized force of civil and military institutions. Temperance thus becomes self-control. The element of docility, acceptance, and followership remains, but receives a new orientation. It is the authority of reason rather than the dominant will of man or of "the government," toward which the docility is now directed, and in the light of reason, i.e., with his eye fixed upon the ideal

[1] *Charm.* 159*b*, etc.; *Phaedo* 68*c* f.; *Rep.* 485*d–e*, etc.; *Polit.* 306*c* ff.; *Laws* 733*e* f., *Epist.* 326*d–e*.

[2] Very many exponents of Platonism take this position, but the evidence seems insufficient, and *Rep.* 442*c–d* appears definitely contradictory to this interpretation. Cf. also *Rep.* 485*e*, 487*a*.

Digitized by Google

pattern of the "good," the individual modestly but firmly begins to set his own house in order.[1] So, too, on the wider field of political action. Plato's candidate for leadership is reluctant to push forward and grasp the reins of power. He retains always this element of modest withdrawal, and has to be persuaded, if not almost forced, to take the highest administrative office in the community. He governs, when he does govern, in the spirit of service, and because he realizes, not only that the community, by training him for this responsibility, has placed him in its debt, but also that, if he declines, the power will fall into hands more avid, indeed, of high position, but less well qualified to direct the destinies of the community beneficially and wisely. At its highest, then, temperance or self-control means modest but unflinching activity in the spirit of the highest idealism, an activity based upon contemplation and issuing in action.

So much for the meaning of temperance as a virtue. It remains to ask on what grounds it is ranked above justice. At first sight we should be inclined to say that, according to the general tenor of Platonism, it ought to be ranked somewhere at the same level as courage. Courage represents the masculine, temperance the feminine side of character. Only out of their complete synthesis and interpenetration under the influence of philosophical insight does the complete development of character occur. But this complete virtue is unmistakably stated to be justice, and there can be no doubt that justice should rank as higher than either of the two one-sided elements which enter into its composition. This seems to be the lesson of the *Politicus*, and indeed of the very passage of the *Laws* in which temperance is ranked as higher in value than justice.[2] While recognizing the force of this reasoning, let us, however, look more deeply into Plato's meaning. Courage

[1] *Phaedo* 68*c* f.; *Rep.* 540*c–d*, cf. 484*c–d*, 501*b*, *Polit.* 308*e* f.

[2] *Polit.* 306 ff.; *Laws* 631*c*.

Digitized by Google

and temperance are each one-sided, contrasted elements of character. This is undoubted. But it does not follow that they should be ranked as equal in value, except, possibly, at their lowest and most instinctive level. Courage is the natural ally of reason, but temperance stands in a much closer relation to the development of wisdom, and is thus more intimately and organically a part of the philosophic life. Without docility, there can be no education, no sound feeling for values. Docility is the student's attitude par excellence, and enters inextricably into the life of contemplation and research. Whole-souled devotion to the cause of truth, joyous acceptance of the laws which reason discovers, the transformation of the whole organism into an instrument attuned to the ideal harmonies—what is this but the life of philosophy itself? In that rapturous contemplation of the eternal ideas, in which the soul knows itself, with every fiber of its being, to be the co-partner of God in the work of regenerating itself and the world, docility, self-control, and the highest wisdom are fused together into the unity which is the ideal life itself.

From the standpoint thus reached, it is not difficult to see why it is that, for Platonism, temperance ranks as higher than courage. But how about its value-relation to justice? Let us pursue the argument a little farther. Justice is, after all, the complete social virtue, the virtue of the administrator who attempts to realize, in the social environment, the idea of good by means of legislative enactments of an essentially temporal and imperfect character.[1] Law-making is always a *pis aller*, and above the administrator one always, in reading Plato, finds the life of the philosopher, the life of wisdom unimpeded by earthly clogs and fetters. The administrator is permitted to retire, at times, to this higher life, in search of inspiration and spiritual replenishment, and it is an axiom for the Platonist that good administration is possible only where

[1] *Polit.* 294*a* f., 299*e* f.; *Laws* 875*c–d*.

Digitized by Google

the administrator has this higher life, the life of contemplation and research, always open to him.[1] But this is the life of the student, in which docility and self-control constitute an important portion, while the life of administration is felt to be a definitely lower thing. For all that the *Republic* insists upon practical training for the guardians, there is something contrary to the spirit of Platonism, something forced and unnatural about this. The student leaves his studies for a number of years, to hold various magistracies and positions of military command. But how irksome this is we can see from the fact that the motive is merely to avoid the besetting sins of the seminarist, *gaucherie* and deficiency in practical address. The practical training is regarded as an enforced descent into the underground den. What the student longs for, as always in Platonism, is to withdraw to academic contemplation, and, from behind his college walls, to let the madness of the many take care of itself. It is only external and practical necessities which force the student to desert, for a season, his beloved cloister, and undertake the ungrateful task of administration. But it is in this higher life of contemplation that he seeks inspiration, and it is to this higher life that he must be allowed to withdraw at frequent intervals, if the quality of his administration is not to suffer. Justice, in fact, is a virtue which contains mechanical elements, and without repeated returnings to the plain of truth, where grows the nutriment of the highest part of the soul, the spirit of idealism flags and droops. This life of contemplation is always higher than the life of action in the phenomenal world. But temperance, at its finest, is peculiarly bound up with this life of contemplation; so much so that it appears to be part and parcel of the life of wisdom itself, whereas

[1] *Rep.* 498*c*, 520*e* f., 540*b*; cf. *Phaedr.* 248*b–c*. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff. *Platon*[2] (1920), maintains that Plato burned to take his place in the political arena at Athens, and was bitterly disappointed to find himself *nur noch Lehrer*. The evidence in the *Dialogues* seems to insist that the philosophical doctrine of Platonism can hardly be interpreted as an expression of its founder's personal desires, if the contentions of his latest biographer are to be accepted here.

Digitized by Google

justice is rather the application of the visions of that life to the mundane sphere in which visions, if not frequently renewed, grow dim.[1] There is much of the mystic in Plato, and in this ranking of temperance as higher than justice, of contemplation as higher than administration, we can see something of the spirit which we have elsewhere[2] traced in the "transcendental" theory of the soul's nature and destiny. From the human or empirical standpoint, justice should, no doubt, be ranked as higher than temperance. From the transcendental standpoint, i.e., for one who regards the soul as a plant not of earthly but of heavenly origin and destiny, temperance, as more closely associated with the life of philosophical contemplation, inevitably ranks as higher.

Finally we come to wisdom or insight, which, on the scale under consideration, is placed above temperance, justice, and courage. If we ask what, precisely, Plato understands by wisdom or insight, we find certain variations of meaning in different contexts. These variations seem to fall into two main groups. At times, wisdom is understood as equivalent to the specifically intellectual side of life, the insight which solves problems of any and every description. It proceeds by the method of analysis and synthesis, extracting from every situation under investigation the maximum of cognitive significance, i.e., the idea, and passes over, without any violent transition, into dialectic and metaphysics. Understood in this sense, intellectual excellence is not necessarily and intimately associated with moral excellence, but is admitted to exist even in characters of a definitely vicious stamp,[3] i.e., is altogether independent upon habit and social convention. It tends to be regarded by Plato as entirely independent upon material antecedents, as a "divine spark" which in origin and value transcends all empirical acquisitions, such as the virtues and

[1] *Rep.* 500*c* f.; *Phaedr.* 246*c*, 248*b* f., 250*a* f.

[2] *Philos. Rev.* XXXII, 486–90; XXXIII, 33–37.

[3] *Rep.* 409*c* f., 491*d* f., 495*a–b*, 518*d* f.; *Theaet.* 172*e* ff.

Digitized by Google

vices, and indeed lends to all such growths the significance and value which they may come to possess for us.[1] Ultimately, wisdom consists in the principle of "ideaness," the principle which organizes into cognitive unity all elements of consistent meaning-value which can be found in any given situation. While expressing itself here on earth, in and through the formation of empirical unity-complexes, it is essentially a transcendent, non-empirical principle, the teleological principle in accordance with which God constructed the cosmos. That is to say, wisdom is ultimately identified in principle with the Divine activity, to which, as creatures of heavenly origin on our rational side, we endeavor to approximate in elevating ourselves to the rational level of pure contemplation of the ideas.[2]

In other contexts, wisdom appears to have a more empirical basis and function. We have instinctive feelings of curiosity, a tendency to see, hear, and manipulate for ourselves, a natural impulse in the direction of seeking sensory experiences. But each sense-organ is a mechanical instrument for selecting and bringing to a common focus certain stimulations, visual, auditory, etc., i.e., is an instrument for carrying through a kind of rudimentary generalization. When simple sensory experience breaks down in its tendency toward generalization, e.g., by falling into illusions and contradictory experiences which refuse to come to a single focus, the generalizing impulse seeks satisfaction by rising above the level of direct sensation to the level of opinion, i.e., of complex sensory experience, the massive organization of sensory and memory images which, with the vast majority of men, does duty for cognitive experience.[3] Such empirical generalizations are more satisfactory than direct but unorganized sensory experiences, for they are

[1] *Phaedo* 69*b–c; Euthyd.* 281*b, d; Meno* 88*d; Rep.* 508*d* f.

[2] *Phaedo* 65*c* f., 66*e* f., 84*a–b; Phaedr.* 247*c* ff.; *Tim.* 90*a; Laws* 896*e* f.; cf. *Theaet.* 176 f.

[3] *Rep.* 476*b* f., 479*e*, 522*c* ff.; *Theaet.* 155*d*; cf. *Tim.* 47*a* f., 64*a* f.; *Phileb.* 38*b* ff., 54*e; Laws* 653*d*.

Digitized by Google

drawn from a wider field of observation, and are more constant, less fluctuating and contradictory, while still remaining sufficiently close to direct sensation to seem familiar truths to most men. For such men, they naturally pass for wisdom, but, for the Platonist, the true wisdom of life is to be sought somewhat more deeply. A prolonged study of something more profound than mere social experience, e.g., a study of mathematical and physical science, is necessary. This, in turn, is to be followed by logical and metaphysical reflection upon the ideal of generalization itself, the method of research followed in these scientific investigations. When the nature of idealization thus comes to be understood, the new rational insight into the idea of good, the principle of organizing into a single consistent system all elements of experience, is used for making over the whole of our human attempts at knowledge and faith. It is in this task of idealization, of reorganizing sensory and practical experience so as to bring out its utmost of meaning and value, that wisdom is finally held to consist, in co-operation with God in applying the teleological principle innate in reason to all the details of human problems. In this way alone we can assimilate human life to the Divine, and can realize here upon earth, out of human materials, the ideal city whose pattern is laid up in heaven.[1]

These two conceptions of wisdom—(1) the turning-away from everything sensory and empirical to the transcendent contemplation of the eternal ideas, and (2) the transmutation of the mechanical and empirical into the ideal and spiritual—correspond to the two theories of the soul which we have elsewhere found to exist in Plato's thought. Yet whether the world is disdained and rejected, or whether it is lovingly and patiently transformed, it is not difficult to see why wisdom, in whichever of the two senses we understand it, is ranked as higher in value than temperance and justice. For, on the one hand, wisdom is the complete life of which temperance and

[1] *Phaedo* 64 ff.; *Rep.* 591 f.

Digitized by Google

justice are mere fragments, and is thus superior to them as the whole is superior to its parts in completeness and self-sufficiency. Again, on the other hand, wisdom is the life of reason itself. But reason, i.e., rational insight, is that which really gives meaning and value to temperance and justice, i.e., raises them above the level of mere bodily dispositions to the position of organic portions of the life of idealism. Temperance and justice are thus to be regarded either as means to the end, as contributory elements toward the rational life, or as resultants of the application of wisdom to the life of study or to social life generally, i.e., as the rational life itself in certain particular applications.

So far, we have examined the detailed comparisons out of which the value-scale has grown. It remains to consider the scale as a whole, penetrating beneath the phrases incident to particular contexts and to the interests of particular dialogues, to the deeper meaning of Platonism as a whole, which has given life and meaning to the varying expressions which we find in the different contexts. The value-scale under consideration passes from the mechanical to the spiritual. On the lower rungs of the ladder are found those elements which remain largely mechanical, and, while contributing somewhat indirectly toward the higher life, cannot be taken up directly and completely into that life. Money-making, beyond the securing of the necessary minimum, is never an object of idealistic endeavor. Muscular development and beauty-culture, beyond the stage of development which renders the higher life easy and attractive, are not objects to which the philosophic spirit devotes its best energies. Physical well-being, beyond the stage at which the body, like a well-regulated machine, gives no trouble, simply does not obtrude itself upon the philosophical consciousness at all. Such things are simply taken for granted. Their absence would be a nuisance, but their presence contributes little that is positive, little that could arouse the enthusiastic pursuit of the man whose vision is fixed upon the higher

Digitized by Google

things of life. On the upper rungs of the ladder we find elements which, while remaining partly mechanical, contribute directly toward the higher life, and can be taken up into the idealistic vision as more and more completely coinciding with the activities in which that vision expresses itself. Resolution of character, justice, self-control, and devotion to the cause of truth—these obviously constitute essential elements in the life of the spirit; and the highest of all, wisdom and insight, while resting partly upon curiosity or wonder, that reaching out after novel experiences which is instinctive with humanity, clearly contains all the other spiritual excellences and fuses them together into the ideal life itself. The value of this life of insight, however, rests not only upon this harmony and organic fusion of its elements, but especially and essentially upon its objectivity, the fact that it is based upon the nature of a reality which is all positive, all harmonious, and fundamentally spiritual. For this insight expresses itself by taking up reality into human life, and thus making that life real and of genuine significance in the ideally real world.

These conclusions seem simple and reliable, as far as they go. Value consists in the development of potentiality and especially in the transmutation of the apparently mechanical into the truly spiritual which is also truly real. But when we look more closely at, e.g., the higher goods, we notice a certain difficulty. Each one of these has itself a mechanical basis, and admits of development into higher forms. Thus, courage begins in instinctive pugnacity, passes through the phase of morale, and ends in a moral courage resting upon philosophical insight. Temperance begins in an instinctive shrinking from excitement, passes through the phase of obedience to authority, and ends in a rational self-control resting upon philosophical insight. Justice begins in the herd-instinct, passes through the phase of law-observance and law-making, and ends in the perfect social relations of the ideal community envisaged by philosophical insight. Finally, wisdom itself seems to originate

Digitized by Google

in instinctive wonder or curiosity, to pass through a phase of acceptance of textbook "knowledge," and to culminate in philosophical insight into the structure and meaning of ultimate reality. The higher goods, then, originate in instinct, are developed by social pressure, and finally all pass over into philosophical insight into the idea of good. The difficulty which this causes is simple, but entirely disconcerting. If at the highest stage of their development these goods all pass over into one and the same form of experience, viz., philosophical insight into the idea of good, they are identical. But, if they are identical, they cannot possibly be compared with one another in respect of value, so as to constitute different rungs upon a ladder of values.

Let us consider this further. The underlying physical mechanisms of the virtues in question are clearly different. The physical basis of courage is not the same as the physical basis of temperance or the physical basis of gregariousness. So, too, at the level of "opinion," while it is social pressure which, in each and every case, brings about this development, military morale, which faces death upon the battlefield, differs from "minding one's own business" and from "co-operating with the government," much as war is different from peace. So, too, conventional respect for law differs from the pupil's docility, much as a law-court differs from a high school. But at the highest level, based upon insight into the principle of realizing the maximum of possible value, whatever the concrete situation, the virtues can no longer be kept apart. The enlightenment characteristic of this level concentrates all the forces of the organism, those underlying temperance and wisdom no less than those underlying courage and justice, upon the problem of realizing maximal value, and from this point of view the virtues interpenetrate and become identical. The truly enlightened soldier is not merely brave. He is the champion of justice and truth, and a pattern of temperance and self-control.[1] So, too, the enlightened dialectician, stoop-

[1] *Laws* 630*a–b*.

Digitized by Google

ing to the task of administration because of the just claims of the community to his devotion, is not only being ideally just, but is also being ideally wise, ideally resolute, and ideally self-controlled. So, finally, the student piercing through the last veil which stands between his growing insight and the principle of ideality, is an example of ideal persistency, resolution, and self-control, no less than of wisdom. From the standpoint of the higest enlightenment, then, it looks as though such a thing as a value-scale must be a commonplace affair, something, possibly, for *le bon bourgeois*, but not taken seriously by the philosopher.[1]

Before drawing such a conclusion, however, let us examine the lower goods also. Health, good looks, and strength are all physical in origin, and all depend upon proper nourishment, proper exercise, and proper sleep. The instinctive tendencies connected with seeking nourishment, exercise, and sleep may (*a*) be left to their own guidance, i.e., may be left to seek their own satisfaction in an unenlightened, brutish way—in which case they are apt to issue in disease rather than in health, and weakness rather than strength.[2] On the other hand (*b*) they may be subjected to social control, as eating, drinking, and an interest in flute-girls were controlled by social usage in the typical Greek symposium. Or finally (*c*) they may be guided by a higher kind of control, whether by the scientific knowledge of a medical expert or by the philosophical insight which characterizes a Socrates or a Plato.[3] When we look into the physical basis of these lower goods, we observe the same three levels of idealization which we have already noted in the case of the higher goods; and if we look closely at what is erected upon this basis, we note the frequent insistence upon the importance of taking wisdom or rational insight as the guide, if health, strength, and good looks are to be truly valuable. From this

[1] Cf. *ibid.* 660*e* f., cf. also *Meno* 72*c* f.; *Polit.* 310*e* f.; *Rep.* 441*e* f., 519*c*, 540*a*; *Laws* 630*a–b*, 963*a* f., 965*c* f.

[2] *Rep.* 404*e*, 586*a* f.

[3] *Symp.* 176*c–d*, 214*b*; *Rep.* 410*b–c*, 591*c*.

Digitized by Google

standpoint, then, these "goods of the body" coincide, both in respect of their physical basis and in respect of their final ideal. When idealized as completely as possible, the bodily organism becomes a single entity, a unit, just as the higher virtues fuse together and become a unit. The *corpus sanum* is, as such, both strong and beautiful, with a strength and beauty which are superior to the excessive development of muscles alone, or of facial complexion alone, as the well-rounded whole is superior to the one-sided development of a single part.[1]

What are we to say about money? This seems to be a definitely lower thing, and yet, if we pass beyond the lowest level, at which possessions appeal mainly to the acquisitive instincts, and beyond the conventional or social level of value to the highest or rational level, we see that money, when expended in an enlightened way, as a medium for translating labor into physical culture, by providing quarters, gymnasia, hygienic meals, and expert trainers, and medical advisers for the military caste, does really enter into the class, "goods of the body." While the members of this caste do not personally own and spend this money, it must be recognized that the ideal life depicted in Plato's pages does rest upon a certain minimum of this world's goods, and if, on the one hand, we must confess that the value of money is conventional and indirect, on the other hand we must also insist that, in the ideal community, it enters into, and constitutes an integral part of, the highest life itself.[2]

At the enlightened level, then, the lower goods, including money, constitute a unit, no less than the higher goods. It remains to ask whether there exists a real gap between the lower and the higher goods, or whether, once the highest level is attained, the ideal life as a whole does not constitute a unit, so that even the comparision of "lower" and "higher" goods becomes impossible. Starting with the "higher" goods,

[1] *Rep.* 420*c* f., 588*a*.

[2] *Phaedo* 78*a*; *Rep.* 421*d* f., 552*b* f.; *Laws* 737*b* f., 740*a* f., 741*b* f.; cf. *Theaet.* 167*c*–*d*.

Digitized by Google

our question is, Do those who have the higher development of character also, as an integral portion of that development, take nourishment, exercise, and rest in the most enlightened way? To this question there can be only one answer. It is very clearly stated that gluttony, drunkenness, and sexual excess constitute no portion of the ideal life, whether from the military, the administrative, or the strictly philosophical point of view,[1] and, further, it is an obvious maxim that the candidates for the higher education are to be, from first to last, superior to vulgar temptations in the case of wealth and private possessions. We must therefore conclude that the ideal life includes not merely the "higher" but also the "lower" excellences as constituent elements. This conclusion is borne out by explicit statements,[2] and it is a consistent Platonic doctrine that the highest virtue, viz., wisdom or philosophical insight, is the root of all excellence—physical, moral, and mental. The ideal life, then, viewed from above, constitutes a unit.

So, too, when viewed from below, i.e., starting with the goods of the body. It is not possible to attain the maximal development of our bodily powers without bringing philosophical insight to bear. Temperance and self-control are essential to bodily health, and, as Plato puts it roundly, bodily goods depend upon the soul, and the soul depends upon wisdom.[3] That is to say, when once the stage of enlightenment has been reached, the ideal life, whether viewed from above or from below, constitutes a single, organic entity, with an excellence which ideally includes all conceivable excellences.

This conclusion at once brings out prominently the whole difficulty of constructing a value-scale. To the Greeks generally, and to Plato himself in various contexts, it has appeared possible to construct a ladder or scale of goods, passing from those which are, in their own essential nature, more remote from the ideal standard of value, to those which more nearly

[1] *Rep.* 398*e*, 403 f.; *Laws* 674, etc. [2] *Laws* 631*b*,*d*, cf. 906*e*; cf. *Rep.* 505*a* f.

[3] *Charm.* 157*a*; *Rep.* 404; *Meno* 88*e*; cf. *Laws* 896*e* f.

Digitized by Google

coincide with that standard. But it now appears that the idealistic spirit can take up into itself, as a genuine portion of the ideal life, not merely such an instinct as curiosity or wonder, which underlies the search after truth, but also the acquisitive tendency, or such instinctive appetites as those connected with taking nourishment, exercise, and rest. For the Platonist, enlightenment or philosophical insight constitutes a kind of crucible or melting-pot in which all the "goods" of the typical Greek value-scale become fused together into a single virtue, which derives its excellence, not so much from the intrinsic nature of the elements which have been taken from the value-scale as from the idealizing principle, the idea of good, which has transmuted them one and all. To sum up our present conclusions briefly: Intrinsic value belongs to our various instinctive dispositions at no level whatever. Not at the lowest or simple instinctive level, for, without enlightenment, these dispositions are just as likely to be harmful as helpful.[1] Not at the intermediate or socialized level, for the value there is derived from the organizing principle of social pressure, and this is one and the same in all the dispositions reorganized under its influence. Not at the rational level, for the value there belongs to the idea of good, and this is a single, all-transmuting principle, one and the same in every case. It looks, then, as though, from the standpoint of Platonism, the popular notion of a value-scale would have to be entirely abandoned.

But it is not abandoned. On the contrary, the value-scale under consideration is officially adopted for legislative purposes, i.e., is accepted as a method for realizing the highest good. How is this conceivable without contradiction? The only point of view in the *Dialogues* which appears in any way capable of uniting these two diverse-appearing conclusions is the following: Our natural dispositions possess no value in their own right. But some of them admit of sublimation more easily than others, and can more easily and more fully be taken

[1] *Meno* 87*e*; *Polit.* 307*e* f.

Digitized by Google

up into the ideal life. Hunger, thirst, and sex-interest contain elements which remain obstinately primitive, hard to idealize. In fact, they endeavor to pervert reason into their slave.[1] As compared with these, the quiet, sober, and docile disposition which underlies temperance, while dangerously near to weakness of character, is obviously far easier to handle in the work of educating the organism and training it for higher purposes. So, too, pugnacity, the spirited element in human nature, is easily converted into morale and righteous indignation, the natural ally of reason in its work of reorganizing character; and, apart from curiosity, the disposition to persist in asking questions, we should hardly develop that intellectual life which furnishes the basis for the last and highest regeneration of personality. External goods, such as money and material possessions generally, are harder to take up into the higher life than such things as healthiness and sobriety, for these already, of themselves, constitute portions of our living, and tend to enter into our growing system of purposes. Bodily goods, such as strength and good looks, again, are less easily assimilated to the life of reason than is the case with the dispositions underlying temperance, courage, and justice; and these, in their turn, can be elevated to their final place in the life of enlightenment less readily than the dispositions underlying curiosity, which are less mechanical and tend of themselves to awaken and persist in stimulating our higher intellectual development. The Platonic idealism thus confirms the distinctions which constitute the popular scale of values, but alters and deepens the basis upon which the value-distinctions rest. There is nothing about the natural dispositions which makes them intrinsically valuable, as is felt in the popular value-scale. Their value for Platonism consists rather in the degree of their availability as instruments for the reception and expression of values whose source is higher, deriving ultimately from the principle of value itself, which is named the "idea of good."

UNIVERSITY OF MANITOBA

[1] *Rep.* 519*a–b*, 553*d*; *Tim.* 71*a*, *d*.

Digitized by Google

SOCIETY, AN ORIGINAL FACT

BRUCE W. BROTHERSTON

Three conceptions of society are possible. Society may be held to be an organism, a spiritual unity as a living creature is a biological unity. Or society may be conceived as a mechanism formed by the implied contracts, each with each, of all its members or by the inter-reactions of the behavior mechanisms in its members. Or again society may be neither of these. It may be too much for the latter and too little for the former. Society may be conceived as an ideal, partially realized. It is not yet an organism but it is becoming an organism.

In the last conception the individual is still the original fact. Whatever is really empirical has its locus in him. Social achievements are outgrowths of the nature of individuals and are never found complete except in some individual philosopher's creative imagination. They root in the individual. The individual becomes a strange demigod. Packed into him in all its fulness is the supreme ideal, not real, and yet real "in germ"—that divine thing, the unified society, the Absolute, to whom all nature is but a garment. It is this ideal, unrealized, yet packed into the individual—in Herder's phrase, this "what he is capable of becoming"—later working itself out to theoretic fulness under the idealist's dialectic, that was moving in Kant's imagination when he announced the maxim: "Use every man not merely as a means but also as an end in himself." And here Kant is truly the father of idealism, for, without the transcendentalist's Absolute, neither such an individual nor such a society has any sufficient support.

In view of the vicissitudes that idealism has suffered in recent times, it may not be too much to say that this conception seems to require of the modern scientific spirit too much faith.

Digitized by Google

Starting for empirical basis with the individual in his shortcoming and his relatively pitiable position among natural and social forces, to leap from him to the Absolute is too great a requirement. Either more must be found for us empirically of the spiritual society, or we will fall back upon what empirical data we have and make the most of them.

But what evidence not presented by the idealists have we that society is more than a mere mechanism? Have we any data to warrant us in assuming further that society is more than a process, that it is a whole in itself and real, that it is in some sense already complete?

The concept of society as an organism has been played with by philosophers from time to time. But even Kant or Spencer, who have been profoundly impressed with the idea, have held in the bulk of their writings, either expressly or by implication, that the individual is the original fact and that society is a construct of individuals. The "social organism" has been conceived in a manner too closely bound to that of the biological organism. The ways in which society resembles and the ways in which it differs from an organism are balanced in lists. But it is not necessary, in order that one should conceive of society as an organism, that one should carry over to sociology all the characteristics of the organism as the conception obtains in biology. If the definitive characteristic be the same in both cases, namely, that the whole shall not be merely a construct of the parts, then it is not entirely necessary that society be even called an organism. Yet, being conceived as here suggested, it may quite properly be called a spiritual organism which has evolved from the biological organism upon its psychical side; self-consciousness, when it arrived, having been primarily the conscious unity of society. It will then be seen that the spiritual organism has varied from the biological organism in this, that each part has become conscious both of the whole in which it has its life and of its own psychical differentiation from the other parts; and hence it no longer

Digitized by Google

requires morphological differentiation in order to attain differentiation of function, as do the cells in the biological organism. It may be held that precisely this differentiation presented at last an order of being fitted for full life and progress.

To test the value of this conception, a student of human nature must everywhere take society into account as an original and not a derived fact. This is, to say the least, not customary. It is almost universally assumed that human nature can be explained in terms of the individual and is individual human nature. Idealists and mechanists hold in common that all that is social is the social aspect of individual human nature. Anthropologists have assumed with biologists that society is constructed of individuals through a tooth-and-claw struggle. In behalf of this assumption they play fast and loose with the facts of primitive life. Primitive men are held to be savage and fierce because they stand near the natural state of unrelieved strife; in which case early society should be least custom bound. But when the strength of social custom among primitive men has become better known, it has been made to mean that primitive men have less of the spirit of freedom and more easily knock under to social restrictions when these appear. But the strength of social phenomena in primitive life is a fact of the first importance, and it finds adequate explanation immediately if society is not a construct but is an original fact.

Even Durkheim, who repudiates any explanation of the social or ethical situation in terms of the individual, falls into subjection to this presupposition of the original individual and the constructed society. Indeed, he presents an excellent example of the naïve force of this assumption. He has explained how the collective life with forces *sui generis* has been developed by the association of individuals, and how, while it resides in the substratum of individuals, it does not reside in it in such a manner as to be absorbed by it—while the collective life is distinct from the substratum of individuals,

Digitized by Google

it is yet dependent upon it as its source—and he adds, "for whence could it otherwise come?"[1] He also, like sociologists and philosophers in general, assumes as self-evident that the social consciousness is constructed out of individual minds by their coming together.

But it would appear that this assumption is of an unscientific nature. If it were advanced as a hypothesis, to be developed and supported as such, that would be quite legitimate. But it is not a legitimate or scientific procedure to take it thus naïvely as a logical implication of the data, immediately recognized and acknowledged by all. To make this evident I propose in the present paper to develop a few of the implications of the opposite position—society is an original fact and not a construct.

Let us first observe the relation of this position to the problem of moral evil. Doubtless the problem of evil presents the data from which it seems naturally to follow that society is of the nature of a construct. Society is in confusion. It presents itself in a most imperfectly unified form. Not only is part against part, but part is so much against part that they appear to be separate units characterized only by the possibility of becoming a larger whole. There is besides one great modern consideration which is opposed to regarding them as the parts of a unified entity. It is the presupposition of all modern science against the idea of a golden age in the past. Modern men cannot consider the position that the human race began its life in a harmonious society and afterward suffered a fall; that human nature fell from original righteousness into sin. The whole force of science and philosophy in ancient Greece as well as in the modern world denies that human nature is fallen and affirms instead that it is incomplete. Society's harmony lies in the future and not in the past. Society is not an organism. Idealists may hold quite legitimately that it is becoming one, if they choose.

[1] "Les representations individuelles et les représentations sociales," *Revue Métaphysique* (1898), p. 295.

Digitized by Google

But is it necessary for society to be fully harmonized in order to be a whole? Does the fact that society is in confusion —that it is divided against itself—imply that it is a process and in no sense a completion? Does it mean that it must be a construct partially completed and not an original fact? Could anyone maintain that individual men could ever be present and society be absent until the process of construction should begin; that society is not a living thing which, if it should die, would involve all its members absolutely in its death?

Now the strongest evidence that society is an original unity and not a construct would lie, on the one hand, in the nature of the good that unites it, and, on the other, of the evil which disturbs and divides it. Do these become effective only in the life-force of the individual, or of the summation of the individuals who constitute society? Or is there some living unity, superindividual, that multiplies the individual's evil and his good, drawing him in one aspect of its life into a living spirit of good and making him its instrument to wield powers far beyond his own? Or, in another aspect of its life, drawing him into a living spirit of evil far beyond his power to stem and rendering him the instrument of vast destruction? Moreover, if the individual is so related to the evil or to the good as to be closely knit into the whole so that each act of his is a living inseparable part of the whole; if his own good and evil is truly his own so that he must feel responsibility for the one and personal enlargement through the other, while yet both are escapelessly superimposed upon him—if this is the case, then there is a somewhat, both in society and in the individual, which cannot be explained upon the theory that they stand to each other in a relation of external construction, or that individuals are the original facts.

To confine our attention for the present to moral evil, the view that moral evil is universal—escapeless, yet every man is responsible for his deeds—is precisely the conception

Digitized by Google

held persistently by common sense both religious and secular. The apparent contradiction involved has seemed to justify philosophy in discarding it out of hand. The one or the other aspect of the common-sense view—escapelessness or genuine responsibility—has been excluded by the philosophers without compunction, and the concept has been accommodated in the most thoroughgoing way to the scientific view of development in conjunction with the philosopher's own metaphysical presuppositions. Three such accommodations are most important historically. One of these methods, by its sheer conception of the universe, excludes moral evil as non-being. Another method so prescribes the concept of moral evil as to make it connote precisely and merely what the individual could avoid. But those who take this method admit that only God can draw the line between moral and non-moral evil. Men, however, always know when moral evil is present. They are puzzled only as to how far it is to be imputed to the immediate agent. A third philosophical method is that of transmuting evil into good. Evil is evil only in the partial view of the finite mind. In the Absolute's view of the total development, it becomes a necessary part of the whole and therefore good.

In spite of the fact that such philosophical views have been held before the minds of men for centuries, philosophy has not succeeded in changing the common-sense view of moral evil, as, for instance, science has succeeded in changing common sense from a geocentric to a heliocentric view of the universe. With common sense at this point stands one of the great philosophers—Immanuel Kant. He maintains the common-sense view of moral evil, and to resolve the contradiction he resorts to an "intelligible act" performed by the individual in a timeless sphere, in which all his empirical acts are, as it were, rolled into one and viewed *sub specie aeternitatis*. It has been maintained that this lapse of Kant's is due to the influence of Christian theology mediated through the pietism of his parents. But Kant is very careful in his *Religion within the Limits*

Digitized by Google

of Mere Reason to make clear the empirical source of his view. And it seems probable that he has correctly interpreted himself when we observe that the same view, with or without attempted explanation, has been held, not only in the Christian and Hebrew tradition, but also by other great minds in widely different religious and secular circles—Greek tragedians, modern satirists, poets, and novelists, men of widely separate generations and differing races who have no metaphysical axes to grind. Their view has been simply a direct reaction upon experience.

Let us briefly illustrate this fact. Aeschylus presents moral evil as a unitary fact. He studies the "ancient blinded vengeance and the wrong that amendeth wrong." Though every wrong is justly punished, every punishment in this realm of wrong is a new wrong calling for fresh vengeance. This self-perpetuation of evil was not his own discovery. It is the central theme both of Greek tragedy and religion. The life of the year daemon is a continuous story of the unity and universality of wrong—wrong punishing wrong. But Gilbert Murray says it was a truth of which Aeschylus had an intense realization. "It had become something which he must with all his strength bring to expression before he died" (Introduction to his translation of *Aeschylus*). The plays of his trilogies are bound together by this unity of moral evil—men blindly seeking their welfare through this chain of wrong, infected as they are with old sin which reaches back to a πρώταρχος ἄτη, a first blind deed of wrong. In the midst of the whole concatenated evil the prophetess maiden, Cassandra, stands with her gift of foresight, fated, as the prophets always, not to be comprehended.

With this common-sense view of the universality of sin, Aeschylus powerfully reflects also the common-sense view of responsibility. As usual among men, it follows the lines of sympathy. The plight of the wronged is powerfully presented, the rich fulness of their humanity and the blasting pain. Moral repugnance against the doer of the wrong is strong, but neither

Digitized by Google

is this rationalized and explained; it is only faithfully presented. The doer of the wrong has also suffered wrong. Beautiful love and hope have been blasted in him too. Loveliness struggles through the evil of his wrong-shattered nature. In this great nexus of wrongs there are none that are merely wicked, but all are wrought upon by the powerful inward persuasion of the entire situation. There are no rationalized stage villains to be treated by humanity with a mere gesture of repudiation. The repudiation is there, to be sure, but every agent just by virtue of his humanity and of our sympathy therein—just by virtue of this powerful involvement in good also, which brings the inevitable sense that the evil could somehow have been avoided—every agent is held responsible. It is by a reaction to things as they are that Aeschylus presents the first great heroine criminal in Clytemnestra, and this faithfulness has constituted much of the power of literature always. It presents us, after all the philosophers have said their say, with the primary and fundamental problem of human life: How can this humanity, so beautiful, so powerful, yet be so evil? By what catastrophe? By what "first blind deed of wrong?" This question, unconsciously asked, underlies all the dramatist's power and the prophet's passion. It is related in the closest way to a question Kant asks in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, a question which Lévy-Bruhl, in his earlier days, when he claimed the critical philosophy as his starting-point, declared to be the question which both the *Critiques* were written to answer. Kant says:

> One sometimes sees men who have received the same education as others to whom it has been salutary, manifest from their childhood a wickedness so precocious and make so much progress in it in their mature age that it is said of them that they are born rascals and they are regarded as incorrigible. But nevertheless they are still judged for what they do and do not do and reproached for their crimes as for voluntary faults. And they themselves find these reproaches just, precisely as if in spite of this desperate nature which is attributed to them they were not less responsible than other men.[1]

[1] Lévy-Bruhl, *Responsibilité*, p. 16; Abbott, *Practical Reason*, p. 193 (tr.; 4th ed.).

Digitized by Google

Even to those whom they think incorrigible men cannot avoid attributing the power of good in view of which they are responsible. It is a question of a fundamental contradiction in humanity's experience of humanity which has ceased to be baffling only when it has been evaded. There has seemed to be in each man a united realm of evil against a united realm of good.

In the opening scene of the *Agamemnon*, according to the interpretation of Gilbert Murray, Clytemnestra is presented in an agony of silent prayer. The consent of Agamemnon to the sacrifice of their daughter, the kind and beautiful Iphigenia, has worked its effect upon her spirit. Her tremendous will has taken its bent. A madness possesses her which is at once the power of the total evil—the fury of the House of Atridae—and the effect of the special wrong working in this powerful spirit. When the deed is done and proclaimed with frenzied satisfaction by the murderess, herself, a certain gentleness and compunction returns to her. Through the wrangling of Aegisthus and other commonplace men she is silent, and emerges only at the end with the astonishing prayer that no blood be spilt. She is at once a murderess and a human being of loveliness and strength, and this fact gives baffling meaning to her responsibility. Humanity divided does not present the confusion merely of a disordered mechanism. It has rather become the battle-ground of two opposing fields of unified power.

To the satirists of the ancient world who lived in the tradition of Greek philosophy moral evil was not regarded with the deep seriousness in which the Greek dramatists had held it. It was merely an adventitious thing. They merely described with vivid fidelity the portion of mankind that came in their way. They had no thought of illustrating a common nature of mankind. But modern satirists took human nature for their theme. Vices, meannesses, vanities, were not single features. They had a common root. They were parts of a whole of which an individual man was merely an exempli-

Digitized by Google

fication. It was no cynical temper that led them. The magnanimity of Swift, sponsor of the oppressed, made him the idol of the Irish people. Rochefoucauld, according to his contemporaries, was of a generous spirit and the soul of probity. But they carried this high spirit, one to the court of England and the other to the court of France, in those centers of intrigue and ambition, to seek preferment. The sense of a baffling division in humanity between good and evil seems to impel Rochefoucauld to intellectual unity in a philosophy in which he finds the common root of virtue and vice in self-love. Swift, in his poem on his own death, definitely accepts this philosophy. But neither the one nor the other takes up the theory with a light heart. A certain passion in their works—even in the courtly and intellectual style of Rochefoucauld—evinces the compulsion of an inward struggle. Their philosophy is a passionate reaction to a profound experience of humanity. Rabelais gives expression to the same experience in boundless laughter, while Swift in bitterness of spirit writes it out in a tale which, "except to himself, gave mirth to the whole world."[1]

It was equally impossible for Byron to react to the evil around him and within him as to an adventitious thing, a mere lack of development. "'Tis not in the harmony of things," he says, "this hard decree, this ineradicable taint of sin."[2] Shelley, like Euripides, cries out upon the gods. "Who made terror, madness, crime, remorse, ... and self-contempt, bitterer to drink than blood."[3] "Remorse" and "self-contempt" signify a sense of responsibility inbred for what is nevertheless an infliction of the universe. Evil is no adventitious thing. It is a universal power.

In our own day we find Thomas Hardy in the same position. He portrays in *Tess of the D'Urbervilles* "a pure woman faithfully presented," in an anguished sense of guilt. As her

[1] J. B. Morley, *Lectures and Other Theological Papers.*

[2] *Childe Harold*, Canto IV, Sec. 261.

[3] *Prometheus Bound*, Act. II, Sec. 4.

Digitized by Google

watching lover and sister see the black flag flown from the prison tower, the signal of her execution, the story ends with the words: "The President of the Immortals had ended his sport with Tess." As Euripides in the ancient world, so Shelley and Hardy in the modern, experience the mixed good and evil of the human conscience—frenzy and inspiration intermingling, virtue and vice impelled from common motives. They see the escapeless evil of man's life, with mutually inflicted pain, bring anguish of soul in inner division and sense of guilt. Yet, in the equally profound charm and loveliness of humanity, they feel a poet's yearning for its wondrous possibility, and in despair of philosophy, baffled and seeking an explanation, they lay the burden of guilt passionately upon the gods.

Those who believe that Kant was influenced in his view of moral evil by a false position in the Christian tradition have surely overlooked this fact. Against the smoothly metaphysical accommodation of the concept, so confidently made, there comes this passionate, age-long reaction in the finest minds to the facts as humanity meets them, a reaction in which moral evil is held to be a universal power interpreted most often as a bias to evil in human nature for which nevertheless men are held responsible.

What, then, is this bias to evil in human nature that lies at the basis of the universality of moral evil? If human nature is the nature of the individual, since responsibility is a fact, the bias therein must be explained as having its origin in a temporal fall, as with the Jahvist in Genesis, and having then been transmitted as original sin. Or it may be explained as having its origin in a non-temporal choice, as Kant taught, or in a prenatal fall as with Origen. But these positions may be dismissed out of hand as thoroughly unsatisfactory.

There remains our hypothesis that society and not the individual is the original fact, that human nature is the nature of human society, and that the bias to evil in human nature is a disordered condition in society in which the individual

Digitized by Google

in his inner being is implicated—which coerces him and prevents moral ability in him. For the theory of an original society which, when good, is a living unity of good in which all its members are unified, and, when evil, is a living unity of evil in whose complicity every member shares and has his evil multiplied many-fold, resolves the apparent contradiction in the common-sense view. And it appears convincing that society, though out of harmony and having moral evil present, may yet be a whole with parts organically interrelated.

But the question immediately arises: Could it have been such in its origin? Since the concept of moral evil logically contains that of responsibility, is not the implication unavoidable that society was once in a harmonious condition providing moral ability? It would no doubt be quite possible to accommodate the concept of moral evil in a new way, if philosophy so wished. Society can be conceived as evolving as an original fact with its parts organically related and yet lacking harmony, like a child diseased at birth. Thus, moral evil would be a predetermined and unavoidable thing though with its vital, organic, superindividual force; and responsibility, with its bitter painfulness explained, would yet be a merely seeming thing, as philosophy has always had somehow to present it.

But we find such a solution still very unsatisfactory. Humanity will always maintain, in spite of all explanations, that responsibility is a fact and not merely an appearance. Yet, are not the findings of science once and for all opposed to the conception that there once in the past was an age of social concord and that there was a fall therefrom into strife? But there certainly is no difficulty in the conception of harmony among the parts of an organism with a possible disturbance of that harmony and consequent disaster; neither do the facts so far gathered which bear upon earliest humanity preclude the conception of a primitive social unity, with the fierceness of individual instinct turned to no extent against fellow-men, but wholly against the enemies of man. It may be shown

Digitized by Google

that the facts rather support such a view. Under our hypothesis, then, we must say that humanity first made its appearance in the world as a social group. In each of its individual members was a social conscience, wholly dominant. Indeed, in the truly primitive stage no individual was conscious of himself as an individual. Moreover, it was by no means a foregone conclusion that society should fall into division. It was rather quite the order to be expected that, in the development of this infant social organism, it should have kept through all its growing intricacy a complete harmony among its parts by holding the growing individual consciousness always under the power of a growing social conscience and of a concomitant growing social organization—that is, that it should have held its parts in normal relationship within the whole organism.

Then there must be conceived that of which there seems to be a race-memory in many peoples—among the Greeks, in what Aeschylus called "the first blind deed of wrong"; among the Hebrews, in the story of the fall. It must be conceived that as individual consciousness was coming to development, a time of crisis arrived, in which the normal social conscience, with its superindividual power, hitherto unquestioned, was not only questioned but was broken by some leader of a group under passionate individual impulse.

Society was then no longer normal, no longer in harmony, but there were divisions and strife within it. The social conscience was no longer single but divided. Its superindividual force henceforth bore upon the individual sometimes for good and sometimes for evil. Nevertheless, original human nature maintains something of its power in the individual. His instincts have a powerful bent toward their original and normal form. Men have an unavoidable sense of the norm of ethics as an inner directive force. But this directive force is opposed by the divided social conscience pressing out of the confused society upon their lives and making for itself abettors of the subordinate instincts which it keeps from their proper

Digitized by Google

subordination to the inclusive social instinct. There are different levels of the divided social conscience. Upon the same person there may press, upon the one hand, a social conscience lofty in its intent of social harmony and of the removal of friction, a conscience nearly normal, and, upon the other hand, an abnormal social conscience bitter in vengeance and hatred, pressing within him as a bias which men persist in calling moral evil with responsibility attached, while yet they know that the individual can avoid his wrongdoing only in relatively small part. A first implication, therefore, of our hypothesis is a solution of the theoretic problem of moral evil.

With this hypothesis are gained all those advantages in the solution of ethical problems which the transcendental idealists obtained through relating the individual to the community mind and will. But now the community mind and will does not rest for its validity upon the Absolute, which is after all a figment of the reason, but it now becomes a social conscience found to be an empirical fact. In the normal social conscience now empirically established, the Absolute is given a local habitation. We have here the sources of the ethics of Jeremiah and of Euripides, of the ethics of Jesus; and at lower levels of the social conscience we find the source of the different standards worked out each under a different *Zeitgeist*—we have the ethics of the law and the gospel—standards of morals, and the spirit of Hegel's ethical world.

That question also, bandied about among different ethical systems regarding the locus of ethical value, whether it resides in the initial motive or in the act or in the consequences of the act, finds here its answer. It becomes now a question only for the partial ethics of the *Zeitgeist*, where a temporizing society reflects itself in the conscience of the individual. In the normal social conscience, the initial impulse is one for the removal of friction, the bringing of ultimate peace among men, and the consequence of its acts is objective social harmony,

Digitized by Google

and hence the initial impulse and the act and the consequence are synthesized. The social conscience itself is the bearer of ethical value. A whole system of ethical value-essences is to be found in it.

When we come to the problem of the origin of religion, we find under our hypothesis already present in primitive men a superindividual force that would constitute all the power and sanctity of his religion, a force that would quite naturally be extended to the universe and be focused either upon great men or great natural events or upon minor objects which chance might signalize. Upon our hypothesis one would expect to find what actually is found—the conception of a vague religious power among different races, known variously as *mana*, *orenda*, *manitu*, etc. Hence, too, an immediate explanation is presented for that very difficult fact—the presence of "high gods among low peoples." Such upon our hypothesis would be the first to appear.

Space permits merely a suggestion of the bearing of our theory upon two other questions in the field of religion. The James-Myers theory explained religious conversion by means of subconscious fields whose elements are "deposited by the experience of life,"[1] and which, after these elements are somehow worked into a unity, usurp the place of explicitly conscious fields. The theory falls into vagueness as to the directive or formative force under which these withdrawn elements thus organize themselves into clear synthesis. Taken into the mind in an unorganized condition, as is obvious, they are themselves "motives" that "mature," or they are "elaborated in subliminal regions of the mind."[2] Howley says[3] that the subconscious here must be conceived either as a brewer's vat in which the elements ferment themselves into a new product, or as a workshop in which they are worked up

[1] James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 230.

[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 235.

[3] *Psychology of Religion*, p. 73.

Digitized by Google

by a subliminal self or some transcendent agency. What is lacking is precisely a directive or formative impulse in the instinctive equipment of human nature, under which the elements "deposited by experience" are thus synthesized and elaborated.

Moreover, without such an impulse the central phenomenon of religious conversion, namely, a profound and long-continued dissatisfaction with the whole circle of experience, cannot be explained. Tolstoy's account of his own experience, for a single instance, makes this most explicit. "Whilst my intellect was working, something else was working too. . . . . I can call this by no other name than a thirst for God. This craving for God has *nothing to do with the movement of my ideas.*"[1]

Here, then, for a most significant phenomenon of human life there is no sufficient explanation in a psychological theory which presents experience as directed and formed, upon the basis of some undefined psychical energy, by mechanical systems of ideas, on the one hand, or of reaction patterns, on the other. There is required rather a psychology such as our hypothesis presents, positing in the original equipment of human nature a normal social conscience, maturing slowly perhaps and holding the expectancy of a certain order of experience which it will itself direct, and leaving its bearer therefore subject to shock and disappointment when he is cast into a different experience.

Finally, I can but briefly suggest the bearing of our theory upon the question of objective knowledge in religion. The noblest religious experience is here explained as the ordering of the elements of experience upon a normal social conscience, which lies in the instinctive equipment of human nature. A fulfilled religious experience issues in a certainty of objective reality which psychologists call the "faith-state."[2] James undoubtedly goes too far in claiming immediate awareness

[1] Quoted in James, *op. cit.*, p. 256.

[2] Leuba, "Studies in the Psychology of Religious Phenomena," *American Journal of Psychology*, VII (1896), 344; James, *op. cit.*, pp. 72, 298.

Digitized by Google

of objective reality for these experiences in their own right—"face to face presentation of what seems immediately to exist" so that "the mystic is, in short, invulnerable."[1]

However, if the weightiest intellectual considerations were to concur with this faith-state, the matter would be otherwise. If this faith-state had discovered its own all-inclusive conditions, and, by analysis of those conditions, had found the weightiest objective support for itself, then it would be justified. Now, in this complete fulfilment of the normal social conscience, the individual has found himself a part of an empirical reality reaching out beyond himself and including the human race. The limits of his own personality and of his own period of life are transcended. He has a social sense as immediate as his external senses. His social conscience is the sense of society transcending the individual with age-long and world-wide causes.

Yet, because he has this empirical knowledge of a reality that is not subject to the death of the individual—not subject to his limits in time and place—is he, therefore, justified in going all the way and affirming a universe that will fulfil the whole passion of this social conscience? It might be argued that in this position the faith-state is fully justified; that upon this footing the cosmological argument gains a new validity. A universe which has produced human society as an original fact which, though its unity is broken, has within itself power to remake itself, may reasonably be trusted to fulfil the purpose of the social conscience it has itself produced. It might be argued that the faith-state is a natural position attained by the normal social conscience.

ST. LAWRENCE UNIVERSITY

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 423.

Digitized by Google

CODES OF ETHICS FOR BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL ORGANIZATION

W. BROOKE GRAVES

What is the extent and importance of the movement for codes of business ethics? How, and by whom, have such codes been framed and adopted? What provisions ought an ideal code to contain? To what extent do the codes now in existence measure up to this ideal? What qualities make one code valuable and another code of negligible importance?

In May, 1922, the Annals of the American Academy of Social and Political Science published a volume devoted to *The Ethics of the Professions and of Business*. It dealt fully with the answers to these questions, in so far as they relate to the well-established professions and to some of the newer ones, but a surprisingly small amount of space was devoted to the codes of the various trade and commercial organizations, no less than fifty of which have, in convention assembled, taken official action on this subject. It was a realization of the widespread interest of such organizations in ethical matters which led to the collection of the facts upon which this article is based.

The variety of organizations interested in this problem may be illustrated by mentioning such codes as those of the International Secret Service Association, the National Association of Advertising Specialty Manufacturers, the American Association of Title Men, the National Jewelers' Association, the National Funeral Directors' Association, and numerous others. Why are these men, engaged in so many diverging lines of human interest and activity, willing to devote their time to considerations such as these?

A prominent Philadelphia clergyman of a generation ago, in a still well-known downtown church, preached one Sunday

Digitized by Google

on the subject "Business is Business." In speaking to a congregation largely composed of the Christian business men of that day, this preacher found it necessary to assume a defensive attitude in attacking that time-honored untruth—not that he was of a cowardly or truckling disposition, but that the sentiment of his hearers was so overwhelmingly against him as to compel that method of approach.

Since that day there has been an almost complete reversal of attitude on the part of the better men—the leaders—in practically all lines of business endeavor. I, for one, choose to believe that this change of methods represents something of a change of heart on the part of business men generally. However that may be, whenever one talks with business men, or hears them talking among themselves on matters of "sharp practice," the consensus of opinion seems to be that "it does not pay." Why not? you ask, and the business man, without having analyzed the situation, simply tells you that experience proves that it does not. But there is a significant reason. With the old, slow methods, or the imperfectly developed newer methods of transportation and communication, trade was still conducted to a considerable extent by methods of barter. Only after a long struggle was John Wanamaker able to establish a business on a policy of fair dealing and of strictly one price to all. The business man "bled" his victim when the opportunity presented itself, with an almost positive assurance that he would never see this particular victim again. The general object was to conduct transactions with as large a number of people as possible, but business men found eventually that this was an expensive method—that it truly "did not pay." They began to realize that by putting quality into their goods and service into their dealing, they could have repeated transactions with the same customers. The ideal was now to build up a steady demand for a constantly high-grade product, as, for instance, that which is known to be 99-44/100 per cent pure.

Digitized by Google

Repeatedly satisfactory transactions built up confidence; rapid transportation made possible the mail order. The development of the telephone and telegraph as instruments of business made these types of communication common. The written contract of the earlier day had been necessary because men lacked confidence in each other, but with the increased use of these new devices, the written contract was either impossible or very impracticable. It became necessary that an agreement made by telegraph or by word of mouth should be just as binding an obligation as a written contract. The code of ethics is a means toward the accomplishment of this end, to which nearly every business man is willing to devote a portion of his time and attention. Codes of ethics help to maintain the faith of man in man by raising and helping to maintain the common requirements of honor and fair dealing.

The development of codes has not taken place uniformly in all parts of the country. Certain sections of the United States seem to be in advance of others as centers for the thought and discussion of these problems, notably Des Moines, Iowa, and Birmingham, Alabama. Organizations in Canada have made advances far beyond our own. But whatever the center from which it starts, interest spreads rapidly. An officer of the New York State Bankers' Association heard an address given by Mr. Guy Gundaker, former director of the work on codes of ethics done by the Rotary International, and the recently elected president of that body. This officer became so interested in the subject that he not only framed a code for his own organization, but, in a comparatively short time, succeeded in interesting sixteen other state bankers' associations. There are at the present time no less than twenty-five national organizations working upon new codes or upon revisions of their old ones. Like every other thing worth while that is done in the world, someone has had to be interested enough in codes of ethics to work for their adoption. The Associated

Digitized by Google

Advertising Clubs of the World were the first to do this on a large scale. The long list of codes adopted by organizations representing the type of work in which they were chiefly interested testify to the success of their efforts—the Direct Advertising Association, the Poster Advertising Association, the Graphic Arts Association, the Photographers' Association of America, the Associated Retail Advertisers, and the National Association of Advertising Specialty Manufacturers, among others.

The work of promotion is now carried on largely by the Rotary International. The campaign was begun by a letter sent to each of the eighty thousand Rotary members, pointing out the value of a code as a guide to conduct, a reminder of principles, and as an influence tending toward the uplift of business standards generally. Thus men who tried and intended to be honest were induced to stop and consider, and possibly to attempt to formulate and reduce to writing some of the things which were essential to fair dealing, and which constituted "standards of correct practice" in their particular phase of business. In many organizations a committee was appointed to fit these into the draft of a code, which was later adopted by the convention.

Many of the first attempts to formulate a new code for a new purpose were exceedingly crude, because there were no good models which could be used as a basis. Meaningless statements of "100 per cent square deal to wholesalers, to the public, and to our competitors," "be square," "100 per cent fair dealing," and the like, often resulted; and, while these have often served as stepping-stones to real codes, they are not themselves codes of ethics. A code of ethics should be a statement of principles to guide conduct in a particular business, defining the terms and explaining the trade practices peculiar to that business—not a mass of glittering generalities, platitudes, and variations of the Golden Rule which might mean all things to all men, and which might apply to any business

Digitized by Google

under any conditions. May I illustrate by a selection from the worst examples of code writing that have come to my attention:

Code of Ethics and Principles that govern membership in the . . . . National Association.

1. I reaffirm my allegiance to my country and its constitution, and I believe in its everlasting endurance through law and order.

2. I believe in the . . . . industry, its future, and its obligations to the American home.

3. I believe that these three have their distinct rights in our industry: The Public, the Employee, and the Employers, and that the rights of each must be protected by the other two.

The remaining sections of this code outline in a similar manner the duties of each of these to each other, and to the public. The following standards of practice, adopted by the advertising group and approved by the Executive Committee of the National . . . . Association, were looked upon by the Association as a great force that would revolutionize their business. They ordered ten thousand copies to be printed for free distribution, but the code is one of the poorest that has been adopted. Its trite vaporizings on the subject of economics mean absolutely nothing.

The retail store recognizes its obligation to establish, maintain, and promote through its publicity these standards of practice as governing its distribution of goods:

1. The *duty to serve* goes hand in hand with the privilege of profit.

2. *Efficient service* requires the substitution of the modern scientific point of view and methods of management for traditional "hit or miss" ways.

3. *Organized service* involves the selection, training, management, and compensation of employees in the spirit of co-operative leadership and the development and inspiration of each and every individual.

4. *Economic service* necessitates economy in expense and speed in turnover with consequent study, analysis, and planning of both demand and supply—existing and potential.

5. *Honest service* puts equality, style, value, and satisfaction in goods before price, with truth in advertising goods and service a necessary corollary.

Digitized by Google

6. *Continued service* can only be with due and proper consideration for all interests—for owner, fair profits; for employee, continuous, healthful, well-paid employment; for producer, steady remunerative outlet; for consumer, enduring satisfaction; for community, fullest possible equitable distribution of the products of industry.

The secretary of the National . . . . Association of the United States wrote to me as follows:

We adopted a code in 1902. Probably a great many of our members do not know that we adopted such a code, but I think I am safe in making this statement: that generally speaking the code is conscientiously observed by a majority of our members. I believe that it has been a great benefit to the industry.

The following are provisions from the code to which he refers, but the italics are my own:

Believing that all men are inclined to do full justice to their fellows, *as they understand justice*, we may *assume that most abuses are simply errors of judgment on the part of those concerned.*

The method of the code reminds one of the questionnaires sent out by the Union League Clubs to the negro voters of the South during the Reconstruction period after the Civil War. For instance:

QUESTION: How do you view the frequent practice of delaying the payment of accounts for amounts due?

ANSWER: There is nothing that causes more vexation to the creditor than this method of securing extension. It is done without his consent and without exception we condemn it absolutely as unjustifiable in any case. Common courtesy demands this course.

And this:

QUESTION: Does a buyer evince good judgment in permitting himself to feel angry toward a house for some mistake or misunderstanding without first submitting the question to the house direct for explanation or adjustment?

ANSWER: He does not. etc., etc.

What characteristics distinguish these codes from the better ones? What qualities do they lack which are essential to a

Digitized by Google

good code? One answer to these questions is to be found in the model code, worked out scientifically by the Rotary International, to cover every possible relationship of the business or professional man with the community in which he lives. They found that these relationships could be grouped under nine general headings, and a preamble:

Preamble

1. The relation of the employer and employee.
2. The relation of the craftsman with those from whom he makes purchases.
3. The relation of the craftsman with his fellow-craftsmen.
4. The relation of the craftsman with professional men whose professions are interlocked with the craft (doctors with druggists, etc.).
5. The relation of the craftsman with the public generally, including the government.
6. The relation of the craftsman with the purchasing public.
7. The making and executing of contracts, with special reference to specifications.
8. Wrong practices—commercial graft, and:
9. A concluding section requiring observance of the code for continued membership in the association.

The best example of a code framed on this skeleton, and, incidentally, the best code now in existence, is that of the National Restaurant Association; it is, however, unquestionably too long. To use the words of its author, it has about one hundred and twenty-five verses. For purposes of subsequent comment, may I quote verses 1, 2, and 3, Article II, Section 1, of this code:

1. Employers and employees should realize and manifest a reciprocal partnership and teamwork relationship.
2. The employer shall give his employees cordial good fellowship. He shall be sympathetic with them in trouble and give them financial assistance if necessary.
3. The employer shall study and analyze all matters affecting his employees, so that, through the information and exact knowledge so gained, he may deal equitably and impartially in making and keeping them efficient, well, happy, contented, and satisfied.

Digitized by Google

These paragraphs have been critized by some on the ground that they are too general in their nature, to which certain leaders in the restaurant business reply that, while these provisions are general, they are as definite an expression of policy as can be made for their business, at this time. Codes of ethics, like other things of human origin, grow and develop. They are written and adopted in the hope of securing the approval of all reputable members of a particular business, but these members have ethical standards ranging from the highest to the lowest, at which it is possible to classify them as reputable concerns. The code must set forth a standard sufficiently moderate and reasonable to appeal even to those whose standards have previously been less commendable—unless the organization is a sort of hierarchy which chooses to ignore "the little fellow." By changes, additions, and revisions, the standard set by the code can be gradually raised, as the standards of that business are raised through the efforts of the leaders, and through the effect of earlier code provisions. One must not hope to accomplish everything at once; if one is sincerely anxious to make progress, he must be willing to take whatever he can get that represents a forward step, and keep working for further advances.

Should a code of ethics be addressed directly to the public, or should it be written so as to appeal primarily to the group for which it is intended as a guide? There seems to be a feeling among code writers that there are certain considerations about their own business that do not need to be blazoned forth to the public. That is to say, that certain expressions in a code which may seem general to the layman, represent something very definite and concrete to one engaged in, and wholly familiar with, the conditions existing in that particular business. To those who may protest that if there is nothing objectionable, there is no reason for secrecy, I can only reply that as yet, at least, the majority of business men have not viewed the matter in that light. Every individual has secrets regarding

Digitized by Google

personal affairs, and there would seem to be little sound argument against a business, which is simply a collection of individuals, withholding the details and particulars of similar private affairs.

England and other countries had generally shown very little interest in the subject of codes, but with the publication of this model restaurant code, the National Restaurant Association received over two hundred requests for copies of the code from England alone. And there were many laudatory comments from the British press and from the heads of large organizations interested in trade matters. May I quote some paragraphs from Section 3 of Article II of this code, to illustrate the more specific type of rules of conduct which the code contains, and the high ideals which the Association hopes to make the general practice in their business. There are thirteen provisions in this section; they reveal very plainly that the demands made upon even those men with high standards of business morality are not inconsiderable.

SECTION 3.—Rules of conduct governing the craftsman's relation with his fellow-craftsman.

The rules of conduct under this section have as their object the promotion of fair and equitable competition in the restaurant business.

1. The Restaurateur shall establish and maintain intimate, cordial, and friendly relations with other Restaurateurs.

2. The Restaurateur shall practice clean and honorable competition and shall further the general welfare and prosperity of every other Restaurateur.

3. The Restaurateur shall lead or support others in the craft to higher ideals of business morality, and co-operate with fellow-restaurateurs for the benefit of each and all.

4. The Restaurateur should invite inspection of his plant, reference to his cost data, systems, and methods of operation by his fellow-restaurateurs, so that the entire craft may increase in efficiency, through the interchange of information and methods.

Statements such as these are sufficiently definite to be intelligible even to the person not acquainted with the details of the restaurant business. With this model code in mind,

Digitized by Google

it may be well to comment briefly upon some of the less highly developed codes. For instance, the National Funeral Directors' Association have a code adopted in 1912, and revised in 1919, which seems to cover quite well the needs of this profession. The reason for such a clause as that found in Section 12 is however, not quite clear:

> There is perhaps no profession, after that of the sacred ministry, in which a high standard of morality is more imperative than that of a funeral director. His high moral principles are his greatest safeguard.

High moral principles are a great asset and of the highest importance to any business or professional man, but why any particular profession should feel that it has a monopoly on the necessity for the practice of such principles is not evident. Why is a high standard of morality more imperative for a funeral director than for a physician, a lawyer, a nurse, or a stenographer? The danger of loose, ill-considered, and extravagant statements is nowhere greater than in a code of ethics, for if such a code serves its purpose, it is a kind of Golden Rule, *expanded, and concretely and definitely applied to the particular conditions of a particular business.*

The one thing which these codes need is definite applicability to the conditions of the business for which they are framed. For instance, the American Bakers' Association has a series of nine obligations accompanying the privilege of membership; one of which is that "I will use no materials or ingredients in the manufacture of bread and other bakers' products other than those of known purity and wholesomeness. I will at all times adhere rigidly to the truth in all my advertising." A provision like this is, as it should be, general enough to be applicable to all engaged in the business, and yet definite enough so that no one who understands the English language can fail to comprehend its meaning.

The code of the National Association of Real Estate Boards is an early one, showing promise of future development. Adopted a number of years before the framing of the Rotary

Digitized by Google

skeleton code, it has five divisions, as follows: (1) Duties of the broker to his fellow-brokers; (2) the agent to his client; (3) the agent to the customer; (4) suggestions to owners and investors; (5) the duties of real estate brokers to organizations. The wording of some of the clauses is sufficiently specific—they should prove helpful to those engaged in the real estate business. Similarly, the first attempt of the National Association of Building Owners and Managers at code framing, was made in 1921. This deals with only two phases of business men's relations—those with the public and those with his fellow-members. The code of an organization whose members are engaged in a relatively new type of secretarial work, published in the form of a wall card, has four divisions, and emphasizes the obligations of the secretary to himself, to his organization, to the public, and to his fellow-secretaries. In this instance, the code was framed as a means of self-protection; to use the words of the secretary of the association:

> This profession, like all of the newer ones, needed something in the way of standardization and housecleaning carried on from the inside. Our ranks were filled with incompetents and with many of the type of folks that drift into something for a year and drift out quite as readily as they entered. Following the formation of the Association, a code was adopted and finally we have established a national school under the joint auspices of our own Association, the United States Chamber of Commerce, and . . . . University.

The code is a very crude one, but it is a step in the right direction. These instances are mentioned in order to stress the inadequacy of the earlier codes in any association, and the necessity for prolonged effort and development.

The best illustration of a very desirable type of regulation, fundamentally ethical and yet not always expressing itself in a full code of ethics, is the standard rules and definitions of trade terms for the fruit and vegetable industry, approved and recommended by the executive officers of the following associations: the National League of Commission Merchants

Digitized by Google

of the United States, the International Apple Shippers' Association, the Western Fruit Jobbers' Association of America, and the American Fruit and Vegetable Shippers' Association. These rules are embodied in a pamphlet containing twenty-eight definitions of terms which are used in this particular business, and of explanations of practices common to this business. The following illustrate the type of definition included: Today's shipment; tomorrow's shipment; immediate shipment; quick shipment; prompt shipment; shipment first or early part of week; shipment by middle of week; shipment as soon as possible or as soon as cars can be secured; future sales or purchase; F.O.B. sales or quotations; delivered sales or quotations; in transit or rolling-car sales; tramp-car sales; track sales, etc.

Mr. Guy Gundaker firmly believes that definitions of this type ought to be framed, and that they eventually will be framed to meet the needs of each association. They should be included as a part of a code of ethics. Some associations, however, have carried this idea to such an extreme as to completely omit the code of ethics, and to frame what they choose to call a practice code. An excellent example of this type is the code of the International Cut-Stone Contractors and Quarrymen's Association, Inc., adopted in 1919. The headings will indicate the general character of the contents:

Providing for the submission of estimates and the fulfilling of contracts for cut-stone work in the United States and Canada.

1. Uniform contracts.
2. Naming a date on which bids on cut-stone work are to be opened.
3. Bids are to be confidential.
4. Soliciting bids and awarding of contract.
5. Awarding contract to an original bidder and upon an original bid.
6. Awarding a contract and soliciting bids upon work which a general contractor has secured without soliciting bids on stone work before obtaining the contract.
7. Solicitation of bids by architects or owners and the awarding of contracts.

Digitized by Google

In like manner, the National Metal Trades Association has no code of ethics, but has adopted a declaration of principles covering an entirely different field from that of the cut-stone men. This aims to govern relations with employees, and deals with general employment conditions, strikes and lockouts, apprentice methods and wages, freedom of employment, disagreements, equitable wages, and other related subjects. The American Electric Railway Association in 1914 adopted a code of principles, the purpose of which is to state the attitude of the owners toward certain important problems of public interest, for the information of the public concerned—for example:

Short term franchises are detrimental to civic welfare.

In order to render good service, electric railways must be allowed to earn a fair return on fair capitalization.

The relation of adequate wages to efficient operation should always be recognized.

Full and frank publicity should be the policy of all transportation companies.

In the interest of the public and good service, local transportation should be a monopoly.

There are a few organizations that establish two sets of rules, a code of ethics and a set of standards of correct practice. This is simply a matter of taste, for surely no association would take the unfortunate position before the public of publishing and indorsing as a correct business practice some business method that was by nature unethical. An example of an association using these two sets of rules is the National School Supply Association. There are ten commandments in each group. The first paragraph in the Code of Ethics pledges the members to "Recognize in the American schoolchild the seed corn of the nation, and to keep the welfare of the child first and foremost in the conduct of our business." Such sentimental twaddle as this is offset, however, by the promise to carry stocks of merchandise sufficient to give prompt and

Digitized by Google

satisfactory service, so that at no time in the year shall a pupil be hampered in educational progress through lack of material or equipment; to accept the principle that the school buyer is guided by the same motives as the seller; and urging that all disputes be submitted to the Appeals and Grievances Committee of this Association, to the final satisfaction of the customer. Their code of business practices is a much better piece of work—for instance: "I will not sell goods at or below cost, as leaders, coupled with statements misleading the public into a belief that they were sold at a profit by reason of the seller's superior facilities," and "The members of this Association are responsible for the merchandising method, for all acts or activities on the part of their salesmen in the field." Provisions such as these mean something, and, if accepted as an obligation and carried out in good faith by the members of the Association, they cannot fail to exert a most salutary influence upon the standards of practice of the business concerned.

A code such as that of the National Commercial Fixture Manufacturers' Association contains very little of interest to the student of code writing. As is the case with numerous other so-called codes, there seems to have been no guiding plan in its formulation. The National Hardware Association has a code of eight provisions which might well be useful, but, as will be evident immediately, such a small number of provisions cannot adequately cover all of the relationships of such a business. Another code only partially complete is that of the National Monument Dealers' Association of America, Inc. This code has fifteen provisions covering some particular problems of the business, but, as a whole, it is inadequate and lacking in orderly arrangement.

In order to uphold certain definite standards without resorting to codes of ethics or of practice, certain associations have seen fit to adopt constitutional provisions looking toward this end. Thus the constitution of the American Booksellers' Association provides in Article 7: "Regional, state or local

Digitized by Google

associations of booksellers will on application be recognized as divisions of the American Booksellers' Association, *provided* that their constitutions and plans for membership are approved by the Executive Committee. . . . . " The man who acts as chairman of the Board of Trade of this Association, associated with Brentano's in New York, drew up a code of ethics in 1918, but it was never adopted. They did adopt a standard of trade practice, which answers important questions arising in the book trade. This was done because the members realized that the inflexible method of regulating such matters by means of the constitutional provision empowering the Executive Committee to pass on the action of the local chapter could not adequately cope with the ethical problems arising under modern business conditions.

Should college students be sold at trade rates and other students at a discount?

Should college students act as agents for the publishers in selling books to students?

Should college bookstores and co-operative stores sell books to students at a discount? (The vote was unanimous that these practices were to be discontinued, on the the ground that they were demoralizing and unfair.)

Should a discount be given to public libraries?

Should Sunday-school libraries be given a discount?

Should publishers sell directly to the libraries?

Should jobbers sell libraries on an equitable commission arrangement with the bookseller?

Should booksellers charge postage?

Should publishers advertise "postage extra"?

The code of the United Typothetae of America, which is one of the very oldest of our codes, is an extremely interesting one. Its history is given in a letter from the secretary of the Typothetae:

> Although brought together in 1887 by a labor issue, the threat of the change to a nine-hour day, the members of the United Typothetae at once discovered the value of co-operative action upon other problems

Digitized by Google

as well as those connected with labor. Owing to the fact that the commercial printing industry is an industry of small units, 77 per cent of the shops having five or less employees, and owing to the nature of the industry, the problem of competition through price cutting has always been a serious one. It came up for discussion at these early meetings, and, at the fourth annual convention in 1890, a committee was appointed to report to the next convention on the evil which results from competitive bidding, and to prepare such a code of ethics as may in their judgment tend to elevate the dignity of the trade.

At the fifth convention, in 1891, this report was made. It included the Code of Ethics which was then adopted, and which has since been reaffirmed at every convention. The effects of the code can hardly be separated from the general working out of the policies of the organization which stands back of the code. It is generally admitted that the United Typothetae has had some considerable success in raising standards of the commercial printing industry, mainly through work in educating master printers in the use of cost systems.

Thoughtful persons will, I think, generally regret that the action of the Typothetae has been confined to the reaffirmation of the original code, which was a most excellent beginning, but which now needs numerous changes and much revision.

In what form are these codes commonly presented to the public? How do the code writers attempt to popularize their work? How great is the real effect of the codes on actual business conditions? These are some of the practical questions confronting associations interested in the code problem. And they are of great interest also to the student of social influences. First of all, the printed form in which the codes are published can be classified under one or the other of two general types, each of which has certain obvious advantages. There is the wall-board or picture idea, adopted by the United Typothetae, and the National Retail Coal Merchants' Association; and there is the small pamphlet of suitable size for the coat pocket, of which there are numerous examples, or for the vest pocket, as that of the National School Supply Association. The manner of statement of most of the codes is positive or affirmative—

Digitized by Google

for which fact, of course, there is a good psychological foundation. Occasionally, however, one finds a negative statement such as "The Ten Condemn-ments" formerly used by the National Association of Piano Merchants of America.

It is next to impossible to determine to what extent the betterment of conditions in any given industry is due to the adoption of a code of ethics. To a certain extent, any improvement of morale in a business must precede the code, for otherwise there could be no one sufficiently interested to promote the code idea. The code represents a crystallization of the best sentiment and finer business instincts of the group which frames it. If it does nothing else than direct the thought of men toward ethical matters, the effort is not lost, for when the normal man thinks about matters of this sort, he is more than likely to try to do better. And the group can only reach a higher ethical standard as its individual members strive for the realization of such a standard. Here the code helps the individual by giving him a measuring rod, and the opportunity to compare his own business practices with the ideal conditions which the code upholds.

This suggests a new problem. What is to be done with the man who fails to respond to this stimulus? Is he to be watched and spied upon and compelled by his fellows to observe the standards mutually agreed upon? Or is he to be permitted to continue in his use of questionable business practices, bringing reproach not only upon himself, but upon all those in the group of which he is an unworthy member? We are not to enter into that profitless discussion, age old though it is, as to whether or not it is worth while to use force and methods of compulsion. We shall simply observe what has been done, in practice, in this field. It may, in general, be said that no provisions have been made for the enforcement of these codes, the associations resorting rather to a pious hope for the best. In the majority of cases the safeguarding of the professional standards is confined chiefly to the examination of the creden-

Digitized by Google

tials of the applicant for membership. For instance, the secretary of the Institute of Chemical Engineers writes that "by using extreme care in choice of membership, this association has solved its problem of professional standards. The Institute has not infrequently rejected candidates for failure to conform to the code, and there is reason to believe that the number who do not conform to it is negligible." In most associations, minor violations commonly pass unnoticed, but flagrant violations lead in some associations to expulsion from membership—as they should. The secretary of the Association of Ice Cream Supply Men writes that "the code has been highly effective since its adoption, and while no miraculous dawning of the new era of business honesty occurred, business transactions have on the whole been more fair. No expulsions of members have been necessary. A number of charges have been brought under the code, and in a few instances they were adjudged to be in part well founded, by the Association." Furthermore, it is the belief of the Rotary leaders who are working for the adoption of codes that it is unwise in the extreme to include in a code strong enforcement provisions. They take the position that a code is a guide to conduct, rather than an instrument for the establishment of an autocratic system for discovering and punishing offenders, and that to insert such provisions puts a wholly wrong emphasis upon the code idea. The government can and does apply compulsion in the enforcement of its trade laws. The whole object of the code is to do away with wrong practices, and exactly in the proportion that the code is successful, the amount of regulatory work of the government in matters of this kind is diminished.

A code of ethics should be as brief as possible and still cover necessary points regarding the different relationships existing between the group for which it is framed, and the other elements in our society. Secondly, it should be definite, defining trade terms and explaining trade practices peculiar to the business or profession for which it is written. Thirdly,

Digitized by Google

it should grow and develop in response to the demands of changing conditions, as business practice reveals the inadequacies and deficiencies of the original code, and as the willingness of the members of the group to work for the realization of still higher standards makes itself felt. The code of ethics is not a cure-all, and it possesses no magic powers by which it can change moral darkness into light, but it is an effective instrument which now contributes much, and which, with proper use, can be made to contribute much more, to the cause of truth and honor in business relationships.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

Digitized by Google

AMERICA AND WORLD-CO-OPERATION

KARL F. GEISER

If those who have attempted to reconcile the lessons of history with the numerous peace proposals that have been made since the war now find themselves under a dominating pessimism, an explanation may be found in the fact that too much attention has been given to fantastic peace "plans" and too little to a study of peace principles. And while extreme and thoughtless views are still expressed on every hand, the events of the last ten years should have given us proof that the future is still in some measure controlled by the past. But new facts have also emerged which will compel a radical change in the present conception of international relations if an enduring peace is to be achieved. In other words, we must recognize and hold to certain facts and at the same time rid ourselves of all prepossessions concerning international relations as hitherto conceived. This does not mean or imply an impractical or visionary program, a radical change in human nature, or a general break with the past. In fact we may well proceed upon the theory that no great or radical change in world-relations is possible, or even desirable if it were possible; for the accumulated wisdom of the ages has accepted many of our existing institutions, for good or ill, and having served mankind through centuries, they must form the anchorage for any scheme of world-co-operation. Lord Bryce said, "Everything which has power to win the obedience and respect of men must have its roots deep in the past, and the more slowly every institution has grown, so much the more enduring is it likely to prove." And it is true; if it were not, the world might well despair of ever again returning to a condition that will make life attractive enough to stimulate a belief in the redeeming qualities of mankind. If there is any hope for a better world-order it is because

Digitized by Google

we may safely assume that the good of the past is not all lost, that an orderly life among men and nations is a natural condition and that wars and conflicts that disturb the normal functions and purposes of society are due to a misconception of man's nature and to a misunderstanding of his true social relations. We must begin by rejecting the doctrine of Treitschke that "war must be taken as part of the divinely appointed order" and build upon the sounder theory of Niebuhr that "war creates no right that was not already existing" before we can hope to provide a mechanism that will prevent war or restore the present convulsion to a durable and orderly progress.

From the general principles stated above, it follows that any plan in which the United States can effectively co-operate in bringing about world-peace must be based upon conclusions deduced from man's nature, his true interests in the widest sense, and his relations to society and to the world in which he moves. These conclusions, moreover, if they are to be realized in fact, must be accepted by the enlightened opinion of mankind in all states or at least in those states which constitute the leading powers of the world; for world-co-operation, it must always be remembered, is not world-domination; yet nearly every peace plan or proposal that has hitherto been suggested as a substitute for war has confused order with peace. This is the chief objection to the League of Nations as now constituted. The great majority of those writers who now urge America's entrance into the League assume that our preponderant weight added to the states which are now members would force a recalcitrant minority to submit to the arbitrament of courts and rule of law quite regardless of the fact that the Treaty of Versailles, of which the Covenant is a part, is the law of Europe and that that law runs counter to the economic currents and interests that flow between states and by which those states that are asked to keep the peace must live. In other words, the League is based on the assumption that obedience to law is peace; it assumes law to be a cause of, rather than a result of, just relations.

Digitized by Google

Yet until Ramsay MacDonald came to power in England not a single large state in the world had approached the European situation in the spirit of justice and conciliation. Scores of plans had been evolved, and some good articles were written and published; but statesmen went on in the management of foreign affairs in the same old way while Europe was sinking, the Allies arming, and new alliances were being formed to maintain the doctrine of force. America, it is true, did make a proposal in the right direction through Secretary Hughes in his New Haven speech in which he suggested an impartial tribunal to determine Germany's capacity to pay. But even this proposal did not meet the vital points of the problem, and it lacked one of the most essential elements of justice, for it rested upon the oft-repeated and universally accepted statement, uttered by every premier of the victorious powers, that Germany should pay every pfennig that could be extracted from her. That was the grand assumption from which every proposal to restore Europe proceeded, though every student of international relations knew that, whatever may have been the degree of her guilt, Germany was not solely responsible for the war. The so-called law of war unfortunately permits the complete destruction of a conquered state, but that implies neither justice nor peace; true justice, even untempered by mercy, would not regard the state as power but would take into account a long train of causes and events and render a verdict of reconciliation based upon the interests of all parties concerned. The foregoing criticism, however, is not made with a view to disparage the possibilities of a league of nations or to minimize the significence of the Hughes proposal, but rather in general terms to call attention to the present state of the public mind concerning international justice and to point the way that America should pursue if a lasting peace is to be secured. For a peace that endures must look to the future; its habitation is beyond the hatreds of the present war; it lives in that far country where there is neither victor nor vanquished.

Digitized by Google

But, it will be asked, if penalties are not to be imposed by force, what other sanctions for the observance of law are to take its place? That is the question to which we may now turn our attention. Leaving aside the question of technique or mechanism employed in the conduct of foreign affairs and confining ourselves to principles, there are three methods upon which states may depend for maintaining peaceful relations. The first is the voluntary acceptance by all states, in the family of nations, of the generally recognized principles of international law. The advantages of this method need no argument, but it should be pointed out that many of the rules and precedents accepted as law between states are not only notoriously defective but in flagrant violation of the most elementary principles of Christian morality. Thus the law which gives to the victor the right to dismember and destroy a state finds no parallel in the domestic courts of any modern civilized state. It is the law of the jungle and of the brigand; but even the most enlightened state has not advanced beyond it. Senator Borah's resolution for the outlawry of war recognized this fact and is a move in the right direction; but the faint support it has received from politicians and publicists shows how little the world has advanced in this regard since Grotius first propounded the idea in his "De Jure Belli ac Pacis." The Treaty of Versailles, it should be remembered, apart from the violation of a solemn promise made by the Allies to Germany in the Armistice, is in itself thoroughly in accord with the present conception of international law. Yet with all its defects the general acceptance of this law has been the great outstanding fact in maintaining world-peace. Any plan for American co-operation should, therefore, rest largely upon its foundation, but means should be devised for its improvement and general acceptance.

The second method of maintaining peace rests upon the doctrine or theory of force. It rejects the idea that states can be educated to the point of voluntary co-operation, of seeing,

Digitized by Google

that is, that their true interests are reconcilable with the interests of all. While the doctrine of force, as applied between states may indeed be regarded as based upon accepted principles, it is no law in the true sense because, in the nature of the case, it rejects the idea of justice. Compare, for example, such a conception of law with that of Hooker three centuries ago:

> Of law there can be no less acknowledged than that her seat is the bosom of God, her voice the harmony of the world; all things in heaven and earth do her homage, the very least as feeling her care, and the greatest as not exempted from her power; both angels and men and creatures of what condition soever, though each in different sort and manner, yet all with uniform consent, admiring her as the mother of their peace and joy.

True law seeks justice by attempting to establish perfect and free relations between states; and until every state within the jurisdiction of a general scheme of international relations is itself convinced that its own interests are secure, and that its free and unhampered development is also safeguarded by a general consent of all states, it must take account of its own protection. This is of course the theory still held by all large states; and the Treaty of Versailles, connected with the Covenant of the League of Nations created to enforce that treaty, is merely the doctrine of force carried to its logical conclusion. It is possible that the world has not yet passed beyond this stage of international relations; but before America enters the present League of Nations, unless detached from the Treaty of Versailles and so modified as to make it an instrument for the development of international law rather than for the enforcement of the law of Europe as embodied in the treaty, we should clearly understand the terms of the agreement we are asked to sign. We should remember that France herself has as her primary motive in urging American participation in Europe the enforcement of the Treaty of Versailles and the acceptance of the doctrine of peace by force.

The third method of international co-operation is the employment of a conciliatory and wise foreign policy; it has

Digitized by Google

never in all sincerity been tried. But the idea though often difficult of application is so simple that it has not received adequate consideration. In domestic law the principle is recognized by that school of jurists which aims to secure justice by reconciling and adjusting conflicts through what is called a "balancing of interests." It takes into account the fact that there are conflicting interests, real or imaginary, and while seeking to adjust disputes on the basis of existing law, when the application of that law clearly aims at securing justice, it also takes into account the possibility of improvement through conscious effort. This theory believes, in fact, that, in the present interdependence of the individuals within a state, the welfare of each individual can only be advanced by improving the condition of society. Applied to international politics this theory would say with Pitt, when he attempted to establish free trade relations between the mother-country and the new government in America after 1783, that "what is good for the American state is not necessarily detrimental to Great Britain." Unfortunately what Pitt and, half a century later, Cobden and Bright clearly recognized as the chief essential to peace has never found a place in America's foreign policy. Yet that policy would seek to reconcile the interests of a particular state with all foreign states.

Since any plan looking to permanent peace depends upon a wise foreign policy let us briefly consider what such a position implies. First we must remember that national interests are controlled—so far as control is possible—through a domestic policy, and international interests through a foreign policy. The two are of course at many points merged into one, in which case the control of one implies the control of the other. Thus a tariff law, enacted solely upon the authority of a state, affects every foreign state in the matter of trade. Likewise laws relating to immigration or national defense, coming solely within the jurisdiction of domestic or national policy, are, from their very nature, of vital concern to foreign states. Our immigration laws with Japan are an outstanding illustration and are

Digitized by Google

typical of policies pursued not only during a war period, which might be intelligible enough, but during normal peace relations.

Now the significance of an unfriendly policy toward a foreign state is not readily appreciated because foreign problems under normal conditions usually arise and are disposed of one at a time and, as they usually affect only particular interests within a state, the general public is not aroused to the seriousness of the situation. Today the press informs us that an Imperial Conference in session in London has unanimously passed resolutions discriminating against American products, yet how few who read that information realize that it is really a form of war against the protective policy of the United States and is of much greater significance than a dispute over the boundary of Alaska or an oil concession in Mexico. The truth is that the mistakes of states in the conduct of foreign affairs, either through the Secretary of State or through Congress, can be so easily discounted by an appeal to patriotism, national interests, or national honor, or by making it appear that the foreign state against which an offensive policy is directed, is the aggressor or offender, that the public seldom sees the real issue before it is an accomplished fact from which it is often difficult to retreat. Newspapers take it up where the diplomat lays it down, and it is soon made to appear that there is a conflict of interests, whereas it is really a conflict between foreign policies which may result in war. To state the idea more directly: War is a conflict between domestic and foreign policy, in other words, between national and international conceptions, and the reconciliation of these two ideas constitutes the whole problem of peace.

If the problem is correctly stated in the foregoing terms, it becomes apparent, upon reflection, that what is commonly regarded as a purely domestic question may be very provocative of war. The man who puts up a spite fence upon his lot to interfere with the view of his neighbor because the law permits it may be doing much more to provoke a quarrel than the man

Digitized by Google

who commits an act of trespass which is forbidden by law. A protective tariff which shuts out goods manufactured in foreign countries and thus prevents thousands of foreign workmen from pursuing an occupation best adapted to their ability and environment may do infinitely more to injure a foreign state than is done by a violation of its neutrality. One of the chief difficulties in maintaining peace is the fact that war is the cumulative result of a series of events scattered over a period of years before the outbreak of hostilities and of unfriendly foreign policies adopted long before the currents of hate consume men's reason by some overt act like the sinking of the "Maine" or the murder of an archduke. Some means must be devised by which nations shall come to realize that conducting a foreign policy wisely and patriotically is not driving a sharp bargain with another state but winning its everlasting friendship before the hand of the "great Anarch lets the curtain fall and universal darkness covers all." In the calm light of peace, in the thousand pursuits that men follow during normal times, in the college, the university, the public schools, the pulpit, the press, around the firesides of millions of homes, must the great lesson of peace be learned. Not alone in a plan to prevent war, devised when its wrath is upon us, nor in a mechanism designed to compel obedience to law in the future, but in the creation of a spirit out of which law and justice shall flow, can an enduring peace be established.

So much for a statement of principles. But America, it must be admitted, is faced with the practical problem of co-operating with Europe—either through political affiliations, such as the League, to determine a common international policy, or through juristic methods such as were employed and recommended by the Hague conferences. To determine our policy through experiment, to "try the league" because "it could not be worse," as we are so often urged, would be like advising the mariner to sail the seas without a compass. Foreign policy should not be determined by the trial-and-error

Digitized by Google

process. The only experiments that can have any validity for the guidance of states are the successes and failures of history; and if we follow the trail of the leagues of the past, the signposts all point to wrecks. Those who advocate America's entrance into the League, or any other form of political organization, must, therefore, find their justification in recent proposals which depart from the idea of the Hague conferences. What are some of these proposals and upon what basis or theory do they rest? There is certainly good reason to doubt whether any of the numerous associations and organizations which are now attempting to drive America into the League of Nations, and even the World-Court, are proceeding upon lines of sound policy or good law. The great majority of these associations are advocating co-operation through a mechanism that is designed to use force from above or from without rather than by permitting the spirit of co-operation to develop from below and from within. Thus the League of Nations Non-Partisan Association announces as its objects: (1) "To secure the approval of members of the United States Senate of the World Court Proposal," and (2) "To secure the insertion in both Republican and Democratic Party Platforms, in 1924, of planks favoring entrance of the United States into the League of Nations."

If the first object, the World-Court, implies the attainment of the second, the League of Nations, it follows that America will become involved in questions arising from the enforcement of the Treaty of Versailles. The Non-Partisan Association in asking America to join the League makes no demand to have the treaty revised. If carried out, such a program, therefore, at its best, could do no more than inspire a faint hope for an amelioration of the conditions imposed upon Germany by the treaty. It frankly accepts the doctrine of force through what is in effect either a superstate or the old method of alliances, in either case a political rather than a juristic method. But if we are to co-operate through political methods, what assurance have we that the results will be different than they have been since political methods were first employed? We have only to

Digitized by Google

reflect that the Treaty of Versailles itself was the result of political bargaining among the victors and not of juristic or equitable thinking. At best the League itself aims to secure order and discipline rather than justice; but since justice is the true foundation for a lasting peace the criterion for any plan looking toward that end must be based upon the development and extension of international law and equity, a problem for the jurist rather than the politician. Moreover, the conception of a peace which assumes the existence of a "criminal state" as the Treaty of Versailles does, ignores the very obvious fact that, for good or ill, international relations are still determined upon the theory that each state has a right to its sovereignty, and political independence. Unless we accept this view we are thrown back upon the doctrine of force which, even if it were possible of being justly applied, requires for its execution military and naval establishments and that is precisely where we are now.

On the other hand a plan of world-peace based on the theory of voluntary co-operation by states retaining their complete sovereignty should take into account the present defects of international law and seek to develop that branch of jurisprudence. The accomplishment of that purpose should have in view two main objects: (1) A study of the present defects of international law and (2) some method to improve and extend it. The proper agencies for obtaining these two objects should not be political but juristic. And a committee of impartial jurists similar to that selected by the League of Nations for the improvement of international law might well be regarded as a hopeful precedent from which much might be expected. That a committee of distinguished jurists would be impartial there is not the slightest doubt. An examination of the published reports of the proceedings of similar conferences and commissions justifies us in believing that nothing man could devise for the purpose of adjusting disputes would more nearly approach justice than a body of experts removed from prejudice and sinister influences. We have a most admirable illustra-

Digitized by Google

tion of the truth of this assumption in the fact that the proposal for a world-court by our own American representative, a distinguished jurist, was sustained by the League's own Committee of Jurists, referred to above; and we have also an illuminating commentary upon the method and likelihood of securing justice through a political body in the fact that the League of Nations rejected the American proposal for the revision and improvement of international law. The failure of political bodies to devise means of preventing war is so obvious that it needs no comment; on the other hand every advance in the conscious development and improvement of international law has been made at the suggestion of jurists and on the basis of legal thinking; nor is it strange that this should be so; law seeks justice, while politics plays with national interests. Moreover, America's traditional interest in an international court to settle disputes between states completely harmonizes with the juristic method. And whatever the shortcomings of the second Hague Conference may have been, it expressed principles far in advance of anything expressed at least up to the time of the first conference, and principles to which a majority of the states have voluntarily subscribed. We should proceed from the foundation laid at the Hague rather than from that of Paris.

Limitations of space forbid more than a mere mention of the very important fact that the numerous arbitration treaties that America has already made with foreign states in accordance with the general principles laid down at the Hague, in both their scope and purpose, go far beyond the League Covenant to which we are now asked to subscribe. The assumption that we have not participated in the interests of peace has no foundation in fact. It is not a question of extent of participation—for that is in a sense beyond the control of states—but of method; and in the last analysis there are but two choices: On the one hand, an enlightened control of foreign policy, described in preceding pages, in accordance with a progressive outlook upon international law; on the other hand, force, with all the burdens, commitments and entanglements which that

Digitized by Google

method implies. America's greatest single contribution toward future world-co-operation lies in the realm of law, in creating agencies and forces that will develop a public opinion that will sustain that law and support the organs necessary to extend it and make it universally acceptable. This idea has already been expressed by one of our ablest international jurists. In his instructions to the American delegation to the second Hague Conference, in 1907, Secretary Root said:

> If there could be a tribunal which would pass upon questions between nations with the same impartial and impersonal judgment that the Supreme Court of the United States gives to questions arising between citizens of different states, or between foreign citizens and the citizens of the United States, there can be no doubt that nations would be more ready to submit their controversies to its decisions than they are now to take the chance of arbitration. It should be your effort to bring about in the second Hague Conference a development of the Hague Tribunal into a permanent tribunal composed of judges who are judicial officers and nothing less . . . . who will devote their entire time to the trial and decision of international causes by judicial methods and under a sense of judicial responsibility.

To the consummation of this idea, America should return.

To summarize: Due to the general confusion of ideas concerning America's duty to the world, the first and greatest step toward real co-operation lies in the formulation and general acceptance of a set of principles that should be applied to the conduct of foreign affairs. These principles should be based upon our own experience and upon international relations as they have developed through history and as we find them today; we should generally assume that neither law nor mechanism can reverse the economic currents that naturally flow between states or change human nature; and therefore that any plan or policy of co-operation, to be effective, should be directed toward the removal of restrictions upon states, thus developing the spirit of good will and the sense of justice, rather than toward the application of force to keep order.

OBERLIN COLLEGE

Digitized by Google

THE ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF MOH TIH'S PHILOSOPHY

CHI FUNG LUI

At about five hundred years B.C. China produced one of the greatest and most brilliant souls of her history. He was a philosopher, an altruist, radical, and social reformer. He possessed an ardent and indefatigible spirit. He never wearied of attempting to secure justice and universal peace. Had his doctrine prevailed, cosmopolitanism and humanitarianism would now be realized. Although he could not make his doctrine so popular as that of Confucius had been at an earlier day, some aspects of his theory are being put into effect in the twentieth century. That man was Moh Tih. (He was also called Moh Tze.)

Moh Tih ranked equally with Lao Tze and Confucius. He was more than a philosopher; he was founder of a religion which was known as Mohism. Mohism repudiates determinism and holds that the salvation of the individual depends upon his own effort to do good. Thus we may call Moh Tih's philosophy energism, meliorism, or pragmatism.

In order to understand Moh Tih's whole philosophy and radical viewpoint it is necessary first to make a brief survey of the time in which he lived in order to see by what he was influenced.

1. Feudalism and Aristocracy dominated in ancient China until the time of Chun Chiu.[1] They reached a full development and then gradually declined. Confucius was born into that society and became dissatisfied with it. He realized its defects which he always thought to reform. But Confucius, like Aristotle, held the "doctrine of the mean"; his reform was, therefore, a matter of evolution—a peaceful process. At the

[1] The Chun Chiu ("Spring and Autumn") is a chronicle of the state of Lu, covering a period of 242 years (722–480 B.C.).

Digitized by Google

time of Moh Tih society was more chaotic than it had been even in the day of Confucius. This situation may be responsible for the radical nature of the social reforms of Moh Tih. He thought that Confucius' doctrine of the mean was entirely insufficient. For Moh Tih the only remedy for society was to destroy the old traditions and institutions and to construct new ones. He was of a revolutionary spirit and laid down some principles which were contrary to the current thoughts of his time. His main idea was to create a new heaven and a new earth.

2. During the later part of Chun Chiu, ritualism and formalism were very prominent. Careful observances had become merely appearance. Confucius had laid much stress on substance and yet he did not care to abandon ritualism. What he wanted was a compromise. Moh Tih became thoroughly dissatisfied with ritualism and formalism. He regarded the method of reform advocated by Confucius as useless. He felt it necessary to do away with them entirely and absolutely.

3. In the time of Moh Tih, nation attacked nation and war followed war. Some small nations were always on the point of the spear of stronger powers. In order to prevent such a situation Moh Tih thought no other process so efficient as that of changing men's hearts. This process was based on social psychology. Therefore, he promoted the doctrine of "Love all," from which he derived another principle, "Non-attack."

4. There were wide inequalities in the society of the time. The noble classes lived a luxurious life, and the poorer classes suffered for it. Hence, Moh Tih gave special emphasis to economic reconstruction. He and his followers lived a simple life, wore coarse clothes, and by their example encouraged hard labor. In a word he wanted to establish a society on the basis of mutual help.

5. Moh Tih had no power; he was not aggressive. How could he carry out his theories? As a humanitarian he did not

Digitized by Google

wish to see people shed blood. Revolution and mobs were not agreeable to him. Therefore he founded a religion, based on the belief in the existence of spirits who possess intelligence and the power to reward and to punish man according to his deserts. A religion of faith and hope is implied and serves to sustain this doctrine.

6. At that time Lao-Tze's philosophy had gained a strong foothold and was especially popular in South China. Lao-Tze advocated the laissez faire policy, being of the opinion that peace can be secured only by "doing nothing." Men would not quarrel if there were no class distinctions.

On the contrary, Moh Tih regarded "human endeavor" as very important; nothing can be achieved without effort. Hence, Moh Tih adopted the policy of the "wise man" and held that interference in the individual's activity was necessary. His political doctrine is the doctrine of "agreeing upward," that is, of agreeing with the most universal. This illustrates the practical implications of Moh Tih's attitude toward universals. "To do things" is his policy, and his reaction from the "laissez faire" doctrine of Lao-Tze.

II

Now let us turn to the fundamental principles of his ethics. As we have seen, his starting-point is the doctrine of "Love-all." From this are derived those principles—"Non-attack," "Thrifty," and "Condemning of Music." The word "usefulness" is his measure of "Love." He was opposed to those who live a luxurious life and seek pleasure and happiness for themselves, because their actions take advantage of others. To rely on the determinism of fate is also a dangerous thing, for if everyone depends upon fate no one will do good and no one will love others.

Moh Tih interpreted the doctrine of "Love-all" always in this sense, that "Love-all" means "Benefit each other." "Love-all" is a theory, and "Benefit each other" is a method to carry out this theory. Without the latter the former can

Digitized by Google

never be realized. "Love-all" is Tolstoy's altruism and "Benefit each other" corresponds to Kropotkin's "mutual help."

The logic of "Love-all" can be stated as follows: The sage-king takes it as his first duty to find out the cause of chaos in the world. The cause of chaos is due merely to selfishness. Everyone loves himself and does not consider others. Therefore, he takes advantage of others in order to benefit himself. Then war, civil or international, is bound to arise and to create all manner of evils. Consequently, all human beings will suffer and the world can know no peace. In order to get rid of evils it is first necessary to get rid of selfishness. To attain this end there is no other method than that of "Love-all" and "Benefit each other."

Moh Tih strongly contends that man should love all his fellows indiscriminately instead of making distinctions in love. Neither did he recognize private property. Here lies the difference between Moh Tih and Confucius. To Confucius men should love their parents first and then love the parents of others as much as possible. But Moh Tih regarded this distinction between loving one's own parents and loving the parents of others as a source of social evil. War, theft, and fraud arise from this distinction. For with this conception of distinctions any advantage in a situation will gravitate to the subject of the most loved—yourself or another. Consequently, men struggle with men, nation attacks nation, and the world is out of order. The remedy is to make no distinctions, that is, "Love-all."

Moh Tih wanted to make all property common. His ideal society resulting from "Love-all" is the communism which Plato tried to realize. Moh Tih agrees as well with Socrates that to know is to act. Later Wang Yang Ming elaborated the theory that knowing and acting are one.

Moh Tih was a practical man. He judged that whether a thing is good or bad depends upon whether or not it is useful. He seems to be an utilitarian. We possess a clear and natural

Digitized by Google

standard for the ethical estimation of worth only when we restrict ourselves to the effect of an action. If one asks why an action is good, our decision will ultimately depend upon whether at any point and in any sphere it has produced a good and useful result to all the members of society. Here I hasten to add that Moh Tih did not ignore the motive. That "end justifies the means" was never accepted by Moh Tih. He believed that a good motive, as a rule, produced a good result. He had a sense of utility. Human nature is so constituted that it desires nothing which is not either the whole of happiness or a means to happiness. Every action is judged—and must be judged—according to the degree in which it promotes what is thus always the ultimate object of human desire. Utility is found in such a judgment.

To the question as to whose happiness is to be the standard of measure, Moh Tih, like Stuart Mill, would answer that it is to be found not in the greatest happiness of the agent but in the sum total of the happiness of all. Moh Tih recognizes the value of moral obligation and social life. The moral sentiment, although it has a history of development, is a natural sentiment. It is natural for men to speak, to draw inferences, to till the ground, and to build cities. If there is any one element of the moral sentiment which is innate, that one is sympathy. The most important point is that social life accustoms the individual to common interests, team work, and consideration. With the development of social life and the removal of social barriers there comes an increase in social solidarity.

Moh Tih's altruism differs from the cosmopolitanism of Confucius both in theory and practice. Confucius did not expect his ideal of cosmopolitanism to be realized at once. He felt that it would come about gradually. A necessary step in its realization is peace within the nation. On the contrary, Moh Tih saw only altruism, and that achieved in a single stroke. He was absolutely opposed to narrow patriotism and

Digitized by Google

militarism. Regarding this point I can do no better than to quote a passage from his writing:

Here is a man who enters his neighbor's orchard and steals some peaches and plums therefrom. When this is known, he is condemned by the public, and, when caught, will be fined by the government. Wherefor? Because he has injured his neighbor to profit himself.

And if he steals from his neighbor a dog, a pig, or a chicken, he commits a wrong greater than the stealing of peaches and plums. Why? Because he does a greater injury to another man; and the greater the injury he does the greater is the wrong, and the severer shall be his punishment.

And if he steals his neighbor's horse or cow, he commits a wrong still greater than stealing a dog, a pig, or a chicken. Why? Because he does a greater injury to another; and the more he injures another the greater is the wrong, and the severer shall be his punishment.

And if he goes so far as to waylay an innocent man, take away his fur coat and cloak, and stab him with his sword, then his crime is still greater than that of stealing a horse or a cow. Why? Because he has done thereby a still greater injury. And the greater the injury the man does to another the greater is his crime, and the severer shall be his punishment.

In all these cases, the gentlemen of the world agree to condemn this man and declare "he is wrong."

Now here is the greatest of all crimes—the invasion of one nation by another. But the gentlemen of the world not only refuse to condemn it but even praise it and declare "it is right."

Shall we say that these gentlemen know the distinction between right and wrong?

Killing one man constitutes a crime and is punishable by death. Applying the same principle, the killing of ten men makes the crime ten times greater and ten times as punishable; similarly the killing of a hundred men increases the crime a hundred fold, and makes it that many times as punishable.

All this the gentlemen of the world unanimously condemn and pronounce to be wrong.

But when they come to judge the greatest of all wrongs—the invasion of one state by another—(which is a hundred thousand times more criminal than the killing of one innocent man), they cannot see that they should condemn it. On the contrary, they praise it and call it "right."

Digitized by Google

Indeed, they do not know it is wrong. Therefore, they have recorded their judgment on it to be transmitted to posterity. If they know it was wrong, how could we explain their recording such false judgments for posterity?

Here is a man who sees a few black things and calls them black, but who, after seeing many black things, calls them white. We must all say that this man does not know the distinction between black and white.

Here is another man, who tastes a few bitter things and calls them bitter, but who, having tasted many bitter things, calls them sweet. We must all say that this man knows not the distinction between bitter and sweet.

Here is a world which condemns a petty wrong and praises the greatest of all wrongs—the attack of one nation upon another—and calls it right. Can we say that the world knows the distinction between right and wrong?[1]

From this passage it is evident that Moh Tih strongly condemned narrow patriotism and militarism! He did not press his principle of "Non-attack," but he hoped that his conception would be put into practice. He saw that self-defense might be one means of attaining the aim of the principle. All his students took up the art of war, that is, they all understood strategy. Whenever Moh Tih heard that one nation was preparing to attack another he would go to the aggressor in an effort to prevent the attack. If the intention was persisted in, then Moh Tih and his students joined the invaded nation in its program of self-defense. Thus Moh Tih's method for preventing war was quite different from that of the Hague Conference or the Washington Conference, which did not consider the fundamental problem of securing lasting peace.

III

It is no less important to make a thorough study of Moh Tih's utilitarianism and economic theory. Many aspects of his economics mark him as a leader of socialism.

Since Confucius seldom talked of "benefit" but rather stressed "benevolence" and "righteousness," the Confucians

[1] Chap. xvii, translated by Dr. Hu Shu.

Digitized by Google

judged all actions by their motives and not at all by their consequences. This removed the standard of morality from everyday living and was the real defect of Confucianism.

On the other hand, Moh Tih contends that morality and its benefits cannot be separated. Beneficiality is the standard of right and wrong. He always put the two words "benefit" and "love" in parallelism. Take, for example, "Love all" and "Benefit each other," or "Love all" and "Benefit the world." Here two points are worth noting: the meaning of Moh Tih's "benefit" is not egoism but is altruism; the meaning of "love" is not love per se, but takes "benefit" as its premise. In other words, love and benefit must be closely connected with each other. The main point is that Moh Tih intended to establish a "society of love all" on the basis of an economic organization.

"To be thrifty" is the cornerstone of his utilitarianism.

As to consumption, which is the starting-point of Moh Tih's economic theory, he laid down this formula: "Self-sacrifice is desirable. It is sufficient that the everyday needs of man be supplied." He meant that human desire should not exceed the necessities of life. For example, cloth is made for protection against cold in winter and heat in summer. Cloth, in meeting this demand, fulfills its function. Any further demand upon it is luxury. Those who live a luxurious life deprive others of the right of living. Marxians and Moh Tih are in agreement that the capitalists' surplus comes from robbery!

As for production, Moh Tih laid down a second formula: "The benefit enjoyed should be in proportion to the capital invested; we should not do that which requires money and energy without good return." For Moh Tih, since production depends upon capital and labor, it is necessary to make an estimate of the gain in efficiency and results which that capital and labor achieve. The function of cloth, we have previously noted, is to protect against cold in winter and heat in summer;

Digitized by Google

that is all. Silk cloth requires more money and labor, but its protecting qualities are no greater than those of coarse cloth. Therefore, the making of silk cloth is a mere waste.

Moh Tih, who was ever the utilitarian, based his judgments of a thing or situation upon its usefulness. The practical consequences constitute the value of an action.

To take a concrete example, Moh Tih said:

> I asked the Confucians wherefore they should have music, and they answered, "music is an amusement." I said to them, "you have not answered my question. If I asked you why you should build a house and you said it was built for protection against cold in winter and heat in summer and for separate dwellings of persons of different sexes, you would then be telling me why you had built the house. Now I ask you why you should have music and you have said music is an amusement. That is equivalent to saying that a house is to be a house."[1]

Such is the meaning of Moh Tih's standard of morality. The value of a thing lies in what it is good for.

Labor is the unifying element in Moh Tih's economic theory. Therefore he formulated the doctrine, "labor is sacred." There followed this statement: "Living depends upon human activity; without it living is impossible." The difference between human beings and birds and animals is that birds' feathers constitute their clothing, and animals can stand in their bare feet. They also can live on water and grass while the human cannot. Hence, human beings who wish to maintain their life must labor and do that which is fitted to their individual capacity. Moh Tih, thinking it necessary to have a "division of labor," laid down this formula: "Everyone should do what he is capable of doing." Works, manual or mental, are of equal value.

However, Moh Tih feared that some people would be lazy and the standard of work would thereby be diminished. So he gave this formula: "Time and production are correlative." That "time is money" was recognized by him. If the judge

[1] Chap. xl, p. 14, translated by Dr. Hu Shu.

Digitized by Google

always gives himself up to the charms of music, how can he have time to settle disputes; if the farmer gives himself up to the charms of music, how can he have time to till his field; if the woman gives herself up to the charms of music, how can she have time to make cloth? Moh Tih regarded music as the best killer of time. To me he is entirely wrong on this point. He did not know that music supplies a recreation which can give an increased efficiency in work. The important point is to avoid extremes.

Lastly, Moh Tih set forth a sixth formula on distribution: "Help others with your additional labor and distribute your surplus money." This is the practical consequence of "Love all and benefit each other."

Now the political organization of the Soviet government has most nearly realized Moh Tih's theory. First, the Soviet government controls the clothing, food, and dwellings of people. No matter how much money you have you cannot live luxuriously under such a system. Thus the policy of "thrift" can be easily carried out. Second, the compulsion of labor is equivalent to Moh Tih's theory that where production does not meet the demand more hours can be required.

From what has been said it is apparent that Moh Tih possessed a spirit of self-sacrifice and charity. Once he said: "If the existence of the world depended upon my killing myself, that would mean that killing myself would be a benefit to the world, and as such I would be willing to do it." "The greatest happiness of the greatest number" is his premise.

In conclusion, let me state briefly the significance of his theory and the contribution of his thought. It is summed up in three phrases: "Love all," "Non-attack," and "Self-defense." Should his theory prevail, the disasters which human beings have suffered from time to time would not. I believe his ethical theory has doubled in significance in the present and chaotic world in which we are living.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Digitized by Google

THE OLD RELIGION AND THE NEW

C. DELISLE BURNS

Many historians and philosophers would say that religion was like magic, a thing of the past. In their view it still survives only among those who belong to a more primitive stage of development. Such indeed appears to be the opinion of Sir James Frazer, the author of *The Golden Bough*, and of Mr. Bertrand Russell. They continue the tradition of the eighteenth-century "Enlightenment," as expressed in that phrase of Gibbon's, when he begins his *Decline and Fall*—"I now turn to the history of religion and of barbarism." In that sense it is as impossible for a civilized man to be religious as the orthodox would say it is for a religious man to be a scientist. Religion is then identified with all those theological beliefs and rituals which preceded the conclusions and methods of science: and in this sense there can be no "new" religion which would not be a mere continuance of superstition, and therefore the relation between the old and new would be unimportant because all reasonable men would wish to be rid of both. In the eighteenth-century meaning of the word, religion is obsolete.

On the other hand it is possible to say that religion is as inevitable in every age as art is, or philosophy, and that the only choice is between a good religion and a bad. In that sense a man may be religious as he may appreciate art, whatever the extent of his knowledge, and the religion of barbarism would naturally be succeeded by the religion of civilization. Thus the passing of an age of faith does not necessarily involve the obsolescence of religion, for a man's religion is part of his humanity which continues to exist when he no longer believes as a child does on the authority of the past This is the sense of the word "religion" with which we are here concerned.

Digitized by Google

Religion is therefore always changing and it is possible to have a "new" religion which is not alien to modern thought and modern artistic impulse. We shall, therefore, suppose here that Russell and Gibbon are incorrect in their view of religion.

This is not merely a matter of words. The definition of the word religion is not of any consequence, and it is of little use to discuss whether its meaning can be extended. The important question is whether there is an element or component part in the living experience of a civilized man for which we need a special name, corresponding to that used to express the attitude of mind in the builders of the Greek temples or the cathedrals of the Middle Ages.

Art exists in our painting and architecture today, but something more than art is required to explain why men built cathedrals and temples rather than houses for themselves. Again, the emotion felt by the modern audience in hearing Brahms's "Requiem" may be the aesthetic emotion; but something more than aesthetic emotion compelled men to compose requiems rather than drinking songs. That something more we call religion. Its relation to art may be intimate, but it is not the same element in life. And as we require the word religion for explaining the cathedral or the requiem, so we require it now for expressing what is not art. Similarly with regard to the body of knowledge which is called science and philosophy, including the historical sciences, there is an emotion or an impulse which makes the thinker turn his attention toward ultimate problems of life and death rather than toward the contrivance of the instruments of living. That impulse compelled the primitive scientists of the Middle Ages to discuss obscure traditions before directly examining the structure of common things. That impulse in them is called religion. As the sciences grow the impulse to inquire into ultimate problems may become less general or less dominant, because the detail of common things is so complex as to absorb attention. But

Digitized by Google

the ultimate problems remain and do not lose importance. Indeed, the very advance of the sciences of detail may make the impulse to think of comprehensive issues more subtle and more effectual. Death remains even if we have explained away all love by an examination of the biology and psychology of sex: and the greatness or majesty of one man's mind compared with another's remains an ultimate fact, even if all habits are reduced to statistical formulae. Now this impulse to think of ultimate issues is religion, although it now arises out of science and in earlier times it arose out of tradition.

Thus there can be a "new" religion.

To understand what this new religion is it is necessary to examine its relation to the older forms of the same impulse. We should consider not only our opinions of the old beliefs but also our attitude toward believers; for it is possible to deny every one of a man's statements and yet to bear him no ill-will. Indeed it is even possible to feel some sympathy with those who believe what we know to be false. They are not our enemies, and in many ways they are closer to us than those "who care for none of these things."

As the old Chinese verse has it:

> You ask me why I greet the priest,
> And not his god.
> The god sits mute: the man at least
> Returns my nod.

Perhaps the distinction between believers and unbelievers or rationalists is not so important as the distinction between those who have and those who have not the religious emotion or impulse: for there are some, of whom Gibbon was one and Mr. Russell is not one, who are without any sensitiveness for what moves religious men. The doom of man, the mystery of character and personality, the vast movements of nature do not affect some men. There are some who are deaf to poetry or blind to painting; but they may be very admirable in other ways. And in the same way there are some who are without even the capacity for religion. This does not mean

Digitized by Google

that they are fools or knaves; nor does it mean that their work is useless, although it may mean that they are unable to deal adequately with the history of religion. Human abilities differ, and the person with clumsy hands cannot be a good surgeon; nor can a blind man be a good judge of painting. We do not condemn or despise men for such defects; but we should not neglect to observe that such defects exist. Those who have no capacity for religious emotion, then, may be omitted from the present argument, in order to concentrate attention upon the differences among those who are religious.

Clearly it is open to an adversary to say that what is here called religion is itself a defect; and that if we treat religious men with respect we are merely confessing our own deficiency, like the fox who lost his tail and said that tails were useless. To confess the existence of some emotion beyond that of the arts and of some impulse to think of what science cannot formulate, may be to confess to being primitive and superstitious. We should not avoid that issue. If we say that religion is a permanent characteristic of man at all stages of his development, we do not indeed mean that all men must have it, but we do imply that it is not a defect, for we imply that it survives, not as the appendix in a man's body, as an atrophied remnant of an earlier form of structure, but as an arm or a leg whose shape has changed though it remains the same arm or leg as it was in the mother's womb. A long argument would be necessary to show that surviving religion in a modern thinker or artist is not a defect; but it will be enough for the present purpose to assert that temples and cathedrals cannot reasonably be explained as the results of a disease or an abnormality. The force which makes them something more than merely artistic objects is what we have called religion; and if this was normal in Greek or medieval times, it is probably normal still, however weak and ineffectual it may now be.

Further, in judging the development of an impulse it must be remembered that the stages of civilization are not matters of date. An Egyptian statue of 3000 B.C. may be more civilized

Digitized by Google

than the British sculpture in the Tate Gallery. Euripides, in addition to his intellectual eminence, is a more civilized dramatist than Shaw. It is not Shaw's fault, for he lives in a less subtle age and among the economists and the calculators, whereas Euripides dined with persons who knew that quality cannot be expressed numerically. No doubt Shaw would have been more welcome than Lord Rothermere at the dinner parties to meet Socrates; but even Shaw would have seemed rather childish in that company. A man cannot be civilized apart from the society in which he lives and in many ways our society is less civilized than that of ancient Athens.

So in religious emotions we should find ourselves much more at one with Marcus Aurelius or Plotinus than we are with our contemporaries now in the chapels and churches of London. Many stages of civilization exist together. Even in London today one could find magic and fetichism, medieval superstition, priest-worship and Bible-worship, as well as the more innocent forms of Christianity. It is not to be expected, then, that the old religion should cease to exist before the new appears. The two can very well exist together at the same date.

The old religion is well known. In London it means Christianity in many of its forms; but these are not fundamentally different from the old religions of Arabia or India. Christianity, Mohammedanism, and Buddhism are what are referred to here as old religions. But what of the new?

Its characteristics may be indicated as follows: The dominant belief or general attitude of the new religion is a confidence in reason. It is therefore the religion of rationalists in so far as they are persons whose beliefs rest upon either actual proof or capacity to be proved. Reasoning is the method by which truth is obtained other than the truth of immediate experience and by which the different parts of experience are made intelligible in relation to one another. For the new religion there is no other method, since the immediate perception of fact which

Digitized by Google

is sometimes called revelation or intuition is simply an element in the life of reason. Hence the new religion repudiates all claims to other sources of truth than those which are open to the scientist, historian, and philosopher.

In action the new religion is distinguished by the quality of character or conduct of its adherents, which is independent of all sacred rites or unexamined rules. Thus it is the religion of morality pure and simple, which implies no excellence in any act except that which belongs to the act as part of a fine character. The fineness of a character is itself an ultimate fact which cannot be explained in other terms; for it cannot be said that a character is fine which results in church-going or giving alms or in any other obvious external actions.

As an external sign of the new religion it may be noted that, like Stoicism, it has no fixed rituals and no authoritative creed. Like the Stoics the adherents of the new religion are eager to know the character of the common world, and to act their part in that world, being somewhat careless as to what happens to them at death or after, since that is not in their hands. Such hints should be enough to indicate what is meant by the new religion.

If it be granted, then, that there may be a religion natural to men and women who accept the methods and results of modern sciences and modern arts, what relation will this religion bear to the old religions? A future historian may describe its connections with the tradition of Western Christianity but we are more interested now in its difference from orthodoxy. The history of Christianity allows for the same two points of view, for clearly the early Christians were chiefly interested in the difference of their creed and practice from those of paganism, while the modern historian can see how nearly related and how like were early Christianity and the religions it displaced. In spite of our divergence from the orthodox tradition it is perhaps well to recognize how close the relation is between the old and the new religions. First,

Digitized by Google

it is not an accident that the new religion has developed most effectually in the Christian West. Whether we like it or not, the Catholicism of the Middle Ages and the Protestantism of the Renaissance are the progenitors of the scientific and philosophic attitude of modern times. Mohammedanism, Buddhism, and Confucianism have not led to the development of science; and their arts are not free and secular as are the arts of the West. Science is a Western product, not indeed due to Christianity, since its development was much hampered by the various forms of the Christian religion, but arising within the Christian world. Christianity was capable of supporting within it the intellectual energy and the artistic freedom which did not find any scope within other religious traditions. For example, the same Greek science which is the basis of our modern knowledge was once as well known among Mohammedans as it was among Christians. Indeed the Christians of the Middle Ages were less advanced in thought and in art, as well as in general culture, than contemporary Mohammedans; but the Koran eventually destroyed science and philosophy, and the Bible at least in Western Europe did not. This may have been due to many causes. Possibly the weakness of the Bible as an obstacle to thought is that it is a composite of inconsistent ideas by many different authors, whereas the Koran is a single whole, consistently obsolete. Possibly the West escaped from tradition more easily because it was divided into many different cultures under different ruling castes, whereas Mohammedanism was a more homogeneous culture under a very few dominant castes.

Whatever the causes may be, clearly modern thought has developed within Western civilization, and has spread thence into America, into modern Japan, modern India, and parts of Africa. It follows that the new religion has a closer relation to the Christian tradition than to that of any other religion. This may be bad or good. It is bad in so far as it limits the outlook and causes prejudgment of certain issues. For example, even rationalists often adopt the irrational idea of

Digitized by Google

Judaism and of some forms of Christianity that work is and ought to be disagreeable. On the other hand the relation of the new religion to Western Christianity may be good in so far as the latter provides a soil of traditional practices and attitudes, without which no new development can be permanent. No revolution is secure if it breaks completely with ancient habits. No new plant can live in entirely unaccustomed soil.

These are some of the connections between the old and the new religion; but what are the differences?

First, the new religion arises out of the results and methods of modern science and modern art. The best way of explaining what this means is to contrast the new attitude with a liberal interpretation of the old religion. Many of those who profess to be Christians interpret the ancient tradition so boldly that it seems to be in no way opposed to a modern outlook. Thus the earlier chapters of the Bible become a poetic rendering of Darwinian evolution, the sacraments become no more sacred than any meal or any symbolic habit such as that of shaking hands, and heaven and hell become merely states of the mind when one is happy or unhappy. From this point of view the Christian may profess adhesion to any creed and also accept any statements which contradict the obvious meaning of that creed. The liberal theologian is not dishonest. He is doing for Christianity precisely what the ancient philosophers did for pagan mythology in the first years of our era. The liberal interpretation of the creed is often the first stage in the advance toward the new religion, although many interpreters prefer to remain at that stage. A further advance is often very inconvenient, especially for clergymen. The interpretation of texts, however, is a sign of freedom: for Renan has very well said, "The human spirit cannot be enchained. Tie it to a text, and it will escape in the commentary."

A more radical change has now occurred. The new religion is not a mere development of the old, but is a new departure from a new starting-point, as the child is a new departure from

Digitized by Google

the parent. There is a fundamental difference between all liberal Christianity and the new religion; for the latter is not concerned with commentary or interpretation of texts or creeds or habits. The starting-point of the new religion is not tradition but immediate experience. The chairs and tables of ordinary life, the thoughts and feelings of ordinary men at ordinary times, the distance from London to New York and the present age of respectable devices such as the British Parliament—these are the facts of which we take account. Here and nowhere else is our revelation. It is not reserved to any, but is open to all men at all times. The one thing needful is to use your own eyes and ears. The senses are the sacred ways along which whatever is divine in the world comes to us, and the mind is but a short name for all the senses we have.

Out of such daily experience arise science, history, and the arts. To express your knowledge well, you must be a scientist; to express your emotion well, you must be an artist; but every man is something of both. So far, however, there is hardly place for religion; for it needs no religious ability to tell an eel from an elephant. There is in addition in some men an ability to feel ultimate issues and realities which cannot be expressed in science and can only be indicated by the arts. In the midst, therefore, of the ordinary experience of which science and art take account, there is sometimes found by some men a strange quality in experience which raises them (as it seems) to another plane. All such metaphors are dangerous, but the metaphor of being raised above the valleys of experience is ancient and its implications should be well enough recognized. It does not involve any fantastic new method of knowledge nor any special privilege. Any man who is capable of such experience may find that his everyday view of the world he lives in is changed and that he has come, as it were, to a new point of view. The same familiar things are to be seen, but now from a new angle. What makes this new point of view religious is that from it one sees the vast spaces yet unexplored

Digitized by Google

by normal vision, all as a living whole in which one's own past stands out. The greater issues of birth and death, of endless time and the fate of man take up into themselves the smaller daily problems of business and pleasure. The world of space and time absorbs the home we live in and the brief hour of life.

The new religion, which is the reaction to such elements in experience, finds its expression not only in the conclusions of philosophers but also in the songs of poets; for the modern poet fulfils the function of the prophet. Thus in Walter de la Mare's poem, "The Flower," there is some of the feeling which has been here called the new religion:

Horizon to horizon, lies outspread
The tenting firmament of day and night;
Wherein are winds at play; and planets shed
Amid the stars their gentle gliding light.

The huge world's sun flames on the snow-capped hills;
Cindrous his heat burns in the sandy plain;
With myriad spume-bows roaring ocean swills
The cold profuse abundance of the rain.

And man—a transient object in this vast,
Sighs o'er a universe transcending thought,
Afflicted by vague bodings of the past,
Driven toward a future, unforeseen, unsought.

Yet, see him, stooping low to naked weed
That meeks its blossom in his anxious eye,
Mark how he grieves, as if his heart did bleed,
And wheels his wondrous features to the sky;

As if, transfigured by so small a grace,
He sought Companion in earth's dwelling-place.

Such is one among many expressions to be found in modern poetry of the survival of religion and its transformation into something new. It follows that the new religion is gradually permeating society, so that many believers in the ancient creeds today really differ immensely in their outlook from that of

Digitized by Google

the old orthodoxy. The division between old and new is very seldom sharp and definite and the old hostilities of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries are no longer so extreme. One finds even in the speech of deans and bishops the phrases of modern knowledge; and modern methods of investigation are innocently used even by theologians who little know how much they undermine in the effort to make the foundations of belief more secure.

In the continually changing relations of old and new the new has so far gained ground even in the churches and chapel of orthodoxy. There is much less confidence among believers and their interpretations of the creeds and the sacred books are bolder. But it should be remembered that progress is never secure. There may be a reaction and indeed at the end of the war it seemed that there was a reaction among the half-educated ladies of fashion and gentlemen of leisure. The new religion is not safe; nor is the work accomplished which is necessary for the freedom of the spirit of man. Our task, therefore, is to attend more carefully to such moments of insight and deep feeling as may come to each of us. If we preserve such vision as we have, even when there are clouds we live as we should in the sunlight; for a man's best moments cannot be many and none of them last long, but in the light of such moments the whole of life may be lived. The new religion will find its justification, not in the logical proof that the old is mistaken, nor in the excellence of science or art, but in the lives of its adherents.

LONDON, ENGLAND

Digitized by Google

BOOK REVIEWS

CONTEMPORARY BRITISH PHILOSOPHY. Personal Statements (First Series). Edited by J. H. Muirhead, LL.D. London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1923. Pp. 432. Price, 16*s*. net.

This is a most interesting and amusing book. We shall look forward to still greater amusement when the second series of personal statements is published. There is every variety of belief expressed about the characteristics of reality or the nature of the world we live in; and the old friendship of philosophy with theology is represented by the articles of Dean Inge and Bishop Temple. No doubt a philosophical significance can be perceived in the bishop's assertion that he has been a regular communicant since he was twelve years old. Imagine a series of essays on mathematics or biology or history whose authors confessed that they ate fish on Fridays or practiced baptism by immersion.

The volume is a valuable record of the prevailing confusion of methods and results in philosophy in Great Britain. Most of the articles are attempts to state comprehensive views of the whole of reality as necessary conclusions. Naturally Dean Inge and Bishop Temple do not delve into evidence but emphasize their convictions. The philosophers, however, make summaries of the evidence and in general this follows the idealist tradition. It is worth noting that the older philosophers seem to rest a great part of their argument upon "moral" facts or "elements of value," whereas the younger sort, although they acknowledge the importance of such facts, show no special interest in them. Professor Hobhouse, for example, makes an almost passionate statement of the fact of personality, whereas Professor Broad writes "the religious and mystical experiences of mankind" must be taken into "most serious consideration," but "many people, of whom I am one, are practically without those experiences." The many schemes for understanding reality are refreshingly increased by Mr. Bertrand Russell who provides one in the brief space of two pages at the end of his article; but he confesses that in this matter other philosophers have the advantage, since each arrives at the certainty of the exclusive truth of his own system while his scheme is frankly a transient hypothesis.

Prefixed to many of the articles are short statements by the authors of the course of study or the occupations they have followed; and at the end of each article is a list of publications of the author of the article.

Digitized by Google

The book should, therefore, prove useful in any philosophical library, less as a summary of doctrines than as a means of discounting certain prejudices or limitations which must be obvious to the reader of the works of contemporary philosophers. It seems regrettable that the same terms, "mind," "thought," "proposition," "logic," etc., should be used in so many different senses by contemporaries; but far more regrettable is the vagueness and indecision in attaching any meaning whatever to such terms. This perhaps indicates that the objects of which philosophers discourse are not very clearly perceived or distinguished by them. In a fog it is easy to believe that all things are one.

C. D. BURNS

LONDON, ENGLAND

THE DISINHERITED FAMILY. By Eleanor F. Rathbone. A plea for the endowment of the family. London: Arnold, 1924. Pp. xii+324. Price, 7*s*. 6*d*. net.

This study is a closely reasoned and articulate consideration of the family unit as an economic problem, which leads Miss Rathbone to advance a plea for the endowment of motherhood. In the first part of her book her object is to "put the present method of providing for families on the dissecting table and subject it to a thorough examination." It is pointed out that the complete dependency of the wife and children upon the earnings of the male head is of modern growth, while the family formerly assisted in earning the household living—hence the employment of young children in cotton mills in the industrial revolution, which was considered as a normal extension of their employment at home, and as a boon to families overburdened with children. When child labor was slowly released from factories, it was not realized, in fixing rates of wages, that a heavy economic burden was laid upon the male head of the family.

A valuable contribution is her dissection of the imaginary "normal family" (arrived at by averaging), consisting of husband, wife, and three dependent children, which is, however, one of the least common family units in actuality. The commission appointed by the Australian commonwealth in 1919 to investigate the principle of the minimum wages based upon the "normal family unit" reported:

> There is little doubt that the present quasi-submergence of employees with families is due to ignoring the true incidence of the actual cost of living. From the produced wealth of the country, its children have less than enough in order that the unmarried childless may have more than enough.

The result of paying an uniform wage to wage-earners whose needs are obviously widely variable might have been foreseen. The closing

Digitized by Google

section of this valuable sociological study is given up to consideration of experimental family allowances in Australia, and certain European states, New Zealand, and Japan. It is significant that the system of family allowances in France has been effective in increasing the birth-rate.

M. J.

EARLY BUDDHIST MONACHISM. By Dutt Sukumar. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1924.

The merging of Aryan culture with that of the pre-Aryan peoples of India to produce the multiform religious currents of the first millenium B.C. makes one of the most fascinating chapters of the world's religious history. It is also one of the most perplexing. The author of this book selects from that tangled period the single problem of the development of the Buddhist order of monks and presents it in a way that is clear and convincing. He shows the need which produced the body of wandering teachers in the non-Aryan East. Narrowing his study, then, to the special class of Buddhist mendicants, he traces the peculiar development of that body, the stages of the evolution of their code into the ritual of an order, explains the democratic form of government which arose after their great master had passed from the scene, and presents a picture of the arrangements for communal life in a typical district headquarters. In working out his own problem he suggests avenues of research for other workers in the obscure and fertile field of sixth-century India. No one can read the book without a sense of reverence for the creative power, democratic spirit, and freedom of thought of the race which produced these amazing systems. The work is a genuine contribution toward an understanding of the development of early Buddhist monasticism. It will be most valuable in its suggestions to specialists; for the uninitiated layman of the West its constant and unavoidable use of technical terms will make it very difficult reading.

A. EUSTACE HAYDON

THE POSITIVE RELIGION. By J. C. Ghose. Bhowanipur: The Calcutta Law Press, 1924.

India also has her modernism. This work may be best described as a brave and brilliant apologia for the values of God, immortality, and the spiritual life in the face of modern science and philosophy. The author brings to his task an unusual equipment—knowledge of the findings and implications of modern science, a wide acquaintance with philosophy, oriental and western, a thorough understanding of the history of the world-religions, and a glowing religious mysticism. Accepting change

Digitized by Google

as fundamental he makes no attempt to rescue any particular formulation of doctrine nor any historic embodiment of religious life from the scientific onslaught. He interprets change, however, as development. Evolution shows the emergence of life from dead matter and through the long ages a progressive achievement of the *better*—all under a leadership and protecting presence which we may know as God. The book is not so much an argument as a statement of a possible interpretation of the world from the point of view of one whose own religious life makes it seem true. It will be consoling to those who are already convinced. The unbeliever cannot but rejoice in the spirit of quiet tolerance that pervades the pages. The author will win admiration even though his modernism may not produce conviction.

A. EUSTACE HAYDON

SHORTER NOTICES

THE FIGHTING INSTINCT. By Pierre Boevt Litt.D., translated by J.Y.T. Greig, M.A. London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1923. Pp. 252. Price, 10*s*. 6*d*. net.

Is it possible to isolate a pure fighting instinct, in a strict sense, which is independent of the aggressiveness which appears when other instincts or impulses—sex, hunger, and so forth—are forcibly thwarted? That is not the problem raised by Monsieur Bovet, who studies and describes the aggressive tendency with great skill and patience from its simplest expression to the forms it assumes in social life, and compares it with the sex instinct. The conclusion he reaches is that "aggressiveness is a part of human nature, but is very variously expressed at different ages and may be sublimated. War today no longer satisfies the aggressiveness or initiative of most individuals. It is not the pacifist education of individuals that has to be done, but that of the governing classes."

THE HELLENISTIC AGE. Essays by J. B. Bury, Edwyn Bevan, E. A. Barber, and W. E. Tarn. Cambridge: University Press, 1923. Pp. 151. Price, 6*s*. net.

Short as this book is, it is one of the most important of recent contributions to the history of civilization. It is most valuable as a study of moral standards and intellectual movements in a period which has been somewhat neglected by historians. The Mediterranean civilization between Alexander the Great and the domination of Rome produced Euclid and Greek science, the Stoic and Epicurean philosophies and social revolutions. Professor Bury begins with a general essay on the period emphasizing its importance for the history of thought. Mr. Barber follows with a study of the literature, but in the modern manner, not in the old formal linguistic tradition. Mr. Bevan's article on popular philosophy is most valuable and illuminating, and gives a very important side light upon the reasons for the success of early Christianity. Mr. Tarn's paper is on the economic and social conditions of the time, showing the extreme division of rich and poor, the distress of rising prices and the character of communistic revolutionary movements especially in Sparta. Professor Bury and Mr. Tarn are at Cambridge, and Mr. Barber and Mr. Bevan represent Oxford. The scholarship and the critical insight of the essays are in the very

Digitized by Google

best tradition of the older universities. The essays are based upon informal lectures to graduates at Corpus Christi College, Cambridge; and it is to be hoped that they will have sufficient success to be followed by others of equal interest and importance.

C. D. B.

PSYCHOLOGY AND PRIMITIVE CULTURE. By F. C. Bartlett, director of the Psychological Laboratory in the University of Cambridge. Cambridge University Press, 1923. Pp. 294. Index. Price, 8*s*. 6*d*. net.

This book, although not designed with reference to moral problems, will be useful to students of ethics and social philosophy. The primitive society to which reference is made is the actual field of exploration for ethnology and the history of religion. But Mr. Bartlett keeps always in view the likeness between the tendencies within that society and the tendencies of modern life. Therefore the study he gives us is never far removed from reality which can be tested by the ordinary educated man. One of the most interesting theories is that which concerns the formation of special groups within a society. Certain social tendencies which may be contrary are preserved by being, as it were, embodied in distinct groups. Classes arise. Specialists within the class are supported by the group, sometimes against the outside society, and sometimes special ability, such as the early form of science in magic, is driven into secret corners in which a special group protects and develops it.

In dealing with the folk-story, Mr. Bartlett emphasizes the importance of the listeners or audience; but he does not develop his theory as he might. Children, for example, are strongly conservative listeners, and will not endure changes made by a careless story-teller. Even the audience at a learned lecture contributes something to the situation; and in politics the audience at a meeting may contribute more than the speaker.

The conflict of tendencies having been resolved by embodiment in groups, there is interchange between groups as there is between different cultures or civilizations. Mr. Bartlett considers both the transmission of culture by borrowing and the diffusion of culture and its development. The chief examples are again drawn from the usual ethnological sources, books on Australian tribes and American Indians. The one criticism which might be made on the otherwise admirable analysis of the evidence is that there is no personal contact of the writer with primitive men "in the flesh." They may exist at Cambridge, but it is improbable that the author would meet them if they did. The primitive is, no doubt, as Mr. Bartlett very well argues against Lévy-Bruhl, very like the civilized man in his methods of thinking, but there is an atmosphere surrounding the whole of primitive life which is generally lost by workers in the laboratory. In psychology it is as it is in painting: studio painting may be excellent, but it often lacks atmosphere, and no models in the studio can ever replace the free movement of figures in wind and rain. Nevertheless, Mr. Bartlett has succeeded in a difficult task, for he is definite and logical where so many investigations of primitive mentality have been vague and sentimental.

C. D. B.

CHRONICON SPINOZANUM. Tomus alter. Hagae comitis. Curis Societatis Spinozanae, MCMXXII.

Though belated, notice should not be omitted of this, the second volume of essays and newly edited material bearing on the life and philosophy of Spinoza, issued by the Spinoza Society with headquarters at the Hague. The essays in the present volume are of a high order, including treatments of various aspects of Spinoza's thought by such authors as A. Wolf, Harald Hoffding,

Digitized by Google

L. Roth, Carl Gebhardt, E. von Petersdorff, and J. H. Carp, in the course of which important work is done toward the proper orientation of the Jewish thinker in relation to the ideas and interests of some hitherto neglected predecessors. The series bids fair to become indispensable for those who find in Spinoza a continued appeal, or wish to understand his unique influence in modern philosophy.

EDWIN A. BURTT

EPOCHS IN BUDDHIST HISTORY. By Kenneth J. Saunders, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1924.

This volume offers to the public the "Haskell Lectures in Comparative Religion" delivered in 1921. Mr. Saunders has shown an open-mindedness and sympathy in all his writings on Buddhism. On that account he has been able to render an important service in introducing the layman to the spirit of the religion. This book tells the story of the rise of Buddhism as it centered about the magnetic personality of Gotama, traces the early development in India, and follows the spread of the religion in Ceylon, Burma, Siam, Korea, China, Japan, Nepal, and Tibet. The title of the book modestly makes acknowledgment that the author realizes that no scholar is yet wise enough to write a complete history of Buddhism. It is indeed a series of sketches of various forms of thinking at different epochs and in many lands rather than a history of the religion. Even as an interpretation of the *ideas* of Buddhism it suffers from the fact that the author assumes that the Scriptures are an adequate source. Specialists will undoubtedly find the book unsatisfying because so many of the crucial problems are left untouched. Missionaries at work on the field will complain that this is an idealization of Buddhism as they know it. Modern historians will object to its methodology. For the layman, untroubled by too much knowledge of Buddha lore and Buddhist lands, it will be a valuable introduction to one of the most important religions in the modern world.

A. EUSTACE HAYDON

THE UNKNOWABLE. By George Santayana. New York: Oxford University Press, American Branch. Pp. 29. Price, 2s. net.

In this Herbert Spencer lecture, delivered at Oxford in 1923, Professor Santayana in one of the happiest streaks of his inimitable style orients the concept of the unknowable in the Spencerian philosophy and discourses upon the function of the concept in human experience generally. To render substance unknowable by definition did not for Spencer and does not for us annihilate it nor lessen its beneficent functioning. A definition of knowledge that renders matter or substance or God unknowable renders unknowable at the same time all things else that matter. Substance is unknowable only when either the term "substance" or the term "knowledge" is used in trivial senses. "Belief in substance, besides being inevitable in daily life (which I think is the right place for philosophy), is vindicated by the adequacy and harmony of the view it gives us of existence."

T. V. SMITH

THEISM AND THOUGHT (Gifford Lectures, 1922–23). By the Earl of Balfour. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1923. Pp. xii, 281. Price, 15s. net.

The substance of Lord Balfour's second course of Gifford Lectures, now published as *Theism and Thought*, is complementary to the earlier *Theism and Humanism*, and the Index of the present volume is a guide to both. Lord Balfour delimits a narrow field for his Gifford Lectures. He is not dealing at

Digitized by Google

large with the history of philosophy, the metaphysic of nature, the epistemology and psychology of perception, but only with such fragments of these subjects as are relevant to "the philosophy of the familiar"; and to the question why certain familiar and fundamental beliefs (such, for instance, that we exist, that memory is a trustworthy instrument, that we have a real and regular world to exist in) should be treated as true. It is clear that this body of belief is inevitable, for "so far the human race is compelled to travel in company; in the ranks of the army are to be found some who grumble, but none who desert," but though inevitable, as Mr. Bertrand Russell has shown, methodological doubt steps in, asks inconvenient questions, and presses for a reply. In the present, as in the first course of lectures, the system called naturalism is Lord Balfour's dragon. It may be objected that the dragon has retreated from the scene as an active antagonist. However, accepting naturalism as still in being, still actively regarding the universe as "unguided," still explaining the evolution of intelligence, conscience, and the aesthetic sense as the "unpurposed" survival of the fittest, he answers that "To higher things selection is either indifferent or hostile and if among the by-products of its activities higher things have been indirectly produced, this result can only be due either to accident or guidance." His verdict is unhesitatingly given for guidance. Unless the reality of a universe which is spiritually guided is assumed, the higher values, love and beauty and knowledge, if regarded as transitory and ineffectual accidents of material evolution, must lessen and fade. That our familiar stock of beliefs presents puzzles is not indeed a novelty, but he makes an original use of the "naturalist" attitude toward such beliefs as a solvent to that theory. He writes: "We are required to deny that matter at any stage of evolution is moved by reason or influenced by purpose. The causes of our beliefs must, therefore, be regarded as non-rational, whether they be remote or whether they be proximate. With the remote causes, indeed, we are not now concerned. They must have first come into operation when the world was young, before matter gave birth to life, or life flowered into reason. But it has to be noted that reason since then has, on the materialistic hypothesis, run no independent course. None of our beliefs are due to it. They are by supposition mere epiphenomena, the product of nervous changes, which themselves obey only the laws of matter. And since there is no ground for supposing that purely non-rational causes will issue, except by accident, in anything but non-rational effects, and since the materialistic dogma we are discussing is itself one of these effects, materialism is a creed which by its essential nature destroys its supports." In its stead, Lord Balfour, who is on the side of the angels, recommends, as is known to readers of the earlier course, theism as an essential support of our familiar creed, the theory which teaches that reason and purpose play a large part in the whole process of belief productions.

INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. Vol. I. By S. Radhakrishnan. London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1923.

Comparison of Professor Radhakrishnan's treatise on Indian philosophy with Max Müller's *Six Systems of Indian Philosophy* affords striking proof of the enormous progress made in the last quarter of a century in the interpretation and evaluation of Indian thought. It is true that in several respects the work of Max Müller failed to utilize fully the information then available, but it has the more than countervailing advantage of being the expression of the views of one who had long studied with sympathetic interests Indian philosophical views, and who himself was versed in German metaphysical speculations. The period since Max Müller's work has been marked, on the one hand, by the systematic investigation of Indian texts by European scholars, and, on the other, by the reinterpretation of their own philosophies by Indian scholars who have made

Digitized by Google

themselves familiar with occidental ideas, and who thus are specially fitted to bring out the essential signification of Indian texts. Western scholars may admire and appreciate the achievement of India in matters of thought, but they are essentially heirs of a different tradition, and the task of developing the philosophical conceptions of India must be performed by those to whom Indian philosophical ideas are an essential part of their mental equipment.

There is, of course, a real danger which is inseparable from the process of reinterpretation, the tendency to read far more into the philosophy of the past than it ever meant to those who expounded it. This is a danger from which Western interpreters have not escaped; Professor Deussen's enthusiasm for the Upanishads as precursors of Kant and Schopenhauer led him into grave misunderstandings, and it is still more difficult for an Indian interpreter to adopt that judicial and detached attitude, which gives its special value to Professor Oldenberg's exposition of the doctrines of the Upanishads. Professor Radhakrishnan's familiarity with modern philosophy, while it enables him to invest with unusual interest and even charm the often somewhat crude ideas of early India, undoubtedly leads him to convey at times rather what one would wish to find than what is actually present in the sources. But it is easy to excuse one, who aims rather at a general survey of Indian thought than at a formal history, for determining to bring out explicitly what may be held to be implicit in the sources; the disadvantage is that the student who has not easy access to the authorities may be misled into confusion between what was actually in the minds of early Indian thinkers and what may legitimately be regarded as the logical outcome of their ideas. But he cannot fail to be stimulated and led on to further study by the enthusiasm of the author, while even those scholars who differ from his evaluations will find much that is undoubtedly sound and provocative of reflection. Moreover this work, taken in conjunction with Professor Dasgupta's *History of Indian Philosophy*, may serve to convince general historians of philosophy that India can no longer be treated as negligible in the history of thought.

It is natural that, in reaction against the neglect by the West of Indian conceptions, the author should be inclined to run to the opposite extreme. It is impossible to admit the claim (pp. 29, 30) of substantial achievement in science for early India; the philosophies treated of in this volume, those of the Upanishads, the epic, the Jains, and the Buddhists alike, are marked by their aloofness from scientific conceptions; much later indeed we find even Indian logic unappreciative of experiment and content with faulty methods of observation. If ancient India laid the foundation of mathematical knowledge, it is strange indeed that not a trace of the influence of mathematics on Indian thought can be indicated. In truth India was largely indebted to Greece for her science, though later she accomplished original work, but her philosophy was emphatically her own and science never affected it deeply. It is quite impossible to accept the doctrine (p. 342) that early Buddhism in its fundamental ideas and essential spirit approximates remarkably to the advanced scientific thought of the nineteenth century. What all the evidence shows for early Buddhism is a simple and practical, if narrow-minded rationalism, and such measure of subtlety as came into the system was of slow development; moreover this development was psychological only; Buddhism shows itself singularly uninfluenced by any other aspect of science. Nor is there any justification for regarding it as a prophecy of the creative evolutionism of Bergson; here again we have the error of reading something in to the original which is not there, though the comparison may be helpful in aiding modern thought to appreciate ideas which at first sight appear unintelligible. Fortunately here and elsewhere by his citation of the original authorities Professor Radhakrishnan

Digitized by Google

enables us in some degree to control his judgments, and, despite the many points on which divergence from his views seems necessary, he has unquestionably placed all students of Indian thought under a real debt, which will doubtless be enhanced when the work is completed by a volume dealing with the great Brahmanical systems.

A. BURIEDALE KEITH

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY. By Floyd Henry Allport. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1924. Pp. xiv+453.

Written in the conviction that social science has suffered by not keeping up with the advancing psychological insight, this treatise attempts to make available for all persons interested in social relationships the best psychological knowledge as yet attained. More specifically, the author has fruitfully exploited the literature of behaviorism, the ever growing contributions in experimental psychology, and finally the varying leads of the Freudians. This survey, so generously conceived, is executed with admirable balance and proportion. In successfully gathering up and synthesizing these various insights, the author has brought not only information but suggestive guidance for those who, though not primarily interested in social psychology, must still use its springboard for entrance into other fields. What some might regard as a disproportionate emphasis upon the individual is justified upon the basis that "only *within the individual* can we find the behavior mechanisms and the consciousness which are fundamental in the interactions between individuals." The book merits a careful reading by all students of the social sciences, and it will almost certainly prove to be the best text available for courses in social psychology.

T. V. SMITH

ABSENTEE OWNERSHIP AND BUSINESS ENTERPRISE IN RECENT TIMES. THE CASE OF AMERICA. By Thorstein Veblen. New York: B. W. Huebsch, Inc., 1923. Price, $3.00.

The matter which occupies the center of Veblen's attention here, as elsewhere, is the "desperately precarious" discrepancy between "the ancient and immutable rights and principles of law and morals" and the "physical facts" of modern life. And here as elsewhere the author's treatment is literary rather than scientific or pedagogical. The argument proceeds upon the basis of "work-day facts" rather than of "recondite information," and "makes little use of the received theories of political economy not as departing from the received theories or discrediting them but because the inquiry is concerned chiefly with economic forces and phenomena which are of a later date than the received doctrines." And, like Veblen's other books, *Absentee Ownership* aligns itself with literature by dispensing with all indexes, black-face headings, and other aids for the footsore.

As an essay, the book is typical Veblenese. Its argument wanders and turns back upon itself ever and anon, but never loses its stride nor takes a false step. The sentences are monotonously long and rambling; but the diction is vigorous to an incredible degree. The words prance and pirouette upon the page—"This enterprise of disembowelling the country's timber resources"; "Later experience has fluttered against the stable framework of natural rights"; "The authorities of the democratic commonwealths go about their work under a cover of reticence tempered with prevarication"; "Treason is the gravest of crimes, next after lése majesté. Indeed the spirit of national integrity touches the skirts of divinity and carries more than a trace of religious

Digitized by Google

intolerance. So that the crime of treason comes near to the unique atrocity of sin against the Holy Ghost"; "The spirit which chiefly moves the younger generation in these premises is not a boundless aspiration to out-bid and out-run all competitors and reach a preëminent notoriety for a splendid and colorful personal presence. It is to the fear of derogatory notoriety that the expert advertisers of these ways and means of fabricated beauty address themselves." I question whether Veblen has ever penned a racier bit then the note to chapter xi, on the "Propaganda of the Faith."

But Veblen's irony is well known. What is not so generally appreciated even by students is that it is by no means mere irony for the familiar purpose of amelioration by deflation. Quite the contrary. No hint of expectation of any substantial amelioration is conveyed by word, tone, or gesture. The deprecating gesture which accompanies the use of such phrases as those just quoted is, in my opinion, quite sincere, in spite of the fact that, taken ironically, it serves to deepen the irony. When the author asserts that he has "no intention to find fault with these facts of history, or in any way to question the moral value of this untoward frame of mind by which ancient habit besets civilized mankind," he actually means precisely what he says. He deserves to be taken seriously because he is proposing a theory of morals, that facts are facts and morals are ancient habits. "It is only that (the patriotic animus) is untoward in the material respect. Moral values are another matter, and many untoward usages are highly moral. Moral values are a matter of settled habit; and assuredly national animosity is a sufficiently settled habit."

This theory of morals as mores is familiar enough, at least in America; but Veblen's statement of it is uniquely and devastatingly consistent. Sumner, of course, was all at loose ends. All the while that he was saying that the mores can make anything right he could also speak of the justification of mores by evolutionary survival, and by their bearing upon welfare. He apparently suffered no ill effects from holding both that the mores define welfare and that they are selected by reference to the standard of welfare. But here Veblen is painfully clear. There are mores. There are also the biological conditions of survival. When men take thought concerning conduct, they have regard to immemorial principles of make-believe. Then they either live or die according to the facts of the case. "Whether any given people is to come through any given period of such enforced change, alive and fit to live, appears to be a matter of chance in which human insight plays a minor part and human foresight no part at all." Which said, Mr. Veblen awaits the ensuing crash with serenely untroubled cynicism.

In short, Veblen drives home in this volume more completely than ever before a point which ethicists must dispose of somehow: that morals and survival on this planet are relevant to each other only in so far as death sets a limit to the incompetence of morals. Few readers will have any great difficulty with their own emotions in disposing of this point; but whether such disposition will have been righteous or intelligent remains a question that may still preoccupy random philosophers.

C. E. AYRES

NATURAL JUSTICE AND PRIVATE PROPERTY. By Rev. Daniel Merino B. (of Santiago, Chile). 1922. N. V. "Lecturis," Eindhofen.

This little volume is evidently a dissertation presented to the faculty of some Catholic seminary, and for some strange reason circulated in badly proofread English. In it the author essays to deduce from the writings of popes, theologians, and economists certain general principles concerning the rights and duties of property. The principles are not particularly striking, with this one exception: the distinction is made between property that is the fruit of the

Digitized by Google

owner's toil and "natural goods," and upon this basis the author suggests that when the limitation of the rights of ownership is under discussion, the burden of proof in the former case should be on those who wish to abridge, and, in the latter on those who wish to maintain, an excellent prescription!

The argument contains little of interest save the fact that the authorities cited upon economic obligation are St. Thomas Acquinas and Professor Sharp (*International Journal of Ethics*, New Hampshire, July, 1920, p. 390).

C. E. AYRES

BOOKS RECEIVED

ADLER, F. The Reconstruction of the Spiritual Ideal (Hibbert Lectures, 1923). London: D. Appleton and Company, 1924. Pp. 218. Price, 6*s*. net.
Annales de L'Institut Superior de Philosophie (Tome V). Paris: Librairie Alcan; Louvain: L'Institut Superieur de Philosophie, 1924. Pp. 697. Price, 57 fr.

BOYLE, M. E. Man before History. London: G. G. Harrap, 1924. Pp. 128. Price, 2*s*. net.

CARR, H. WILDON, D.LITT. The Scientific Approach to Philosophy: Selected Essays and Reviews. London: Macmillan and Company, 1924. Pp. viii+278. Price, 12*s*. net.

DICKSON, V. E. Mental Tests and the Classroom Teacher. London: G. G. Harrap and Company, Ltd., 1924. Pp. xv+231. Price, 6*s*. net.

DODDS, E. R. Select Passages Illustrating Neoplatonism. London: The Society for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge, 1923. Pp. 127. Price, 5*s*. net.

FINOT, JEAN. Race Prejudice. Translated by Florence Wade-Evans. New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, 1906. Pp. xvi+320. Price, $3.00.

FLOWER, J. C. Psychological Studies of Religious Questions. London: Williams and Norgate, 1924. Pp. xii+264. Price, 7*s*. 6*d*. net.

FRISCH, EPHRAIM. An Historical Survey of Jewish Philanthropy. New York: Macmillan Company, 1924. Pp. xi+196. Price $1.75.

GHOSE, J. C. The Positive Religion. Bhowanipur: H. L. Banerjee. Pp. 676.

HARDMAN, OSCAR. Ideals of Asceticism: An Essay in the Comparative Study of Religion. London: The Society for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge, 1924. Pp. xviii+232. Price, 12*s*. net.

HARTLEY, C. G. Women, Love, Children and Marriage. London: H. Cranton, Ltd., 1924. Pp. 190. Price, 7*s*. 6*d*. net.

JOHNSTON, G. A., M.A., D.PH. International Social Progress. London: G. Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1924. Pp. 263. Price, 10*s*. 6*d*. net.

LOCKE, JOHN. An Essay concerning Human Understanding; Abridged and Edited by A. S. Pringle-Pattison. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1924. Pp. xlviii+380. Price, 8*s*. 6*d*. net.

LYMAN, R. L. The Mind at Work. Chicago: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1924. Pp. 349.

MARÉCHAL, J. Études sur la Psychologie des Mystiques (Tome 1). Bruges: C. Beyart, 1924. Pp. viii+266. Price, 12.50 fr.

MCCLURE, B. WALLACE. A New American Commercial Policy. Columbia University Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law. Vol. CXIV, No. 2. Whole No. 255. New York: Longmans, Green and Co.; London: P. S. King and Co., Ltd., 1924.

MCDOUGALL, WILLIAM, F.R.S. Ethics and Some Modern World Problems. London: Methuen and Co., Ltd., 1924. Pp. xvi+240. Price, 7*s*. 6*d*. net.

Digitized by Google

MURGOTTEN, FRANCIS CLARK. The Origins of the Islamic State. Part II. Columbia University Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law. Vol. LXVIII. Whole No. 163A. New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1924. Pp. 297.

O'SHEA, M. V., Editor. The Child: His Nature and His Needs. A Contribution of the Children's Foundation, 1924. Pp. ix+516.

PHILLIPSON, COLEMAN. Three Criminal Law Reformers: Beccaria, Bentham, Romilly. New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, 1923. Pp. 344. Price, $7.00.

RADHA-KRISHNAN, S. The Philosophy of the Upanishads, with a Foreword by Rabindranath Tagore. London: G. Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1924; New York: Macmillan Company. Pp. xvi+143. Price, 5s. net.

REICHL, OTTO. Reichls Philosophischer Almanach. Darmstadt, Germany: Otto Reichl Verlag, 1924. Pp. 480.

RIVERS, W. H. R. Medicine, Magic and Religion. Preface by G. Elliott Smith. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc.; London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., Ltd., 1924. Pp. xviii+146.

ROTH, L. Spinoza, Descartes and Maimonides. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1924. Pp. 148. Price, 7s. 6d. net.

SMALL, ALBION W. Origins of Sociology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1924. Pp. vii+359. Price $3.00.

TURNER, J. E., M.A. The Philosophic Bases of Moral Obligation: A Study in Ethics. London: Macmillan and Company, 1924. Pp. xii+277. Price, 12s. 6d. net.

VAIHINGER, H. The Philosophy of "As If." Translated by C. K. Ogden. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Company, Ltd., 1924. Pp. xlviii+370. Price, 25s. net.

VOLTAIRE. Philosophical Dictionary, selected and translated by H. WOOLF. London: G. Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1924. Pp. 316. Price, 10s. 6d. net.

WERNER, HANS. Die Ursprünge der Lyrik. Munich: Ernst Reinhardt, 1924. Pp. 243. Price, 5 M.

SIXTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF PHILOSOPHY

The American Philosophical Association, through the courtesy of Professor H. Wildon Carr, honorary secretary of the Fifth International Congress, appointed for London in 1915 but interrupted by the war, has been authorized by the Permanent International Committee, as constituted at the Congress of Bologna, 1911, and by the English Organization Committee of 1915, to convene the next International Congress in the United States. The American Association has also received assurances of cordial support from philosophical scholars in England, France, Germany, and Italy. It, therefore, announces its decision to invite the philosophers of all nations to meet with it in the United States in the second week of September, 1926. The place of meeting—to be more definitely announced later—will be at one of the eastern universities, not far from New York. English, French, German, Italian, and Spanish will be recognized as the official languages of the Congress.

In a few months the American Association intends to issue a fuller announcement of the plan of the Congress and more formal invitations to its sister-associations, other learned bodies, and our colleagues throughout the world. Meanwhile, inquiries and correspondence may be addressed to the corresponding secretary, Professor John J. Coss, Columbia University, New York, U.S.A.

For the Organizing Committee,

NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER, *Chairman*
A. C. ARMSTRONG, *Honorary Secretary*

Digitized by Google

THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS

Volume XXXV JANUARY 1925 Number 2

MORAL VALUATIONS ABOUT MEN AND WOMEN

A. P. BROGAN

I

Most of us know, in a general way, that public opinion has had different standards for the moral judgment of men and of women. We know also that reformers, especially feminists, have condemned these so-called double standards. But no definite study has been made of the exact nature of recent public opinion about double standards. So we do not know exactly what the double standards have been or exactly what evolution they may be undergoing. In the present article, an attempt is made to determine what are the characteristics and the changes which may be found in one phase of popular double standards, that of American college students.

In an earlier article in this *Journal* for January, 1923, a study was presented of what may be called general worseness or comparative value. That study showed that there is in public opinion a very definite scale of comparative moral values, and that this scale is remarkably uniform among students in different universities in America. This scale may be called general worseness, because it makes no sex distinctions. The students were asked whether one practice is worse than another, no matter whether both were done by men or by women. Although the investigation of this scale gave very definite results, it is clear that there is another question to be asked. How bad would each practice be if done by a man, and how

Digitized by Google

bad if done by a woman? The answers to these questions give what will be called the scales of double standards. The results concerning these double standards will be an exhibition of one interesting phase of public opinion, will throw some light on the ethics of the double standards, and will present some novel results concerning the use and authority of statistics.

The material used in this study consists of the same sixteen "worst practices" that were used in the earlier article. These practices will be found in any of the following tables. The practices were listed by the students themselves without any help or suggestions from the teacher. They were then put in alphabetical order and given to the students for further work. This work was done at the beginning of a course in elementary ethics, before any class or textbook discussion of problems could influence the students. Usually the sheets were unsigned, but this precaution did not influence the results noticeably. Three rankings were secured from each student. First, the students were asked to rank the practices in the order of what they considered worse for a woman to do. These figures give a scale of comparative badness for women's actions. For the sake of brevity, this scale will be called worseness for women. Then the students were asked to state for each practice whether that practice is worse for a man to do than for a woman to do, or whether it is worse for a woman to do, or whether it is about equally bad for men and for women. These figures give what I shall call the "criss-cross," as they enable us to tie together the scale for men and the scale for the women. Finally the students were asked to rank the practices according to the comparative badness for men. This gives what will be called the scale of worseness for men.

The tables and figures presented in the present article are based upon student judgments collected at the University of Texas from 1921 to 1924, and also upon some material from the University of Chicago and other universities during the same years. Since the results about the scales of double standards

Digitized by Google

are rather intricate and perplexing, the figures for the academic year 1922–23 at the University of Texas are printed in detail, and then other results are compared with them. In this one year at Texas, the figures were collected from 126 men and from 99 women. Each student gives three judgments about each of sixteen practices. Somewhat over a thousand students have been studied with reference to double standards. So the present article summarizes the statistical characteristics of approximately 50,000 judgments.

TABLE I

WORSENESS FOR MEN

1	2	3	4	5
PRACTICES IN ORDER OF WORSENESS	VOTES OF MEN		VOTES OF WOMEN	
	Averages	Ranks	Averages	Ranks
1. Sex irregularity	3.1	1	2.1	1
2. Stealing	3.2	2	3.9	2
3. Cheating	4.5	3	5.3	3
4. Lying	5.2	4	5.63	6
5. Drinking	6.2	5	5.62	5
6. Gambling	6.6	6	5.56	4
7. Vulgar talk	7.3	7	7.73	8
8. Swearing	8.5	8	7.70	7
9. Idleness	9.6	9	8.8	9
10. Selfishness	9.8	10	10.55	12
11. Sabbath-breaking	10.3	11	10.53	11
12. Snobbishness	10.4	12	12.7	15
13. Gossip	11.0	13	10.4	10
14. Extravagance	11.1	14	11.7	13
15. Smoking	13.9	15	12.3	14
16. Dancing	14.5	16	14.2	16

II

The scale of worseness for men is given in Table I. The practices are listed in the order given by the men, with the worst at the top. Column 2 shows the arithmetical averages as given by the men, with the corresponding rank in column 3. Columns 4 and 5 give the averages and ranks according to the votes of the women about the men. The reader will notice that the rank given by the men about the men is very similar to the rank given by the women about the men. The coeffi-

Digitized by Google

cient of correlation is positive .95. This is a very high correlation, though it is not as high as the correlations for the scale of general worseness. The only important differences in this scale of worseness for men concern gambling, snobbishness, and gossip. There is a tendency for the women's averages to lump several practices as being approximately on the same level.

The medians and the ranks by medians are omitted in order to save space. Their correlations with the ranks by averages are between .98 and .99. (Since most of our correlations are very high and positive, they are to be understood as positive unless separately labeled negative.) The dispersion was studied in connection with the medians. The quartiles for the men about the men range from 1 to $2\frac{1}{2}$. The average of the quartiles is 1.94. The average of the women's quartiles about the men is 1.62.

III

Table II shows the scale of worseness for women. The arrangement of columns is the same as in Table I. When the ranks in columns 3 and 5 are compared, we find the extremely high correlation of .99. In other words, there is virtual identity between the men about the women and the women about the women. There is no difference of more than one rank. There are four instances where two practices exchange their ranks. But it would be difficult to find any significance in a one-point divergence in rank.

When the rank in column 5 is compared with the rank by medians the correlation is .99. The dispersion is similar to the dispersion for the figures about the men. The average of the quartiles for the women about the women happens to be exactly the same as for the men about the men, 1.94. The average of the quartiles for the men about the women is 1.81. Each sex has a smaller dispersion in its judgments about the opposite sex than in its judgments about itself. I do not know how to explain this fact.

Digitized by Google

IV

Are we now in a position to compare the rank of what is worse for men with the rank of what is worse for women? We can do so, but only superficially. We can find the correlations between the different ranks but we cannot draw inferences about the comparative badness of any practice with respect to the two sexes. Thus the women rank gossip higher in the scale of worseness for women than in the scale of worseness for

TABLE II

WORSENESS FOR WOMEN

1	2	3	4	5
PRACTICES IN ORDER OF WORSENESS	VOTES OF MEN		VOTES OF WOMEN	
	Averages	Ranks	Averages	Ranks
1. Sex irregularity	1.8	1	2.2	1
2. Stealing	3.9	2	4.2	2
3. Cheating	5.4	3	6.0	4
4. Drinking	5.6	4	5.3	3
5. Lying	5.7	5	6.3	5
6. Vulgar talk	6.8	6	6.5	6
7. Swearing	7.2	7	6.9	8
8. Gambling	7.8	8	6.8	7
9. Gossip	10.0	9	9.4	9
10. Smoking	10.1	10	10.2	10
11. Sabbath-breaking	10.4	11	11.1	12
12. Selfishness	10.7	12	10.7	11
13. Snobbishness	11.2	13	11.7	14
14. Idleness	11.3	14	11.6	13
15. Extravagance	11.7	15	12.1	15
16. Dancing	14.6	16	14.4	16

men. Does this imply that gossip is worse for women than for men? We are not yet in a position to say. The reader may be referred to one result in the article on "Group Estimates of Frequency of Misconduct," published in this *Journal* for April, 1924. Stealing was placed as 16 (least frequent) among the men, but 12 among the women. Yet when our tables were completed we found that stealing was placed as less frequent among the women. There were other practices which were less frequent among the women and these crowded

Digitized by Google

stealing up to position 12, even though it was less frequent than among the men. Now so far we have no knowledge whether there might be a similar condition in the double-standard figures. Abstractly it might be that every practice is considered worse for women than for men. From our two similar ranks we can neither affirm nor deny this possibility. We need what has been called the criss-cross, that is, the figures for the answers to the direct questions whether each practice is worse for a man than for a woman, and so forth.

In the meantime all we can do is to note certain correlations. The women about the two scales have a correlation of .92. The men have a correlation of .89. The men about the men and the women about the women have a correlation of .90. These are still rather high correlations. If we rested with these figures, we should be inclined to say that there is no noteworthy double standard in the morality of these American students. The only exceptions concern smoking and idleness.

V

The figures for the so-called criss-cross are given in Table III. This table shows, as the reader will recall from the introductory section, the answers to the questions whether each practice is worse for a man to do than for a woman to do, or worse for a woman, or about the same in badness. The answers were tabulated according to the threefold division, and then turned into percentages. For example, there was a very small percentage voting that cheating is worse for men, a majority voting that it is the same in badness, and another small percentage voting that it is worse for women. As there were no noteworthy differences between the votes of the men and the votes of the women, the results were thrown together. However, the main figures for the two sexes will be shown separately. In order to use these threefold divisions for our purposes, they were subjected to the same treatment that was used in the similar figures for frequency of misconduct. (See this *Journal*,

Digitized by Google

XXXIV, 261–63.) The total number of votes about each practice was divided into the sum of the votes saying "worse for men" plus one-half of the votes saying "same in badness." This method gives a scale of percentages such that the smallest percentage indicates most agreement that that practice is worse for women than for men, and the largest percentage indicates most agreement that that practice is worse for men. Please notice that this is a scale of relative agreement among opinions but not a scale of badness.

TABLE III

CRISS-CROSS

1	2	3	4	5	6
Practices	Rank by Men and Women Together	Percentages for Rank in Preceding Column	In Which Sex Worse	Percentages by Sexes Separately	
				Men	Women
Smoking	1	10	Women	7	13
Swearing	2	14½	Women	10	19
Drinking	3	15	Women	13	17
Vulgar talk	4	15½	Women	9	22
Sex irregularity	5	22½	Women	20	25
Gambling	6	29½	Women	29	30
Stealing	7	44½	Same	43	46
Sabbath-breaking	8	47½	Same	46	49
Cheating	9	49	Same	48	50
Gossip	10	49½	Same	54	45
Dancing	11½	51½	Same	47	56
Lying	11½	51½	Same	50	53
Extravagance	13	53	Same	60	46
Selfishness	14½	54½	Same	56	53
Snobbishness	14½	54½	Same	62	47
Idleness	16	76½	Men	79	74

Column 5 of Table III gives the percentages according to the men, column 6 according to the women. With few exceptions, the women tend to give percentages which are closer to 50 than the men's percentages. This means that they are somewhat more reluctant to admit double standards in morality.

Column 3 gives the results of adding the percentages in columns 5 and 6 and then halving them. In other words, it gives the combination of the votes of the two sexes without

Digitized by Google

regarding the greater number of men than of women. Column 2 gives the rank for the practices according to column 3. Thus there is most agreement that smoking is worse for women and that idleness is worse for men. The other practices are in between these two. Column 4 classifies all the practices according to the figures in column 3. Practices with percentages from 0 to 33 are called worse for women. Practices with percentages from 34 to 66 are classified as the same in badness. Practices with percentages from 67 to 100 are called worse for men. Idleness is the only practice which is voted to be worse for men than for women. There are six practices which are considered worse for women: smoking, swearing, drinking, vulgar talk, sex irregularity, and gambling. The other nine practices are considered about the same in badness, as the percentages for the combined votes run from 44 to 54.

VI

We are now ready to tie together the scales about the two sexes by the use of the so-called criss-cross. I shall use the word "co-ordination" for this process of tying together. Table IV shows the co-ordination for the men's votes. Column 1 gives the averages for the men about the men. Column 6 gives the averages for the men about the women. Columns 3 and 4 give the results for the criss-cross. Both columns give the same information, but column 3 gives the information for each of the men's practices as arranged in column 2, while column 4 gives the same information for each of the women's practices as arranged in column 5. In columns 3 and 4, the letter "M" stands for "worse for men," the letter "W" stands for "worse for women," and the letter "S" stands for "same in badness." When the letter "S" occurs in column 3 the reader should look across to the right and see that the same practice is on (approximately) the same line in column 5. When the letter "W" occurs in column 3 the reader should glance to the right and upward until he sees the same practice in column 5.

Digitized by Google

In the one instance of a practice worse for men, the reader should look down from position 9 among the men to position 14 among the women. This table was constructed by first tying together all the practices which were considered the same in badness. Then the other practices were fitted around these "same" practices.

TABLE IV

CO-ORDINATION OF MEN'S VOTES

1	2	3	4	5	6
Averages about Men	Men's Practices	In Which Sex Worse		Women's Practices	Averages about Women
			W	Sex irregularity	1.8
3.1	Sex irregularity	W			
3.2	Stealing	S	S	Stealing	3.9
4.5	Cheating	S	S	Cheating	5.4
			W	Drinking	5.6
5.2	Lying	S	S	Lying	5.7
			W	Vulgar talk	6.8
6.2	Drinking	W	W	Swearing	7.2
			W	Gambling	7.8
6.6	Gambling	W			
7.3	Vulgar talk	W			
8.5	Swearing	W			
			S?	Gossip?	10.0
9.6	Idleness	M	W	Smoking	10.1
9.8	Selfishness	S	S	Sabbath-breaking	10.4
10.3	Sabbath-breaking	S	S	Selfishness	10.7
10.4	Snobbishness	S	S	Snobbishness	11.2
11.0	Gossip?	S?	M	Idleness	11.3
11.1	Extravagance	S	S	Extravagance	11.7
13.9	Smoking	W			
14.5	Dancing	S	S	Dancing	14.6

On the whole the men's votes about the men's practices and about the women's practices seem to fit together fairly well. There is just one place where trouble occurs. Concerning gossip there seems to be a self-contradiction in the men's votes. This group of men judge as follows: (1) Women's gossip is worse than women's selfishness. (2) Women's selfishness is the same in badness as men's selfishness. (3) Men's

Digitized by Google

selfishness is worse than men's gossip. (4) But women's gossip is the same in badness as men's gossip. It seems to me undeniable that if X is worse than Y, and if Y is equal in value to Z, and if Z is worse than W, then X must be worse than W. But this logical truth seems to be denied by this group of men. Let us look at the matter in this way: The two ranks in columns 2 and 5 seem clearly to imply that women's gossip is worse than men's gossip. Yet the criss-cross in column 3 or 4 asserts that women's gossip is equal in value or badness to men's gossip. I cannot pretend to explain this contradiction with any assurance. Gossip is listed in the frequency scales as the most frequent practice among the women. In the scale of general worseness, gossip is ranked 13 by the men and 10 by the women. This difference may be due to the fact that most women are more easily injured by gossip than most men. In Table V of this article we shall see that women put gossip about equally bad for men and for women in position 9 or 10. Now why do the men put gossip as 13 among the men and 9 among the women, and yet say it is equally bad in both sexes? I can theorize about this matter but I have no proof as yet.

I do not know whether anyone has ever discovered such a statistical contradiction before or not. Of course many instances of low or negative correlations have been discovered, but we are dealing with something totally different. Probably it would be impossible to discover such self-contradiction except where human opinions were being studied. Moreover, self-contradiction could never be discovered unless a triple set of statistics were being used, and unless all were from the same group. With only two sets of statistics nothing could be discovered except high or low correlations. What our threefold tables show is a contradiction held by the same set of individuals about the same set of topics.

With the exception of the facts about gossip, there is no real contradiction in Table IV. There might seem to be a slight contradiction in the ranks of Sabbath-breaking and selfishness.

Digitized by Google

But the arithmetical averages are so close together that the exchange of positions is unimportant. The reader will notice that even in the figures about gossip, the arithmetical averages differ by only one point. So the self-contradiction, while real, is not as great as it might easily be.

In the co-ordination of the tables about frequency of misconduct, no self-contradiction appeared, though the possibilities for contradiction were the same as for contradiction in this table about double standards.

VII

The co-ordination of the women's votes about double standards is shown in Table V. The order of the columns is the same as in Table IV, but all the votes are by women.

The women have a contradiction not about gossip but about gambling. The arithmetical averages are crowded so close together that it might be doubted whether we have a real contradiction here. But as the ranks stand, we find the following judgments: (1) Men's gambling is worse than men's lying. (2) Men's lying is the same in badness as women's lying. (3) Women's lying is worse than women's gambling. (4) But women's gambling is worse than men's gambling. These judgments clearly imply that men's gambling is worse than women's gambling and also that women's gambling is worse than men's gambling. This is surely an absurd self-contradiction. It would be easy to indulge in unverifiable theories about this contradiction concerning gambling. Instead, I shall point out one interesting fact. In the criss-cross for the frequency of misconduct tables, gambling is at the top as being most typically masculine. Gossip is at the bottom as being most typically feminine. So we get the result that the most typically feminine practice gives rise to contradiction among the men, and the most typically masculine practice gives rise to contradiction among the women. I do not know whether this relationship explains the contradiction in any way.

Digitized by Google

Some day we must study the reasons for all these popular valuations. Such a study must include the reasons for these contradictions. But at present we must concern ourselves with the prior task of description rather than with the later task of explanation.

TABLE V

CO-ORDINATION OF WOMEN'S VOTES

1	2	3	4	5	6
Averages about Men	Men's Practices	In Which Sex Worse		Women's Practices	Averages about Women
			W	Sex irregularity	2.2
2.1	Sex irregularity	W			
3.9	Stealing	S	S	Stealing	4.2
			W	Drinking	5.3
5.3	Cheating	S	S	Cheating	6.0
5.56	Gambling?	W?			
5.62	Drinking	W			
5.63	Lying	S	S	Lying	6.3
			W	Vulgar talk	6.5
			W?	Gambling?	6.8
			W	Swearing	6.9
7.70	Swearing	W			
7.73	Vulgar talk	W			
8.8	Idleness	M			
10.4	Gossip	S	S	Gossip	9.4
			W	Smoking	10.2
10.53	Sabbath-breaking	S	S	Selfishness	10.7
10.55	Selfishness	S	S	Sabbath-breaking	11.1
			M	Idleness	11.6
11.7	Extravagance	S	S	Snobbishness	11.7
12.3	Smoking	W			
12.7	Snobbishness	S	S	Extravagance	12.1
14.2	Dancing	S	S	Dancing	14.4

The rest of Table V seems to be free from contradiction. There is an exchange of ranks between snobbishness and extravagance, but this hardly deserves to be called a contradiction.

The women's chart as given in Table V is very similar to the men's chart as given in Table IV. The high coefficients of

Digitized by Google

correlation have already been given in the accounts of Tables I and II.

NOTE.—The reader should be cautioned that the spatial differences which I have used in Tables IV and V do not correspond exactly to the differences in the arithmetical averages. These tables indicate only approximate relative position. They do not pretend to give anything like quantitative measurements by the spatial differences.

VIII

We are now ready to compare the double-standard scales with the scales for general worseness and for frequency. These

TABLE VI

COMPARISON OF GENERAL WORSENESS, DOUBLE STANDARDS, AND FREQUENCY, UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS, 1922–23

1	2	3	4	5	6
PRACTICES	RANK FOR GENERAL WORSENESS	DOUBLE STANDARDS		FREQUENCY	
		Men about Men	Women about Women	Men about Men	Women about Women
Sex irregularity	1	1	1	10	16
Stealing	2	2	2	16	13½
Cheating	3	3	4	12	9
Lying	4	4	5	10	7½
Drinking	5	5	3	10	15
Gambling	6	6	7	6	13½
Vulgar talk	7	7	6	4	11½
Swearing	8	8	8	2	11½
Gossip	9	13	9	14	2
Selfishness	10½	10	11	14	5½
Sabbath-breaking	10½	11	12	6	7½
Idleness	12	9	13	6	5½
Snobbishness	13	12	14	14	4
Extravagance	14	14	15	8	2
Smoking	15	15	10	1	10
Dancing	16	16	16	3	2

scales are shown in Table VI, for the academic year 1922–23 at the University of Texas.

Column 2 of Table VI shows the combined votes of the men and the women about general worseness. As the two sexes showed a correlation of .97, they were combined in one rank.

Digitized by Google

This rank has a correlation of .99 with the similar rank for the figures for the years 1919–21, as published in this *Journal* for January, 1923 (XXXIII, 125). The only important difference is a slight change in the rank of Sabbath-breaking, which seems to be moving slowly in the direction of the position which northern students give it. When the scale of general worseness in column 2 is compared with the scale of the men about the worseness for men in column 3, the correlation is .96. When the scale of general worseness is compared with the scale of the women about the worseness for women in column 4, the correlation is .95. Columns 3 and 4 have a correlation of .90. On these figures one would be inclined to deny that there is any noteworthy double standard in popular morality. Yet our so-called criss-cross has shown very decided double standards. The rank method alone is not fine enough to bring out the divergent characteristics of the popular double standards.

The frequency scales in columns 5 and 6 are very similar to the scales for 1918–22 which were published in this *Journal* for April, 1924. The men have a correlation of .92 with the earlier scale, and the women have a correlation of .95. The main differences are that drinking among the men and smoking among the women are ranked as increasingly frequent. When the frequency for the men (column 5) is compared with the general worseness scale, the correlation is negative .42. For the women the correlation is negative .72. When the men's frequency is compared with the worseness for men, the correlation is negative .36. But when the women's frequency is compared with the worseness for women, the correlation is negative .83. This big difference seems to indicate more of a causal relation between women's standards and women's conduct than is to be found among the men. There is a good positive correlation between comparative *badness* for women and comparative *infrequency* for women. For the similar facts among the men, only a low correlation is found.

The scale formed by the so-called criss-cross is so com-

Digitized by Google

plicated in its meaning that I shall not attempt a detailed discussion here of the significance of the various correlations between this criss-cross scale and other scales. But a few correlations may be given for the reader who cares to analyze them. When the double-standard criss-cross is compared with the scale of worseness for men, the correlation is positive .27. For the women, the correlation is positive .57. For the double-standard criss-cross and the similar criss-cross for frequency, the correlation is positive .85.

IX

So far we have confined our study to the figures for the men and the women at the University of Texas during the academic year 1922–23. Let us now consider the figures for other years at the University of Texas and at other American universities. These other figures cannot be printed here in full, but each set of figures will be compared with the set of figures we have studied, the coefficients of correlation will be given, and any noteworthy differences will be described.

At the University of Texas, the figures for 1922–23 can be compared with the academic years 1920–21 (spring term only), 1921–22, and 1923–24. For the men about the worseness for men, the correlations are, in the order given, as follows: .99, .98, .98. When each year is compared with every other year, the correlations run from .95 to .99. The average of the correlations is .97, with a standard error of .01. For the women about the worseness for women, the comparison of the year 1922–23 with the other years shows a correlation of .98 in every case. When all the years are compared, the correlations run from .96 to .98. The average correlation is nearly .98, with a standard error of .01. When the so-called criss-cross scales for the different years are compared, the only noteworthy differences are about drinking and smoking. There is a clear tendency, both among the men and among the women, to be more unanimous in placing these practices as worse for women

Digitized by Google

than for men. There seems to be no other considerable or important difference in any of the Texas figures during these four years.

Materials about double standards have been sent to me from several northern universities, all indicating a general similarity to the figures we have been studying. I shall limit myself to an account of the figures from the University of Chicago, partly because those figures are typical of most northern figures, partly because I have two adequate sets of figures from Chicago, one for the year 1923 and another for 1924. As the Texas figures are about the same for the different years, I shall compare the Texas figures for 1922–23 with the figures for Chicago for the two years studied.

When the scale of the Texas men about the worseness for men is compared with the scales of the Chicago men for 1923 and 1924, we find correlations of .97 and .96, respectively. The corresponding figures for the women about the worseness for women are .90 and .95. At Chicago both sexes put Sabbath-breaking lower, just as they did in the general worseness scales. But it should be noticed that the Texas students are moving in the direction of the northern students in this matter. The women at Chicago put smoking lower and selfishness higher than the women at Texas. Otherwise all the scales are fairly similar. At Chicago the men about the worseness for men in the two years have a correlation of .97. The correlation for the women about the women is also .97.

The most striking differences between Texas and Chicago are to be found in the criss-cross figures. In general, it may be said that the Chicago students tend much more strongly to a single standard than the Texas students. There are really three levels in the criss-cross figures which I have tabulated. The men at Texas (as shown in Table III) have a very definite set of double standards about seven of the sixteen practices. The women at Texas tend more to a single standard by giving

Digitized by Google

figures which are closer to 50. The men at Chicago give almost exactly the same figures for the criss-cross that the Texas women give. Both hold double standards but less strongly than the Texas men. In particular, the Texas women and the Chicago men place gambling and sex irregularity close to the dividing line between the "same" practices and the practices which are worse for women. The Chicago women go farther. They place gambling and sex irregularity as definitely the same for men and for women. Then they place drinking, vulgar talk, and idleness close to the dividing line from the "same" practices. So the Chicago women have strong double standards only about smoking and swearing, and less emphatic double standards about drinking and vulgar talk as worse for women, and idleness as worse for men. Thus we have three levels of judgments, the Texas men with strong double standards, the Texas women and the Chicago men with moderate double standards, and the Chicago women with almost negligible double standards. As to the future characteristics of similar groups of men and women, the reader can predict as well as I can.

X

If it would not be too complete a reversal of the method of most discussions in philosophy and ethics, I should be tempted to leave this article as all facts and no conclusions. But I shall give a few comments without much theorizing.

This article has shown further possibilities of the use of statistical methods in the study of popular opinion, especially about ethical matters. The figures about double standards have shown very definite results with high correlations. The facts studied have been more complex than the facts previously studied about general worseness, and have been more variable. In particular, the figures for the double-standard criss-cross showed several distinct types of attitudes about double standards.

Digitized by Google

These studies in the different aspects of statistical ethics have been concerned with the central tendencies of each group. The central tendencies represent fairly closely the middle half or two-thirds of each group. On the basis of this knowledge of the central-group tendencies, later studies can be made of individual or eccentric differences.

Every group judgment about double standards which I have studied carefully and fully has developed an explicit self-contradiction. This contradiction is important, but it must not be overemphasized. The reader is asked to consider whether the contradictions which this article has shown are as great as are to be found in most books written by famous and supposedly logical philosophers.

The self-contradictions in our double-standard scales may serve one very useful purpose. Several readers of my first article on statistical ethics have complained that such results would be used to coerce individuals into accepting the group judgments, whether the group judgments were really wise or not. This criticism is important, though I might plead that it is not my fault if people misuse my results. Moreover, the figures about frequency of misconduct seemed to be very reliable as evidence about actual behavior, and this fact might be used to support the reliability of the general-worseness figures. But, as I said in my first statistical article, I do not wish to set these scales up as norms or authorities. They are facts to be studied rather than accepted. But what shall we do if people insist on accepting them uncritically? Well, the contradictions we have found in the double standards can be very helpful. The naïve mind may be unduly open to group suggestion, but it is usually not so uncritical as knowingly to accept an explicit self-contradiction. Only a mind spoiled by too much shallow philosophy can do that. So we can use the self-contradictions in the double standards for the purpose of making people be critical about the group rankings. The

Digitized by Google

group rankings cannot be treated as infallible, because they contradict themselves. So every individual should criticize them and make his own scale of values.

It is hardly necessary to point out the profitable use that can be made of these double-standard figures in the teaching of introductory ethics classes. Most students are interested in the problem. The self-contradictions and the differences in the criss-cross arouse thought and demand study. A beginning can be made with something like a project method in the teaching of ethics. The results obviously call for ethical and philosophical discussion. The opposition between traditional and reflective standards is brought out very clearly. Finally, the various aspects of the problem of equality are given an enlightening factual basis.

The facts brought out both in the double-standard scales and in the criss-cross seem to offer still more empirical verification for my earlier philosophical theory about the melioristic interpretation of value. (*Journal of Philosophy*, XVI, 96–104.) All facts about value are facts about the relation of betterness or worseness. Popular opinion seems to be perfectly in harmony with this theory. While it is true that I asked the groups for a scale, yet they could not have given such uniform and definite answers unless they already possessed the scale of values in their minds.

The present article has been concerned almost entirely with description of the double-standard facts. Of course there are other things to be done. The double standards need genetic study from the anthropological, sociological, and psychological points of view. But without our present accurate description of part of present-day morality, the genetic study tends to explain away rather than to explain. It tends to assume that the present is nothing but the past genesis of itself. This is frequently false. Moreover, we need to formulate reflective criticisms of all these moral attitudes. But the criticism should

Digitized by Google

come after and refer to the existing facts. It should aim at controlling the direction of change for the better. This can hardly be done without accurate factual knowledge such as we have been trying to present. Finally, some people will think that the whole problem of a double standard is to be condemned emotionally rather than studied intellectually. To them I must quote Spinoza that our task is "neither to ridicule nor to lament nor to detest but to understand."

UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS

Digitized by Google

ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY AND THE CONCEPT OF INDIVIDUALITY

JOHN M. THORBURN

The true meaning of propositions lies always ahead of fully conscious usage.—BOSANQUET, *Logic.*

Every self is a copula, a meeting-point of tension and fulfilment, a self-maintenance of the true life through a portion of the external, and of the external as centered in the true life. But, as it is distinctly figured in the poem, the complete experience brings together all the selves, with nothing omitted, but transformed and expanded by the place they hold and the illumination they receive in it.—BOSANQUET (of the *Divina Commedia*).

I

It is impossible to summarize the import of the psycho-analytic movement and its incidence on European culture. The movement and its claims upon human interest are too many sided and various to admit of any comprehensive formulation in the limited space of this article. But there is one mode of its appeal that presents itself to me as of sufficient importance to deserve special discussion; and that is its adequacy to deal with, at all events, the phenomenology of the religious consciousness. This is the point of view from which I shall try to define the aim of Dr. Jung in *The Psychology of the Unconscious* and more especially in *Psychological Types.*

In the former, an indication was given of the possibilities that psychoanalysis held in store for a philosophy of religion. In the latter, the translation of which has now been before the English-speaking public for more than a year, these possibilities have become actual. From the point of view stated above, I regard it as, in fact, a work upon the philosophy of religion. But together with this aim which I am thus inclined to state as the main intention of the book, there is bound up the attempt,

Digitized by Google

as a correlated obligation, to show the precise incidence of psychoanalysis upon philosophy. Or again, since all these aspects are inseparable, in the attempt of the author to discover a method of practical psychology, it is found that this method is also the method of philosophy. In this last respect, the book offers a curious challenge to traditional philosophy and to all that by current convention passes for philosophy, whether technical or otherwise.

But the title, *Psychological Types*, in connection with the subtitle, "The Psychology of Individuation," offers a more or less effective key to the structure of the work. It is a contribution to the philosophy of one of the dominating concepts of the age in which we live, that of individuality; and as the use of the term "individuation" would imply, it deals with that concept from the side of the dynamic. Modern philosophical literature is rich in expositions of the idea of individuality; but some of the greatest of these have scarcely been able to transcend a more or less purely static treatment of the subject. The contrast of such a book as Bosanquet's *Individuality and Value* with *Psychological Types* would elucidate my meaning clearly enough. Indeed, my invitation to the philosophic student in England toward an approach to the viewpoints of analytical psychology would be through Bosanquet, but also in his kinship with them no less than by way of contrast. It should be kept in view from the outset that it is through the proposed eightfold classification of human beings that the exposition and development of the idea of individuation proceeds. This division is reached through the application of two principles. First, a definition of type is given according as the individual in his development and the confirmation of his type is determined mainly through objects and other persons or through his own personality. The former is the extraverted type; the latter, the introverted. The extravert would, however, show the characteristics of the introvert on another side and to a lesser extent; just as the introvert would have his

Digitized by Google

subsidiary function of extraversion. Extraversion and introversion, therefore, while they appear first as the definition of type, are fundamentally mechanisms or moments that belong to all life and all experience. On the plane beneath the *fundamentum divisionis* of types according to extraversion and introversion, types are classified according to the preponderance of any one of the four functions, thought, feeling, intuition, or sensation; thought being a moment antithetical to feeling; intuition antithetical to sensation. Combining this method of division with the first, the eightfold classification is reached. With regard to the second principle of division the author is careful to state that he has been able to discover no a priori principle through which it could be substantiated. Against this mode of the exposition of the subject the criticism may, I think, very well be urged that the development of *Psychological Types* as a whole is nothing else than the systematic exhibition of the evolution of types and of their relation to each other, and is so far, therefore, an attempt philosophically to justify what is taken for granted on general experimental grounds. More than once the author mentions that the pathway by which he came eventually to separate the plane of division according to attitude as extraversion versus introversion from that of the four psychological functions was through the recognition that the feeling type is not necessarily the extraverted type. For originally[1] he had identified feeling with extraversion. The observation of introverted feeling types led him to recognize that there was no *de facto* connection between feeling and extraversion. From the genetic point of view, however, the suggestion that feeling is primarily a movement of extraversion and that thought is primarily a movement of introversion might prove to be one of extreme value. Even if it could not eventually be substantiated in that form, it is along the lines of such suggestion that we must look for a means of viewing the real psychological antithesis

[1] See *Psychological Types*, p. 14, footnote.

Digitized by Google

of thought and feeling, and of attempting to show the origins of the various functions in relation to each other. In the same way, it seems to me unnecessary any longer to insist on the merely empirical character of the opposition of sensation to intuition. The later chapters of the book afford abundant means of showing that the antithesis is not merely *de facto* but psychologically necessary. Jung's contention on behalf of intuition as an organ of the psyche developed and differentiated just as clearly as perception or thought is, indeed, of altogether extraordinary importance for psychology. English psychology, at all events, has so long been preoccupied by the attempt to exhibit the genesis and development of thought from sensation that it has completely lost, as regards this topic, its real orientation. If Jung's contention can be substantiated that not thought, but intuition, is the specific antithesis of sensation, thought (or feeling) must be regarded rather as a mediating term between the two. In the same way, the antithesis of thought to feeling might eventually be understood more completely by considering sensation and intuition as middle terms. But since any psychology finds a natural starting-point in sensation, the antithetical character of intuition to the latter necessarily becomes prominent. In particular the psychoanalytic movement, as in Freud, began by an altogether new insistence upon the facts of sensation. The relation of intuition to sensation must therefore become one of importance for psychoanalysis as a whole; and its elucidation and criticism are essential to any comprehensive view of the movement from Freud to Jung. For these reasons it is suggested that the too brief and brusque exposition of the classification of types in the introductory chapter is not fully in harmony with the profoundly philosophical spirit of the book.

II

The type problem is exhibited in the history of thought inasmuch as every thinker is implicated in his type, and, as the author insists, the value of his thinking lies first of all in

Digitized by Google

its being an expression of his type. Psychological analysis, however, will deal with opposing views or with opposing schools by revealing the inner motivations that lie behind the dialectical opposition. Nominalism, for example, can be traced back to that psychological type upon whom the influence of the object is powerful. For the significance of the universal is depreciated or denied through the immediately compelling power of the object. It is only a name, a *flatus vocis*. Such a dispute, therefore, as that between the nominalists and the realists is simply an illustration or manifestation of the inevitable misunderstanding by each other of different psychological types. While the sources of the nominalistic doctrine are to be traced back to the sensational type, realism, with its insistence on the reality of the universal, is to be traced back to the thinking type over whom the idea may have as compelling a power as the sensational contact with, or perception of, the particular object has upon the sensation type. We are warned, however, that it is exceedingly difficult and in many cases quite impossible to decide an author's type merely from his writings or from the historical record of the part he played in the controversy. The difficulty of deciding particular cases does, of course, make no difference to the need—or to the fruitfulness—of discovering what fundamental psychological tendencies lie at the bottom of the dialectical conflict.

III

The analysis of the type represented by Schiller is pursued at very considerable length and indicates more clearly an approach to the general problem of individuation. The perplexities which beset the thinking introvert in whom the intuitive function is also well developed are clearly illustrated in Schiller. His problem as finding expression in the *Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man* was that of the contrast between Hellenic and modern civilization in so far as the latter appears to submerge the individual in favor of the social, or at least to render his full self-realization difficult or rare in com-

Digitized by Google

parison with the opportunities afforded to individual genius in the Greek city states; while, on the other hand, Greek civilization was bound up with such social anomalies as slavery which the Christian consciousness of a later age had rendered unacceptable.

To discover the path of reconciliation between the "harmony" of Greek life and the obscure and dubious demands of the "labyrinthine" modern spirit for its own individual values was, of course, also the problem of Goethe. But while the profound relation that existed between Goethe, the extravert, and Schiller, the introvert, rendered through reciprocity of criticism the inestimable service of placing each in securer possession of his own world, the interest of the problem is focused through the mind of Schiller. When he asks himself, What was it that broke up the "harmony" of Greek life? he answers at once, it was culture. Culture—that is to say, differentiation of function. For such things as slavery, Jung observes, signified merely the undifferentiation of a social function. To bring about this differentiation of function was the task accomplished by Christianity; but in doing so, in asserting the value of all individuals and thus removing the reproach of undifferentiation from the social organism, Christianity threw over that very undifferentiation into each and every individual soul. "Just as the enslavement of the mass," Jung's comment runs, "was the open wound of the antique world, the enslavement of the inferior function is an ever bleeding wound in the soul of man today."[1] Such observations imply a very definite reading of history. The advent of Christianity is regarded as necessary in so far as the liberation of the slave and the assertion of the individual value of all souls were achievements that the social consciousness of Europe had to accomplish for itself. Yet Christianity places all individuals under inevitable disability in the pathway of their own individuation. The question of criticism of this

[1] *Psychological Types* (English translation), p. 94.

Digitized by Google

reading of historical Christianity would take us far beyond the scope of this article. But it should be understood by the reader how this assertion of the absolute need for Christianity at a particular time in the history of the West together with his denial of the permanent or absolute value of the Christian consciousness defines Jung's place in the psychoanalytic movement, and his attitude toward its most important issues.

Readers of Schiller will remember that he is not in harmony with himself in the proposed solution of his problem. On the one hand, he declares that it is to be found in beauty and in the cultivation of humanity's gift of the enjoyment of beauty. But on the other hand, the moral and social incapacity of such epochs as the Renaissance in which the cult of beauty has been deliberately pursued is acutely felt and honestly admitted. This self-contradiction, Jung points out, is simply due to the divergent movement of the functions of thought and intuition, both highly differentiated in this type. For Schiller the intuitive and the poet, the solution is to be found in beauty. For Schiller the intellectual and critical, this is quite unreal.

It is clear that a reconciliation cannot be found by thought, because the solution put forward by the intellect is already one of the terms of the opposition. The contradiction, in Jung's view, can be removed only by taking the solution offered by Schiller the poet in a symbolical and not in a literal sense. For while Schiller *felt* the problem on the side of its terrible reality, the solution which he proposes, if taken literally, has all the reproach and futility attaching to aestheticism if the latter be offered seriously as a philosophical ethic. But the very completeness of divergence between the intuitive and the intellectual in Schiller stamps the intuitive as genuinely intuitive, that is to say, symbolical or securing its value only through being taken as symbolical.

The psychoanalytic movement has encountered no keener criticism from the scientific and philosophical world than in its use of the word "symbol," and in the account it had to give

Digitized by Google

of the idea of symbolism. It will be the object of this article, in so far as is possible in such a brief space, to direct attention upon the importance of the conception of symbolism and of the difficulties attaching to its definition. At this point it will be sufficient to observe that when Jung regards the intuitive contrast of Schiller's writing as a symbol, he implies an attitude of conscious orientation toward what the symbol suggests or indicates either on the part of Schiller or of his reader capable of apprehending the values of his mind. It is a question of what consciousness can *make* of the thing offered to it by the fantasy. Hence the term "creative" fantasy is used of such symbols. They offered a mediation between otherwise irreconcilable terms, this mediating solution being the most vital or fruitful means for the progress of the psyche as a self-developing organism. In so far as the individual can avail himself of this mediation it is the pathway of his individuation.

In Nietzsche, and for his generation, the problem becomes still more real and urgent. In *The Birth of Tragedy* it is still disguised under the aspect of aestheticism. That is to say, it is treated as if it were one merely of theory of beauty. But this is a formal disguise only. The problem is now felt to be a prodigious one—in Nietzsche's own words, "a problem with horns." It is *felt*, indeed, with all the reality and urgency of the religious and ethical, though Nietzsche, as it were, evades the conscious religious and ethical standpoint, seeking refuge under the veil of an apparent aesthetic detachment. Every mind of any considerable merit that has contributed to the psychoanalytic movement has indeed recognized the importance of Nietzsche as in a sense the initiator of the analytic attitude toward life. But special claims must, I think, be made for the insight shown by Jung in his analysis of the psychology of Nietzsche, of whom he has indeed spoken to the present writer as "his spiritual father." For while Jung is able adequately to apprehend "that deep mistrust of human nature and human truth which haunted the epoch of psychological

Digitized by Google

criticism inaugurated by Nietzsche," while he is able to extend a profound sympathy to the exponents of that mistrust, and while he is able to evaluate the epoch as a necessary spiritual moment in human evolution, it would be utterly foreign to his intention to suppose that that aspect is the only, or even the chief, value of Nietzsche's writing. In a most remarkable sentence, Jung says,

> Nietzsche unconsciously had Wagner in himself, that is why he envied him his *Parsifal*. But even worse, he was a Saul and had Paul within. That is why Nietzsche became a stigmatised outcast of the spirit. He had, like Saul, to experience Christification when "the other self" inspired him with his "Ecce Homo."[1]

The personal conflict of Nietzsche must indeed be taken as of extraordinary significance for Jung; and of the impressiveness and depth of his reading of it, it is difficult to convey anything at second hand. Unless, however, the significance that *Zarathustra* or the *Gedichte* had for Jung is recognized and appreciated by the student of the latter's work, an essential clue toward its understanding will be lost.

IV

Reverting to the basal psychological antithesis of extraversion to introversion, the reader may be inclined to ask whether the type in all cases does incline to one side or the other, or whether there be not a neutral type in which extraversion and introversion would be equivalent in determining force. The answer is, I think, in the negative. There never is such a neutral type. The significance of the question, however, lies in the extent to which any given type can be false to itself and assume the guise of its opposite. The temptation for the introvert living in a highly extraverted milieu (as, for example, that of England) to cultivate a false extraversion may be no small one; just as certain Eastern races whose natural tendency would be rather toward introversion have been hypnotized by the economic and military extraver-

[1] *Analytical Psychology* (English translation), p. 384.

Digitized by Google

sion of the West into assuming a standpoint altogether foreign to them. Such a loss of standpoint, whether individual or social, would mean simply a neurotic condition. Neurosis, therefore, may be regarded as having one of its most basal or radical illustrations in the conflict between the demands of extraversion and introversion. The conception of neurosis or psychological conflict is thus raised out of the merely pathological and is made significant for every human being and for every race. This universalizing of the conception, therefore, sets the problem on the same plane as that of the universality of religion, and thus becomes identical with the problem of religion itself. There is individual conflict and there is social conflict. The *de facto* irreconcilable tendencies and claims make demands at every point and in every kind of relation for possibilities of reconciliation. This is at once the problem of neurosis in which the psychoanalytic movement began and the problem of religion as it has been from time immemorial.

In the section of *Psychological Types* on the type problem in poetry, this theme is worked out in so completely systematic and constructive a form and is illustrated with such richness of material and so profound a psychological insight that one is compelled to demand a very full recognition of its value on the part of any writer who proposes further attempts toward a philosophy of religion. The claims of psychoanalysis no doubt require a certain modesty of statement that they may not always have had. But I cannot say less than this: that it seems to me entirely unreal for philosophy, in so far as it takes any account whatever of the phenomenology of the religious consciousness, to proceed without the fullest understanding and apprehension of passages such as these in the literature of analytical psychology. Whatever criticism is to be brought to bear upon them, here, at least, is the point at which all genuinely philosophical criticism and construction must begin.

Extraversion and introversion in their "demonic" character make incompatible and yet inexorable demands upon the

Digitized by Google

individual. That is to say, in so far as either tendency is unrecognized and refused its legitimate scope, it becomes a compulsive or demonic agency, running athwart the conscious standpoint and threatening to overwhelm conscious values. From the literature of the West, through which Jung illustrates this conflict, he turns for restatement of the problem to oriental philosophy as affording a source of ideas of "quite extraordinary depth . . . . and amazing psychological accuracy." The leading motive of oriental thought—the pairs of opposites beneath which "this world must suffer without ceasing," with its proposed reconciliation of these in Brahman or Tao—is again reinterpreted by Jung through Western ideas, more especially through Meister Eckehard's conception of the relativity of God. Different epochs in human history have proposed widely different ethical orientations, and the ἤθη to which our epoch has committed itself are widely diverse and divergent from those sought after by another. The same will be true for individuals, and even for individuals inhabiting the same social world. God is, therefore, in Eckehard's view, not an absolute, but relative to every epoch or to every human soul. And the idea of God taken symbolically would afford the movement of reconciliation between the conflicts that express themselves in such a variety of social and individual relations. The idea of God is thus, on the one side, a fantasy that has all the creative and rejuvenating power of the symbol; on the other hand, it is a reality, provided always it is not taken for what it is not. God, as representing the sum of psychical energy, is as real as any other tendency or power that can operate within the soul.

V

But how, it will be asked, is this view of fantasy as something essentially positive and constructive related to current views of analytical psychology and to the history of the psychoanalytical movement?

Digitized by Google

It will be best, perhaps, for the purpose of this article to illustrate through the psychological *motif* of rebirth the mode in which Jung's view of symbolism grows out of and is related to the earliest conception of symbolism as held, for example, by Freud. For the latter, the manifold imagery in which the *motif* of return to the mother's womb is clothed in the psychology of different individuals is nothing more than a means of veiling the will toward incest. The imagery is symbolical only in the sense that it is at once the satisfaction and the concealment of a wish. It is therefore only the effect whose cause is essentially the infantile sexual desire. Jung's contention is that in such a context the term "symbol" can be interpreted as nothing more than symptom, the whole series being essentially causal or mechanical and *ipso facto* ruling out the essence of the idea of symbol. Freud's conception, that is to say, is intelligible only on a severely mechanistic hypothesis. In so far as it is possible to ask whether a more teleological view of nature has not an equal right to consideration with the mechanical, it will be possible to challenge Freud's use of the idea of symbol.

Hence the philosophical interest of the dominant controversy with which the analytic movement has been beset; that very old problem, mechanism versus teleology, has been restated in startingly new terms, and in terms that make the issue turn around the conception of symbolism. The imagery that surrounds the *motif* of rebirth is manifold, various, and complex; and it is different for every individual case. It is full of material derived from conscious experience, and it is molded in some way through conscious orientation and attitude. The attitude of consciousness itself toward the imagery which it scrutinizes will also affect that very imagery in its development and in the changing forms which it assumes. If there be room, then, for a teleological view of nature at any point, the operation of the teleological principle will certainly demand investigation and scrutiny here. Jung's elaboration of the idea must, I think, be

Digitized by Google

taken as an essential contribution to philosophical teleology, and so far his treatment of symbolism merits special attention. It would be futile to attempt to summarize so difficult a controversy as that now existing between the different schools of psychoanalysis in the space at my disposal, were it not that the incidence of the controversy upon philosophy has nowhere been clearly indicated save in the pages of *Psychological Types*.

But here at last and effectually, the extraordinary challenge which analytical psychology makes to philosophy is given without, as it seems to me, possibility of evasion. For while a relative distinction is drawn between the critical use of the intellect and thought processes based on intuitive experience, types of philosophy of the most epoch-making kind, such as the conceptualism of Abelard, are expressly identified with creative fantasy, and are not separated in essential respects from other forms of the "transcendent" symbol. The "transcendent" function which issues in the new symbol is a reintegration of already differentiated functions, and is necessarily an irrational process. It is typified, for example, in the dream. Every dream may be regarded theoretically as a symbol, of importance, of course, only for the individual dreamer. But in so far as fantasy is typified, for example, in art and religion—these being social as well as individual—the symbol also appears as possessing a social or collective value. The teleological aspect of the symbol is here seen to better advantage, in so far, at least, as the character of important symbols that have from age to age appeared in history can be more easily read than by limiting consideration to the symbol as belonging to the individual alone. When one considers, for example, such a symbol as the Christian cross, in relation to St. Paul and the mystical speculation of the early church, it is perceived to be "that which represented the inexpressible in *an unsurpassable way*."[1] That is to say, that for which the symbol stands has

[1] *Psychological Types* (English translation), p. 602.

Digitized by Google

not yet been, and cannot yet be, expressed. The symbol nevertheless stands for an experience which is immediately to be lived.

At this point, again, it might be not unfair to make the criticism that we have here matters of enormous psychological and philosophical import compressed into a very few paragraphs. Further criticism and elucidation of the idea of symbolism is, I take it, integrally bound up with the need more fully to exhibit the genetic relation between the various functions; and perhaps in especial to exhibit in detail the biological character of intuition. Just as I conceive that Jung has rendered the greatest service to general psychology in stating the case for intuition as a differentiated organ of mind, so I think the thoroughgoing criticism of his view of symbolism and its fuller elucidation in respect of the religious problem will become most fruitful if related to a more systematic treatment of the nature of intuition.

We may conclude with an attempt to summarize, from our point of view, the psychological character of individuation.

In so far as consciousness is confronted with the symbol, the individuality is so far imperfect. It is in the living of the life implied by the symbol and therefore in the gradual dissolution of the latter as symbol that individuation becomes actual. Individuation is thus conceived to lie in the progressive harmonization of the outer with the inner, in the progressive interpretation or elucidation of the one by the other. Any symbolic imagery thus represents a stage at which outer and inner are brought together without being harmonized. Any image in dream or fantasy borrows its material from the outer world and yet is itself representative of an undeveloped function of the mind. In so far as the outer from which it borrows is really harmonized with the inner for whose tentative efforts toward a higher actuality the borrowing is made, so far forth there is effected a harmonious relation between outer and inner, and the image or symbol vanishes and becomes a function

Digitized by Google

of life. Thus for the artist, his subjective imagery as such vanishes in the expression of it in art, which is one of his proper and individual functions of life. The mode through which individuation takes place is therefore to be subsumed under the general conception of the image or symbol which is dissolved, or—if the image be of a human form—which is depersonalized, as the life implied by it is more and more completely lived.

It seems to me that this conception is implicit, though certainly not explicit, in the original form in which Freud stated his initial discovery. Whether so or not, it is of the utmost importance for psychology and ethics that it should have a perfectly general, philosophical, and detailed exposition.

CARDIFF, WALES

Digitized by Google

THE RATIONAL CHARACTER OF THE DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLE

MARIE COLLINS SWABEY

A significant feature of our times is the growing world-wide recognition of democracy as in some sense the natural and the normal form of government. Almost within our remembrance democracy has advanced from the position of a storm center of dispute, a dubious and uncertain issue, apparently rejected by the greater masses of mankind, to that of an accepted ideal principle lodged with "the established order of things" and embraced by the common sense of the world almost as one of the eternal verities. So thoroughly is the ideal of democracy intrenched today in many minds that it becomes increasingly difficult to discover the underlying grounds and informing principles which account for its universal acceptance under a wide diversity of forms.

The present paper examines certain presuppositions of democracy with a view to showing that the vitality of democracy as an idea is ultimately to be traced to its foundation in pure reason and in logical principles. It cannot be too clearly emphasized that this interpretation of democracy in no way denies or conflicts with the conception of it as essentially concerned with the worlds of experience and practice, but only affirms that the essence of democracy is to be sought in some sense, in pure reason and its laws applied as standards to human relations. Our inquiry, however, since it deals with democracy as pure idea, has obviously nothing to do with the historical development of popular government or with the contributions which abstract theory and practical reasoning have made to its advancement as a social and political force. It may be permitted us to point out, nevertheless, in passing, as creating a presumption in favor of the close connection between democ-

Digitized by Google

racy and reason, that in those two great documents which together constitute what Lord Bryce has called "a sort of Apostles' Creed of democracy" (the American Declaration of Independence and the Declaration of the Rights of Man made by the National Assembly of France, August, 1791), the universal and necessary character of the principles in which democracy is founded are recognized, such truths being held to be valid antecedent to and independent of experience and beyond the possibility of doubt or refutation. It is the object of the present paper also to maintain that democracy has its foundations in principles that are in some sense transcendentally rational.

Although the doctrines of natural rights and self-evident truths, which inspired the great legislators of the Enlightenment, are today in their original form hopelessly out of fashion, nevertheless the main purport of their message—the assertion of the incontrovertible and transcendental character of the democratic principle—remains unshaken. It is impossible to derive the notion of democracy from mere experience. Some element of the a priori, some phase of universal and necessary truth has to be recognized in its constitution: something which raises its appeal above the level of purely utilitarian arguments or arguments from the facts of history, and which renders it *in principio* beyond the possibility of denial by honest intelligence. Experience of itself can never discover such principles as liberty and equality. Equality, if we accept the teaching of experience, is the grossest biological falsehood. Nature has made men unequal both in the degree and the kind of their powers; and has even implicitly stratified them, it would appear, according to types and levels of capacity. Personal liberty also, judged from this point of view, is no less a fiction. Although our desires are infinite, their free and untrammeled gratification is everywhere thwarted by obstacles: by conflicts with our fellows and by the limitations of experience itself. The freedom of each to do as he likes, far from being a notion

Digitized by Google

derived from experience, is if anything rather a postulate which we bring to experience, but which experience as such constantly belies and refutes. In brief, the perpetual frustration of our plans together with the hard facts of biological inequality render abundantly clear the impossibility of deriving from experience the notion that men are free and equal. The true basis of the democratic principle is rational; and the roots of liberty and equality are rather to be looked for in the independence and the universality of reason.

But to show that the idea of democracy is founded in reason requires the consideration of its nature in more detail. As generally understood, democracy is a form of government which confers the power of ruling upon the members of the community as a whole. Involved in this central notion of popular sovereignty are several assumptions that deserve to be examined separately. In the first place, according to the democratic principle the power of ruling is distributed by units, one of which is vested in each individual of the community. In the second place, the power of the collection of these individual units is accepted as being authoritative over that of the single individual or unit, as well as over less numerous collections. Lastly, the basis for conferring a share of power upon each individual, and that upon which the responsibility for its exercise rests, is the individual's reason. Reserving the first two points for later discussion, let us begin with this last aspect of the democratic principle, which refers the *locus* of sovereignty in the individual to his reason.

Democracy can hardly fail to recognize in reason the capacity specially fitted for the exercise of its form of government. For, if we be permitted to anticipate, reason is the sole capacity by which a man is enabled, uniformly, to share the point of view of other men, and by which he is able not only to see things as others see them but also to see them synoptically and all together. Again, all men have a modicum of reason and its very commonness recommends it as the basis of popular

Digitized by Google

sovereignty. In brief, reason as the faculty shared by all and capable of grasping all seems peculiarly adapted to the form of government of "all by all."

It needs scarcely to be pointed out that democracy, since it accords the individual the power to govern, assumes that he possesses a capacity for sovereignty. The seat of this capacity, as has been said, can only be his reason, since in reason alone is to be found that breadth of view and levelness of vision which equips man for judgment of the world. Reason lifts man above the sphere of particular existences, and invests him with peculiar powers of independence and universality. These powers, both in their theoretical form and as applied to human relations under the names—shall we say—of liberty and equality, possess great significance for democracy. On the one hand, man, in so far as he shares the independence of reason, is autonomous, self-directing and freed from bondage to things irrational, since reason—and what is guided by it—obeys only such laws as are rationally self-imposed. While carried over to practical and political relations, this same independence of reason reveals itself as the guaranty of the liberties of the individual, since the freedom of every man in a political sense goes back to the postulate incorporated in government that the will of the individual as embodied in the laws and otherwise is sovereign and legislative just in so far as, and because it is, the expression of a sound and unfettered understanding. The universality of reason, on the other hand, provides man with a vision of the whole and with the desire to take everything into account. It is by virtue of this comprehensiveness of standpoint gained from reason that man is led, in the sphere of human relations, to recognize the points of view of other men as equally valid with his own, and which constrains him to acknowledge that men's relations with one another can only rest upon the postulate of their equality.

As reason is the faculty that enables the individual to share the point of view of other men, so also it is the faculty that

Digitized by Google

enables him to apprehend and judge of the collective interest. Emotion, while it has its fitful bursts of contagion in which it may bring men temporarily together, is in its essence incommunicable, and leaves the fundamental point of view of the individual separated by a gulf from that of his fellows. Reason alone enables him to see things equally, to see them as others see them and to consider them without prejudice in their relations to each other. This universality of scope possessed by reason, furthermore, lends perspective and proportion to its dealings; through its inclusiveness of viewpoint it is able to outflank and to embrace—at least in principle—the attendant circumstances, the accidents of time and place, that envelop the individual event. Because it comprehends men and things against a wider background, it alone is able to render minor idiosyncrasies their due by allowing them to be subordinated and lost sight of in the light of the totality of things taken together. This seems to be largely what is meant by the saying that reason views things in their essence and *sub specie aeternitatis*. For it is only temporarily and as a means that reason abstracts from the special circumstances of an event in reaching its conclusions; ultimately and pre-eminently reason is the faculty of taking everything into account; yet in doing so what often comes to light is just of how slight account the individual circumstances of time and place may be. What reason sees is that the differences between things are not so basal as their identity; for all things are alike subject to the laws of the universe, and fundamental to their diversities they remain so many units or identities obeying principles that hold alike for all cases. Indeed in this assumption of universal law of uniformity we discover a principle of theoretic reason which is strikingly in harmony with the inmost spirit of democracy. For in assuming that one law or set of laws operates high and low throughout the universe, admitting of no possible abrogation or exception, we are postulating equality before the law in the widest possible sense; equality no longer

Digitized by Google

as merely a regulative ideal but as a presupposition of the reason. Such uniformity prescribes the treatment of each as of all and of all as of each, not as meaning that the law applies with monotonous iteration to all alike irrespective of their differences, but in the sense of assuming an exact adjustment of the law to the specific case, a principle expressive at once of perfect lawfulness and the highest impartiality.

Furthermore, it is only because reason is present in all men in some sense equally that democracy is able to accord authority to all in the exercise of the power of rule. Reason is equal, in the sense that it is a definitive character of man as such, and not a special talent of the few; for although men are not equally gifted at reasoning, there is yet a certain modicum, a certain irreducible minimum in every man, enough to insure his general competence to sustain a share in the government. While certain powers seem granted only to a few, to be natural gifts—such as talents in music or in mathematics—other powers seem shared and common among mankind, so that of reason especially it may be said that it constitutes a kind of common sense, since every man, if he will but exercise his ability, must prove to have the root of the matter in him. Thus reason, because it is a process shared by all and because it grasps things equally or impartially and in their mutual relations, seems uniquely fitted to be the seat of authority for the democratic form of government.

But let us turn to the consideration of another of the assumptions, which were found at the beginning to be involved in the idea of democracy. The first of these was the notion that in democracy the power of ruling is divided up into units which are distributed to and vested in every member of the community. This division of sovereignty would appear to be guided by logical considerations, and in particular, as it seems to me, is under the influence of the law of identity. It is as if the law of identity were here adopted as the standard of human relations, the sovereignty being divided into as many

Digitized by Google

units as there are individual entities to claim recognition. To be sure, the law of identity—as usually interpreted—is a purely formal law, stating nothing directly regarding the world of existence. Nevertheless it cannot be denied that the so-called laws of thought hold as laws of the entire universe, and as such are standards of the world of existence no less than of the realm of purely formal truth and validity. There can, therefore, be no objection in principle against turning the law of identity to practical effect by conceiving it as the norm of a special class of existent entities, namely, human beings. The law of identity says simply that any entity is itself, that A is A. In its applications, however, this law may be interpreted as expressing in the broadest terms the essence of the democratic principle, since it everywhere involves in its treatment of particular objects the two cardinal democratic notions of the integrity or irreducibility of the individual and the equality of each individual with every other—since in respect of identity one entity is as another. By the individual, it should be understood, is here meant simply any entity regarded as an identity, with no preconception of it as being unique, conscious, or possessed of free will. The law that A is A constitutes a kind of magna charta, asserting the inviolable integrity of every entity in the universe. Every defense of the rights of the individual ultimately goes back to it as its source. Of course, the affirmation of the irreducibility of the individual takes on different meaning in respect of different classes of entities; only with respect to the class "persons" does it furnish a basis for social relations and government. The equality of individuals is no less bound up with the law of identity. For the principle of identity implies that each entity is itself prior to, or fundamental to, its connection with any other. Each entity is, accordingly, assumed to be distinct from every other, yet every entity, in being such a "distinct," shares by virtue of its distinctness a certain identity with every other. Thus every entity—and here the entity we happen to

Digitized by Google

be talking about is man—is fundamentally on a level with all the rest. For with respect to logical identity, one is as another, since one individual cannot be more or less of an identity than another. Thus it is the law of identity which prompts our assumption of equality in thought and conversation, by which we postulate as the condition of all relations with our kind that each is as much himself as is any other. In fact, the possibility of all communication with our fellows rests upon our acceptance of the principle that I am I, that you are you, and that, since our respective identities have the same basis, we are equals.

But the democratic principle, although it is founded in the application of identity to the practical world, has both more and less to it than the law of identity. For democracy narrows the scope of identity to a special class of objects in the world of existence. Accordingly we may expect to find other elements entering into it besides the law of identity, even while the latter remains fundamental. There must be, for instance, some principle which marks off human beings as a special class of identities, and which accounts for the exclusive application of democracy to this class. The ground of such differentiation, it is here suggested, is to be found in the peculiar character of this class in being identified identities. Man alone among identities not merely is himself but affirms that he is himself, thus appropriating his identity as a conscious right. He does not merely come under the law, but applies the law to himself. To lower and inanimate nature, the law of identity remains only external; though presupposed everywhere by experience, it has here no practical significance for the particulars. Such objects remain means, not ends. In the case of human beings, however, identity is asserted within experience by the objects themselves as the mark of their integrity and inviolability. Thus with the emergence of self-reference or reasoning, the principle of identity takes on a new meaning, and comes to function as a logical norm in the material world in a totally different way.

Digitized by Google

It is no longer merely a bloodless presupposition to which all experience must conform, but is applied within experience to its uses, and invests objects with a peculiar prerogative. For every entity that is able to identify itself makes of its identity a reasoned possession, which it asserts as the guaranty of its integrity and as a rational right. Herein, in fact, is to be found the kernel of truth in the claims regarding natural rights made during the eighteenth century. Man's rights, his only indefeasible ones, are not merely natural but rational; and spring from his consciousness of the norm of logical identity represented in him, which permits him to affirm his ultimate inviolability. It is to this class of identities, possessed of the power of applying the law to themselves, that democracy is limited.

With this, we come to the last of the three assumptions involved in democracy; the assumption, namely, of the superior power of a collectivity of individuals over the single individual as well as over less numerous collections. This principle seeks to provide a solution of the problem arising from the fact that democracy affirms the sovereignty not merely of each but of all. The law of identity of itself can never solve the difficulty of the one and the many. While it recognizes entities as being so many equal, homogeneous units, it remains powerless to determine the respective rights between the individual and the plurality. For identity is directed on the individual alone and cannot take account of the collectivity as such. Although the laws of thought can distinguish that the single entity and the collection are not the same but different—since a simple unity cannot be identical with what is more-than-a-simple unity—they lack the further power to tell in what they differ or how that difference is to be dealt with. For this we must look to some further principle. And the means which recommends itself to reason for reconciling the sovereignty of the individual with that of the plurality, and which is embodied as an assumption in the very idea of democracy, is that of

Digitized by Google

determination by number and quantity. The notion of number, of each entity being accounted a numerical unit, is fundamental in democracy. As Aristotle said, "democratic justice is the application of numerical . . . . equality"; and Bentham's formula, "everybody to count for one, nobody for more than one," expresses a similar idea. But once the individual is taken as a numerical unit, the inevitable means of reconciling the rights of each unit with those of all the rest is that of determination by magnitude or by the greater number—a device essentially incorporated in the notion of democracy and known as "majority rule."

By way of conclusion, it may be recalled that the principle of democratic government has here been represented not only as appealing primarily to reason, but as claiming its validity on the grounds of the same. The freedom and equality of democracy are discovered to have their roots in the independence and universality of reason. The law of identity, moreover, is held in democracy to express the fundamental standard of human relations. The law, of course, has to be narrowed in its application to human affairs, with the result that only that class of identities is considered that are self-identified. As for the means employed to harmonize these respective identities with one another—for since they exist, they form a plurality—the one which recommends itself to reason is their determination by number and magnitude. Democracy, like natural science, here seeks to apply reason to the world of existence by treating entities, fundamentally, as pure identities subject to determinations of magnitude.

NEW YORK CITY

Digitized by Google

LIBERTY EDUCATION AND THE MAKING OF CHARACTER

J. W. SCOTT

To many of us in England, I am sure I am safe in saying, something of the old sense is still inevitably associated with America. I refer to the sense of a century ago; the sense which makes Carlyle, as you may remember,[1] when he is speaking to us of our dream-land say so naturally after Goethe, "your America." A flavor, still, of that spirit of misty possibility, of untried freedom and of hope, clings around the idea of the West for many of us; and whether we will or no, shapes our expectations as we address ourselves to the journey. It is not without its foundation in fact. No Briton, I imagine, can come here, stay here, and return, and not carry back with him something of a strong, glad sense that the old America still lives. It lives, both in the literal and the metaphorical sense. On the one hand, the literal unconquered land still exists—no one can travel from seaboard to seaboard of this continent and not know that. And on the other hand, even where there is no longer the actual unconquered land, where great centers of civilization have sprung up, even there in environs of peace the adventuring spirit still dwells and pushes out toward new conquests in other and higher realms.

An example, I take it, of the persistence of this spirit of exploration and adventure in the peaceful realms of the mind is modern America's incursion into the theory and practice of education. America's impact upon the world of education has been American, quite in the old pioneer sense. It has been in the direction of achieving liberty. All across this continent, there are evidences of an invasion of the field of educational practice by just that spirit of liberty which belongs,

[1] The substance of this was given as an address to the Parents' Association of Princeton University.

Digitized by Google

in the last resort, to your mountains and skies and broad seas and plains. I am not to attempt on this occasion any historical or statistical account of that. I am only desirous of submitting a few reflections upon it. I have in mind to propose, in the main, but two questions. What is the effect of liberty education on the mind and character of those who get it? And what is the importance of securing such an effect? I begin with the latter point, the importance of the effect.

The thing which takes the effect I am venturing to name summarily "liberty education." I do not need to instance in detail what I am referring to. Our generation has prosecuted the science of teaching, and as a result of this special study, the new liberty is in all our ideals for educational practice from the university down. Everywhere we are convinced that it is well with our work as educators in so far as the old set task is passing away, and is giving place to the task which is also an invitation. Whether it be the college youth or the high-school pupil or the infant of the kindergarten that is our primary object of concern, our aim for them now—however far our practice may lag behind it—is to elicit the mind they have got, not to impose one upon them; to place opportunities before their powers, and not to make of them either mere receptacles to be filled or mere passive clay to be shaped.

The quest of this ideal has been strenuous. Its results though various have yet apparently been alluring as a whole; since the quest itself goes on apace. In consequence, we stand today amid an outcrop of almost feverish experimentation in educational liberty, from the ideal of self-government among university students all the way down to our studied liberty-schemes for quite little children. What impresses one in it all is the apparent determination to make the principle of liberty a success. In this lies its importance; for in this, as I construe the matter, it is working directly at the problem of the future. The ethical problem of the future is, surely, just the problem of making liberty a success. But let me dwell a moment on

Digitized by Google

this last suggestion. I do not say the creating of liberty, but the making of it succeed; because the creating has been already largely done. I confess I cannot feel with those who insist on taking another view here. I can well enough imagine another view being taken. For frankly, when I say that the creating of liberty has been largely done I am thinking just of social and political liberty in the ordinary sense. I am thinking of the thing which is written on your American coins, and is symbolized by that statue which stands on your eastern shore looking out so confidently toward Europe and the rising sun; the thing which makes one use the phrase "a free country" in ordinary speech; just, in a word, that American freedom of thought and speech and conscience which was won in England after so many centuries of struggle, and which, planted down here in these wide spaces, has seemed to flourish as in its native air.

It may seem daring to use such language. I know well that for many years—and especially now, with memories of war-experience and after-the-war sickness fresh in so many minds—such familiar words may seem to have lost something of their fire. It is so in any of our democratic countries. The cynic is abroad; the cynic who has seen with his own eyes, in so many cases, that the "free country," with its boasted "liberty of thought and speech and conscience," is a tradition only and not a reality. But I am frankly not one of those who feel the force of such assertions when made in general and in the large. I do not think that liberty is not a reality, readily as I will allow that we have not understood it very well. Indeed I think it absurd to deny that this democratic age of ours with all its faults will really appear an age of liberty, if compared with any tolerably accurate picture, say, of medieval Europe at the time when the economic basis of life was serfdom and in England, for example, when two-fifths of the population were thralls, legally attached to the fields they tilled, living in comfortless sheds and in a poverty both abject and wholly

Digitized by Google

without hope. It should be clear even to a neo-Marxian socialist, I think, that compared with that, our own age does enjoy comparative freedom. And so does it, I make bold to say, could we compare it detachedly with any age since. I am prepared to submit the matter to a simple test question. Let anyone detachedly and keeping the eighteenth century in his mind (to say nothing of the tenth or the eleventh) ask himself whether the time we live in is not pre-eminently a time—to put it quite simply—when things are allowed. I think there can be no doubt of the answer. Barriers of convention exist, of course. The fences are there still. But they have been eased back in conduct, in taste, in all the management of one's affairs. The obvious truth, I think, is that freedom has grown more or less steadily with the centuries, and that now we live on the summit. Today, as compared with most former ages of the world, the things that "may be done" are not few; they are numerous. The problems before our time are the problems which freedom itself brings. How conserve our freedom? How prevent its passing from us and becoming that unhappy régime of mere indiscipline whose only end—if Plato was at all right—is tyranny? That is our problem. We want to prevent liberty from ending in new despotisms. We want to make liberty a success.

If this is true, then I think the more closely we come up to the modern social problem, we see the more clearly that it is a problem of education. I was going to say at once of liberty education, especially in the early years, but, at any rate, it is a problem of education.

What *is* the social problem? There are many possible formulations for it. Let me try to put one important aspect of the matter in a deliberately crude way. At an earlier stage than the democratic, a government is, say, monarchical, or oligarchical, or aristocratic. Under such conditions only a few are free. It stands to reason that in that case the few

Digitized by Google

can be very free. A small aristocracy can have a great deal of unearned wealth, and can have all the authority and power in their hands. It is not unlimited, of course; each individual of them has to allow something for the others. But if there are not very many others, or not many who count, he does not need to allow very much. Suppose, though, that the typical aristocrat, the privileged private member of a little ruling group, should realize of a sudden that an age of democracy has come, and that he has to let everybody into the privileged circle now. What is the net effect upon him? I want an abrupt spatial metaphor to help me to an answer here. I want to reply quite banally that the net effect on this man is to make him take up less room than he did. He has to come off his perch, and get back, and take up less social space. That is the kind of change that has come, when democracy has come. And if we ask just at once: What is the result of this democratizing process? What is the logic of the awakening of a social conscience among the privileged? How does it work out? The answer, I think, inevitably is that it spells social law after social law, regulation piled on regulation, till we are hemmed in by regulations, bound neck and crop by them, and cry out that we are suffocating. Such it seems to me is one way at least, of expressing the inwardness of the social problem.

Let us ruminate over the situation further. We are asking about the problem which democracy brings. We are supposing that the aristocrat's social conscience has been awakened. Whether it happened by a divine influence from above or by a crude upthrust from the forces below does not matter. It has in any case got itself shaken awake; and the result is the coming of democracy. What is the effect on him? He sees that the serf cannot be tied to the soil; that he cannot be bound for a lifetime to the man who pays the wages; that he must be let choose whom he will serve; and must eventually be allowed, if he cares and they care, to call together his fellows to help him to choose—to weld themselves with him into a

Digitized by Google

solid mass which can bargain and make stipulations as he, all alone and unsupported, cannot bargain. The aristocrat has had to come to see that this lowly man cannot be denied the citizenship of his country any more than he. The small privileged circle has to open its doors, modify itself, shift about a little, widen the circle, make room and always make more room, as more and more claims which cannot be denied come up from below. And the process repeats itself as democracy develops. In more and more ways room has to be made, for more and more claims. There are voteless people who should not be voteless; ignorant people who should not be ignorant; ill people who should not be ill. That all this may be changed we, the privileged, must submit to an abundance of regulatory arrangements. There is yellow fever in the world, and quarantine liabilities must be imposed that those who have it may be relieved of it, and that those who are going to have it may not have it. And all the time, and at every turn, with the advance of science forever showing us what more we could do, and the advance of the social conscience impelling us to do it, we are discovering further things and ever further things which simply must be submitted to and done; with the result that regulation piles on regulation, and having to observe so many regulations our social room gets curtailed, and more and more curtailed, till we suffocate.

Now the result of this suffocation is an unfortunate outcry against the social legislation which does it. It is a paradoxical state that we are brought into, a kind of a seesaw of alternating moods. When we look at one side of the picture we are all for it; when we look at the other side we are all against it. In these days of world-epidemics, for example, when we think how such a thing, for instance, as pneumonia could really be prevented from spreading from country to country as fast as the fastest ships can travel, could we but bring ourselves to adopt the complicated system of prevention measures which would compass the result, then we are all for the proposals; they are

Digitized by Google

irksome, but nothing at all if people are going to be saved thereby from disease and death. But the minute we are actually caught unaware in the toils of such regulations, it becomes evident that the best of us cannot keep always looking at the right side of the inconveniences which the modern social conscience imposes on us in the name of our fellow-men. We do not, of course, openly quarrel with the end. We condemn the means adopted. We find the regulations absurdly framed or absurdly administered, or what not. But this makes no difference to the main fact, that, as social legislation increases, the irritations of life increase, till we look around at certain moments almost in a kind of despair and ask ourselves whether, after a hundred years of science on the one side and social morality on the other, real human happiness has increased by any infinitesimal fraction. We feel very convincingly as though it were with society as with the individual; just as the search for happiness becomes more expert and scientific, happiness itself recedes and disappears. Here, it seems to me, we have the social problem. I would express it by the question, How are we going to counteract this? How are we going to learn to stand the curtailment of our social space which social advance brings with it?

But if this problem seems insoluble or even discouraging to us, if happiness seems receding as we pursue it, I think it is because we have forgotten something we knew; namely, this simple two-sided fact, that regulation is external while real good is inward.

It is as well, in an investigation like this, to abstain from moralizing and keep to hard scientific facts as far as possible. That maxim, however, does not prohibit my making once more a certain old observation, to the effect that

> If happiness have not her seat
> And centre in the breast,
> We may be wise or rich or great
> But never can be blest.

Digitized by Google

In plain words, I think it a scientific fact of the hardest description that happiness of heart is what gives to all our efforts at social legislation whatever success they have. This in turn gives me my point about liberty education. For these liberty methods we are discussing have their value just in this: that they are getting happiness into the "breasts" of the children while they are young.

I would insist on this as the one important point I have to urge. It is happiness of heart which oils all the social machinery and gives to the social legislation which is the feature of modern democracy all the success which it has. And what these liberty methods are doing—I am thinking especially of the education of young children—is that they are putting the happiness there; getting it in, in childhood.

I turn now to my other question which, as may be noticed, I have just raised, namely, what these methods do; what effect, exactly, they are fitted to take. I have replied that they are putting happiness into the breasts of the children while they are young.

That again, I am well aware, is very crude speech. But if I am told that it conveys, at best, only a rough practical approximation to the truth, and not the actual psychological truth, my reply must be that it is in the making of character and the practical issues connected therewith that I am here mainly concerned. I am liable to be asked, I know, whether I imagine happiness to be some crude material substance with which you can dose human beings or a stuff with which you can stuff them. And I do not. But I am speaking in the rough. And I am convinced that one may help one's self not a little by thinking *as if* it were so.

I will make bold to put it in this way. Children are live little beings. But to keep them free, as nearly as possible always free, is all just *as if* you were putting a lubricant into their little constitutions, which would have the effect of running them smoothly all the way down the course of life to the very

Digitized by Google

end, however many social regulations they have to put up with. That done, they will be started free; and through all the obstructions of their much-obstructed path, they will have a free run.

I can imagine, though, that another sort of objection may have been brewing in your minds all the time that I have been speaking thus, and a more serious one; an objection to the whole idea of adopting any liberty principle without giving careful attention to the question of how it is to be qualified and limited. This stressing of liberty, it may be said, is after all a familiar old gospel, which, however, has its other side which you may think I am not duly emphasizing. We have always known that liberty was a very good thing. But the greatest believers in freedom have always been the clearest headed about the truth that real freedom implies discipline and only comes through that. It is not liberty but disciplined liberty which is going to carry us through the strain of those coming social conditions and their irritation, which I have referred to.

I reply that this, to me, is an exceedingly true principle exceedingly unhelpfully expressed. For real freedom you require discipline. Of course you do. But you do nothing by going on repeating that. I do not know whether, as parents,[1] and with the experience of parents behind you, you won't want to take vital issue with me here. But I must put the matter as I see it until I see it differently. And I say that you do nothing except harm by going on repeating that freedom requires discipline. You may perpetrate anything in the name of discipline. The true point, as I apprehend it, is that while it must be a disciplined liberty, it must be liberty. Otherwise put, there must be lines, but there must really be liberty within them. This is more or less the center of my thesis. This is what I mean by getting a stock of happiness laid in early. The latter point perhaps could have been expressed better as keeping unhappiness out. For happiness

[1] See footnote p. 150 above.

Digitized by Google

is naturally there. And unhappiness can come there and stay.

Getting happiness in, then, by preserving liberty. That is all the story I have to submit; and I think, somehow, it will bear inspection.

The devil who drives, if I might put it so, is this progressive restriction of our social space to which I have been drawing attention. Only, he is no devil either. It is part of our humanity to have this problem. It is part of our humanity to have to make room for one another. The problem only presses specially close to us under these democratic conditions which let so much of other men's humanity out. And I say the hope lies with the preservation of the liberty that is in the child's mind—the quantum of spontaneous interest that he possesses. Because the problem of making room for our neighbor, the problem of really not coveting his patch, is in very large degree the problem of being absorbed in cultivating our own garden. The problem of freedom is tolerably akin, if one may descend to a very homely illustration, to the farmer's problem of keeping his cows in their field. If it be a field of clover they have to wander in, then no need of high fences; they are not tempted to stray; but if it be a stubble field, and over the hedge a field of clover, it is another matter. I say, let each be able to cultivate his own field. Then the problem solves itself. Of course, this is metaphor again. The field I am speaking of is a man's own mind and soul as it gets out within certain limits. But the principle is simple. Let the mind, as within these limits, really live. Let the world it sees be genuinely alive with interest. Within these limits, let mind on the one side and world on the other be in fertile contact at as many points as possible. Maximum life to the square inch of the ground which falls within the limits of the moral law—that is the principle I am trying to express.

One point more—which, however, is the whole point—and I have finished. I have spoken about maximizing interest;

Digitized by Google

about making the world live; about making the points of interest which a person's world has for him as many as possible, and so making the person happy. I have been advocating the making of children's education time a happy time, one which appeals to them—boys scouting in the fields and learning there in preference to learning by means of the dull quotidian task. But, it may be said, we have to cultivate in children the power of endurance. How is that affected by this ideal of liberty training?

Let me try to answer anecdotally. I happened across an educational book lately called *The Child's Path to Freedom.*[1] I was sufficiently struck with it to seek out the author and request the privilege of passing a day and a night with him at his little school in Essex, England. I put to him the following question—I knew it was nearly a banality, and that it had been certainly put to him often before, but I put it—so freshly was it suggested to me by the mere sight of the happy faces of his young protégés. "You would agree," I said, "that the business of an educator is to train youth to meet the world?" And he did not object to this utterance although he was not visibly stirred. His business *was* to prepare boys to meet the world, if it pleased anybody to say so. "And," I said, "the world is full of hardness"; and still he did not object. "And how can you believe that you are really preparing these boys to endure hardness, by making things so easy for them as everything appears to be in this so unmistakably happy little place?" "Suppose," I pursued, "that they had a lot of it to endure eventually, on some 'Western Front' or other of the future, perhaps, doing days and weeks and weary months in filth and slush and cold; how are you preparing them for that?" Now, I may be wrong, but it did not seem to me he had any very clear theory with which to answer my question; yet it seemed to me that the note of conviction with which he did answer was of the sort that is better than theory; the quiet,

[1] Bell & Sons, London.

Digitized by Google

unshakable conviction born of experience; "If ever again it comes to that," he said, "then just these are the kind of boys who will do well."

Now, much as I believe in the view he expressed, it is not much to the point if I only say so. What we need, if we are to believe that liberty education really strengthens and does not weaken powers of endurance is to know the way it works. And that, I apprehend, though apparently peculiar, is quite easily understood.

The point is simply this. If a person's childhood be kept interesting and happy, he is being every day practiced in the art of extracting happiness from the world; and afterward he is able to "stick" things, simply because he has got into the habit and acquired the skill to extract interest and happiness from whatever situation the demands of duty or the moral law decree he must be in.

That, I believe, is the whole matter. To express it more in detail, the whole question of endurance is a question of the chronic state of a man's inner thought and imagination. Men, after all, are not like oxen. Hardness is a different thing, to them. What makes hardness for a man is not the actual cold and slush, the sore bones, and the physical fatigue. Men are creatures of imagination. If an ox falls (to take an example at random) it's all right if only he falls soft. With a man it is not enough to fall soft. It depends on what he falls on, or what kind of a mess he falls into. It is the chronic state of the imagination that makes evil and good for a man. It is not the pain of death, for instance, that disturbs a man, but the thought of dissolution. The real burden of all oppressions and horrors—when they break a man down, for example—is the inward rebellion of thought and imagination against the things that are being endured. The inability to carry on through adversity is not usually a matter of the actual outward things which he has to put up with. It is a matter of the permanent weak places in the arches of his mind, and the

Digitized by Google

perverse tendency of the load to pile itself up just precisely there. Keep unessential burdens from him, and you reinforce everything that is manly in him. And the whole impact of the freedom-giving movements in education, the whole point of taking the child to the open, teaching him to tie knots and pitch tents, or kindle a fire or follow a trail, lies, I think, just here. It prevents the formation of unnecessary internal burdens to be carried for the rest of life; it prevents the formation of weak arches, arches weak because loaded to breaking-point from the first, and so unable to stand their share of the common burden of life without staving in.

For, as to these weakened arches—how are they formed? Educators, one and all, parental or scholastic, should face this question. They are formed just as we should expect: by the bad old ways, by "disciplinary" measures—thrashings, in plain words—by having scenes with a child, by falling out, then letting things come to a pitched battle between you and him, then "showing him which is master, no matter how long it takes," *et hoc genus omne*. I will not pursue the subject and ask where the scenes in their turn have their origin. I shall not even insist that to lift them bodily out of life is possible. But I will say that to bring up a child without such—altogether without—means that you have given him a happy heart; and therewith, to come back to my thesis, the ability, however severe the limits of his life, to enjoy whatever of joy these limits afford.

And notice, in conclusion, the test of the happy heart, the criterion which tells whether it is there. It is what preserves the boy's identity. One of the most beautiful things, to me, in the book I have referred to—beautiful because said by one who believes he has proved it possible—is the claim he makes that when a boarding-school takes away a boy from out of his mother's hands for purposes of his education, it should undertake to return him to her, developed, indeed,

Digitized by Google

and more of a man, but still her own boy. If he comes home loaded with prizes, but not her boy, then there is failure. Such an eventuality is in no way unfamiliar. It is in no manner of way necessary. Boys should not lose their identity as they grow up. They should remain the same boys. The state of perennial youth which we occasionally read about and always think of as pertaining only to human creatures rare and very blest is in literal truth not an Arcadian dream—not even in these days of social restriction—but a possibility, a genuine possibility, and one that should be disturbing us.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE
CARDIFF, WALES

Digitized by Google

THE TRANSCENDENTAL DERIVATION OF EQUALITY IN AMERICA

T. V. SMITH

Though the early American doctrine of equality, as expressed in the Declaration of Independence, was confessedly tied up with a certain normative view of nature, yet the conception of equality did not pass with the passing of the inherited view of nature. It is true that Calhoun had given up the two together; but not all men are as logical as Calhoun, and few men have had such compelling desire to be rid of the notion of equality. Had this *naturrecht* philosophy been the only ground for asserting equality, the latter doctrine would presumably have ceased with the decline of the former. The fact that it did not, indicates that it had other sources of support. Like the hero of a once-popular ballad who, when his legs were shot away, fought still upon the stumps, the doctrine of equality lived on as though it too bore a charmed life.

Equality had become too closely connected with the concept of democracy to pass while democratic government was spreading throughout the world. There is, indeed, good historical ground for the supposition that democracy, whatever more it may mean, must at least mean some kind of equality. Plato rated democracy as a form of government very low because, among other reasons, of its insistence upon "equality between things that are equal and those that are not"; Aristotle, though more favorably disposed, admitted that for democratic states "equality is above all things their aim"; Montesquieu thought equality the very soul of democracy; De Tocqueville identified democracy with equality; Locke certainly supposed that democracy involves at least equality of natural rights; Rousseau held equality as the precondition of liberty and the primary aim of all popular government.

Digitized by Google

The American fathers shared the faith of Locke; and the French Revolutionists wrote equality into their trinity of aims. Historically all intelligent critics alike have confessed democracy's equalitarian complexion; some have called that complexion its virtue, others its defect. Such modern authorities as Sir Henry Maine,[1] Sir James Stephen,[2] and in America a group fairly represented by President Nicholas Murray Butler[3] have sought to show that in the democratic household there is division, and that, since liberty and equality cannot dwell together, equality must go. Along with these critics, who have been unfriendly toward democracy conceived as equality, may be listed also the brilliant French student, Faguet. No one has set out better than he the close connection between democracy and equality, though it be but the more tellingly to parade the defects of democracy.[4] In picturesque language he declares that "the people's one desire, when once it has been stung by the democratic tarantula" is "that all men should be equal, and in consequence that all inequalities natural as well as artificial should disappear." But there are contemporary friends of democracy who are as quick to praise as Faguet is to censure this equalitarian emphasis. Conklin declares that "equality is the dearest of the democratic graces";[5] Professor Dodd, in a brilliant delineation of "The Struggle for Equality in the United States," surpasses even De Tocqueville in asserting that "democracy is equality, economic, political, and even social in large measure";[6] Dean Inge of St. Paul's feels assured that "democracy, as a form of society, rests on the idea of social equality";[7] and Lord Bryce has in the intervening century found some confirmation for De Tocqueville's broad contention that "the love of equality is stronger than the love

[1] *Popular Government.*
[2] *Liberty, Equality, Fraternity.*
[3] *True and False Democracy.*
[4] *The Cult of Incompetence.*
[5] *Direction of Human Evolution*, p. 127.
[6] *International Journal of Ethics*, XXVIII, 465–84.
[7] *Atlantic Monthly*, April 1922, p. 291.

Digitized by Google

of liberty."[1] While not all the contemporary students of democracy are as emphatic as are these, yet such citations indicate that long after the notions of natural rights and the social compact have become, in Lowell's phrase, "exploded theories," equality is still emblazoned upon the democratic banner.[2]

I

But, with natural equality confessedly refuted,[3] what forms has the assertion of equality taken in America since the Civil War? Speaking generally, the doctrine of equality has undergone two closely connected transformations. The first change was from the assertion of equality as a past or present *fact* to the declaration of it as a worthy *ideal*. Lincoln's well-known and clear-cut interpretation of the equality clause in the Declaration of Independence, while more an interpretation than an exposition, reflects clearly this changing status of the equality doctrine. Calhoun's argument against natural equality needed for its support such a philosophy as slowly fought its way to acceptance in America in the latter part of the nineteenth century in the form of organic evolution. The newer anthropology, built upon an evolutionary foundation, brought facts to confuse those, the strength of whose theories lay in an appeal from existing inequalities to a rosier period in a hazy past. With the researches of Spencer and others, it became increasingly clear that the more remote the antiquity to which one appealed, the greater the inequality of men; the more primitive the people studied, the more complete the dominance of some over others and of the tyranny of custom and superstition over all. Equality, like freedom, ceased to appear an original datum of human nature, and came to be an achievement of the social process, as Calhoun had contended. From a claim of fact, equality thus, through the slow metamorphosis of anthropological discovery, came to be accepted

[1] *Modern Democracies*, I, 68.

[2] Merriam, *American Political Theories*, pp. 308 ff.

[3] *Ibid.*

Digitized by Google

as an ethical ideal. Rousseau had foreshadowed such a shift in his declaration that "it is precisely because the force of circumstances tends always to destroy equality that the force of legislation ought always to tend to maintain it." But with him equality was not merely to be gained, but rather to be *re*-gained.

Rousseau, of course, put the blame for this disparity between the ideal and the actual upon social conventions. But with the nineteenth-century recognition of this hiatus, Nature herself underwent a transvaluation of values. From being the benign giver of all good gifts and the guarantor of all those given, as the eighteenth century had tended to picture her,[1] Nature now became the niggard stepmother, who not only gives nothing good, but wars continually against the weal of her hapless ward. It remained for Huxley, the ardent disciple of Darwin, completely to unmask Nature. From her man could expect no unmerited favor; from her he could learn nothing of moral worth. Conceived at her best, Nature wore the mien of utter neutrality:

> . . . . some Vast Imbecility,
> Mighty to build and blend,
> But impotent to tend,
> . . . . . .
> . . . . an Automaton
> Unconscious of our pains.

Conceived at her worst, she became a "monster, red in tooth and claw," destroying without prevision the products of her

[1] Cf. Hardy's *To Outer Nature*,

> Show thee as I thought thee
> When I early sought thee,
> Omen-scouting
> All undoubting
> Love alone had wrought thee—
>
> Wrought thee for my pleasure,
> Planned thee as a measure,
> For expounding
> And resounding
> Glad things that men treasure.

Digitized by Google

own processes. "So careful of the type she seems, so careless of the single life." Man's hope and aims, his moral interests, and his plans for betterment are precisely what distinguish him most sharply from such a natural order. Ethics has nothing to do with Nature, except to superimpose, wherever possible, an alien law and a steady hand of control upon her effrontery, brutal in its indifference. Huxley's picturesque way of putting the matter was not lost on American thought.

This attitude found clear expression in America through Edmond Kelly.[1] On the one side is Nature with all her inequalities, including a most radical inequality of men; on the other side is man, the product of Nature, seeking to control her for his own ideal ends. "Justice may, then," says Kelly, "be described as the effort to eliminate from our social conditions the effects of the inequalities of Nature upon the happiness and advancement of man, and particularly to create an artificial environment which shall serve the individual as well as the race, and tend to perpetuate noble types rather than those which are base."[2] While this thoroughgoing antithesis between man and nature was not accepted by all who considered the problem of human inequality, nevertheless that aspect of it which necessitated making an ideal rather than a fact of the claim of equality marked one important change in the American doctrine.

As the second transformation, equality as a general abstract doctrine got dissipated into specific claims more or less concrete. The evolutionist could not find equality in the past, common-sense observation had always failed to find it in the present; it must therefore exist as an ideal to be realized in the future. But if it is to be a program for achievement, it must substitute for its general far-away character a certain concreteness, for action is always specific. A fact may be as general and as broad as it is, and if the chief basis for the assertion of it is

[1] *Government or Human Evolution.*

[2] *Ibid.*

Digitized by Google

merely the desire for its existence, then there is no restraint from asserting it in its most general form. With some such motivation, the traditional philosophy had with a generous sweep declared that *all* men are equal, without the trouble of adding any qualifications whatsoever.[1] But if one sets up a program for action, where the difficulties are many and hard, prudence dictates that, instead of making his aim so inclusive as to discourage, if not outright to inhibit, endeavor, he make his claims modest enough and concrete enough to facilitate their realization.

And so the persisting claim of human equality, general and factual, simmered itself down in America during the nineteenth century to three major claims, each more or less specific: (1) all men ought to be equal before the law, (2) all men ought to have equal access to the suffrage, and (3) all men ought to have equality of opportunity.[2] This is not to say that from the beginning in America a struggle had not been carried on for concrete equalities; but in earlier times equality was something other and far more than specific equalities: the fact that *it* existed gave moral validity to the claim that *they* ought to exist. And so the emphasis upon *natural* rather than *civil* equality. But following the decline of the natural-rights doctrine—and the sequel shows the shift in emphasis to be important—there came a time when the doctrine of equality seems to have dissipated itself into, and to have been exhausted by, these specific claims for concrete privileges.

This shift from *fact* to *ideal* in a relatively specific field of American interest but foreshadowed a long overdue reinterpretation of the nature and function of ideas throughout the

[1] "It would have been enough to make out a case for equality before the law; or for equality in vote and in eligibility to office; and perhaps for some effectual abatement of inequality of social status, and of fortunes. But they did not think so. In an evil hour for their cause, they took up a position which they thought to be strong because it was so exhaustive, and even by public declaration proclaimed 'equality of men.'" (Maccunn, *Ethics of Citizenship*, p. 3.)

[2] A phrase that, while having a larger vague connotation, came especially to stand for economic and educational aspiration.

Digitized by Google

whole field of general philosophy. The claim of general equality, as already noted, tended naturally to take a past tense: men *were* created equal or they *were* by nature equal. This retrospective tendency grew out of the age-old human predilection to regard ideas as of ontological significance. This tendency stands out with all its challenging naïveté among the earliest civilizations. The Hebrews, finding themselves possessed of dreams of brotherhood and idyllic bliss that were observable neither in their social life nor in their physical environment (the milk and honey of which was too allegorical to eat or drink), and yet feeling that there must exist a real counterpart to these ideas, put it in the past as a reality: hence the Garden of Eden. The Greeks, awakening to reflectiveness from the reign of the mythologists, and finding themselves possessed of ideas also that found no satisfactory counterpart either in Grecian society or in Grecian geography, and yet never doubting that ideas have ontological meaning, supplemented their barren present with a richer, realer past: hence the Golden Age. Plato, when Greek thought had come to maturity, was still so under the domination of this fundamental assumption of the ontological significance of ideas that, finding himself and others possessed of such charming ideals as seemed not to befit any earthly past, however remote, he put them out of time altogether in order to make them the realest of all things and then invented a theory of knowledge by recollection to bridge the gulf between relatively real ideas and the realest of all things which the ideas meant. The future reference of ideas as constituting their meaning was, if present at all, very vague in either Greek or Hebrew consciousness. The putting of the Golden Age behind rather than in front of mankind persisted all the more through the influence of Christianity, which interpreted ideas, whether good or bad, as having real ontological counterparts already eternally realized in highest heaven or in lowest hell. The nearest approach that Christianity came to reading a future significance

Digitized by Google

into ideas was in the imagery of the new Jerusalem coming down from God out of heaven; and even here it was realized in advance and given to man ready-made. Ideas have been in the history of man so unique, so magic, so comforting, that man could not believe them other than promissory of reality, and only with the coming of a technique of control did he begin slowly to suspect that their meaning might look forward rather than backward; that their promise was of something that *might* be in the future rather than of something that *necessarily* had to be in the past. This change from equality as a fact (which tended to be put in the past) to equalities of the sorts named (to be striven for in the future) prefigures a revolutionary change in the American philosophy of ideas and ideals.

The two closely connected claims of equality before the law and political equality indicate, for the most part, the negative direction taken by the equalitarian impulse in America. Even if there were no theoretical justification, the practicality of law would for the most part make its function negative. But to the practical considerations were added the weight of a laissez faire philosophy which held that government best which governed least. The whole Anglo-Saxon struggle for equality before the law—a time-honored aspiration transferred to America in the political habits of the colonists and brought to its final expression in the declaration of the Fourteenth Amendment that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws"—has been thus but a persistent effort to equalize the burdens of associated life. Justice was held to demand that necessary taxation, punishment for crime, and all other restraints that the law must lay shall be laid impartially. And so the extension to all of the "right to sue and be sued" represents "the culmination of an age-long experimentation with the problem of reconciling individual freedom and public

Digitized by Google

order." Chiefly out of the desire to establish and to maintain an equalization of burdens grew a demand somewhat more positive in its nature—an insistence upon the right to vote.[1] The story of this persistent demand and of its steady realization constitutes the most conspicuous chapter in the history of American democracy. Starting with a severely limited suffrage, the democratic impulse has overcome successively religious barriers, property limitations, racial disqualifications, and finally in our own day sex boundaries. Equal participation in suffrage has been avidly sought by an ever enlarging number primarily because it was felt to be the only effective guaranty that the negative terms upon which associated life shall be sustained are not to weigh more heavily on some than on others. This instrumental nature of political equality is indicated by Bryce's observation that "popular government has been usually sought and won and valued *not as a good thing in itself, but as a means of getting rid of tangible grievances or securing tangible benefits*, and when those objects have been attained, the interest in it has generally tended to decline."[2] The motivation of this struggle for political equality is also clearly set out in Bryce's further remark that "as a rule, that which the mass of any people desires is not to govern itself, but to be well governed."[3] In a word, then, equality before the law, generalized by the Fourteenth Amendment and made effective by the universalizing of the suffrage in the Fifteenth and the Nineteenth amendments, indicates and completes this impulsion in its more or less negative aspects.

But equality as an ideal has also developed its positive form. "Equality of opportunity" is the general statement of the demand, but its influence has been felt specifically upon both the aims of legislation and upon the changing nature of the laws enacted. This more positive emphasis was little known in early America. With a continent of unfathomed but not

[1] Godkin, *Problems of Modern Democracy*, p. 56.

[2] *Modern Democracies*, I, 4. [3] *Ibid.*, II, 501.

Digitized by Google

unappreciated opportunities before them, the pioneers were little inclined to stress equality of opportunity.[1] So long as there was easily available enough for all, it was more natural that the maxim of conduct should be "each for himself"; for if the government would but preserve order and not oppress, every industrious man could take care of himself. When, however, with fuller exploitation of natural resources, it became apparent that the maxim of "each for himself" really left many hindmost as toll for the devil, new occasions taught new duties.[2] The popular cry for a freer field with fewer favors tended to develop the legal meaning that private interests may be of public concern:[3] law may sometimes tell men what to do as well as what not to do. *Pari passu* with the lengthening of the shadow cast by such foreseen outcomes as the passing of the public domain, complete monopolization of timber above and ores below the land, and even of the exhaustion of the soil itself, the cry for equality of opportunity approached unanimity as the official expression of the equalitarian impulses in American life. Ward represented the sociologists in declaring that "equality of opportunity is the only means of determining the degree of merit";[4] Hart, the historians in listing among the living American ideals "equality of opportunity";[5] Conklin, the biologists in defining democracy as "a system which, ideally at least, attempts to equalize the opportunities and responsibilities of individuals in society";[6] Dewey, the philosophers in judging social institutions and political measures by the test of "whether the general, the public, organization and order are promoted in such a way as to equalize opportunity

[1] Turner, *The Frontier in American History*, p. 343.

[2] President Eliot, of Harvard University, clearly sets out this change in American philosophy in his little book entitled, *The Conflict of Individualism and Collectivism in a Democracy.*

[3] The most celebrated statement being by the Supreme Court, *Munn* vs. *Illinois*, 94 U.S. 113.

[4] *Sociology*, chap. xii.

[5] "American Nation Series," XXVI, 85. [6] *Direction of Human Evolution*, p. 101.

Digitized by Google

for all";[1] Herbert Hoover, the man of affairs in finding the spirit of American democracy in "its glorification of equality of opportunity for all";[2] and Woodrow Wilson, following the emphasis that Lincoln before him liked to make[3] and applying also his own earlier conviction that the function of the state consists in an "equalization of conditions in all branches of endeavor,"[4] crystallized this common thought of the nation into a political program in his first campaign for the presidency.[5] Finally, President Eliot, at the close of the century, looking back upon a period that had completely accepted in principle and had, it felt, largely succeeded in establishing in practice the negative aspect of the equality ideal, summarized the contemporary American conception in terms of equality of opportunity.[6]

That both civil and political equality has been accepted in principle and more or less achieved in practice, that equality of opportunity has come to be unanimously accepted as the goal of social justice—these facts, significant in themselves, serve but to necessitate the further question, On what basis, or bases, have these several equalitarian claims rested? Since it appeared to be the breakdown of the doctrine of natural equality as a *fact* that necessitated these claims as moral *ideals*, they cannot logically assume as basis the existence of a fact whose very non-existence motivated their genesis. They have asserted that justice demands that men who are actually unequal should be treated equally. On what conception of justice does such a conclusion follow? Certainly not upon the

[1] Dewey and Tufts, *Ethics*, p. 483.

[2] *The World's Work*, April, 1922, pp. 585-88.

[3] *Works* (Nicolay and Hay), I, 179 ff.

[4] *The State*, sec. 1273 ff.

[5] *The New Freedom*. Wilson's basic plea in this remarkable collection of campaign speeches was that opportunities should be equalized by curbing the monopolies of the privileged.

[6] *Contemporary American Conception of Equality*. (Phi Beta Kappa address at the University of Missouri, 1909.)

Digitized by Google

traditionally accepted notion of justice. Aristotle's statement of the principle here involved rings as clearly now as when he made it. His canon of justice was: "If the persons be not equal, their shares will not be equal; and this is the source of disputes and accusations, when persons who are not equal receive equal shares."[1] Equal remuneration for unequal labor would hardly, as a general practice, be less complainingly received by the moral sense of our day than it was by the laborers in Jesus' parable of the vineyard.[2] Why, then, should men have equality before the law; why be given equality of opportunity?

II

With equality become an ideal, its basis might be expected to shift from impersonal nature to human nature, from history to psychology. And speaking broadly, this is what happened. A unified basis for the insistence upon specific equalities will emerge from a separate consideration of the influence upon American thought of three factors: (1) Christian theology, (2) Kantian ethics, and (3) Utilitarian philosophy.

And first it is well to correct and to complete the scant justice sometimes done to the influence of religion on the American doctrine of equality. The most available justification for not emphasizing more explicitly the influence of religion upon the early views is the fact that the church itself, seizing upon the conception of natural rights, poured its spiritual wine into the available philosophic bottles. Nature to the fathers was that which if called by a theological name would serve as well. Whatever consideration was given to natural law as a basis of equality was therefore also at least implicit recognition of the religious influence. But more explicit recognition of it is demanded by the fact that while the religious influence did work hand in hand with the then current political and legal philosophy, the former also worked right on after the latter had ceased to dominate American thought.

[1] *Nichomachean Ethics*, Book 5, III, 6. [2] Matt. 20: 1–16.

Digitized by Google

While the average eighteenth-century Englishman, permitting the Puritans "to glorify God and enjoy him forever," went on stolidly about his own business pursuits, as Professor Tufts[1] remarks, in America there was a difference. Torn from England at a time of foment and persecution, and isolated in a new world of straitened environment,[2] Puritanism suffered a kind of arrested development. But having got in on the ground floor of the American enterprise, it showed a remarkable tendency to persist. Montesquieu's remark that "religion in England does no harm" did not apply to America. The influence of religion in America was profound, and this influence lasted well into the last half of the nineteenth century. While it is obviously true that religion has been most influential in keeping alive a faith in human equality among the class that has never yet discarded the belief that men are actually equal also by nature,[3] nevertheless by social osmosis upward, and otherwise, religious influence has been strongly felt by those who have formulated American thought, especially by political and legal theorists.[4]

Now the whole weight of this influence, whether Puritan or otherwise, has been to keep alive a belief in human equality. A glance at the nature and history of Christian doctrine will make apparent some of the reasons for this. From the beginning, Christianity made men conscious of themselves by such large-scale contrasts as to minimize whatever difference there might be among them. The Augustinian and Calvinistic exegeses, to which Puritanism fell heir, seemed, if anything, to heighten these colossal contrasts. The whole race of Adam

[1] *The Individual and His Relation to Society*, p. 1.

[2] It was this phenomenon that caused Barret Wendell to suggest that "New England would be better named if, in the course of generations, it had come to be called Old." (*The Cambridge Modern History*, VII, 725.)

[3] Popular thought is still confessedly impregnated with the same political philosophy that was brought to America from Europe in the seventeenth century.

[4] An influence recurrently expressing itself in, and perpetuating itself by, such far-reaching waves of revivalism as swept most of the colonies in the middle of the eighteenth century and many of the states in the middle of the nineteenth.

Digitized by Google

is so depraved when seen in the juxtaposition with the blinding purity of God that there ceases to be degrees of even sin among men: "Whoever shall keep the whole law, and yet offend in one point, he is guilty of all." Even those who were snatched like brands from the burning had no distinction whereof to boast, for their salvation was by grace wholly unmerited. Natural men were equally lost; the elected ones were equally saved; and even the saved, when they saw themselves by the light of heavenly holiness—as they were encouraged constantly to do—were so wholly without human merit that they too, like the lost, were but poor worms of the dust. In such a milieu, human inequalities, like the witches in *Macbeth*, "made themselves thin air into which they vanished." Indeed, the infinity of this theologically inherited contrast darkened counsel so completely that such gross inequalities as had served for the unsophisticated Anglo-Saxon to mark the choice between dishonorable life and honorable death were beneath notice; for in Christ not only did economic and even sex inequalities disappear, but the bond and the free were one.[1]

The equality thus obtained through a kind of bankruptcy of human worth had great influence, at least by setting limiting conditions for all more specific thinking. But to the influence of this theological background were added more conscious and explicit emphases looking toward equality. Close association of men fostered by religion at least once a week, its co-operative enterprises, constituted a sort of practice of equality. Moreover, God had created all races of men from one stock; all had lost their splendid birthright in Adam; Christ had died for all;[2] a common lot awaited all upon earth, birth, marriage, disease, death; after death, a common judge; and through

[1] "I am not aware that either Judaism or Christianity affirms the political freedom or the political equality of men in Rousseau's sense. They affirm the equality of men before God—but that is an equality either of insignificance or of imperfection." (Huxley, "On the Natural Inequality of Men," in *Method and Results*.)

[2] The view at least toward which religious thought increasingly gravitated in America as the nineteenth century progressed, in spite of the early opposite direction given it by Edwards.

Digitized by Google

eternity for the saved a common guerdon, for the lost a common doom. The fundamentals of this theology—which was also a psychology and a cosmology in one—was driven home with a lasting emphasis in early America by Edwards. While, of course, the changes of a century made themselves felt in theology, eliminating now this crudity, now softening that sternness, yet the great influence of religion toward a doctrine of equality easily persisted into the post-natural law period. For almost, if not quite, throughout the nineteenth century, the changes in theology left singularly unmodified one tenet—a tenet too that served as a cornerstone for equality—a certain static view of the soul.

God himself is unchanging: "the same yesterday, today, and forever." Man is made in the image of God; it is indeed the possession of a certain substantial miniature of God's spirit that makes man, man—God breathed into Adam's nostrils the breath of life, and not until then did Adam become a living soul. Though there existed some room for haziness or even for dispute as to the exact *modus et tempus* of Adam's descendants' receiving this spirit of God, the human soul, all were at one in holding that *before* it comes, man is not man; that *after* it leaves, man is but *corpus*. The Christian sects in colonial times could disagree so violently on other things because they agreed so fundamentally on this. The deistic revolt in the eighteenth century left quite undisputed the commonly accepted doctrine of the soul. Paine clearly implies throughout his *Age of Reason* an unquestioned acceptance of the orthodox view upon this vital point, even had he not explicitly stated his belief in God and a hope for immortality of his soul "beyond this life." Moreover, the motivation at work is interestingly foisted aboveboard when in the next sentence he declares, "I believe in the equality of man." Paine, much in the spirit of Kant, wished to abolish spurious knowledge in order to make way for a valid faith, as he avows upon the first page of the *Age of Reason*. Franklin likewise

Digitized by Google

confesses a profound belief in the immortality of the soul. The Unitarian protest expressed itself through Channing as not merely acquiescent but even insistent upon the orthodox view of the soul as furnished to man.[1] The impatient yearning of transcendentalism culminated, through Emerson's articulation, in an Over-Soul to which men were related as more or less brightly flickering under-souls. Ingersoll, who after Paine was the *enfant terrible* of popular religious thought, certainly had not deeply questioned—even granting him capable of such questioning—the currently accepted view of the soul. The small influence on American thought of materialistic eddies in Europe is indicated by the fact that no well-known American philosopher or scientist of the period expressed a thoroughgoing materialism; and common thought was even less susceptible to such leanings. Finally, the influence of Darwin, destined to make an impression eventually, made slow headway against such hoary and sacred views as those about the soul. During even the last quarter of the nineteenth century, leaders of thought in America who did not with true religious fortitude hold out faithful unto death against evolution so diluted or compromised or compartmentized their acceptance of it as to guarantee practical security, if not actual immunity, to the soul, until the century was over.[2] Though

[1] Unimportant in this context, but supremely important generally, was the Unitarian insistence upon the inherent goodness of man; instead of satanic parentage and consequent total depravity, it asserted the universal fatherhood of God. Moreover, Unitarianism believed God to be good, because it believed the soul to be a divine microcosm. "The soul," writes Channing, "is the spring of our knowledge of God. . . . . We must start in religion from our own souls. In these is the fountain of all divine truth. An outward revelation is only possible and intelligible, on the ground of conceptions and principles furnished by the soul. Here is our primitive teacher and light. . . . . The only God, whom our thoughts can rest on, and our hearts cling to, and our consciences can recognize, is the God whose image dwells in our own souls."

[2] A scientist graduated as doctor of philosophy from a reputable American university in the first decade of the twentieth century was heard to suggest to a group of upperclassmen in a secular university that, while evolution may have produced the organism of the first man, he did not become a *living soul* until God breathed into his nostrils the breath of life! Verily, "man is not logical and his intellectual history is," as Dewey says, "a record of mental reserves and compromises. He hangs on to what he can in his old beliefs even when he is compelled to surrender their logical basis." (*Human Nature and Conduct*, p. 224.)

Digitized by Google

amid this earthly dance of plastic circumstance all else should change, yet so long as the soul and God stood sure, a firm foundation remained for a belief in human equality. And so for a half-century after the natural-rights philosophy had ceased to be consciously appealed to, this not unrelated religious account of the soul continued to serve as ground for the ancient belief. The combined weight of the limiting conditions furnished by religious faith to all American thought, as indicated above, the practice of equality fostered by the churches, and the universally accepted view of a ready-made soul—the weighty influence of all these religious factors was summarized in the universally acclaimed formula, *equality before God*. Here, then, is at least a partial answer to the question raised above. Men ought to be equal civilly and politically, ought to have equal opportunities, *because they are equal—before God*. That is, men actually are equal, could they but be seen *sub specie aeternitatis*, as God sees them.

This notion of a furnished soul, which served so conveniently as a religious basis for equalitarian demands, was reinforced through a new approach furnished by the Kantian ethics, the influence of which on American thought grew as the doctrine of natural equality declined. When, in 1827, Francis Lieber, a German refugee of good mind and scholarly training, came to America, he brought not only a pregnant theory of the organic as over against the contractual basis of the state but also a new account of the ethical nature of man. The German influence upon American thought steadily increased from then on to the close of the century. Lieber's college teaching and writing, particularly his pretentious and influential treatise entitled *Political Ethics* (1838), as well as his personal influence upon such other teachers of America as Theodore D. Woolsey, president of Yale and author of *Political Science*, all conspired to give him a large place in the beginning of the movement which, after the Civil War, culminated in a yearly emigration of American students to German universities. From all these

Digitized by Google

sources, the German idealistic philosophy, initiated by Kant and culminating in Hegel, came, by the close of the nineteenth century, to be the orthodox philosophy of America.

The Kantian philosophy, though much more than this, was at heart essentially an ethical formulation. Taking his cue from the stupendous dualism of Christianity, indicated above, Kant comes out with that dualism still unresolved, though now clothed in the pretentious language of philosophy and much belabored with heavy thought. The natural world of religion became in Kant's language the phenomenal world; the spiritual world, the noumenal, a world in which as the idealistic movement progressed all values gradually congregated. Man shared both these worlds. His desires and interest tied him to the phenomenal. Pure reason itself moved in the world of time and space, and landed man, when sometimes it pushed impatiently at the bars of his earthly cage, in hopelessly bewildering antinomies. Only in the will as manifesting itself in practical reason could man enter the noumenal world of absolute freedom. But he could so enter. And since all men had this nexus with the real world, they were in so far equal. Autonomy of will expressing itself in the categorical imperative, as over against the phenomenal selves manifesting their nature in counsels of prudence, was the insignia of man's real self. The transcendental unity which Kant thus achieves no more arises out of the world of experience than does the soul of religion arise from a favorable concatenation of somatic atoms. Instead of arising out of experience, the Kantian self is furnished to, and conditions, experience. Men are equal and should be treated only as ends precisely, because *as moral beings* they tower above the phenomenal world of measurement and are consequently infinite. It is interesting to note that natural men, according to Christianity, are equal, because they are infinitely insignificant, whereas noumenal selves, according to Kant, are equal because they, like the elect souls in Calvinism, are infinitely significant. Attribution to men of infinity always

Digitized by Google

gives formal equality, whether through a leveling down to the equality of complete moral bankruptcy or a leveling up to the equality of absolute autonomy; for what is infinite can be neither more so nor less. That the motivation of Kant's metaphysical equality is not alien to that of Christian theology is also externally indicated both by the fact that he starts from a religious dogmatism and by the further fact that he uses his ethical outcome—autonomy of wills, from which flows his equalitarian doctrine of the kingdom of ends—to reinstate the traditional religious values, God, freedom, and immortality. The self of the Kantian ethics is thus, like the soul of Christianity, a transempirical entity of which equality can be, ethically ought to be, and logically must be, predicated.

The Utilitarian ethics, which also had considerable influence upon American thought, especially through legal and political channels, served in the long run, if not directly to emphasize, at least indirectly to assume, the same basis that has, as indicated above, appeared common to Christian theology and Kantian philosophy. Bentham's well-known antipathy to abstractions prevented him from consciously relying upon them. There is genuine insight in his remark that the judgments, "Justice, Right, Reason require it, and the law of nature commands it, and so forth; all are but so many ways of intimating that a man is firmly persuaded of the truth of this or that moral proposition, though he either thinks he *need not*, or finds he *can't*, tell *why*." Tabooing all such obscurantism, Bentham flattered himself upon his ability to tell *why*. "The general happiness principle" became the concrete touchstone to which he brought all demands for justification. It was hardly short of ridiculous, thought he, to claim that men are naturally evil, but that does not mean, of course, that we should not have equality as an ideal, provided only it squares with the greatest happiness of the greatest number. Bentham believed that equality could not only pass the test of utility but that it had also great positive value

Digitized by Google

as one of the means to the maximum of happiness. Equality, though one means to the good, is not the chief means to be emphasized. Before it, come subsistence, security, and abundance. It is not to be insisted upon at their expense; but if, after they are assured, equality can be realized, the general happiness will be thereby increased.[1]

Bentham meant to follow consistently his principle that nothing could be justified except by showing as its increment an excess of pleasure over pain. But in the light of this, what can be made of his further demand that "each count for one and nobody for more than one?" It really means not only that in his mind justice is prior to pleasure, but also that the individual brings with him to the happiness hunt something so important as to be taken for granted. This something is, psychologically put, a common susceptibility of all men to the "Sovereign Masters, Pleasure and Pain," certain fixed desires, a ready-made interest in pleasure. The fact that Bentham felt no need for distinguishing (as Mill later did) different qualities of pleasure indicates that what he took for granted in men was also assumed to be qualitatively equal. Men are men before Bentham begins to deal with them. He did not feel the need of indicating the method whereby selves arise precisely because he assumed the current religious account of their genesis to be correct. In this assumption he seems to have been representative of Utilitarianism in general.

There is no occasion here to score an easy point by citing from the so-called theological Utilitarianism Bishop Berkeley's religiously motivated remark that "no distinction can be conceived between men," or such similar sentiments frequent from Berkeley to Paley; such views are foregone once the background is understood. But the significant thing is that what the theological Utilitarians made the center of their emphasis, the non-theological Utilitarians took for granted, starting with

[1] This Bentham thought to prove by a kind of hedonistic law of diminishing returns. (See *Civil Code*, chap. iv.)

Digitized by Google

the religious presuppositions about the soul or using the whole theological paraphernalia as a convenient sanction for the enforcement of moral demands, as did Bentham. Both sets of Utilitarians were at one in insisting upon a theological justification as over against an a priori one. But the more the end served, the results achieved, were emphasized as the ethical criterion, the more unconsciously the individual at the other end of the relationship was assumed to be furnished ready-made to the situation. As Dewey observes, "the idea of a fixed and single end lying beyond the diversity of human needs and acts rendered utilitarianism incapable of being an adequate representative of the modern spirit."[1] The chief reason why this is so, Dewey suggests in a later passage.[2] It is that fixity begets fixity: the logical counterpart of a fixed end is a ready-made self. Only here and there in the history of Utilitarianism is there a suggestion of the possibility of the constitutive influence of the situation, the concrete social process, upon the individual as well as upon the end. One such suggestion—the most notable one—is Mill's well-known insistence upon a qualitative distinction in pleasures, a distinction which is as significant in describing the individual judging as it is in describing the pleasure judged. But Mill himself never saw the full meaning of this suggestion. It did not lead him to call in question the assumption of a ready-made self furnished to the specific situation.

So completely *given* (apart from the social process) are the selves with which law and ethics must deal that Utilitarianism disintegrated society into a thoroughgoing atomism. But, as in many another case, it was found easier to decompose than to reconstruct; the terms of the analysis left no basis for an adequate synthesis. Sanctions so external as to be suspiciously like compulsion were invoked, but there was no final resolution for this atomism except the power and grace of God. This was frankly admitted by the early Utilitarians, like Berkeley and

[1] *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, p. 183. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 193.

Digitized by Google

Paley and Tucker, assumed by Bentham, and made the subject of serious concern by the later Utilitarians, Mill, Bain, and Spencer. That the efforts of the latter group, though laudable and helpful, were not entirely successful is seen in the reversion of Sidgwick, perhaps the keenest as well as the latest of them, to the old-time theological aid for final resolution of this problem. The renewal by Sidgwick at the close of the nineteenth century of the original *rapprochement* between Utilitarianism and theology but serves to indicate that a certain common view of human nature was inherently fundamental to both. At bottom this common element may be reduced to the same conception already seen to be shared by theology and the Kantian ethics, namely, the notion that the "essential attribute" of man is a soul furnished to him independent of the social process. All these systems of thought found a place, of course, for growth: Kant set the soul the task of subduing all desires to the mastery of a universalizing reasonableness; the Utilitarians, the task of creating out of external compulsions internal sanctions; and Christianity, the task of adding the Christian virtues, of "growing in grace and knowledge." In all of them, indeed, the task of the soul was growth; but the soul was as given as was the task. The very nature of the given logically involved, and made inevitable, the nature of the task assigned it. Though there might have been differences as to just what and how much was given, for all of them alike at least the core of individuality was furnished. Locke himself had reduced the given to the minimum; but though the human *tabula* was *rasa*, still the *tabula* was *there*.[1]

III

Postponing to another time a consideration of the fate of the equality ideal in America when this persisting conception of a static self should have been undermined by twentieth-

[1] Cf. Dewey: "Orthodox psychology starts from the assumption of . . . . independent minds. However much different schools may vary in their definition of mind, they agree in this premiss of separateness and priority." (*Human Nature and Conduct*, p. 84.)

Digitized by Google

century psychology, it is sufficient, in closing this account, to indicate how admirably adapted was this notion of the soul, common to all the large idea-systems influential in the nineteenth century, to serve as a basis for the belief in human equality.

The clearest meaning of the term "equality" is quantitative. Its strict sense appears in connection with mathematically measurable entities, a yard of cloth, a bushel of wheat, or an acre of land. When it is applied to qualities, they are such again as can in some fashion be measured. While the quantitative connotation lingered, the concept itself was put beyond danger of disproof through measurement in the bold theological claim that men are equal before God. Now, however, that we have examined two great modern ethical systems, we are better prepared to understand what that theological phrase really meant. Its meaning was wrapped up in the conception on which Kantians, Utilitarians, and theologians were at one, a given self. One does not need to see the products of a mint to predict that they will be equal. True, one might from careful scrutiny and weighing of silver dollars come inductively to the conclusion that they were equal; but he might also from an understanding of the mold predict with confidence that all the products of it would be equal. Not having been able to reach equality by the difficult inductive road, philosophers discovered the royal thereunto: they merely assumed the mold, from which equality of products followed of course. Equality before God, when thought thoroughly through, had chiefly to do with God's keenness of vision; it merely meant that if anybody could see the core of men, the very "principle of individuality," as James phrased it, he would see that men are actually equal. God had the advantage in being the only one that could see this. This phrase was, then, but the religious way of putting what the philosophy of the time as truly, if not as graphically, presented. The given (and by definition it

Digitized by Google

constituted the human differentia) was in all men equal because it came to them all from the same matrix of indefiniteness, whether that matrix be named, with the Hebrew-Christian tradition, *God;* or, with Kant, the *noumenal world;* or, with Spencer, the *Unknowable;* or, with the non-theological Utilitarians, be left unnamed and largely unacknowledged. Though the essential element of men was pushed beyond the reach of measurement, yet a certain feeling for fact, a certain reminiscence of the quantitative connotation of the concept of equality, is contained in the two attributes given to it from Plato to James—*simplicity* and *substantiality.* A simple substantial soul furnished to all alike from an unchanging matrix is so admirably adapted to serve as a basis for equality that it is not unnatural to suspect the harmony pre-established;[1] that the desire for equality created such an account of the derivation of human nature as would guarantee equality.

We have already stated in religious terms (*supra*, p. 180) a partial answer to the question raised at the beginning of this article. We are now prepared to state in terms general enough to include all influential elements in nineteenth-century American thought a more complete answer. Men should receive equality of treatment, in the various ways assigned by the equality ideal, because they actually are equal. This fundamental equality is guaranteed by common element given independently of the social process, through which, by general consent, it later develops. And so without violating the common-sense dictum of Aristotle's that justice does not permit equality of treatment to unequals, nineteenth-century America

[1] Interesting corroboration of this suggestion is found in the most extreme arguments to prove the Negro unequal to the white. Before the Civil War, the most radical appeal was to the theory of "multiple origins," it being felt apparently that if races came from different molds, no more was needed to prove them unequal. The converse implication is clear. When talk of racial equality grew freer, especially during the administration of the late Theodore Roosevelt, there was rather widely circulated in the South a book entitled, *Has the Negro a Soul?* The argument was that he has no soul. Again the converse implication is unmistakable.

Digitized by Google

was able to justify specific demands for equality, by reasserting, in forms more acceptable to the spirit of the age, a doctrine that, stated merely in terms of natural rights, had been found unacceptable—the doctrine that men are actually equal. The beggar ejected in eighteenth-century secular rags was welcomed when garbed in nineteenth-century theological finery. It remained for the twentieth century to demand more than a change in costume.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Digitized by Google

BOOK REVIEWS

CREATIVE EXPERIENCE. By M. P. Follett. New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1924. Pp. xix+303. Price $3.00.

Readers of Miss Follett's *The New State* will expect a vigorous attack upon a fundamental problem of democratic government, and they will not be disappointed, although in the present book the author moves in the realm of philosophic and psychological conceptions more than in the earlier book, in which the political aspect of our society was more prominently in the foreground. There is, however, one common quality: In the earlier work the effort was to penetrate to something deeper in democracy than the ballot-box or the mere counting of majorities. In the present work the effort is made to get at some deeper principle for the adjustment of conflicts than the mere transfer of power from one group to another, and a deeper view of the relation between the expert, who is supposed to be the great need of a democracy that is living in a scientific age, and the popular will, which does not always find in the expert a guide to those values which a groping humanity persistently if somewhat blindly seeks.

For a deeper interpretation of what goes on in conflicts within a democratic society, Miss Follett brings to bear the principle, old in philosophy but given fresh illustration and prominence in recent psychology, of the mutually determining factors of wholes and parts. In the field of law, this would mean that the law would aim not so much to sacrifice the individual to the social or the social to the individual, but to integrate individual and social interests in order if possible to restate and remake each in terms of the other. "The legal order by helping to integrate purposes is helping to produce larger purposes."

The psychological conceptions which the author finds significant are especially those of circular response, of total or integrated behavior, and of *Gestalt*.

The doctrine of circular response is that response is not to an environment which remains unchanged; it is rather a response to the relation set up. Translated into terms of social processes, "my changing activity is a response to an activity which is also changing. . . . . My behavior is a response to the new situation which I in part have created." The school may stimulate the boy, and this very stimulating character of the school in relation to the boy may in turn react upon the school to bring about improvement.

Digitized by Google

The concept of total behavior, as developed especially by Holt, is another aspect of the principle of creative experience. Finally, the *Gestalt* school, represented especially by Köhler and Koffka, emphasizes the fact that psychological states and processes whose characteristic properties and activities differ from the properties and activities of their so-called parts may justly be regarded as units. The application of this to problems of state has been familiar since the time of Aristotle, but every generation needs to be taught in its own language. Applied to social work, the author finds that it would mean a more complete view of the "total situation" than the detached and specialized approach would sometimes yield. The great significance of all these aspects of circular response is to make clear the thought that a process of mutual consideration and of forward-looking co-operative planning may itself so change the elements of the situation as to point the solution. Certainly in many of the efforts to work out a better relation between capital and labor, the mere fact of sitting around the same table changes the nature of the problem, because part of the problem is an attitude of mind. The type of solution which is most likely to be permanent is not that of compromise but that of invention, by which each can gain, because some new value is created.

Is it always possible to meet situations in this "creative" way? Professor Fite many years ago in his *Individualism* expressed his conviction that it is, if we are intelligent enough. Others are less optimistic. At times we certainly meet a clash of wills which seems incapable of adjustment. It is however a good working hypothesis to assume that there may be some plan of action which will do better than hold conflicting views and rights in balance. Life undoubtedly goes on because it does find some way to outgrow many of its seemingly hopeless conflicts. The expert who can find what the facts are, is one contributor toward a creative process, but when we have all the facts it is by no means clear in all cases just what we are to do with them. An attitude of mind that is constantly inventive may go along with a process of conflict and may often use the process, as Hegel believed, for reaching a larger result than would emerge without it.

The student of philosophy, as is apparent from this outline, will find little novelty in fundamental conceptions, but the student of the present social process or the practical worker in that process will find many fresh applications of an old principle, and these should tend to make it a genuine working tool instead of a museum specimen.

J. H. TUFTS

Digitized by Google

ETHICS AND SOME MODERN WORLD PROBLEMS. By William McDougall, F.R.S. London: Methuen & Co., 1924. Pp. xvi+240. Price, 7*s*. 6*d*. net.

When in 1893 Mr. McDougall read Huxley's famous Romanes lecture pointing out the disharmony (as it seemed to him) between evolution and ethics, he received a severe moral shock, followed by deep depression, and from that shock and depression (he tells us) he has never wholly recovered. The present book is his delayed reaction to this early experience and in this he attempts to resolve the disharmony. There are two leading themes set forth, the internal danger of race degeneration (upon which he has already said much in his *National Welfare and National Decay*) and the consequent foundering of the ark of culture; and the external danger to all mankind (but to the European races in particular) of the growing menace of the new weapons of destruction.

To take first the first theme, that of race-degeneration: He points out certain "suicidal" tendencies to civilization arising from the working within humanity of the altruistic or benevolent impulse, which prompts us to desire that every human being shall be free to satisfy and exercise every strong impulse proper to the human species, especially the impulse to procreate our kind. Yet such a "natural right" is not compatible with the maintenance and progress of any civilization of a high type. Hence the existence in our present civilization of a *dual* ethical basis, two distinct systems which have never been harmonized, the national and universal systems. Ethics has been in the main the ethics of the individual, whereas politics has been national, and the Western world has consistently regarded ethics and politics as two distinct studies. So European nations have developed a code in which the incompatible precepts of the two systems are blended in varying proportions. This duality was in certain respects favorable to progress, for while the universal element was a liberalizing influence, the persistence beside it of the national system conserved and protected the growth of stable nations. Thus was produced that diversity of culture within the bounds of a common civilization which has conditioned European progress. Occasionally there appears, as in Nietzsche, a reaction to the perception of the destructive tendency of universal ethics, and "in the violence of his reaction, he poured out the baby with the bathwater and preached an ethic that was neither national nor universal but purely individual and aristocratic."

Professor McDougall is one of our most distinguished and alert psychologists, and his theme is expounded with all his accustomed

Digitized by Google

vigor and lucidity. But when he turns to give a prescription for the disease he has diagnosed he follows the mirage of a utopia of his own creation. To remedy the racial degeneration he suggests the reversal of the "ultra-democratic" legislation which has carried out its ideal of universal adult male suffrage, and the deprivation of the criminal, illiterate, and degenerate classes of the vote, the franchise being limited to a specially favored "Class A" selected and certificated. This class would, it is argued, form a self-protective nucleus and arrest degeneration. As a remedy for international chaos, he would have preferred to institute a permanent Court of International Justice rather than the present League of Nations. This Court should, he suggests, be provided with a unique striking arm, an irresistible air force, which would enable it to enforce the Court's awards, each nation having previously made a binding agreement that it will not permit the use of military or commercial air craft. This Court would interpret and enforce existing treaties, and it is argued that the great powers would be induced to enter into mutual series of treaties looking toward international justice and the enforcement of peace. "In this way we should advance from the present position in which no international law (*loi*) exists, but only partially recognized principles of international right (*droit*), to one in which all nations would be bound and forced to obey certain explicitly defined and limited principles of international law."

M. J.

RACE PREJUDICE. By Jean Finot. Translated by Florence Wade-Evans. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1906. Pp. xvi+320. Price, $3.00.

Until his death recently the gifted author of this volume was a recognized leader of those whose sympathies and social interests extended beyond the boundaries of their own race and nation. He set himself squarely against the rising tide of modern race theories. In this book he seeks to show that these theories have no sound scientific basis. Indeed, they are little more than pseudo-logical justifications of the prejudices, national and racial, of their proponents. Point by point he examines the anthropological, psychological, and sociological data upon which such writers as De Gobineau, Chamberlain, and Lapouge have based their contention that the white race—or some particular element within it, such as the so-called "Nordic" type—is innately superior to all other races. Invariably Finot finds that the evidence does not support the basic assumption of "innate racial inequality." There is little consensus of opinion among the racial theorists as to the specific traits upon which

Digitized by Google

inequality is based and the evidence they offer, Finot insists, is not simply vague and inconclusive but positively contradictory and frequently irreconcilable. Indeed, much of it may be used equally well to support the contrary thesis: what appear to be permanent significant race differences are in fact the temporary effects of differences in cultural, or direct readily modifiable results of peculiar environmental, conditions. The physical differences may be striking to the eye but they are not indexes of innate racial capacities which fix the level of civilization above which a given race cannot rise.

Finot pleads his case brilliantly; it is a cause to which he is wholeheartedly devoted; he meets his opponents with a fire and vigor of expression fully equal to their own; he urges the claims of universal humanity as ardently as they espouse the cause of their chosen tribes. Underlying Finot's carefully constructed argument lies the belief "that it is often sufficient to breathe on the subjects of our discord to see them vanish. The union of a few men of good will has succeeded in overcoming the stupidity of the theory of races and of age-long prejudice! For it is often enough not to believe certain conventional lies in order to render them nil and harmless."

This belief in the ability of good will to overcome stupidity and prejudice appears somewhat naïve when we consider the very character of prejudice: it is not dissolved by force of logic; it is illogical, unreasoning; knowing truth it holds to untruth. Therefore we call it prejudice. This persistent perversity of prejudice makes it a most baffling form of human behavior. We cannot banish it by breathing on it, nor by taking thought, nor by deprecating or abusing it. Its roots lie too deeply within our nature.

Accommodation to another race is not easy and occurs only where conditions are favorable, such as comparatively slow rate of penetration and absence of active economic competition. Assimilation of another race rarely occurs; this requires intermarriage, a relation which brings into direct contrast those physical differences which symbolize race and touch off the ancient prejudices, but more important, involves the surrender of important property rights and the loss of superior economic and social status. High ideals of racial equality and inter-racial good will are not sufficient to offset these powerful, dominating life-interests of racial groups. Racial amity will most probably result from the development of forms of social organization in which these interests are preserved. How may this be accomplished? Finot is not concerned with this problem.

ERLE FISKE YOUNG

Digitized by Google

DEMOCRACY AND LEADERSHIP. By Irving Babbitt. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1924. Pp. 349.

Now comes Professor Babbitt to descry anew and anew to lament the tendencies of this modern age. We have all gone out after our "expansive desires." He and a few other humanists alone are left to call us back to do penance by humbly pledging perpetual subjection to our ethical wills. But a loyalty that begins within extends beyond the individual, just as a lawless self, as he argues, lays the basis for and prophesies the coming of the imperialistic state. Under the psychological guise of submitting to the domination of our better self, he leads us gently into a political subserviency to other selves better than we are at knowing our own good. This is what he pleasantly calls substituting "the doctrine of the right man for the doctrine of the rights of man." The common man is asked to accept ethical humility, but awakes to find that along with it he has actually accepted authoritative guidance from technicians. They in turn are asked to accept the leadership of their higher nature, and awake to find themselves in bondage to an external group who call themselves "ethical workers," but who do nothing but enjoy with dignity a subsidized leisure and thus set a good example for mankind! Already, then, the prospective reader is prepared to expect from this book such treatment of social questions as would occur to a literary critic who writes of times that to him are utterly out of joint. Babbitt's literary criticism, brilliant if detached, is water-logged by preoccupation with weighty matters about which he knows next to nothing. Water and oil are both sometimes ruined by injudicious attempts to mix them.

If one were inclined to be facetious—and after all that is a happier attitude than scorn or anger—he might lament the fact that Professor Babbitt has not given freer rein to his expansive desires in the field of literary criticism without ever so much as attempting to subdue them to a conscience made weighty by brooding over social woes. But since he insists on subjecting his own expansive desires to his ethical will, he need not be surprised if, running true to his own doctrine, he wakes to find himself in the toils of social theorists and political scientists who will humble his pride or kill him in the ordeal. Thus have workers ambitious beyond their status always fared in earlier régimes dominated by Babbitt's philosophy.

It would not be fair, however, to leave the impression that this book has no virtue. Its grievous defects will serve one good purpose if it stirs up minds sympathetic with democratic institutions and aspirations to reflect upon the problem of leadership. Professor Babbitt himself, suggesting this problem in his title, does not get significantly farther

Digitized by Google

than the now trite emphasis that democracy, like every other form of social philosophy, must stand or fall with its ability in practice to produce able leaders. In so far as he gets beyond this truism, he does so by renouncing democracy and turning for leaders to a more aristocratic way of life. How crass the form this treason takes has already been indicated. Even though one does not share Babbitt's pessimism regarding democracy's potentiality for leadership, he will hardly read this brilliantly written criticism without going on to raise the more significant question as to the nature of the leadership that democracy envisages and that modern men need. Such a quest must not be allowed to end until we have clearly distinguished leadership based upon prestige from that based upon knowledge, that is, until we have distinguished the society in which Babbitts would shine like stars in the firmament from one in which justice would be available to common men.

T. V. SMITH

SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT, ITS NATURE AND CONDITIONS. By L. T. Hobhouse, Martin White Professor of Sociology in the University of London. London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1924. Pp. 348. Price, 7*s*. 6*d*. net.

This is the third of a series of books by Professor Hobhouse which provide an analysis of ethical conceptions and their applications in social life. In this book he is primarily concerned with sociology, that is to say, with a description of facts; but those who are interested in moral philosophy will find a special importance in the section (pp. 90 ff.) which treats of the place of ethical ideals in sociological inquiry. The author's conception of good as a harmony supplies him with a means of bridging the obvious gulf between fact and value, for he finds that society is co-operative and moral goodness similarly is a unit formed by adjustment of a variety of capacities.

The natural history of social development is summarized, and due weight is given both to contemporary problems such as national conflicts or the decline of the birth-rate and to the psychological suggestions of Professor Graham Wallas and Professor McDougall. The two chapters on the interaction of minds and the social factor in the life of the individual should be made a preliminary for any student of economics; for the traditional economics is still dominated by the physical sciences. Professor Hobhouse gives its due place to the category of "impulse" in modern psychology, but he corrects the exaggerations of some social psychologists by his emphasis upon intelligence in social relationships.

Digitized by Google

The book, as a whole, is a most valuable contribution to the prolegomena of economics, political science, and moral philosophy. We are suffering from social sciences of detail, whose assumptions are never examined; and the most fantastic ideas seem to be still prevalent as to the motive forces at work in such relationships as those of supply and demand. It is not simply that economics is never corrected by a criticism of implied moral judgments. The more important fact is that economics is often taught without any reference to social psychology and social history. The issues in many contemporary controversies in practical life, such as those in regard to profits or wages, are not in the main economic, but moral and psychological. Hence economists, who are still regarded as guides to all tendencies in public policy, make pronouncements on ethical and psychological issues in which they have no status at all. Indeed, the state of the social sciences at present is disgraceful; and if there were no other value in the book, Professor Hobhouse's *Social Development* would be useful at least in turning our attention to fundamentals. Wherever, in a group of sciences, one has made great advances, the conclusions and methods of that one tend to be extended outside their proper sphere. Such is the position of economics among the social sciences. For example, the Washington Institute of Economics, which has already produced a most valuable study of the problem of reparations, must inevitably be driven to study problems of administration and international organization of government which are not primarily economic. But the concentration upon economic aspects of our present difficulties may lead to partial and therefore inadequate conclusions. The position of the social sciences and their interrelation, therefore, is not a merely academic matter, but may have important practical consequences. It is one of Professor Hobhouse's special claims to attention that his social studies have been carried on while he has been also doing practical work in the art of government.

C. D. B.

BERNARD BOSANQUET: A SHORT ACCOUNT OF HIS LIFE. By Helen Bosanquet. London: Macmillan & Co., 1924. Pp. 189. Price, 6s. net.

It was the wish of Bernard Bosanquet, who died last year (February, 1923), that no formal memoir of him should be written. He had, he believed, put the best of himself into his books, and there would be no advantage in repeating their contents; but a brief and simple personal record, such as Mrs. Bosanquet's, is necessary to set the life-scene of one who for a generation was the center figure of British philosophy. Of mixed Scotch and Huguenot parentage, Bernard Bosanquet's life began

Digitized by Google

at Rock Hall, in Northumberland (of which an earnest and delightful record is presented), and was continued at Harrow and Oxford, where, after graduating, he taught for ten years as fellow and tutor of University College. He used to say that he owed much of his philosophy to the practical and concrete nature of the teaching of T. H. Green, who, in his turn, accounted Bosanquet as the "best-equipped man of his generation."

Philosophy, and also his interest in social work in connection with the Charity Organization Society, drew him later to give up tutorial work and to live in London, where he was associated with the London Ethical Society, an offshoot of the ethical movement set on foot by Professor Felix Adler, of New York. He alludes to this period in his book, *The Meeting of Extremes in Contemporary Philosophy*. With the ethical movement in America and England he was not, however, in complete accord. He did not think that the teaching of "morality," as such, could ever be a substitute for religion, and in a small leaflet issued in 1887 he maintained that moral philosophy has little definite tendency toward moral edification, and that even moral suasion is not the prime necessity: "A man is what he is made of, and he is not made of what he hears once a week, but what habitually goes into him."

Bosanquet's life-work falls in three main clearly marked periods: in the earliest he was mainly occupied with logic; in the central, his chief interest lay in ethics and aesthetics; and later, he was largely preoccupied with the implication of Absolutism in religion, a development no doubt inevitable in his deeply religious nature. Logic, as we have said, had the earliest claim on him, and the object of his first book, *Knowledge and Reality*, was to show how Bradley's "essential and original conceptions might be disengaged from some peculiarities which he apparently shares with reactionary logic." His own *Logic* (1888) seemed to an American critic writing of recent years in the *Philosophical Review*, "the greatest masterpiece of logical writing in our tongue." The publication of Bradley's *Ethical Studies* in 1876 was to him an event of highest importance, not only because it restated and concluded the discussion of hedonism, but because it furnished the basis of an entirely new interpretation of Kantian ethics. Feeling that Bradley's work had been so thoroughly done, Bosanquet himself never attacked any systematic treatment of ethical history or problems on a large scale. What interested him in the main was, as J. H. Muirhead has written, the "extension of the idea of the moral good in the spirit of Plato, so as to include non-personal objects, such as beauty and truth."

The Meeting of Extremes in Contemporary Philosophy, which was published in 1921, was characteristically the outcome of his desire to set

Digitized by Google

himself "at the point of view of the younger men." Among personal qualities which aided his great output is a noticeable clear-sightedness; he always had very clearly in mind what he wished to achieve, and there was seldom any appreciable interval between the end of one book and the shouldering of another. The extracts from his letters, the record of his activities, also show him a gentle and generous spirit. He was quite without competitive feeling, and looked upon the whole movement of thought as essentially co-operative. He might have labeled his ideas, as Groeier his books, as the property of himself and his friends. "I often think," he wrote to a friend, "how anything said or done is the work of a generation or group, rather than of anyone; I often feel myself a sort of spokesman for my friends, and am only crushed at doing it so imperfectly."

M. J.

A SHORT HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL INTERCOURSE. By C. Delisle Burns. London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1924. Pp. 159. Price, 5*s.* and 3*s.* 6*d.* net.

The reason why this book was written, as the author tells us, is that there is no history which shows how far civilized European life is the product of peaceful co-operation between peoples. In contrast with the detailed social histories of nations, which are treated as isolated cases, this is a brief record of peace, of mental intercourse between nations, and the invaluable interchange of goods and services; also of the international triumphs of art and science. Like all Mr. Burns's writings, the historical survey is vivid in presentment, and will provide ideal material for the teacher and lecturer, who is to supplement purely political and economic history. No class who listened to this summary history of peace could avoid receiving the impression of the waste of arbitrary interruptions of reasonable progress and of the fertility of co-operation and the contagion of "ideas."

The penultimate chapter summarizes what has been gained since the Great War, the new mechanical advances and the establishment of the League of Nations, whose work is the organization of peace. It has already achieved something, but it has not been able to attack the growth of armaments, and other tendencies urging toward future war. The checking of war can only be discovered as men have found out how to fight disease, by study and the spread of knowledge. But if we do not discover this in time, another collapse is quite certain to occur, for as it has been well said, the history of peace must now be "a race between catastrophe and education."

M. J.

Digitized by Google

HINDU ETHICS. A historical and critical essay. By John Mackenzie, M.A. Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press, 1922.

In dealing with a propagandist work there is always a danger of being unjust to the positive value which the exposition may possess. But the propagandism is here undisguised, and the author tells us for whom the book is meant. He is going to instruct India. "He believes that it is important that thoughtful Hindus should have their attention directed to the principles on which their practical life is based," and his aim had been to make the subject intelligible to the ordinary educated reader, particularly to the educated Indian. His work, he tells us, is in no real sense of the term a history of Hindu ethics, and as he doubts "whether there is any history that might be properly so called in Hindu ethical thought," we cannot blame him for not giving what he does not profess to offer. He gives a sketch of Vedic religion and magic, the ethics of the Upanishads and the philosophical systems, and the doctrine of Dharma. There is nothing to show that his studies have taken him deeper than certain well-known textbooks and translations.

The philosophical systems both orthodox and heterodox did not distinguish their ethics from their theological principles. Nor did they profess to teach people living in the world. They all, except the extinct Charvakas, taught for those who had abandoned social relations, and were intent on salvation. Evidently there is nothing here to tell us how the bulk of the people regulated their lives, and yet most of the book is taken up with the discussion of these systems. However, there was a a great system of duties for all social classes. What did the ordinary man think about the duty of saving a fellow-man, or helping the poor, or keeping a promise? The author never tells us. What he does is to give us one chapter on Dharma, and this is entirely based on the so-called "Law-Books," written by Brahmins, and not representing actual laws, but only what these theorists thought ought to be valid. It is no wonder that he finds in these works "the confusion of mind that existed and still exists in India regarding the value of the ordinary round of human life." But we can find the real ethics of daily life in Hindu literature, which tells us what these ideals really were, and there we find moral conceptions unsurpassed by any in the Greek dramatists. Of all this, which shows us how Dharma was realized in practice, the author says not a word. And because he has not found any philosophical theory written round these ideals, he declares that there is in Hinduism no philosophy of conduct, and holds that no such principle could be given. He admits that hospitality to guests is a Hindu principle, but quotes Westermarck to the effect that it is based in the main on egoistic considerations. Still

Digitized by Google

he graciously admits that we must not rule out the possibility of the presence of altruistic motives. Is this kind of thing likely to make the constant references to Christianity more palatable to the thoughtful Hindu?

By confining his account of Dharma to the contents of the "Law Books" he is able to represent it plausibly as "cold, rigid, and lifeless, resting on no great fundamental principle." Yet although the *Bhagavadgita* is equally Dharma, he treats it quite apart, and here he makes great concessions. But he ignores them again when he finally comes to state how "Hindu ethics is in certain important ways fundamentally different from that of Christianity." The basis of the Christian ethic is "the eternal love of God to his creatures." This he contrasts not with the incarnate Vishnu, "the great Lord of all the worlds, the friend of all beings," nor with Ramanuja's conception of God as "the Omniscient, the Truth-teller, the one Ocean of affection for all who resort to him, the supremely merciful," but with the quietistic ethic of philosophy, and the cold system of Dharma. This indicates a certain lack of persuasiveness even as propaganda, and it is not decreased by the fact that what the author understands by the Christian philosophy of ethics is never systematically stated. But the aim of the book as part of the religious quest of India does not concern us.

E. J. THOMAS

CAMBRIDGE, ENGLAND

A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY OF MYSTICISM. An essay. By Charles A. Bennett. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1923. Pp. 192.

Not since the appearance of Hocking's *The Meaning of God in Human Experience*, now more than a decade ago, has a book of its kind offered itself to students of philosophy in America which challenges such a thoughtful perusal as Professor Bennett's achievement. Writers on mysticism have not been few, but none with whom I am familiar has revealed the thorough grounding in the history of thought, the sensitiveness to the larger issues which mysticism involves, and the delightful though undeserved modesty which stand out on almost every page of the present essay.

It is well to have Hocking's book in mind at the outset, for it stands to Professor Bennett in more than a temporal relation. In his brief Preface Professor Bennett acknowledges that his chief debt of gratitude is to the Harvard idealist, and in fact those familiar with the latter's *magnum opus* will find little that is distinctively different in point of doctrine in the chapters of his Yale follower. But let no one suppose

Digitized by Google

on this account that the book can be safely neglected or even hastily skimmed through, for the same virtues of thought and style which made *The Meaning of God in Human Experience* so stimulating to those who gave it a careful reading are characteristic of Professor Bennett's pages, and I think it must be said also, the same defects. Without taking the space to enumerate these in detail, let me note and illustrate the most prominent of each.

Perhaps the most attractive feature of Hocking's writings is the genius for novel and provoking suggestions in the way of definition or analysis, often not systematically followed up, but none the less powerful to dissolve and enlarge ideas in the reader's mind. The same happy faculty is everywhere obvious in the present study—the chapters teem with alluring hints of philosophical novelties—and while doubtless few readers will finish the book prepared to admit the author's conclusions, none will finish it without having clarified his own notions or reflected fruitfully along unanticipated lines. Professor Bennett notes:

> There are two sorts of persons who will not let you go without a definition: the wise man and the fool. The difference between them is that the latter demands one at the beginning of an investigation, while the former is content to wait until the end [pp. 6 f.]

Again, "the mystic, as it were, forestalls the processes of history by anticipating in his own life the enjoyment of the last age" (p. 31). Or "the ascetic is one who wants to know and suffer the worst in order to try if by any chance he may be man enough to meet it" (p. 56). And a large portion of Professor Bennett's thesis comes out in the following:

> Mysticism is a perpetual return to the vision of God, to the original datum, a return therefore to the old; but to the old not as an exhausted but as an inexhaustible datum from which may be drawn out new suggestions, new dogmas—not in the form of pure metal but in the form of ore. . . . . In the beginning was the ore [pp. 109 f.].

Nor is this faculty unattended by a simple richness of expression and analogy such as adds charm of dress to suggestiveness of idea.

> The mystic, every mystic, declares that he has discovered—God! Hardly a new insight this, it would seem, nor yet one to be proclaimed to all mankind as an unheard-of revelation. Indeed, there is a naïveté here akin to that of lovers, every pair of whom is, in their own eyes, the first pair, while a sophisticated world watches and reflects that this sort of thing has now been going on for a long time. In short, there is nothing original in mystic knowledge unless indeed originality consists not so much in the discovery of the new as in the rediscovery of the eternal.

Digitized by Google

So much by way of brief but hearty commendation of our author's philosophical style. It is when we pass to the convictions which he would have us share that we come upon the chief defect in Professor Bennett's essay (though one which, being apparently admitted in his Preface, we cannot belabor him too vigorously for). How far does the Yale defender of mysticism succeed in meeting the challenge which the prevailing philosophical temper is ready to hurl at the champion of such a solution of the world-problem? This challenge, as I see it, is twofold. Let us rapidly formulate it. (1) If the mystic, as he reports, has experienced the final or absolute good, how can activity of any sort be rational in his eyes on emerging from the mystic state, save only the recommencement of the discipline necessary to another moment of ecstasy? How, in short, justify morality, science, civilization, friendship, progress? Either Mr. Bennett ought to show us more conclusively than has yet been done the essential vanity of these things, or else he must show us a type of mysticism which, *in virtue of its own nature*, positively furthers these values. (2) If, as the mystic reports, he has discovered a supreme, all-comprehensive truth about the universe, what is the relation between the logic implied by such a discovery and its method and the logic of modern science? To validate the logical claims of mysticism, he needs to work out for us a complete transformation of logic itself, in order to show that *every step in any valid logical procedure implies and demands the mystic intuition to complete it.*

Now Mr. Bennett attempts to meet this twofold challenge, with, I fear, only partial success. A considerable portion of the book is devoted to the first point, including the whole of Part III on "Religion and Morality," but the answer offered is decidedly meager. Our author notes that

> it is clear that the mystics do not seek God in order to return to the world better fitted for active life. . . . . The consummation of it [the ecstasy] carries a conviction of finality. . . . . They have expressed regret [at] . . . . the transiency of the ecstasy [pp. 34 f.].

Yet

> there is something paradoxical about this finality: it must be in some sense surrendered in order to be retained. Contemplation seems to demand action [p. 35].

The answer offered to this paradox is the distinction between the finality of the value and the finality of the experience of it, and the assertion that just because the value is final the experience of it cannot be so (p. 42). Just how this can be put into a defensible syllogism is not made clear, and the distinction between the value and the experience

Digitized by Google

of it is certainly precarious for the mystic's claim (also defended by Mr. Bennett) to have become one with God and to have experienced eternity. An interesting analogy is drawn between the mystic communion and the experience of love (pp. 42, 139f.):

> I suppose that every lover knows that in love he has somehow touched finality: here is a foretaste of his destiny. Yet lovers come to learn that they can only keep the meaning of the experience by letting it go: to try to perpetuate it by dwelling in it is fatal. The meaning of love must be worked out, for love is a metaphysical experience, discovering to one not only the beloved, but making all things new. The new truth has been grasped, but it remains to be assimilated. So with the relation between the mystic and God: if he is to retain what God means he must let God go, or, more accurately, he must surrender the exclusive direction of the mind upon God and establish in the world the God to find whom he left the world.

Here is acuteness of analysis, but just how does it support the negative answer given to the central question: Is the value experienced by the man who has worked out the meaning of the ecstasy greater than the value experienced by one who has merely had the ecstasy? What *does* support that answer? Worse still, is it not clear from mystic literature that this moral working-out of the meaning of God, which Professor Bennett is disposed to stress, is to the mystic rather a necessary evil than a part of the value; is it not an unfortunate consequence of the psychological law of shifting attention? If there is a type of mysticism of which this is not true, what are its distinctive marks? Mr. Bennett cannot help us here; according to him we can only tell good from bad mysticism by their fruits (pp. 141, 150): "The mystical vision of the good . . . . is a *prescience* of the good, a foreknowing in its totality of that which moral effort has to establish in detail." Surely here is little encouragement for men of moral zeal to submit themselves to the mystic discipline—*suppose I am vouchsafed the experience, only it proves to be of the wrong kind?*

The other aspect of the challenge Mr. Bennett attempts to meet by an analysis of the nature of intuition. Here he succeeds in showing the importance of "total-working" as over against "part-working" in any knowledge-achievement—we are never wandering in the presence of particulars merely, without a universe (pp. 98 ff.)—but what is distinctive about the mystic claim is not its insistence on this fact but in the unique view of the universe which it offers. The prevalent attitude of philosophy and science on this point is not far from that of Kant, namely, that the idea of the whole plays a regulative rôle merely and has no objective reality. I venture to affirm that Professor Bennett introduces no facts which need disturb a follower of Kant on this matter. What mysticism

Digitized by Google

needs here is no mere analysis of intuition, but a thorough transformation of logic such as to show the mystic intuition as presupposed and implied by every valid logical process of whatever sort. For that we have still to wait.

But let the final word be one of praise rather than of detraction. He is the poorer who has not read Professor Bennett's essay, and it is a pleasure to express for many other former students of his the hope that he will not permit the philosophical world to dispose of him on the basis of this book alone.

EDWIN A. BURTT

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

SHORTER NOTICES

THE IDEALS OF ASCETICISM: AN ESSAY IN THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF RELIGION. By Oscar Hardman, D.D. London: The Society for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge, 1924. Pp. xviii+232. Price, 12s. net.

This is an attempt to indicate the scope and significance of asceticism, a wide subject, as some measure of renunciation, of discipline enter into nearly all forms of religious belief from the crude practices of the savage to the mild and rational habit of the Quaker. When people speak of asceticism, however, they bear in mind such severe "buffeting of the body" as was practiced by many hermits and monks in the early ages of the church and in medieval times. The *New English Dictionary* recognizes this by defining the term as "rigorous self-discipline, severe abstinence, austerity." Asceticism thus comes to be regarded as based on the conviction that suffering is a virtue in itself, a state which Mr. George Bernard Shaw describes as "thinking you are moral when you are uncomfortable."

But a closer scrutiny cannot require the recognition of rigor as an essential feature, "for when all the ascetic practices have been satisfactorily graded, when exactly does self-denial become ascetism?" If, as Dr. Hardman well defines it, asceticism is a "means of self-adjustment in the attempt to establish an ideal system of relationships," mere plain living, simplicity, and absence of display are thus included in asceticism. Dr. Hardman rightly emphasizes the persistence with which man—even Caliban—turns to ascetic practices. It is not (as Durkheim points out) a "rare, exceptional, and nearly abnormal fruit of the religious life, as some have supposed it to be; on the contrary, it is one of the essential elements." It is, in the form of "renunciation, suffering, and toil," an essential element of Christ's teaching. Dr. Hardman does not, however, consider critically how far the formula is an *interimsethik* or valuable at the present day and such as would be enjoined by Christ under present conditions.

The comparative study of religion may be approached by two distinct methods, that of the scientist working in critical detachment and that of the professed believer, who approaches the subject with admitted prejudices. Dr. Hardman (as he admits) makes his own religion a standard and gauge of the validity of other ascetic ideals, on the plea that pure science is incapable of providing an adequate description and interpretation of religion, and that "a personal knowledge of religion in its purest form . . . . is the necessary clue to the maze of human faiths." There is, indeed, a defect in the otherwise interesting survey of a field of human experience.

M. J.

Digitized by Google

MEDICINE, MAGIC, AND RELIGION. By W. H. R. Rivers. With a Preface by G. Elliot Smith. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., Inc.; London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd., 1924. Pp. viii+147.

This volume constitutes the Fitz Patrick Lectures delivered before the Royal College of Physicians of London in 1915 and 1916. A supplementary chapter is added on "Mind and Medicine." The starting-point, as the occasion dictated, is medicine. Disease has been attributed (1) to supernatural powers and agents, (2) to human or subhuman powers and agents, and (3) to thoroughly natural causes. Medicine has accordingly been applied religion, applied magic, and applied science. Beginning his study with Melanesian society, the author traces out the varying relation of medicine to religion and to magic among widely diffused primitive peoples still living. This process leads him to defend the view that diffusion of cultures rather than separate genesis is the more promising explanation of the similarities noted in medicine. The specialized discussion is thus generously oriented in the whole field of ethnology.

T. V. S.

PROBLEMS OF BELIEF. By F. C. S. Schiller. (Library of Philosophy and Religion.) London: Hodder Stoughton, 1924. Pp. 194. Price, 3*s*. 6*d*. net.

Dr. Schiller is at his best in a pointed and practical study of the nature and effects of belief. Psychologically he is on familiar ground, but his skill in presenting the problems and their accepted conclusions makes this little book much more useful philosophically than many large volumes. He makes the point that "dissociation" is probably a misleading term since it implies that what was one has become many, whereas in fact the self is more correctly conceived as a unity, gradually "conflated" out of many impulses. In the chapter on the "Logic of Beliefs," Dr. Schiller very well shows that there is no absolute or exact distinction between rational and "merely psychological" belief; but his attack on the logicians appears still to rest upon a misunderstanding of what logic means. This is a very old controversy with pragmatists and perhaps so inveterate a psychologist as Dr. Schiller is unable to feel sufficiently interested in what thinking is "about." He appears to argue that logic is concerned with the processes of thinking and not with their "object"; but of course the traditional logic does in fact seem to imply the same confusion. In any case this book is a valuable contribution to the study of bad and good habits of thinking.

C. D. B.

THE BEAUTIFUL. By Henry Rutgers Marshall. London: Macmillan & Co., 1923. Pp. x+328. Price, 15*s*. net.

One cannot help feeling that this book marks the end of a phase in the history of aesthetics. It is admirably lucid in exposition, never leaving the reader for one moment in doubt as to the author's meaning. It resumes, without any marked bias, the theories of the old metaphysical schools; and it takes up a definite position within the psychological school really initiated by Kant, but made much more empirical and even pragmatic during the course of the nineteenth century. Dr. Marshall divides his subject into three parts, beginning with an exposition of his aesthetic theory, going on to the application of this theory to the appreciation, creation, and criticism of beauty, and finally winding up with four chapters of metaphysical aesthetics which do not bear much relation to the rest of the book.

Digitized by Google

The author's hypothesis, as finally formulated, states that "Beauty is relatively stable or real pleasure. Any pleasant element may become part of the field that is relatively stable. We call an object beautiful which seems always to yield pleasure in impression, or contemplative revival." Ugliness is related to disagreeableness in a similar formula. The first objection to this hypothesis, and its dependence on the pleasure-pain theory of aesthetic sensibility, is that it fixes on a relatively insignificant attribute of beauty; for though it may be admitted outright that pleasure always is an element (and perhaps the only constant element) in beauty, nevertheless it differs so in degree between one kind of beauty and another as to constitute a difference in kind. There are really three distinct fields of aesthetic: the sensational, the emotional, and the intellectual. Dr. Marshall nowhere keeps these fields distinct and his theory is merely a reduction of them to their lowest common element. It is impossible to subsume under the same law the reactions of different sensibilities to such diverse phenomena as a "glorious" sunset, a bust by Donatello, and the purely "intellectual" music of Bach (to take three examples cited by the author). Dr. Marshall does not fail to recognize the ubiquitous variability of man's appreciation of beauty and the truth of the maxim *De gustibus non est disputandum*, though this does not prevent him from rather naïvely accusing Aristotle of a lack of aesthetic sensibility because he failed to appreciate the architecture of his age. Because of this total variability of man's response to the pleasure-pain element, it surely follows that the psychological method can do no more than subserve the historical and metaphysical approaches to aesthetics, particularly in the invaluable process of analysis. It cannot result in a categorical science simply because it cannot account for all the relevant facts. Beauty is insignificant when it is reduced to even *stable* pleasure; it loses definition. Much more real, because much more definite, are the formalist theories which hold that beauty is due to perceived relations: they may not account for all the items in Dr. Marshall's unconfined term, but they do at least seem to have some application to the more intellectual forms of beauty, fitting most happily where the art is most complex. The unconfined use of the word "beauty" is paralleled by a similar vagueness in the use of the word "pleasure." According to Dr. Marshall's theory, pleasure is determined by the using up of a surplus stored energy (this does not, however, lead him to any agreement with the various "play" theories of art). The only satisfactory conception of pleasure is one that relates it to physical factors like hypnosis, and though pleasure used in this sense would allow Dr. Marshall's aesthetic hypothesis to cover the wide fields of sensational and emotional beauty, it would not account for intellectual beauty, which is really the historical creation of a few minds, and the result of a process of judgment. But we are really trespassing here on another confusion, that between art and beauty. Dr. Marshall seems to include all art within his conception of beauty, but this is a very doubtful assumption. The examples of art which he takes to illustrate his arguments are throughout rather commonplace and make one doubt whether he has surveyed the field afresh. Does his conception of art include early Egyptian art and Byzantine art? His few references to modern art betray a confused apprehension of the subject, lumping together as romantic excess ("expression for expression's sake") what he calls "the extravagances of *l'art nouveau* in architecture and decoration, of the 'cubists' and 'futurists' in painting and sculpture, of the wild cacophonists in modern so-called music." This makes it fairly evident that he has no conception of abstract or geometrical art, and indeed he would find it difficult to account for such art on a hypothesis deduced from "glorious" sunsets, and so on. He totally ignores the important theories of Worringer on the nature of abstract art and his account of Lipps, by far the most important

Digitized by Google

and significant of modern aestheticians, is perfunctory and even false. He confuses "empathy" (*Einfühlung*) with sympathy, and imports into the theory a quite gratuitous sense of function, illustrated by an example which completely misses the point, betraying that the root of his appreciation of beauty is associative and sympathetic, and never formal.

A more detailed illustration of the insufficiency of his theory may be taken from the art of poetry. Pleasure and pain would account for the rhythmic and tonal effects of this art, and for the contemplative value of the evoked images and ideas. But perhaps the most essential element in poetry is what we might call surprise, or even shock, and takes the form of a bringing together of two unexpected epithets or images.

Branches of wistaria
Circumscribe *a golden grin.*

Dr. Marshall might refuse to acknowledge beauty in the image, but that would show his incapacity to recognize original qualities in art. The conjunction, it may be admitted, is not pleasant in the sense of his use of the term; it is rather in the nature of an alarum to awaken the cloyed sensibilities.

In conclusion I would like to emphasize the fact that in taking exception to the theories of Dr. Marshall, I do not wish to identify him too personally with these theories. He merely represents, and represents with finality and distinction, a tradition in the history of aesthetic method. It is impossible, however, to make silk purses out of a sow's ears, and the phenomena of beauty are too disconnected for anything but an empirical aggregation. We have besides the critical and historical problems of art, which had better be reserved as a distinct field of inquiry (the *Kunstwissenschaft* of the German language, for which we have no equivalent expression); and there is finally the problem of ideal form, of the Absolute; but this had better be left to the metaphysicians pure and simple, who will treat it not as a separate science, but, in the manner of the Greek philosophers, as an aspect of the moral good.

HERBERT READ

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS. By S. Radhakrishnan. With a Foreword by Rabindranath Tagore and an Introduction by E. Holmes. London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1924. Pp. xvi+143. Price, 5*s*. net.

To Schopenhauer the Upanishads were in every line full of firm, definite, and completely harmonious significance, with profound, original, and lofty thoughts on every page. But this was not the spirit in which they were introduced to English readers. The nineteenth century was so intent on its rationalistic polemic with orthodoxy that it was unable to admit the reality of the religious feeling even as a psychological phenomenon. This attitude has changed, and there is perhaps no one better qualified to speak to the East and West of the experience of the spiritual life than Mr. Rabindranath Tagore. However much the authors of the oldest Upanishads were speculators, they were in the first place the possessors of a spiritual experience. Their messages "are not associated with any particular religion, but they have the breadth of a universal soil that can supply with living sap all religions which have any spiritual ideal hidden at their core, or apparent in their fruit and foliage." They were speculators, but their theories were interpretations of their most fundamental experience, not merely of the needs of the intellect. These needs later found their full expression in the philosophies that look to the Upanishads as their authority, and it was the mistake of Gough and Deussen that they took one of these later systems as the one authoritative interpretation.

Digitized by Google

Professor Radhakrishnan in this work, which is a reprint of the section on the Upanishads from his *Indian Philosophy*, restores the subject to its true atmosphere, so that although he writes on the philosophy of the Upanishads, he admits that they "had no set theory of philosophy or dogmatic scheme of theology to propound. They hint at the truth in life, but not as yet in science or philosophy." For the metaphysician their interest is thus chiefly historical, but for the student of religion they are still the vital expression of an ever living experience. It is not always easy to distinguish Professor Radhakrishnan's interpretation of what he holds to be the teaching of the Upanishads from the actual expressions themselves, but unless the reader is prepared to study for himself, he must not expect that by means of any exposition he will be sure of penetrating to the actual thought of two or three thousand years ago. On the relations of Upanishadic thought to the ritualism and polytheism of the popular religion and the rigors of the social system, questions that are still alive, Professor Radhakrishnan is severe, and coming from an Indian his remarks are all the more weighty. But there is nothing unbalanced in his attitude, and the lucidity of style and expression makes his book an admirable introduction for Western readers to Indian modes of thought.

EDWARD J. THOMAS

CAMBRIDGE, ENGLAND

THE WORLD OF SOULS. By Wincenty Lutoslawski. London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1923. Pp. 224. Price, 10*s*. 6*d*. net.

Professor Lutoslawski has long listened to the golden voice of Plato and has become a Platonist attempting to realize in his own person Plato's ideal of the philosopher. The book originally termed *The Progress of Souls* was first written in English in 1897, then re-written in German and published two years later. *The World of Souls* (as published today) contains six chapters of the original work written in 1897, with a later chapter written in 1921. In his English work, the origin and growth of Plato's *Logic*, Lutoslawski has shown himself a patient and accomplished scholar; in the present work (as William James wrote a quarter of a century ago), the cosmopolitan "almost entirely gets away" from the technical philosopher. His message is to impress us with the significance of the soul. The soul is able to communicate telepathically with other souls, though he frankly recognizes this method of communication is not readily or universally at our command; and in the necessary training of the soul he lays stress on the acquirement of languages, since the mastery of a new form of expression is a widening of the soul's range. He is himself, it should be noted, an accomplished linguist, and his previous writings include essays in five other languages.

Lutoslawski believes in individual souls as ultimate facts, that is, that "each of us in his inner individuality is a permanently receptive and permanently active part of the universe." The soul is immortal, and this belief is based on his experience of a sudden intuition. At a certain date (1885) he was aware of most of the arguments for immortality, but they did not appear definitely convincing. The immediate intuitive certainty was (as in the classic instances collected by William James) sudden. Professor Lutoslawski is aware that the majority of his readers will consider his discovery as a subjective illusion, but points out that a persistent illusion is at least a psychological fact deserving attention. He will find fewer believers in his intuitive certainty of pre-existence. The work closes on a delightfully utopian note—his dream of a community or Forge; a trifle of some two hundred thousand pounds would be sufficient to insure its permanent existence, in which all reasonable means

Digitized by Google

would be applied to help the growth and awakening of human souls. But this philosopher's eidolon, like Plato's ideal republic, is not likely to be realized on earth.

M. J.

THE RE-CREATING OF THE INDIVIDUAL: A STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPES AND THEIR RELATION TO PSYCHOANALYSIS. By Beatrice M. Hinkle, M.D. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1923. Pp. xiii+465.

While the vocabulary of psychoanalysis (and all that means) has been quietly winning a place in common life and in many sciences, constant criticism and reconstruction have gone on in the psychoanalytic camp itself. A layman may now guess that psychoanalysis has passed from the all-or-none insistence and is disposed to accept the more-or-less principle. Beatrice M. Hinkle is perhaps the best-prepared American to mediate between the varying claims of Freud, Adler, and Jung and to pass the result on to the public. Though confessing greatest indebtedness to Jung, she draws upon all the masters with a discriminating mind. The scoffer will see a fine poetic justice in her application of psychoanalytic insight to the strained relations between Freud, Adler, and Jung; but the earnest student who wishes to exploit all sources of wisdom for the common human good will appreciate the objectivity of her analysis.

Dr. Hinkle's most recent book marks, moreover, the extension of the analytic psychology from the definitely pathological to all who with difficulty orient themselves on this reluctant cosmos. Starting with the broad distinction between extraverts and introverts, she sharpens the distinction until some sort of psychological classification is furnished every individual. One may allow for a diversity of prejudices in this highly speculative field, and still suspect that no one can read this solid volume without feeling himself in the author's debt. For the passing of ancient and steadfast moorings leaves many in need of new centers for integration of personality. It is not improbable that as traditional religion is pushed more and more toward the periphery of life, psychotherapy will play an ever more responsible rôle in re-creating individuals who manage to survive but for whom nevertheless the world is too much. Dr. Hinkle writes with this possible universal service in mind. If mankind must eventually seek a substitute for salvation, psychoanalysis, on both its mystic and its scientific side, is already in on the ground floor of mankind's spiritual enterprise.

T. V. S.

CAUSATION AND THE TYPES OF NECESSITY. By Curt John Ducasse. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1924. Pp. 132.

Written from the viewpoint of symbolic logic, this essay aims to give a thorough and exact logical analysis of causation. Hence it is chiefly of interest to logicians. Part I is a closely reasoned technical critique of the theories of causation of Hume, Mill, Kant, Schopenhauer, Kemp Smith, and Bertrand Russell.

Part II is a painstaking exposition and defense against possible objections of the author's conception, which is that causation is an observable relation of necessary connection between states or changes of objects. "A state or change X of an object is said to have been the cause of a state or change Y of another object, if the factuality of X (namely, the persistence of X if X is a state, or the occurrence of X if X is a change) was *sufficient to* the factuality of Y. A state or change Y of an object is said to be the effect of a state or change X of another object, if the factuality of Y was *necessitated by* the factual-

Digitized by Google

ity of X" (p. 55). The chief defect in these interesting definitions is their neglect of the reciprocal character of the causal relation. To put it paradoxically, the effect is partly the cause of itself, and is never wholly due to the cause. The connection is within a system or pervading universal. Otherwise how could the warmth of the sun which hardens clay soften wax?

In Part III causation is distinguished from the types of necessity, which are designated psychological, analogical, isological, formal, and nominal (p. 113). The concluding chapter deals with the relation of philosophy to science. They are held to have the same method but to differ in subject-matter. "*Philosophy seeks knowledge concerning values, Science concerning that which is valued*" (p. 119). It is to be hoped that Professor Ducasse will develop in another essay this implicit reduction of philosophy to ethics.

DANIEL S. ROBINSON

INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL PROGRESS: THE WORK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS. By G. A. Johnston. London: Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1924. Pp. 263. Price, 10*s*. 6*d*. net.

This book is a useful account of the achievements of the International Labour Organisation; but it is by no means an account of international social progress. Five pages at the beginning indicate the "conditions" of social progress, and the rest of the book is devoted to an account of the organization and development of the International Labour Office and the Conference and Governing Body. The last chapter deals with future problems. The whole account is admirably clear and well presented. It should be useful to all officials and others who have interest in the I.L.O. Mr. Johnston was a lecturer in philosophy at the University of Glasgow and is now at Geneva in the Secretariat of the Labour Office. He writes therefore with full knowledge, and his sources are unimpeachable. There are problems such as that of the competence of the I.L.O. in various countries which no one outside would know so well. But a vague feeling may arise among outsiders that perhaps the Secretariat of the I.L.O. do not see very well from their office in Geneva the complexities and the changes of industrial, commercial, and financial life with which the I.L.O. must deal. Officials are not good judges of the importance of their office; they may tend to think that departmental development is international social progress.

C. D. B.

JESUS AND CIVIL GOVERNMENT: A CONTRIBUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF CHRISTIANITY AND COERCION. By A. T. Cadoux, B.A., D.D. London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1924. Pp. 166. Price, 6*s*. net.

The index of biblical references indicates that the writer is concerned in the main to argue with orthodox Christians of the Protestant denominations. But he faces the real issues in regard to civil government and points out that if coercion is un-Christian there can be no logical ground for accepting the benefits of law and government. Indeed, he shows that Jesus himself could not have taught except for the coercion invoked in the Roman Empire. War itself, it is argued, may be regarded as Christian, in the sense that it has often been due to the influence of the Christian ideal of justice in a world of interstate anarchy. The "explanation" of texts from St. Matthew's Gospel and elsewhere is naturally theological, for it assumes that Jesus did not make serious mistakes of judgment. The book, however, should be cogent against the extreme Tolstoian or Quaker who does not accept any form of coercion.

C. D. B.

Digitized by Google

THE SPIRITUAL OUTLOOK OF EUROPE TO-DAY. By Rudolf Eucken. London: The Faith Press, 1922. Pp. 96. Price, 3*s*. net.

This small book, one of a series devoted to the "spiritual reconstruction of Europe," is respectable both for the sake of its eminent author and on account of the high end to which it is devoted. Starting with an analysis of the present state of religion the author concludes that "the civilization of today is so full of open questions, it has disclosed so much that is dark and evil, it affords so little for the inner life or the complete life of the soul, that we feel the failure of religion to be a painful loss. . . . ." "A loss indeed we cannot bear," he significantly continues. *There* lies, for him, the real sanction of religion, in the perpetual need of men for some higher unity, the sense of that unity, or at least the belief in it—not in the validity of some revelation. Thus it is curious that, as he proceeds to consider the task now before religion, he condemns the utilitarian philosophy.

He discovers three characteristics of our modern culture against which (together with utilitarianism and materialism) religion "must" set its face. They are "the preponderance of the dynamic over the static, for religion must rise above considerations of time and change; the guidance of the spiritual life by the intellect, for the unfettered understanding leaves no place for reverence; and last, the prominence assigned to economic problems, for this is a symptom of the materialism of the age." In conclusion, Professor Eucken, in a short chapter which is by far the most interesting and coherent part of the book, looks into the future, and describing and distinguishing the two types of Eastern and Western religion—Christianity and Buddhism—concludes that men must adopt either the attitude of positive affirmation of the one or the negative attitude of resignation of the other.

There is nothing here to disturb the mind or ravish the heart of a reader; a certain nobility in the purity and aloofness of the author's own outlook and something touching in the attempt—for one reader at any rate the unsuccessful attempt—to send down some message of hope to a tortured and disillusioned generation which can no longer discover the things that pertain to its peace.

M. J.

AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING. By John Locke. Abridged and edited by A. S. Pringle-Pattison. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1924. Pp. xlviii+380. Price, 8*s*. 6*d*. net.

Locke's inquiring essay into the powers of the human mind, which became later the philosophical bible of eighteenth-century enlightenment, was announced by him as "an attempt to examine our abilities and see what objects our understandings are fitted to deal with." Locke still is a vital and stimulating figure in the history of thought; following up his searches after truth (as he wrote) "as a sort of hawking and hunting, wherein the very pursuit makes a great part of the pleasure." As a pioneer, and not entirely consistent, thinker, he has been chosen by certain historians of philosophy as the type of British empiricist, and at the same time the enemies of empiricism find him attractive because, as a somewhat inconsistent empiricist, he could be confuted. Locke occupies, therefore, a halfway-house on the highway of philosophy, and the student leaves his shelter for other terminals. Mr. A. S. Pringle-Pattison has done excellent service in reducing the *Essay Concerning the Human Understanding*, written, as Locke confesses, "by catches and many long intervals of interruption," to smaller compass. He has done for the text what Locke was "too lazy, or too busy" to do for himself, and given us an edition with omissions. The *cadres* of the essays are retained, even to the extent of supplying the titles

Digitized by Google

of chapters from which no extracts are given. On the whole, while the redundancies of the text are pruned away, there is left an authentic picture of the *Essay* as it took form in the author's mind.

M. J.

LONDON, ENGLAND

BOOKS RECEIVED

BERNARD, L. L. Instinct. A Study in Social Psychology. New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1924. Pp. ix+550.

CROCE, BENEDETTO. The Conduct of Life. Authorized translation by Arthur Livingston. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1924. Pp. xiv+326.

CUNNINGHAM, G. WATTS. Problems of Philosophy. New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1924. Pp. xvii+453.

DUTT, ULLASKAR. Twelve Years of Prison Life. Calcutta: The Arya Publishing House, 1924. Pp. iv+292.

GHOSE, AUROBINDO SRI. Evolution. Calcutta: Arya Publishing House, 1923. Pp. 52. Price, *As.* 8.

GHOSE, AUROBINDO SRI. Ideal and Progress. Calcutta: Arya Publishing House. Pp. 68.

GHOSE, AUROBINDO SRI. Songs to Myrtilla. Calcutta: Ayra Publishing House, 1923. Pp. 57.

GHOSE, AUROBINDO SRI. The Superman. Calcutta: Ayra Publishing House. Pp. 28.

GHOSE, AUROBINDO SRI. A System of National Education. Calcutta: Arya Publishing House, 1924. Pp. 55.

GHOSE, AUROBINDO SRI. Thoughts and Glimpses. Calcutta: Arya Publishing House, 1923. Pp. 20. Price, *As.* 6.

GUPTO, NOLINI KANTO. The Coming Race. Calcutta: Arya Publishing House. Pp. 94.

KIMBALL, EVERETT. The United States Government. Boston: Ginn and Co., 1924. Pp. vi+785.

LEQUIER, JULES. La Recherche d'une Première Vérité: Fragments Posthumes Recuelles par Charles Renouvier. Notice biographique par L. Dougas. Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1924.

MATHEWS, SHAILER. Contributions of Science to Religion. New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1924. Pp. vii+427. Price, $3.00.

OTTO, M. C. Things and Ideals. Essays in Functional Philosophy. New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1924. Pp. xi+320.

PATRICK, G. W. T. Introduction to Philosophy. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1924. Pp. viii+463. Price, $2.50.

PEIRCE, CHARLES S. Chance, Love and Logic. Edited with an Introduction by Morris R. Cohen. With a supplementary essay on the "Pragmatism of Peirce," by John Dewey. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1923. Pp. xxxiii+318.

Digitized by Google

RANULF, SVEND. Der Eleatische satz vom Widerspruch. Copenhagen: Gyldendalske. Boghandel, 1924. Pp. 222.

REICHL'S PHILOSOPHISCHER ALMANACH. Darmstadt: Otto Reichl Verlag, 1924. Pp. 480+52. Price, 12 marks.

The Rockefeller Foundation Annual Report. New York: The Rockefeller Foundation, 1923. Pp. xiii+389.

SHULTZ, WILLIAM J. The Humane Movement in the United States, 1910–1922. Columbia University Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law. Vol. CXIII, No. 1. Whole Number 252. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1924. Pp. 319.

WARD, STEPHEN. Ethics: An Historical Introduction. New York: Oxford University Press, American Branch, 1924. Pp. 96. Price, $1.00.

WATERMAN, WILLIAM RANDALL. Frances Wright. Columbia University Studies in Political Science, Vol. CXV, No. 1. Whole Number 256. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1924. Pp. 267.

Digitized by Google

IN MEMORIAM: JAMES EDWIN CREIGHTON

G. WATTS CUNNINGHAM

James Edwin Creighton was born at Pictou, Nova Scotia, April 8, 1861. He graduated from Dalhousie College in 1887. In 1892, after travel and study abroad, he received the degree of Doctor of Philosophy from Cornell University, with which institution his life thenceforward was to be identified and which he was to serve as Sage professor of logic and metaphysics from 1895 until his death, and as dean of the graduate school from 1914 to 1923. The honorary degree of Doctor of Laws was conferred on him by Queen's University in 1903, and by Dalhousie College in 1914. He was editor of the *Philosophical Review* from 1892, and American editor of *Kant-Studien* from 1896. The American Philosophical Association, which he was instrumental in founding, chose him for its first president; and he was ever a faithful attendant upon its sessions and an enthusiastic participant in its programs. A joint committee of the Eastern and Western divisions of the Association extended to him an invitation to fill the Carus lectureship at the 1924 meeting, but this honor his weakened condition prevented him from accepting. After a lingering illness the end came on the afternoon of October 8, 1924.

Professor Creighton's published writings are largely in the form of articles scattered through various journals, particularly the *Philosophical Review*, to which through thirty-two years he gave such loyal and unstinted service. Since its first publication in 1898 his *An Introductory Logic* has held its rightful place among the leading texts for beginners in this field of study. He had projected a book under the title, *The Rise of the Historical Method in Philosophy*, and many years had been devoted to its consideration; unfortunately his death occurred before the work was brought to completion —an irreparable loss to American scholarship!

Digitized by Google

There have been few teachers of philosophy who excelled Professor Creighton in the art of stimulating students to their highest endeavor. Of his students he was one of the keenest of critics—and one of the kindliest. He would tolerate neither the hasty incubation of ideas nor their slipshod expression; and yet his criticisms were so genially presented that the student felt, not hurt, but ashamed that he had fallen so far short of his real abilities as to have been content to bring such a sorry offering! Professor Creighton could get before the student's vision an ideal of high and lofty accomplishment and could keep it there as an alluring goal rather than an unattainable ideal disheartening by its very remoteness. And in this ability lay one secret, and it seems to me the main secret, of his really remarkable power as a teacher. Many who caught this vision remain to bless his memory.

The novel in philosophy Professor Creighton was inclined to regard with suspicion until it could show itself competent to adjust itself to the deeper drift of the historical development of philosophical thought. And this, in his opinion, it could do, not through bare negation, but through a meaningful and significant synthesis of some at least of the major aspects of the tradition. He did not, of course, minimize originality and self-expression on the part of philosophers. But it was his belief that genuine originality grows out of a sound historical scholarship, that true self-expression is made possible only by historical orientation. He remained convinced that the best constructive work in philosophy is necessarily linked with a sympathetic grasp of the history of philosophy, just as a real appreciation of the significance of the historical tradition is inextricably bound up with constructive effort. He never departed from the position advocated in his presidential address before the first meeting of the American Philosophical Association: "If either historical or constructive work in philosophy is to prove fruitful, the two sides cannot be separated, but must be carried on in close connection, the past

Digitized by Google

being used to reveal the present to itself, and the present to unlock the secrets of the past" (*Philosophical Review*, XI, 224). This conviction dominated him in both his thinking and his teaching. And it caused him at times to feel more or less dissatisfied with certain currents of contemporary philosophy. The tendency which he seemed to discern there to swear allegiance to the novel without first seriously endeavoring to test its value by the touchstone of the major historical systems appeared to him unfortunate and mistaken, and not infrequently did he openly deplore it. Our infatuation with novelties, he was prone to fear, would more and more lead us to minimize the importance of patient historical research and so would carry us away from contact with that which he deemed of indispensable value in revealing the present to itself.

It was Professor Creighton's hope, expressed to the writer in the summer of 1923, that he might find time and strength to give something like systematic expression to whatever he might have to add to the philosophical enterprise. But his length of days was unfortunately not sufficient to enable him to realize this hope, and our philosophical literature is very much poorer in consequence. As a partial recompense, it is sincerely to be hoped that his various articles in the journals will some day be brought together into a single volume so that they may receive the consideration which their wealth of content deserves.

UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS

Digitized by Google

THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS

Volume XXXV APRIL 1925 Number 3

THE ETHICS OF THREE RUSSIAN NOVELISTS

C. WILLIAMSON

The immense vogue of Russian novelists in England and America immediately prior to the war resulted in the division of their readers into two parties: those who imagined that all Russians are mystics, philosophers, and saints, and those who imagined that the average Russian is a driveling idiot who will cut your throat for twopence and then spend the rest of his life sniveling over your grave in a state of unreasonable remorse. The novelists themselves certainly encouraged us to believe that imbecility was a common characteristic of the Russian people.

"The Russian novel," wrote Matthew Arnold in 1887, "has now the vogue and deserves to have it." Tolstoy was his theme, and then and since the vogue has been mainly the vogue of Tolstoy. The others have had but the crumbs that fall from his table. And yet, ten years before Arnold wrote on Tolstoy, William James had declared of Turgenev that he took "a view of the great spectacle of human life more general, more impartial, more unreservedly intelligent, than that of any other novelist we know."

It is almost an impossibility to dissociate the writer from his works. And yet, on the other hand, there is no more fruitful source of futile criticism than to seek closely to identify an author with the creations of his imaginations, or to suppose that an intimate knowledge of all that has ever been written or said about an author can take the place of a first-class acquaintance with his work. So far as he is depicted in his literature, the aver-

Digitized by Google

age Russian is a crude, uncouth, half-cultivated creature, very sensitive to religion and superstitious associations, capable of insane bursts of brutality, and a man who lives by his heart and not by his head. The Russia that its great writers have described is buried, though perhaps it is not really dead.

Now the English taste for Russian literature is a taste for the human qualities in it, for the human love, understanding of suffering, and the enigma of life. This abounding love and animation and delight make the very rocks of the steppe the symbol of some mysterious wisdom, its windmill an angry and imprisoned spirit, its solitary slim poplar tree a dryad lovely. The cruelly tragic becomes endurable, and pain and grief too. What we prize in Russian novels is the opinion that has been lived through before it was written down, that which is written in blood. Except as a bypath, we are not interested in the splashes of political ink made by the propagandists. Some people even feel that the literature of Russia contains much that is unpleasant, much that is not intended for the young mind. This idea is generally fostered by those who know but little of the subject; it is a misconception. Russian literature is considerably more pure than our own. The bulk of it can be given to any young man or woman, however puritanically either may have been brought up.

I

Most Englishmen, if they were asked to name offhand the greatest Russian thinker, would undoubtedly say Tolstoy. But it is very unlikely that a native of his land would give the same answer. Tolstoy has never had the same reputation in Russia as abroad, and it is probable that those acquainted with the matter would name Soloviev. All the same, the former was, until a short time ago, the best-known Russian novelist.

It is easy to pick holes in Tolstoy, whose inconsistencies have made his work the bait of shallow critics. We prefer to look at the man who was so great as to override a mass of minor defects; who, speaking from afar, in a little-known tongue, profoundly

Digitized by Google

influenced the thought of the whole civilized world. He certainly had gigantic imperfections, but he had still more surprising perfections. At his death his most determined opponents recognized that a splendid intellect and a noble heart was extinguished. If he could be ugly he could also be beautiful, in his looks, his gestures, above all, in his speech.

Tolstoy is probably the greatest modern example of a writer who is even more interesting as a man than as an artist. We are familiar enough with cases of rather small artists who were rather big men; in the case of Tolstoy we are dealing with a very great artist who was an even greater man.

He was so great a man that he could afford not to be an artist. He could write novels that nobody else could write, and he could decide that novels were not worth writing. Here is a stumbling stone for those who think that the end of life is to produce works of art, for nobody can say that Tolstoy turned against art because he was an unsuccessful artist.

Such is a just estimate of an unknown correspondent to the *Times*. His career stands out as one of the proofs of the futility of man's sublimest efforts to benefit mankind without the saving ballast of mental discipline, of intellectual humility. His own striving to live up to his doctrine was pitiful in the extreme; he renounced all his worldly goods in favor of his devoted wife. Some years ago Mr. Bernard Shaw wrote a striking estimate of the Russian sage for the *Fabian News*, in which he brought to light a number of complex paradoxes. Tolstoy lived in the soldiers' camp, in the courts of royalty, in the dwellings of the demimonde, in the savage life of the Caucasus, and in the patriarchal life at Yasnaya Polyana. Although a soldier by profession, he became an apostle of peace; he gambled away his ancestral home. A literary lion at Moscow, he became an exponent of the simple life—in a word, his early life had been given up to sin, and although he was an aristocrat he became a preacher of the most liberal democracy. One characteristic of his teaching was the sanction of revolutionary methods to effect a return to primitive ways of life. His participation in the Crimean War supplied him with the material for his *Stories of Sevastopol*, which

Digitized by Google

made him popular throughout his country. Henceforth he abandoned the sword for the pen.

His characters, drawn from life, compel sympathy for their very humanity. He describes the rake and the drunkard with as much sympathy as a good man. He has been likened to an anatomist of the soul. Students well acquainted with the story of his life cannot but be impressed by the infinite compassion and tenderness of heart so characteristic of Tolstoy's noble nature. He even went to the extreme of enunciating the doctrine of non-resistance that condemns the exercise of all physical violence between man and man, irrespective of the cause for which such force may be brought to bear. His laissez faire system of education is well known for the amount of freedom enjoyed by the learner, and for the easy and voluntary way in which the child assimilates his lessons.

Tolstoy relied on no party and on no sect, but on the potency of the pen, on thoughts and feelings which have changed the face of Europe. Leo Tolstoy appears to have been an almost unprecedentedly inclusive man—that is, his own thoughts and emotions were so numerous and varied that by selecting suitably from them he could equate himself, as it were, to a very large number of different people. But where is the critic to be found who can equate himself to Leo Tolstoy?

There is hardly any plot to recommend *War and Peace*, but the minute analysis of human nature as represented by the two families and their circles of relatives and friends under the trying circumstances created by the war will always strike those of its readers who take a genuine interest in man, as singularly fascinating in many ways. *Anna Karenina*, which was begun in 1875 and was not finished till three years later, has a tragic interest coupled with the didactic intentions of its author. It is a woeful tale of an unhappy marriage which resulted in the tragic death of the wife. It holds up before all those intending to enter into conjugal relationship a mirror in which are reflected the disastrous consequences of a miscomprehension, or a partial

Digitized by Google

comprehension, of the duties of life, as well as its true meaning and significance. Few can equal him in depicting the human body. He is accurate, right, and brief, selecting only a few problems, and producing them gradually, he distributes them over the whole course of the very story.

Since the time when Rousseau came upon the scene, educational thought has undergone a virtual revolution which has its far-reaching effect on the system adopted in many countries at the present day. In this connection the little school Tolstoy opened in his native land after his experiences in the Crimean War had satisfied his martial enthusiasm, appeared to all intents and purposes to be the experimenting ground for the teaching of Rousseau, who lived and worked at least some hundred years before. However, Tolstoy may be said to be original in this sense—he was the first to attempt to carry out his ideas of freedom in education in his native country, into which the light of *Emile* had not yet fully penetrated.

But what a life! He began as a great master of Russian literature, and ended as a great Nebula in the undiscovered constellation of theory. Perhaps it is the richness of Tolstoy's genius that strikes us most in this story, though short it is. Nothing seems to escape him. The wonderful eye observes everything—the blue or the red of a child's frock; the way a horse shifts its tail; the action of a man trying to put his hands into pockets that have been sewed up; every gesture seems to be received by him automatically and at once referred by his brain to some cause which reveals the most carefully hidden secrets of human nature. We feel that we know his characters both by the way they choke and sneeze and by the way they feel about love and immorality and the most subtle questions of conduct.

Tolstoy's life had no Damascus road. The consummating spiritual victory which made him the John Baptist of a new world was the outcome of many a burdened, many a troubled, year. Like Rousseau, he undertook to mark out the path of salvation for mankind; he is the pet of intellectual opposition.

Digitized by Google

His literal interpretation of the Bible marked him out to the authorities as a dangerous visionary; his pretended clue to the riddle of life is impossible of application. For seven years he searched after truth, a quest resulting in his rejection of the rules and culture of modern society for a life of extreme simplicity and asceticism. It was at this period that *Resurrection* was written. As a study of crime and prison life the novel led indirectly to much-needed reforms, and the eloquent appeal stirred the consciences of many when they saw the system in all its brutal horror. Although he was respected and admired by nearly all classes, he had but few followers; and there is no doubt that it will be by the novels that his name will be remembered. All the circumstances of his personal life and even of his death have been viewed and interpreted by himself, his relations, his enemies, and his friends *subjectively* to suit this or that theory or interest. Tolstoy's views on life and religion altered in 1881. He gradually became convinced that all private property was unlawful, that no form of compulsion was permissible, that natural affection was wrong, and that man's whole life should consist of work and a direct approach to God. He was a married man, and those who are too easily condemnatory of his wife might usefully remember that she bore Tolstoy thirteen children.

He ceased to copyright his books; but he gave his wife a certain power over his work previous to 1881, and on the sales of those volumes, which included the great novels, he and his family largely depended. He lived, that is, a life he condemned, in surroundings he hated, on money which he thought it was wrong to take. Is it any wonder he was miserable? He was characterized by introspection, egoism, lack of passion, headstrong wilfulness, yet vacillation, humanist sympathies, yet fundamentally aristocratic pride!

Tolstoy marked out clear differences of nature and temperament in the different stages of his life. He had his period of childishness and innocence, succeeded by a period in which he

Digitized by Google

sowed his wild oats in utter and complete selfishness. Then came his literary period, illustrated by his two masterpieces, *War and Peace* and *Anna Karenina*, and finally the time when he turned his back on literary and artistic ideals and became an Early Christian, a conscientious objector against war, an enemy of the military class, and a disbeliever in official religion and a bureaucratic state.

Tolstoy is the pioneer of the group of writers who have advocated the practical arts and crafts as being more in accord with the child's living interests than bookish subjects. He emphasizes free drawing, and the child's own efforts in the use of color and self-activity in song and music. His story-telling and his stimulus to the self-activity of the children to compose stories are examples in the irresistibility of personality to bring out personality. It is only through dramatic vivid recital or representation that he considers the teaching of history worth while. In his books there are no heroes, no characters, no personalities, and hence there is no tragedy, no catastrophe, no redeeming humor or laughter. The principles are all good, clean, but we are never at home with them. From Tolstoy we shall get no "tips."

II

Dostoevsky was born in the great period of rationalism, the period of which Comte and Spencer were, either avowedly or implicitly, the accepted prophets, a period in which only in doubt and difficulty men clung to their belief in a supernatural order. In all his novels where there is any trace of philosophical struggle he is endeavoring to find the synthesis which he knew to exist between faith and reason. His own position is stated quite clearly: "If anyone can prove to me that Christ is outside the truth, I should prefer to stay with Christ and not with the truth." That defiance is not one of obscurantism. What Dostoevsky saw, long before the days of William James or Bergson, was that the rationalists were wrong in their efforts to exclude

Digitized by Google

from truth those aspirations, even those superstitions, which, equally with the voice of reason, represent to men something without which life is not real.

Dostoevsky was a Lithuanian, and thus loved purity; he was a Lithuanian, and thus paid his brother's debts; he was a Lithuanian, and thus wrote bad Russian; he was a Lithuanian, and thus a devout Catholic. When he complained that he had a strange and evil character he did not realize that it was neither strange nor evil, but simply Lithuanian. As Dostoevsky himself never attached much importance to his descent, we may be allowed to follow his example.

Some readers of his life may think that Mlle Dostoevsky emphasizes too much the fact that her father was Lithuanian not Russian; and she is, perhaps, ill-advised to dwell on the early quarrel with Turgenev. For our part we are glad she has stressed Dostoevsky's non-Russian origin, and agree that the whole subject of race heredity in the arts has been unduly neglected. There is parallel to be found for Dostoevsky's vehement adoption of Russia in the ardent passion some non-Irish have felt for Ireland, or the manner in which such Welsh houses as the Cecils have served England. His character had a nobility which compares with that of Scott; and he had trials greater than any which afflicted Sir Walter. When he was sent to Siberia none of his brothers or sisters gave him any succor; when he returned, and became successful, he was besieged by greedy relatives, whom he supported. After providing for his brothers and their families he was plagued with the ill-natured son of his first wife, a woman who was always unfaithful to him; and though he found real happiness and comfort in his second marriage, it was nearly spoiled by the efforts of relatives who saw their supporter taking up other obligations. His singular goodness was recognized by many people. When he went to Siberia the other convicts, the ordinary criminals, were first inclined to mock and bully him, but quickly they realized they had a saint among them. "He was a precious object to his humble

Digitized by Google

comrades. They felt that he would render great services to the Russian community, and they all protected him."

Dostoevsky himself, as is well known, was an epileptic, and was for a time in great danger of falling an incurable victim to the gambling instinct. He was not merely a man of letters, but also a true son of literature. He fathomed the most dangerous and criminal depths of the human heart, especially the passion of love in all its manifestations. In his twenty-eighth year (1849), while making a precarious living by literature in St. Petersburg, he became entangled in a conspiracy promoted by a few of the de-Russianized intellectuals against the Tsar, was sentenced to be shot, reprieved on the point of execution, and sent to Siberia. Here he spent four years amidst the filth and degradation of a convict prison. Of this period he wrote, on his release, to his brother Michael:

> I had made acquaintance with convicts at Tobolsk; at Omsk I settled myself down to live four years in common with them. They are rough, angry, embittered men. Their hatred for the nobility is boundless; they regard all of us who belong to it with hostility and enmity. They would have devoured us if they only could. Judge then for yourself in what danger we stood, having to cohabit with these people for some years, eat with them, sleep by them, and with no possibility of complaining of the affronts which were constantly put upon us. "You nobles have iron beaks, you have torn us to pieces. When you were masters you injured the people, and now, when it's evil days with you, you want to be our brothers."

But in the same letter, which we quote from Miss Mayne's collection, he tells his brother that he found among these convicts not a few "deep, strong, beautiful natures. . . . . I lived into their lives, and so I believe I knew them really well. Many tramps' and thieves' careers were laid bare to me, and above all the whole wretched existence of the common people. . . . . I have learned to know the Russian people as only a few know them."

This was the turning-point in Dostoevsky's career. From his four years' imprisonment followed by six of exile he came

Digitized by Google

back with the convictions, to which he was thenceforth faithful to the end, that the intellectuals, conspirators, cosmopolitans, were all wrong; that the Tsardom and the church were essential factors in the wholesome development of the Russian people, and that in the mystical faith and simple direct human feeling of the masses was to be found the regenerative force of the future. Unlike Tolstoy, however, he never rejected European culture—he urged his countrymen to seek for and assimilate it in a much deeper sense than they had ever done before.

Many modern artists and critics, he begins, in seeking to present the real, confuse the real with the actual. They are thus misled into what Dostoevsky called "arid observations on everyday trivialities"; whereas reality is far profounder than this. It includes the spheres of the soul and the spirit; it is, perhaps more concerned with these than with their effects in the material world. "I am a realist in the higher meaning of the term," wrote Dostoevsky. Modern psychology, especially since the psychoanalysts, has shown us that the everyday consciousness of man is only a single facet of his mind; Dostoevsky sought to enter into this house of many mansions. But when is it, he asked himself, that man is most closely attuned to the struggles and adventures of his innermost self? It is at moments and in states of unbalance, in what the world calls "pathological conditions," that the barriers are overthrown. This is why so many of Dostoevsky's heroes are "abnormal." Man's quest for the answer to the riddle of the universe resolves itself largely into a search for an absolute value. To what or whom does he owe allegiance?

If we view it from a certain angle, it is not at all impossible to see in Dostoevsky's influence upon the English intellectuals of today the bones of a marvelously typical Dostoevsky novel. Supposing we select London for his small provincial town and his arrival for the agitating occurrence—could he himself exaggerate the discussions he has provoked, the expenditure of enthusiasm and vituperation, the mental running to and fro, the parties that have been given in his honor, the added confusion

Digitized by Google

of several young gentlemen-writers declaring (in strict confidence) that they were the real Dostoevsky, the fascinating arguments as to whether or no he is greater than Jane Austen, in the sight of our young egoists puffing up like undismayed frogs, and of our superior inner circle who are not unwilling to admit that he has a considerable amount of crude strength, before returning to their eighteenth-century muttons?

Ohé Dostoevsky! Où est Dostoevsky? As-tu vu Dostoevsky?

Few indeed have so much as caught a glimpse of him. What would be the end of such a novel? His disappearance, without doubt, leaving no trace but a feeling of, on the whole, very lively relief. For if we do not take him superficially, there is nothing for us to do but to take him terribly seriously, but to consider whether it is possible for us to go on writing our novels as if he never had been. This is not only a bitterly uncomfortable prospect; it is positively dangerous; it might very well end in the majority of our young writers finding themselves naked and shivering, without a book to clothe themselves in.

He saw much, but there is more to see than his loving and sorrowful eyes ever saw. He is not, like Shakespeare, complete. He saw nothing outside Russia, and was so sodden with her pains as to seem unaware that beyond her provinces there were happier lives.

The Russians are not realists; they are dreamers and mystics. They have to lose themselves in visions instead of studying life. When they try to be realistic they fall at once into Mongolian cynicism and eroticism. Dostoevsky's realism is an inheritance from his Normanized ancestors. It was not for nothing that Dostoevsky admired Balzac so heartily, and took him for his model. Modern psychology has illuminated certain things which were before obscure in Dostoevsky's work; that Dostoevsky was, in fact, extraordinarily expert at tracing the borderland between the conscious and the unconscious mind. Dostoevsky never refuses to see the sordid things in the world. Few novel-

Digitized by Google

ists are so free from sentimentality or pretense; but he continually insists that there is no degradation possible which does not leave some beauty if you seek for it. For him, human nature is not a fire of coals which, when it is out, is out, but a fire of woodlogs built on old, warm ashes among which it is always possible to blow alive a new flame. He holds to the belief without any false optimism as to the likelihood of reform in the bad. Svridrigailov, in *Crime and Punishment*, when on a sudden he gives up his efforts to outrage Dounia, makes no spectacular repentance. He hustles Dounia out of his room, knowing that he cannot trust himself or expect the supernatural moment to last, and afterwards shoots himself with the deliberate despair of one who has all his life followed evil, and garnered from the pursuit nothing but disgust, disappointment, and a mad necessity for persisting in evil. Dostoevsky is no meliorist; his philosophy has no affinities with that which holds that man, from his own efforts, and by the development of his natural goodness, can improve himself; he rather holds, with Browning, that the old doctrine of original sin is the truth, and that the heart of man is given over to corruption. For him, that is, man is decisively separate, unlike the rest of the animal world. He is capable of greater depths of horror and sin, and capable of supreme heights of self-sacrifice.

Dostoevsky had early prepared himself for the career of a soldier by going through the Imperial College of Engineering, but he finally took up literature as his vocation. It is to this great novelist that we owe such vivid pictures of peasant life in Russia as are exhibited in his *Poor Folk*. The abject poverty of that class, their dire misery, their doubts and difficulties, their ignorance and helplessness, are painted for us by the pen of a master hand with his profound "knowledge of human nature, penetrating insight, fearless sincerity, wit, sarcasm, eloquence, style." Another great work of Dostoevsky's, and unquestionably his masterpiece, is *Crime and Punishment*, which was pub-

Digitized by Google

lished in 1868. This remarkable story occupies a place of unique distinction in modern fiction. It is intensely realistic in its characterization, and exquisitely minute in its analysis of human nature. The several characters in this novel are so powerfully drawn that they not only claim the full sympathy of its readers, but they seem to have a subtle influence upon the minds of the latter, who cannot but feel here and there some intensely personal touches about them. The scene of the story is laid in an atmosphere far from inviting. It is one of extreme poverty and sordidness, yet Dostoevsky, by his marvellous powers of expression and sympathetic insight, has succeeded in the rare achievement of ennobling the souls of his readers and thus opening their eyes to, as it were, a new and solemn grandeur in utter misery itself, instead of in prosperity and sunshine.

Then again, to laugh with Dostoevsky is not always a comfortable exercise for one's pride. For he has the—surely unpardonable—habit of describing at length, minutely, the infinitely preposterous states of mind of some poor wretch, not as though he were "showing us a star," but with many a familiar nod and look in our direction, as much as to say: "But you know yourself from your own experience what it is to feel like this."

European critics often make the mistake of identifying Dostoevsky with the heroes of his novels, an error into which Russian critics never fall. Like the great poet that he was, Dostoevsky drew his countrymen from the life. A moral chaos prevails in his books, for our young and anarchic country is still in a state of chaos. But there was nothing chaotic in Dostoevsky's own life. His heroines desert their husbands and run after lovers, while he weeps like a child on learning of the disgrace of one of his nieces, and refuses to see her. His heroes live dissipated lives and throw their money out of the window, while he toils for long years to pay his brother's debts as an obligation of honor. Every one of his characters shows the conflict of heroic

Digitized by Google

will; he concentrates all his artistic powers of his delineation into his dialogues, which are as free as Tolstoy's are full.[1] His heroes are bad fathers and bad husbands, while he is loyal to his wife, zealous in every duty, and careful as few Russians are for the education of his children. His heroes stand very loose to their duties as citizens, while he is a keen patriot, a devout son of his church, a Slav true to the cause of his race.

III

Of all the later period of Russian novelists A. P. Tchekoff, or more commonly Tchekov (1860–1904) is without doubt the most original. Though Tchekov's genius is, strictly speaking, inimitable, it deserves a much exacter study than it has yet received. If he is great, then he is great not least in virtue of qualities which we may aspire to possess; if he is an ideal, he is an ideal to which we can refer ourselves. He had been saturated in all the disillusions which we regard as peculiarly our own and every quality which is distinctive of the epoch of consciousness in which we are living now is reflected in him—and yet, miracle of miracles, he was a great artist. He did not rub his cheeks to produce a spurious colour of health; he did not profess beliefs which he could not maintain; he did not seek a reputation for universal wisdom, or indulge himself in self-gratifying dreams of a millennium which he alone had the ability to control. He was and wanted to be nothing in particular, and yet, as we read these letters of his, we feel gradually form within ourselves the conviction that he was a hero—more than that—the hero of our time.

In Tchekov's presentment of life, which so strangely reconciles not only failure but futility with beauty, there are constant

[1] "The annihilation of the sense of time in Dostoevsky's stories was first dwelt upon by Merejkowski, and it has been much discussed by all of his serious commentators. Events occur and things take place within a few hours in his books which would ordinarily take months and years. The reason for this timeless cycle of events may be sought in the experiences that the author had in the moments preceding his attacks of epilepsy in which he had thoughts and emotions which a lifetime would scarcely suffice to narrate." Such is a doctor's comment.

Digitized by Google

gradations of atmosphere between two extremes. The extremes are those of tragedy and farce, and the difference between them lies much less in the data than in what he makes the data yield. If in his deepest work there is tragedy, and an exquisite poetry as well, it is not merely because the characters are more interesting and the situation has a larger scope, but because he releases his own compassionate understanding and allows his people to be more aware of life and of themselves. When he has had his say about them they still have an unexpressed suggestiveness, and to find its meaning is like trying to stem the mysterious flow of life. At the other extreme his comment explodes abruptly in a burst of laughter. Human actions are turned into antics and frankly reduced to the absurd.

During the last few years no modern Russian writer has stood so high in English critical opinion as Tchekov, that master of vignette—a tiresome word, but it still has to serve. English readers first learned of Tolstoy, then of Turgenev, and then of Dostoevsky. Tchekov, a writer more recent than any of his great fellow-Russian novelists, has introduced us to a new phase of art. His *Tales* are eagerly read; his plays will be read and seen more frequently as opportunity is afforded; Tchekov is no impressionate. He is no mere sensorium recording stimuli. Consciously or unconsciously, he had taken the great step—the *salto mortale*—by taking which the literary artist of the first rank is distinguished from the minor writers. He has slowly shifted his angle of vision until he could discern a unity in multiplicity. Unity of this rare kind cannot be imposed as, for instance, Zola attempted to impose it. It is an emanation from life revealed only to sensitive contemplation. He is, some imagine, peculiarly full of delicate shades of expression, because, for one reason, he places his story so surely in the present: small oval portraits clearly shaded off round the edge. With many novelists, Russian and other, you can afford, to some extent, to lose a *nuance* because the direction of the whole story is plain. You are being led up to a certain conclusion; and if you should miss

Digitized by Google

the significance of this step or that you may go back, should you think it worth while, and pick up the dropped stitch. Tchekov, too, has, of course, his conclusion; he is too fine an artist to leave a story shapeless or incomplete. But he is only concerned with the present moment, and he is not as some would think a propagandist; it is not easy to discern any social or political theory in his stories. Though dealing with conditions not familiar to Englishmen, his stories bear, as it were, a hallmark of universality. One cannot believe that they are of a type of art likely to be affected by time or place, by fashion or environment.

Whereas Tolstoy and Gorki sought the meaning in an ideal of life that a social revolution might accomplish, Tchekov reaches deeper, to question the value of life, to criticize its forms. In this, his dramatic ideal differs from that of the drama of ideas. Mr. Shaw, master of that form, criticizes not life, but manners; the drama of ideas as a whole, criticizes conditions: its value is, in consequence, constantly decreasing. Its present importance, being a question of a knowledge of conditions, is limited by the quality of the intellect behind it as much as by the quality of dramatic art in its expression. He knows that life itself is perpetual discontent, with no peace attainable. The value of his drama lies in the courage with which, for the most part, it faces and masters disillusion. Its broken rhythm holds the meaning of life, effort, new life, decay, and fresh creative effort. With that, an understanding that art suffers as life is degraded, that the creative activity constantly changing life must shatter the old forms of art to find expression for the new spirit. Because he had the vision, and because he protested, in the distinction of his characters and speech, in his drama's unresting note of revolt against surrender to worn-out forms of life and art, Tchekov is a great artist. He is not a great dramatist, but his plays, faulty as they are, lie on the threshold of the future. Now Tchekov had a gift for stories with a certain pointed absence of point, stories which made human life seem meaningless or else

Digitized by Google

a practical joke played by nothing and nobody. This gift he exploited as all artists exploit their gift, as Shakespeare exploited his gift of rhetoric; and in these notebooks you can see him jotting down ideas which, in the raw, are like little epigrams without the epigrammatic form. They are not philosophic comments upon life at all but observations always with a view to a certain kind of plot; they are, in fact, designs, with the artist's will-to-effect in them, not with the philosopher's will-to-truth. All his stories are delicately poised. He takes you, as one might express it, for a walk; he does not take you walking to this place or that. In nearly every tale he studies the relation of two people to each other; and the "catastrophe" (should there be one) matters no more and no less than each minute development and change in that relation. Behind it all, no doubt, lies certain questions—the old "What?" and "Why?" which have tormented man since he began to think about himself. But his main feature is optimism in the future and to stigmatize him as "gloomy" only betrays the impotence and wrong-headedness of the critic.

Few authors have dealt with so wide a range of men and women taken from all kinds of Russian writing. Innumerable as Tchekov's characters seem to be, they are all different, and their differences are indicated by fine, clean strokes dealt with astonishing celerity and certainty, for the whole story often occupies only a page or two. And yet, we ask again, what aim is there behind this certainty? What was his purpose in defining so many scores of men and women, who are for the most part so disagreeable in themselves or in their circumstances so degraded? Did he find no connecting link, no final arrangement which is satisfying and harmonious in itself, although the parts which composed it are painful and mean? It is difficult not to ask that question, and the very fineness and delicacy of Tchekov's mind make it unusually difficult to be sure of an answer. He seems able with one tap to split asunder those emotions that we have been wont to think whole and entire, leaving them scattered about in small disconnected splinters. But if he were merely

Digitized by Google

cynical, brilliant, and destructive, we should have no question to ask; we should already know the answer. By nature and by desire he was intensely anti-sentimental and was especially prone to an extra-quickness of sense-perception and of what is called "the feelings" and to this quickness the delicacy and subtlety of his stories are largely due. He is more profoundly disturbing than any cynic because his gifts are so rich and various. But among these gifts there are at least three which seem to contradict those who hold him the novelist of hopelessness and despair. There is no one who seems endowed, even through the necessarily coarse medium of a translation, with a keener sense of beauty. In some of the stories we may find that this beauty is itself sufficient. Again, there is an originality in his choice of the elements that make up a story which sometimes produces an arrangement so unlike any we have met with before that it is necessary to consider whether he is not hinting at some order hitherto unguessed at, though perhaps never fully stated by him. His *Contes* are the work of their creator's imagination rather than of his thought and intention; even their commonplace is tinged with fantasy. They are like beings of a former life re-encountered in a dream or seen under the influence of a drug.

To attempt, however, the more difficult problem: What is most peculiar to Tchekov's unity is that it is far more nakedly aesthetic than that of most of the great writers before him. Other writers of a rank equal to his have felt the need to shift their angle of vision until they could perceive an all-embracing unity; but they were not satisfied. They felt, and obeyed, the further need of taking a moral attitude toward the unity they saw. They approved or disapproved, accepted or rejected it. More accurately perhaps we should say they gave or refused their indorsement. They appealed to some other element than their own sense of beauty for the final verdict on their discovery; they asked whether it was just or good. Something must have happened to him which killed hope in him; and after it he wrote about a world from which hope had been removed. "He refused

Digitized by Google

in advance every possible consolation material or metaphysical. Not even in Tolstoy, who set no great store by philosophical systems, will you find such keenly expressed disgust for every kind of conceptions and ideas as in Tchekov. . . . . Finally, he frees himself from ideas of every kind, and loses even the notion of connection between the happenings of life." It was something that happened to Tchekov, not a pose that he assumed for artistic purposes; and therefore the fact that he was able to make real works of art out of this mode of experience is itself valuable. He did, in his negative way, prove something, namely, the supremacy of the spirit of man over its own hopelessness. And he proved it all the more surely because he was not trying to do so. He really was hopeless, and wished that he wasn't. There is no luxury of woe in him. And yet he is interesting and must have interested himself, or he would not have continued to write. He stoops as it were from an ineffable height, picks up a situation, describes it in the smallest possible number of words and lets it fall back into the welter of human débris.

His domain is the short story: he never tries to give the whole history of his heroes, but only one episode—one moment. And he tells it in such a way that the reader forever retains the type of characters represented. As a rule his stories are very brief, and taken in chronological order seem, on the whole, to be full of merriment—constructed with precision, economy, detachment, and with charm. His art is, in fact, the antithesis of realism; he never forgets that what we see is less important than what we do not see: that what happens is infinitely less than what does not happen. Tchekov, beyond doubt, is among the few great silver artists. Many English critics are misled by his nationality into crediting him with qualities which are not his in the least. His stories are "slices of life" and to use a term that is becoming general in painting, Tchekov is an "expressionist," not an impressionist. He asks for no comparison with the greater men of his own literature or ours; you will only court disappointment, if you go to him straight from Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, or even Gorky. Skeptical, critical, infinitely observant, he is an

Digitized by Google

artist of moods and memories. We do not wish to be understood as saying that Tchekov is a manifestation of *l'art pour l'art*, because, in any commonly accepted sense of that phrase, he is not. Still, he might be considered as an exemplification of what the phrase might be made to mean. But instead of being diverted into a barren dispute over terminologies, we may endeavor to bring into prominence an aspect of Tchekov which has an immediate interest—his modernity. It suggests that he is fashionable, or up-to-date. Tchekov is, in fact, a good many phases in advance of all that is habitually described as modern in the art of literature. The artistic problem which he faced and solved is one that is, at most, partially present to the consciousness of the modern writer—to reconcile the greatest possible diversity of content with the greatest possible unity of aesthetic impression. His philosophy is, of course, inseparable from all that he writes, but it has to blend itself with another element that springs with immense vigor and fecundity from a very deep source, guided by the two ideals of art and science. He made his stories, and the complete philosophy of his practice as an artist might be woven together of extracts from his letters. His one desire was personal freedom.

He is a born story-teller. Wherever he looks, whatever he sees, wherever he goes, stories shape themselves quickly and with a sort of spontaneous directness which reminds one of an earlier age of the world's literature when story-telling was natural to man. The whole mass of Russia seems to be leavened with the spirit, instead of small patches or thin crusts.

Tchekov calls for no efforts, demands no abjurations—nothing of "that willing suspension of disbelief which constitutes poetic faith," which was the inseparable condition of all literature before him. We have, it seems, only to open our eyes and his world will be in front of us; we open them, and it is not there. If we are writers, we think for a vain moment of assimilating Tchekov's method—Mr. Gerhardi thinks of it—and the method slips through our fingers like quicksilver; we try to fix it, and we are left with a handful of airy negations—no plot, no orna-

Digitized by Google

ment, no construction, no lies—and the smiling despair of this conclusion, that Tchekov wrote like Tchekov because he was Tchekov, and that if we want to write like him—and who would not?—we must be like him. To see his world is not, after all, merely a question of opening our eyes, but of opening different eyes than ours.

The simplicity of Tchekov is very wise and very old; it is an achievement wrung out of much knowledge and surpassing inward honesty.

IV

The Russian novelists have a wonderful care and patience over details, and next a sense of the tragedy of men's lives, an immense pity for those who are lowly and unfortunate. And as a rule, in Russian novels the women are depicted as much stronger than the men.

The Russian has a multiple personality, because he lives and moves in contradictory worlds. The intellectual lives in the Utopian future while his parents live in the days of serfdom. From the most progressive thought of the century to the traditions of Peter the Great, Russia presents a vast paradox, and it needs but little foresight to prophesy the coming of a tremendous future for the inhabitants of Russia.

The Slav or Russian nature, as it shows itself in its novels, seems marked by an extreme sensitiveness, and an acute consciousness for experiencing conduct and feeling. In the words of Matthew Arnold: "The Russian novelist is thus master of a spell to which the secrets of human nature—both what is external and what is internal, gesture and manner no less than thought and feeling—willingly make themselves known." Russian literature and art have profited much in richness in human dignity and noble sympathy, by the sufferings of her literary men; by the fact that they have been brought face to face with reality. Their endurements have furnished the *causa fabulae* of their work.

LONDON, ENGLAND

Digitized by Google

LIBERALISM IN ETHICS

C. J. DUCASSE

Might is right and justice the interest of the stronger! So does Plato make Thrasymachus speak in the *Republic*, and Socrates' attempt to dispose of the doctrine occupies the greater part of the first book of the dialogue. However shocking that doctrine itself may be, Socrates' "refutation" of it is nothing but a piece of sophistry which cannot possibly be regarded as having settled the merits of the thesis itself.

The essence of his argument is as follows: The physician, the pilot, the shepherd, etc., are truly and properly so called only in so far as they are viewed as promoters of the good of their charges, viz., of the sick, the sailors, and the sheep; while in so far as they are viewed as promoting their own good by exacting payment they are to be called not physician, pilot, and shepherd, but business men, money-makers. And this, which is true of medicine and of the other arts mentioned, is true of all arts: their essence consists in promoting not the good of those who exercise them, but the good of those upon whom they are exercised. The ruler, in particular, is really a ruler only in so far as he is ministering not to his own good, but to the good of the governed. Therefore right, or justice, cannot without contradiction be defined as the good of the ruler.

Obviously, however, Thrasymachus should have denied that the physician can strictly be so called only when he promotes the health of the body. For as much skill in the use of drugs is needed to poison enemies as to cure friends, and therefore what constitutes a man a physician is his technical knowledge, and not what he does with it. The same is evidently true of the ruler, the pilot, or the shepherd. The shepherd, for instance, is no less a shepherd when he leads his sheep to the butcher than when he leads them to pasture. And with this, Socrates' argu-

Digitized by Google

ment collapses. Whether a man rules in his own interest or in the interest of the ruled is quite irrelevant, since on either supposition *he rules;* and that a man in fact does rule is what constitutes him a ruler in the strict sense specified by Socrates. Therefore no contradiction is involved in supposing him to rule in his own interest. At most it becomes necessary to make a slight modification in the letter of Thrasymachus' position. Since the question as to whose interest is promoted is irrelevant to the ruler's being a ruler, we shall have to abandon the thesis that justice is the *interest* of the stronger, and say instead that justice is the *rule* of the stronger. This, however, leaves the essence of Thrasymachus' doctine quite unimpaired: right, or justice, means that which is in conformity to the law, and the law is made by the individual or the group which is strong enough actually to rule.

The odious character of this doctrine would be removed were we able to persuade ourselves of the truth of the version of it which constituted the theoretical basis of the ordeals and trials of the Middle Ages. According to that version, it was right that had might; God saw to it that it should have. But it may safely be asserted that this view never had many adherents not themselves mighty. The mass of mankind, who are weak and have to obey the dictates of the strong, mostly regard them as unjust. That is why they think of some day of judgment when real justice will be done. This day of judgment, however, turns out to be a day when, by the might of God, their own wishes shall be fulfilled instead of those of their present masters. If such a day comes, there is no reason to doubt that those masters, then dethroned, will complain to their gods of injustice and tyranny just as sincerely as the others do today, and on exactly the same grounds, namely, that they are forced to do what somebody else wants, instead of what they themselves want. And their complaints will then be called rebellion, their sincerity will be denied, and they will be accused of deliberately wanting that which they know to be wicked. Today, however,

Digitized by Google

being the stronger, they are the ones who say that to the others, and they believe what they say as truly as the others believe the opposite. There may be no good reason, a priori, for defining justice as the rule of the stronger, but it would obviously be no less arbitrary to define it as the rule of the weaker. Indeed, the fact that no such thing exists as the rule of the really weaker would seem to be a good reason for not doing so. And there does not appear anything, either, particularly to recommend the doctrine that justice is, if not the rule, at least the wishes or the welfare of the weaker, however numerous they may be.

If we can forget for a moment which camp we belong to in human affairs and view them with serene impartiality, what we perceive is for the most part not a struggle between the good and the self-confessedly wicked, but a struggle between the incompatible wishes of two sets of people, each set in all honesty calling what it wants just and right, and whatever opposes it malicious and wicked. The struggle is thus between incompatible conceptions of the right, whose respective devotees fight it out. Whichever side wins lays down the law, and thereby determines how right and wrong shall be measured henceforth. Thus, from the English point of view, George Washington was a traitor, and from the American he was a hero. Whether the American point of view was to be that by which the merits of men would be measured in America was decided by force of arms. We won, and therefore Washington is a hero in America. If we had not won, we might still believe him a hero, but we should not be allowed to say it, and indeed we of today should in all probability not believe it, for we should never have heard anybody but wild radicals assert it.

In spite of all this, however, it is difficult to escape the conviction that the appeal to superior force really proves nothing. The argument *ad baculum* is listed in every textbook of logic as constituting a fallacy of irrelevancy, and we feel that there must be some better theoretical foundation for a definition of justice, or the right, than mere *de facto* might. The will of the

Digitized by Google

majority is perhaps today that which suggests itself most readily as such a foundation. But it is difficult to see what, theoretically, there is to recommend it. Its chief merit appears to be the highly practical one that if the minority object to the will of the majority they can be compelled by the might of superior numbers to comply with it anyway. Indeed, it has often been pointed out that taking a vote is but a sensible device for ascertaining what the outcome of a real fight would be, without the unpleasantness of broken heads on either side. And it has even been held that it was just because women did not count each for one in a real fight, that they were not entitled to a vote. Did we feel inclined to facetiousness, we might even invite attention to the fact that no sooner had Kipling allowed it to become generally known that the female of the species is more deadly than the male than women got the vote everywhere!

It might, however, be contended that the will, or at least the welfare, of the majority is something that commends itself a priori not merely to the members of that majority, but even to the mere spectator, who has no stake at all in the fight. Surely, one may say, the sight of one man, or a few men, tyrannizing over a multitude is revolting to anybody. But at once it may be asked, Why pick on anybody rather than on somebody? If one is allowed to choose one's witnesses in this way from among the very people who already are of the opinion disputed, one will be able to prove anything. The opposite side could then, of course, claim the same liberty, and pick as its witness a man himself mighty and of a proud and masterful temperament; and such a man would testify that the sight of one like himself bending to his will a multitude of weaklings is not revolting at all, but on the contrary, gratifying, as being exactly right and just. A spectator may have no direct stake in a fight, but so long as he does not lay aside even his temperament, he has sympathies with those of like temperament, and he is therefore not impartial, but biased. Thus, the word "tyrannizing" constitutes a question-begging epithet: when the ordinary man,

Digitized by Google

the "anybody," is imposing his will and that of the likes of him who constitute the majority upon the minority, he does not call that tyranny, because he does not find it revolting. But minorities or individuals often do. As readers of Nietzsche well know, "mediocracy" is to the aristocrat a revolting spectacle.

If then the welfare of the majority is a wholly arbitrary theoretical foundation for a definition of justice, it may seem that the definition which Plato proposes is the only one that will not be open to similar criticism. According to him, justice, or the right, essentially means *order;* and that, in turn, means the assigning to each person in the community of a task or function for which his capacities and inclinations fit him, and in the performance of which he will therefore find satisfaction. This view of justice, however, overlooks the fact that in this world of ours there are people who are dissatisfied by temperament and who love opposition and quarreling for their own sakes. Peace and order are to such people what a red rag is to a bull. There exist, in short, revolutionists by vocation no less than by occasion, and to the former nothing but a good, vigorous revolution is satisfactory. What it is about is the least of their cares, for to them revolution is not a means to an end, but an end in itself. It is hard indeed to see what place can be made in a world of peace and order for the addicts of disorder. Nothing will do but for those who want peace to resort to war, and use what might they have to compel those who want war to keep the peace! The only way to have a peaceful world would seem to be to hang the turbulents and say: There are no such people! Universal agreement, whether about peace or anything else, is scarcely to be found, but has to be made—by suppressing the dissentients. We always come back to force in the end.

One could, indeed, propose appealing to the judgment of the expert in prejudices, that is, of the sage or wise man, to settle the merits of conflicting ideals. But unfortunately this at once involves the problem of deciding who is to be called wise or

Digitized by Google

expert. When ends are agreed upon and means only are in question, that problem is easy to solve: he is expert who can do for us what we desire but do not know how to do for ourselves—for instance, the physician, the engineer, or the mechanic. But when it is ends themselves, that is, intrinsic goods, that are in question, the solution is not so easy. A man might acquire a taste for aged eggs and other oriental delicacies, and claim to be a connoisseur in foods because of the very catholicity of his acquaintance with them. But those of us to whom the fumet has been enough will say that his taste has been not developed but perverted, and will laugh at his claims of expertness. And obviously the things about which there are real and bitter conflicts are regarded by the men who fight for them as ends, or at least as the only possible means to the things that are ends. Moreover, such things are not called by them wishes or desires, but *principles, ideals*, meaning thereby things concerning which one must fight, suffer, and if need be, die. Thus it is not particular acts as such that are in question in such disputes, but *the ideals and standards by which particular acts shall be judged right or wrong;* and it is only as between such conflicting standards of right that might is right, or, more accurately, that might decides and selects.

The doctrine that might is right shocks us because we already accept certain standards of right, of which might is not one; and clearly, when the standard is not itself in dispute, right means that which conforms, and wrong that which does not conform, to the accepted standard. But then it is obvious that the words "right" and "wrong" have no more meaning as applied to ethical standards themselves than have the words "long" and "short" as applied to a yardstick. Ethical standards themselves are neither right nor wrong, neither good nor bad, neither true nor false, but just *either factually used or not used* in a given society to distinguish as right or wrong things other than themselves; and what decides whether one rather than another standard shall be used is nothing but the relative might of the sup-

Digitized by Google

porters of each. For where ideals, or principles, or other things thought of as absolute are concerned, there can be no logical demonstration of superiority of one over another. If a thing can logically be proved to be of greater worth than another, then that thing is, necessarily, being viewed as a means and not as an end; for an end, agreed upon to begin with by both disputants, is the indispensable premise of every such proof.

In addition to noting that the proposition "might is right" is true only in the sense that might is what determines the standard by which right shall be judged, but not in the sense of being itself that standard, one could attempt further to mitigate the odiousness of Thrasymachus' thesis by considerations of a different sort. One could, for instance, say that although when it comes to a final showdown might means physical power, yet that which enlists physical power to fight for a given ideal is often not itself physical power. Ideals, as just noted, are outside the scope of logical demonstration, but they are not always beyond the reach of psychological persuasion. The pen and the tongue have been said to be mightier than the sword, because they have had the might to recruit swords wherewith to uphold the causes they championed in the final appeal to the sword. Real might, therefore, does not necessarily mean brute strength.

But these considerations lead us to a definition of justice or right which is little if any more agreeable to our ears than that according to which justice is the rule of the strongest—to the definition, namely, that justice is the rule of the most eloquent orators and the cleverest writers. Of course, one could say "most convincing" instead of most eloquent or cleverest, and then insist that the convincingness of a plea depends not merely on the skill of the advocate, but as much or more on the real accord of what he urges with the natural aspirations of the audience. And one could go on to say that there is then after all an intrinsic connection between fundamental human demands and might; for only the ideals which satisfy such de-

Digitized by Google

mands can attract to their sides swords enough to rule. But evidently the last statement must be supplemented and be made to read "swords enough, or *swords mighty enough.*" For it is not a question only of how many defenders are enlisted, but also a question of who they are. Men, we are told, are created equal, but it is to be feared that this can mean only Adam. As we all know, an intelligent and determined few, if they be highly organized, thoroughly disciplined, and led by some Napoleon, will defeat mere numbers every time and bring it to pass that their own human demands, and not those of the vanquished many, shall be regarded as "fundamental," and as the stuff out of which standards shall be made. Of contending ideals, that one becomes the standard of right and wrong which, by hook or crook, gathers to itself the mightiest champions. Sometimes their might springs from mere numbers, but just as often from the individual superiority in point of courage, intelligence, eloquence, circumstance, or what not, of the defenders. Cynical as it sounds, one must acknowledge that it is with that might as with money in our modern Babylons: the question is not, Where did you get it? but, Have you got it?

It would be futile to deny that there are conflicts of ideals, or that these conflicts unavoidably involve tragedies. But one might be tempted to argue that these tragedies at least tend to be short-lived. Man, one could point out, calls himself a rational animal, but actually he is such only when there is no occasion to be otherwise, which is seldom. For the most part he is a psychological animal, whose mind can be made over quickly for him. A conviction which he must cease to utter or to act upon is soon forgotten. A new law, which is called an outrage by the fathers, is not even called anything at all by the sons, but just obeyed without a thought. The opposition and resentment which any order of things imposed on men has to meet spring as often from prejudice, ignorance, and the inertia of established habits as from any intrinsic inferiority of it to the order it displaces. There are, indeed, a few things which

Digitized by Google

human beings at large cannot be taught to do without. Eating is one of them, and a mate, another. But after this the list becomes more and more tentative, and is in any case short. Any change in the order of things which does not really interfere with the items of that list soon gets itself accepted, and thus the tragedies tend to be short-lived. If, on the other hand, the code imposed on men by force is really unbearable, they die under it. And if, although galling, it falls short of that, it wakes them up, makes them think, and arms them with desperation. In short, it sows in them the seeds of might, while in the camp of the masters ease of life sows the seeds of weakness. Then, sooner or later, the balance of might shifts, and the abuse of might has corrected itself.

But all this really paints the picture in colors overbright. For, as often as not, what makes a tragedy short-lived is but another tragedy, which takes the stage with another set of actors. Again, that a code which is too hard tends to eliminate itself in the long run may be true; but that is small consolation to individuals, for the run of the individual is short. One might as well tell a man with a raging toothache that his grandchildren will certainly have found a way of avoiding toothaches! Let us rather confess the uselessness of attempting to minimize the suffering incident to the clash of ideals. That it involves numberless tragedies is a sad fact indeed, but a fact none the less. And the least disagreeable statement which the truth concerning the nature of justice finally appears to admit is that justice is the rule of the mightier ideal.

The most obvious of the avenues of escape which there seemed to be from the Thrasymachian position have now been examined, and, it seems to the writer, found to lead in each case back to that position itself. The import of it has indeed become clarified in the process, and its odiousness somewhat mitigated. But in its essence it remains unimpaired. There is left, however, one difficulty with it yet to be stated, which is more significant than any we have considered, and which is perhaps the ultimate

Digitized by Google

ground of the deep-rooted feeling that might has really nothing to do with the nature of right. That difficulty arises in connection with the question of the meaning to be given to the word "ruling," as applied to an ethical standard. When an anarchist kills a king, is it not the anarchist's standard which is then the ruling standard, if might is the test? For, if he did the act, he had the might needed to do it. If we exclude acts of habit or impulse, which obviously are not done with a standard in mind, and therefore do not involve a conflict of standards, it would then seem that no act can possibly be wrong. For if an act lacks the might to get performed, it is not performed. And if, on the other hand, it has that might, it gets performed and is then right by the standard which its very performance makes the ruling standard. One could, of course, meet this difficulty by means of a more or less arbitrary definition of "ruling" in empirical terms. Thus one could say that, of two competing standards, that one may be said to rule or prevail, the system of sanctions back of which is administered the more systematically and efficiently. And that is a matter of relative might. If most kings got killed by anarchists, and the anarchists mostly went unpunished, the anarchists' standard would be the ruling standard. But so long as the reverse is the case, the kings' standard is the ruling standard.

But, aside from the arbitrariness of defining "ruling" either thus in terms of the long run, or, no less, of the short, the answer misses the essential fact which would in any case remain, and to which the difficulty mentioned but directs our attention. That fact is, that *what constitutes a standard such is not its being obeyed, but its being used to judge by* (quite irrespective of whether the judgment rendered be that the act judged is right, or wrong) and that *each person may and does judge by whichever standard he pleases*. The same act is therefore equally right or wrong according to different standards; or, more accurately, in the absence of mention of the standard in terms of which a particular act is judged, the statement that the act is right (or

Digitized by Google

wrong) either is a purely *verbal* proposition, which can be made in advance of observation about any act whatever that is not merely impulsive; or else the statement is wholly unintelligible, for every judgment of right or wrong being essentially a judgment of the relation of an act to a standard, the particular standard used constitutes an intrinsic part of the very meaning of the proposition which formulates the judgment. "Right" indeed has an absolute meaning, in the sense that something remains invariant through all cases of the use of the term; and that absolute meaning is: meeting *some* ethical standard. But, with that meaning of "right" none but essentially verbal propositions can be constructed.[1]

However, the propositions of right which we ordinarily formulate are not meant as verbal propositions, and their truth or falsity is then wholly relative to the particular standard in terms of which they are interpreted. But which standard that is, is a wholly arbitrary matter. In other words, it is purely a matter of the taste of each person, and is not something that is in any way arguable at all. It is wholly beyond logic. And it is to this fact that the title of this paper alludes. The viewpoint at which one finds one's self as soon as that fact has been recognized is perhaps most adequately called liberalism, the essence of its insight being that every ethical standard is equally tenable, each being exactly on a level of logical arbitrariness with every other. That viewpoint, however, could equally well be termed relative absolutism, or absolute relativism; the first, in that propositions of "right" are absolutely true or false relatively to a given person as interpreter; the second, in that their truth or falsity is absolutely relative to who the interpreter happens to be.

[1] That is, although such propositions can have a given individual act as subject, they are nevertheless not in any case truly about the individual act as such, but always and essentially about it *qua* case-of-a-kind; thus, although the proposition is true of some given individual act, it is not false of any. Technically, this means that in the propositional function "X is a [non-impulsive] act, implies that X is right [i.e., is in conformity with some ethical standard]," X is only an *apparent* variable. Cf. Harold Chapman Brown, "The Logic of Mr. Russell," *Journal of Philosophy*, February 16, 1911.

Digitized by Google

It might indeed be objected that it is inaccurate to speak of "various possible interpretations" of a proposition; that what we truly have in the situation so described are various propositions, each of which is absolutely true or false as the case may be.[1] But this would be to confuse that which means with that which is meant; it would be to tell us that when we speak of a proposition, we are speaking of the import of a proposition. And that is not true. Assertions can be made concerning either the one or the other, and such assertions are distinct. A proposition is one thing, and the import of it is something else. The first is what means, the second what is meant.

It should, moreover, be noted that even when the standard to which a given proposition of "right" intends to refer is explicitly stated, and the truth of it thereby rendered susceptible of being tested, the import of the proposition is nevertheless not yet fully brought out. For, as merely so analyzed, the proposition is not differentiated from propositions which are like it in declaring that some concrete act is a case of a specified and defined kind, but unlike it in not being propositions of *valuation*, which propositions of "right" usually are meant to be. To differentiate between these two sorts of propositions it is necessary to say that the full import of the proposition, "This act is right," is: "This act is a case of kind K, *and the proponent approves acts of kind* K." If the italicized part were left out of the import of the proposition we should no longer have a *moral* judgment at all, but a purely *legalistic* judgment. And this would mean, legalistic in the odious sense of framed in terms of a law that is law merely by might, sometimes indicated by means of the cynical distinction between courts of law and courts of justice. But judgments of "right" are intended in most cases to be moral judgments; that is, they involve approval—the speaker's approval—and approval, so far as standards and not concrete cases are in question, is *free, individual*, and *ultimate;* i.e., as al-

[1] Cf. R. M. Blake, "A Criticism of Scepticism and Relativism," *Journal of Philosophy*, May 8, 1924, p. 270.

Digitized by Google

ready explained, it is wholly outside the scope of logical compulsion, and no less of physical.

What, we may now ask, does ethical liberalism mean in practice? It must be said at once that the liberalistic viewpoint can be maintained strictly in reflective contemplation only. It demands abstraction from, and the forgetting of, the fact that after all, in the world of action, one is a particular individual with positive preference for, and consequent allegiance to, certain ethical standards rather than others. As soon as one enters the life of action, one's attitude perforce ceases to be strictly liberalistic. Yet the calm of the liberalistic insight tempers the fanatical one-sidedness with which otherwise the earnest soul throws itself into such conflicts of ideals as it has to face. A perspective on one's self, a sense of the sacrificed values as well as of the won, a certain mild irony, go with the recollection that there is nothing theoretically to be said for the ideals which happen to be one's own, as against others. But also and no less, with the knowledge that there is nothing, either, to be said in favor of other ideals as against one's own, there goes a perspective on other men, a sense of the intrinsic worth of things, and a peculiar clearness of conscience in the service of one's standards, which constitute the other half of what may perhaps fairly be called the philosophical temper in the life of action.

UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON

Digitized by Google

THE GENESIS OF THE SELF AND SOCIAL CONTROL

GEORGE HERBERT MEAD

It is my desire to present an account of the appearance of the self in social behavior, and then to advert to some implications of such an account in their bearings upon social control.

The term "behavior" indicates the standpoint of what follows, that of a behavioristic psychology. There is an aspect of this psychology that calls for an emphasis which I think has not been sufficiently given it. It is not simply the objectivity of this psychology which has commended it. All recent psychology, in so far as it lays claim to a scientific approach, considers itself objective. But behavioristic psychology, coming in by the door of the study of animals lower than man, has perforce shifted its interest from psychical states to external conduct. Even when this conduct is followed into the central nervous system, it is not to find the correlate of the neurosis in a psychosis, but to complete the act, however distant this may be in space and time. This doctrine finds itself in sympathetic accord with recent realism and pragmatism, which places the so-called sensa and the significances of things in the object. While psychology has been turning to the act as a process, philosophic thought has been transferring contents that had been the subject-matter of earlier psychology from the field of states of consciousness to the objective world. Prebehavioristic psychology had a foot in two worlds. Its material was found in consciousness and in the world of physiology and physics. As long, however, as psychology was occupied with states of consciousness which constituted objects, there was an inevitable duplication. The whole physiological and physical apparatus could be stated in terms of states of consciousness, and solipsism hovered in the background. A psychology that is called upon to analyze the object into the

Digitized by Google

states of consciousness which it is studying may conceivably be an empirical science, but in so far its world is not the world of the other sciences. A behavioristic psychology, on the other hand, that is not responsible for the content of the object, becomes a science that is cognate with physiology and dynamics, and escapes the trail of the epistemological serpent.

I am not concerned with the philosophical justification of this attitude of behavioristic psychology; I merely wish to emphasize its inevitable tendency to deal with processes, that is, with acts, and to find its objects given in the world with which all science deals. From Descartes' time on, it has been a border state, lying between philosophy and the natural sciences, and has suffered the inconveniences which attend buffer states. Descartes' unambiguous and uncompromising division between an extended physical world, and an unextended world of thought, when it reached the pineal gland found itself in ambiguous territory, and only avoided compromise by leaving the relations of mind and body to the infinite power of his *deus ex machina*. The difficulties which have attended psychology's regulation of these relations have been only in part metaphysical. More fundamentally they have been logical. The natural sciences start pragmatically with a world that is there, within which a problem has arisen, and introduce hypothetical reconstructions only in so far as its solution demands them. They always have their feet upon the solid ground of unquestioned objects of observation and experiment, where Samuel Johnson placed his in his summary refutation of Berkeley's idealism. Speculative philosophy, beset with the problem of epistemology, found its problem in the nature and very existence of the world inside which the problems of the natural sciences appeared, and which furnished the test of its hypotheses. Thus psychology as a philosophic discipline carried the epistemological problem into the experience of the individual, but as a science located the problem in a given world which its epistemological problem could not accept as given. Between the two,

Digitized by Google

its sympathies have always been with the presuppositions and method of the natural sciences. On the one hand, as empirical science it has sought to regard the so-called consciousness of the individual as merely given in the sense of the objects of the natural sciences, but as states of consciousness were still regarded as cognitive, they had inevitably inherited the epistemological diathesis. On the other hand, as experimental science it was forced to place states of consciousness within or without the processes it was studying. Placing them in interactionism within the natural processes ran counter to the presuppositions of its scientific procedure, so that the prevailing attitude has been that of epiphenomenalism, an adaptation of Leibnitz' pre-established harmony and Spinoza's parallel attributes. They ran as harmless conscious shadows beside the physical and physiological processes with which science could come to immediate terms. But this proved but an unstable compromise. The conscious streak that accompanied the neuroses could answer only to sensing and thinking as processes; as qualities and significance of things, states of consciousness became hardly tolerable reduplications of things, except in the case of the secondary qualities. The molecular structure of things seemed to remove these from the hypothetical objects of physical science, and consciousness proved a welcome dumping-ground for them. This bifurcation of nature proves equally unsatisfactory. The horns and the hoofs go with the hide. States of contact experience have no better right to objective existence than those of distance experience. Psychology, however, has not been interested in these epistemological and metaphysical riddles, it has been simply irritated by them. It has shifted its interest to the processes, where phenomenalism is most harmless, appearing as physiological psychology, as functional psychology, as dynamic psychology, and has ignored the problems for which it had no care. The effect of this has been to give to the central nervous system a logical pre-eminence in the procedure and textbooks of psychology which is utterly unwarranted in the analysis of

Digitized by Google

the experience of the individual. The central nervous system has been unwittingly assimilated to the logical position of consciousness. It occupies only an important stage in the act, but we find ourselves locating the whole environment of the individual in its convolutions. It is small wonder, then, that behaviorism has been welcomed with unmistakable relief, for it has studied the conduct of animals in necessary ignoration of consciousness, and it has been occupied with the act as a whole, not as a nervous arc.

But the relief with which one turns to conduct and away from states of consciousness has not disposed of the problems involved in the ambiguous term "consciousness," even for the psychologist. Bergson's theory of perception was at least a step toward the clarification of this ambiguity. It recognizes that in so far as the content of the percept can be termed consciousness, it indicates a diminution of the reality of the object rather than an addition, and this diminution answers to the active interests of the organism, which are represented in the central nervous system by paths of possible response. These co-ordinated paths in some sense cut out the object of perception. The percept is relative to the perceiving individual, but relative to his active interest, not relative in the sense that its content is a state of his consciousness. It is at least meaningless to lodge the so-called sensuous characters of things in the cortex. When, however, Bergson suggests that certain of these qualities may be the condensation of vibrations, we seem again to be in the presence of qualities that are states of consciousness. Presumably the condensations, e.g., the actual quality of color, do not exist in the object, but in the condensing mind. However, Bergson's statement at least placed the central nervous system in the world of things, of percepts, on the one hand, and on the other placed the characters of things in pure perception in the things themselves; but the divorce of duration, as psychical, from a static intellectualized spatial world left a dichotomy which was functional only from the standpoint of a Bergsonian

Digitized by Google

metaphysics. Neo-realism undertook to return all the qualities of things to the things, over against a mind which was simply aware of the sensa. This simple, radical procedure left problems of a perception which was still cognitive in its nature, which a Critical Realism sought to solve by retreating to representative perception again. It remained for pragmatism to take the still more radical position that in immediate experience the percept stands over against the individual, not in a relation of awareness, but simply in that of conduct. Cognition is a process of finding out something that is problematical, not of entering into relation with a world that is there.

There is an ambiguity in the word "consciousness." We use it in the sense of "awareness," "consciousness of," and are apt to assume that in this sense it is coextensive with experience, that it covers the relation of the sentient organism to its environment in so far as the environment exists for the organism. We thus predicate of this existence of the environment for the organism the attitude of cognition on the part of the organism. The other use of consciousness to which I refer is in the sense of certain contents, to wit, the sense qualities of things, more especially the so-called secondary qualities, the affections of the body of the sentient organism, especially those that are pleasurable and painful, the contents of the images of memory and imagination, and of the activities of the organism, so far as they appear in its experience. There is another field, that of self-consciousness, to which I am not as yet referring. There is a common character which in varying degree belongs to all of these contents, that is, that these contents could not appear at all, or exactly as they do appear, in the experience of any other organism. They are in this sense private, though this privacy does not imply necessarily anything more than difference of access or of perspective on the part of the different organisms. If we take the pragmatic attitude, referred to above, consciousness in the first sense, that of awareness, would disappear from immediate experience, while the world that is there for the organism would

Digitized by Google

still be there. A particular organism would become conscious from this standpoint, that is, there would be a world that would exist for the organism, when the organism marked or plotted or, to use Bergson's term, canalized its environment in terms of its future conduct. For Bergson, a percept is an object of possible action for an organism, and it is the active relationship of the organism to the distant object that constitutes it an object. Bergson meets the difficulty that the organism can exercise no physical influence upon the distant object by his assumption that consciousness in this sense is in reality not an addition to the object, but an abstraction from all in the relation of the organism to the object which does not bear upon this action. There arises, then, a selected series of objects, determined by the active interests of the organism.

An environment thus arises for an organism through the selective power of an attention that is determined by its impulses that are seeking expression. This peculiar environment does not exist in the consciousness of the form as a separate milieu, but the consciousness of the organism consists in the fact that its future conduct outlines and defines its objects. In so far as the organization of one individual differs from that of others, it will have a private environment, though these differences may be called those of standpoint. They are objective differences. They exist in nature. The most fundamental phase of these differences is found in the determination of what the relativist calls a "consentient set," i.e., the selection of those objects which may all be considered as "here" with reference to the individual. It is this set, which is co-gredient with the individual, that constitutes an environment within which motion may take place. These perspectives of nature exist in nature, not in the consciousness of the organism as a stuff. In this relation of a peculiar environment for an individual, there is no implication of an awareness. All that is implied is that the ongoing activity of the individual form marks and defines its world for the form, which thus exists for it as it does not for

Digitized by Google

any other form. If this is called consciousness, a behavioristic psychology can state it in terms of conduct.

Consciousness in the second sense, that of a peculiar content or contents, implies relativity in another sense, in the sense of emergence, as this has been defined by Alexander, in *Space Time and the Deity*, and accepted by Lloyd Morgan, in *Emergent Evolution*. In evolution not only have new forms appeared, but new qualities or contents in experience. It is the sensitivities of forms that are the occasions for the appearance, in the worlds of these forms, of new characters of things, answering to all the senses, and new meanings answering to their new capacities for conduct. And these new characters and new meanings exist in nature as do the forms of physical objects, though they are relative to the sensitivities and capacities of the individual forms. If we drop awareness from immediate experience, Alexander's distinction between perception and enjoyment may be also dropped. This distinction lies between the awareness of perception of external objects and that of the experience of the individual in perception and his other processes. Pleased palates and irritated or suffering members are there in the same sense as other percepts or objects. And this is true also of straining muscles, of fearful objects, or a turned stomach, or an attractive thing, nor can we deny this sort of objectivity to imagery, because access to it is confined to the individual in whose world it appears. Part of this imagery fits into the world that is there, and is with great difficulty analyzed out. That which will not fit in becomes located in our pasts or in futures of varying degrees of definiteness.

If my friend enters the room, and I catch a glimpse of his face, the imagery of his face fills out the countenance, and I see him with his whole complement of features. The same imagery might have figured in my memory of last meeting him. Or it might have figured in the plan I entertained of calling, on the following evening. It belongs either to the passing present, or to the irrevocable past, or to the contingent future. This

Digitized by Google

imagery is for the percipient as objective as the so-called sense object. It may enter that object and be indistinguishable from it. Where it can be distinguished, however, it is recognized as having this private character; that is, while we assume that the color of the object perceived, even if it vary from eye to eye, is in some respects identical for all eyes in so far as the organs are alike, it is not assumed that the image which one has is there for other eyes, or imaginations. While this sole accessibility of imagery to the individual does not in itself render it less objective, it places it at the disposal of the individual, when he attains to a mind which it can furnish. The same is true of the other class of objects which in his experience is accessible only to him. I refer to the objects which the individual possesses from the inside, so to speak, the parts of his organism, especially as they are painful or pleasurable. In the so-called lower animals, there is no evidence that this private field is organized and used as the possession of a self. The passing present is neither extended into a memory series, nor into an anticipated future.

Imagery is but one phase of the presence of the past in the passing present. In the living form it appears as facility in the response, and in the selection of the stimulus, in selective discrimination, in the stimulus. Imagery emerges, in the sense of Alexander, as the content of the past in the stimulus, and as meaning in the response. Imagery and meaning are there in the objects as contents, before they become material for the mind, before the mind appears in conduct.

I have referred to the doctrine of relativity. More specifically, my reference was to formulation of the doctrine given in Professor Whitehead's three books, *The Principles of Natural Knowledge*, *The Concept of Nature*, and *The Principle of Relativity*. What I have had particularly in mind is Whitehead's recognition, as over against current Einsteinian doctrine, that if motion is to be accepted as an objective fact, we must also accept the existence in nature of so-called consentient sets at rest, determined by their relation to so-called percipient events.

Digitized by Google

The same events in nature appear in different consentient sets, as these events are ordered in different time systems, and this ordering in different time systems is dependent upon their relations to different percipient events. Motion in nature implies rest in nature. Rest in nature implies co-gredience, i.e., a persistent relation of here and there with reference to some individual, and it is this that determines the time system in accordance with which events are ordered. If rest is a fact in nature, we must conceive of it as stratified, to use Whitehead's term, by the different temporal perspectives of different individuals, though a group of individuals may have the same perspective; we must, however, remember that this is a stratification of nature not in a static space, but a nature whose extension is affected with a time dimension.

It is this conception of the existence in nature of consentient sets determined by their relations to percipient events that I wish to generalize so that it will cover the environment in relation to the living form, and the experienced world with reference to the experiencing individual. This is evidently only possible if we conceive life as a process and not a series of static physico-chemical situations, and if we regard experience as conduct or behavior, not as a series of conscious states. This I take to be the essence of Bergson's philosophy of change, in accordance with which our perceptual world is determined by the actions that are taking place. Conduct does cut out and fashion the objects upon which action is directed. It is only with reference to life as an ongoing process that the animal determines his habitat. The most convincing illustration can be found in the different presentation of the life of a community, in terms of a social statics, the statistical data of population and occupations and the like, or in terms of the actual lives of the different individuals who make up the community. In the latter case we realize that each individual has a world that differs in some degree from that of any other member of the same community, that he slices the events of the community life that are common

Digitized by Google

to all from a different angle from that of any other individual. In Whitehead's phrase, each individual stratifies the common life in a different manner, and the life of the community is the sum of all these stratifications, and all of these stratifications exist in nature. It is this recognition that takes psychology out of its isolation, as a science that deals with what is found in the mind of an individual, and makes of it the standpoint from which to approach reality as it is going on.

It is evident that a statement of the life of each individual in terms of the results of an analysis of that which is immediately experienced would offer a common plane of events, in which the experience of each would differ from the experiences of others only in their extent, and the completeness or incompleteness of their connections. These differences disappear in the generalized formulations of the social sciences. The experiences of the same individuals, in so far as each faces a world in which objects are plans of action, would implicate in each a different succession of events. In the simplest illustration, two persons approach a passing automobile. To one it is a moving object that he will pass before it reaches the portion of the street that is the meeting-place of their two paths. The other sees an object that will pass this meeting-point before he reaches it. Each slices the world from the standpoint of a different time system. Objects which in a thousand ways are identical for the two individuals, are yet fundamentally different through their location in one spatio-temporal plane, involving a certain succession of events, or in another. Eliminate the temporal dimension, and bring all events back to an instant that is timeless, and the individuality of these objects which belongs to them in behavior is lost, except in so far as they can represent the results of past conduct. But taking time seriously, we realize that the seemingly timeless character of our spatial world and its permanent objects is due to the consentient set which each one of us selects. We abstract time from this space for the purposes of our conduct. Certain objects cease to be events, cease to pass

Digitized by Google

as they are in reality passing and in their permanence become the conditions of our action, and events take place with reference to them. Because a whole community selects the same consentient set does not make the selection less the attitude of each one of them. The life-process takes place in individual organisms, so that the psychology which studies that process in its creative determining function becomes a science of the objective world.

Looked at from the standpoint of an evolutionary history, not only have new forms with their different spatio-temporal environments and their objects arisen, but new characters have arisen answering to the sensitivities and capacities for response. In the terms of Alexander, they have become differently qualitied. It is as impossible to transfer these characters of the habitats to the consciousness of the forms as it is to transfer the spatio-temporal structure of the things to such a so-called consciousness. If we introduce a fictitious instantaneousness into a passing universe, things fall to pieces. Things that are spatio-temporally distant from us can be brought into this instant only in terms of our immediate contact experience. They are what they would be if we were there and had our hands upon them. They take on the character of tangible matter. This is the price of their being located at the moment of our bodies' existence. But this instantaneous view has the great advantage of giving to us a picture of what the contact experience will be when we reach the distant object, and of determining conditions under which the distance characters arise. If the world existed at an instant in experience, we should be forced to find some realm such as consciousness into which to transport the distance or so-called secondary qualities of things. If consciousness in evolutionary history, then, has an unambiguous significance, it refers to that stage in the development of life in which the conduct of the individual marks out and defines the future field and objects which make up its environment, and in which emerge characters in the objects and sensitivities in the

Digitized by Google

individuals that answer to each other. There is a relativity of the living individual and its environment, both as to form and content.

What I wish to trace is the fashion in which self and the mind has arisen within this conduct.

It is the implication of this undertaking that only selves have minds, that is, that cognition only belongs to selves, even in the simplest expression of awareness. This, of course, does not imply that below the stage of self-consciousness sense characters and sensitivity do not exist. This obtains in our own immediate experience in so far as we are not self-conscious. It is further implied that this development has taken place only in a social group, for selves exist only in relation to other selves, as the organism as a physical object exists only in its relation to other physical objects. There have been two fields within which social groups have arisen which have determined their environment together with that of their members, and the individuality of its members. These lie in the realm of the invertebrates and in that of the vertebrates. Among the Hymenoptera and termites there are societies whose interests determine for the individuals their stimuli and habitats, and so differentiate the individuals themselves, mainly through the sexual and alimentary processes, that the individual is what he is because of his membership within those societies. In the complex life of the group, the acts of the individuals are completed only through the acts of other individuals, but the mediation of this complex conduct is found in the physiological differentiation of the different members of the society. As Bergson has remarked of the instincts, the implements by which a complex act is carried out are found in the differentiated structure of the form. There is no convincing evidence that an ant or a bee is obliged to anticipate the act of another ant or bee, by tending to respond in the fashion of the other, in order that it may integrate its activity into the common act. And by the same mark there is no evidence of the existence of any language in their societies. Nor do we need to

Digitized by Google

go to the invertebrates to discover this type of social conduct. If one picks up a little child who has fallen, he adapts his arms and attitude to the attitude of the child, and the child adapts himself to the attitude of the other; or in boxing or fencing one responds to stimulus of the other, by acquired physiological adjustment.

Among the vertebrates, apart from the differentiation of the sexes and the nurture and care of infant forms, there is little or no inherited physiological differentiation to mediate the complexities of social conduct. If we are to co-operate successfully with others, we must in some manner get their ongoing acts into ourselves to make the common act come off. As I have just indicated, there is a small range of social activity in which this is not necessary. The suckling of an infant form, or a dog fight, if this may be called a social activity, does not call for more than inherited physiological adjustment. Perhaps the so-called herding instinct should be added, but it hardly comes to more than the tendency of the herd to stick together in their various activities. The wooing and mating of forms, the care of the infant form, the bunching of animals in migrations, and fighting, about exhaust vertebrate social conduct, and beyond these seasonal processes vertebrate societies hardly exist till we reach man. They exhaust the possibilities in vertebrate structure of the mediation of social conduct, for the vertebrate organism has shown no such astonishing plasticity in physiological differentiation as that which we can trace among the insects, from isolated forms to members of the societies of the termites, the ants, and the bees.

A social act may be defined as one in which the occasion or stimulus which sets free an impulse is found in the character or conduct of a living form that belongs to the proper environment of the living form whose impulse it is. I wish, however, to restrict the social act to the class of acts which involve the cooperation of more than one individual, and whose object as defined by the act, in the sense of Bergson, is a social object. I

Digitized by Google

mean by a social object one that answers to all the parts of the complex act, though these parts are found in the conduct of different individuals. The objective of the act is then found in the life-process of the group, not in those of the separate individuals alone. The full social object would not exist in the environments of the separate individuals of the societies of the Hymenoptera and termites, nor in the restricted societies of the vertebrates whose basis is found alone in physiological adjustment. A cow that licks the skin of a calf stuffed with hay, until the skin is worn away, and then eats the hay, or a woman who expends her parental impulse upon a poodle, cannot be said to have the full social object involved in the entire act in their environments. It would be necessary to piece together the environments of the different individuals or superimpose them upon each other to reach the environment and objects of the societies in question.

Where forms such as those of the Hymenoptera and the termites exhibit great plasticity in development, social acts based on physiological adjustment, and corresponding societies, have reached astonishing complexity. But when the limit of that plasticity is reached, the limit of the social act and the society is reached also. Where, as among the vertebrates, that physiological adjustment which mediates a social act is limited and fixed, the societies of this type are correspondingly insignificant. But another type of social act, and its corresponding society and object, has been at least suggested by the description of the social act based upon physiological adjustment. Such an act would be one in which the different parts of the act which belong to different individuals should appear in the act of each individual. This cannot mean, however, that the single individual could carry out the entire act, for then, even if it were possible, it would cease to be a social act, nor could the stimulus which calls out his own part of the complex act be that which calls out the other parts of the act in so far as they appear in his conduct. If the social object is to appear in his experience, it must

Digitized by Google

be that the stimuli which set free the responses of the others involved in the act should be present in his experience, not as stimuli to his response, but as stimuli for the responses of others; and this implies that the social situation which arises after the completion of one phase of the act, which serves as the stimulus for the next participant in the complex procedure, shall in some sense be in the experience of the first actor, tending to call out, not his own response, but that of the succeeding actor. Let us make the impossible assumption that the wasp, in stinging a spider which it stores with its egg, finds in the spider a social object in the sense which I have specified. The spider would have to exist in the experience of the wasp as live but quiescent food for the larva when it emerges from the egg. In order that the paralyzed spider should so appear to the wasp, the wasp would need to be subject to the same stimulus as that which sets free the response of the larva; in other words, the wasp would need to be able to respond in some degree as the larva. And of course the wasp would have to view the spider under the time dimension, grafting a hypothetical future onto its passing present, but the occasion for this would have to lie in the wasp's tending to respond in rôle of larva to the appropriate food which it is placing in storage. This, then, presents another possible principle of social organization, as distinguished from that of physiological differentiation. If the objects that answer to the complex social act can exist spatio-temporally in the experience of the different members of the society, as stimuli that set free not only their own responses, but also as stimuli to the responses of those who share in the composite act, a principle of co-ordination might be found which would not depend upon physiological differentiation. And one necessary psychological condition for this would be that the individual should have in some fashion present in his organism the tendencies to respond as the other participants in the act will respond. Much more than this would be involved, but this at least would be a necessary precondition. A social object answering to the responses of dif-

Digitized by Google

ferent individuals in a society could be conceived of as existing in the experiences of individuals in that society, if the different responses of these individuals in the complex acts could be found in sufficient degree in the natures of separate individuals to render them sensitive to the different values of the object answering to the parts of the act.

The cortex of the vertebrate central nervous system provides at least a part of the mechanism which might make this possible. The nervous currents from the column and the stem of the brain to the cortex can there bring the acts that go out from these lower centers into relation with each other so that more complex processes and adjustments can arise. The centers and paths of the cortex represent an indefinite number of possible actions; particularly they represent acts which, being in competition with each other, inhibit each other, and present the problem of organization and adjustment so that overt conduct may proceed. In the currents and cross-currents in the gray matter and its association fibers, there exist the tendencies to an indefinite number of responses. Answering to these adjustments are the objects organized into a field of action, not only spatially but temporally; for the tendency to grasp the distant object, while already excited, is so linked with the processes of approach that it does not get its overt expression till the intervening stretch is passed. In this vertebrate apparatus of conduct, then, the already excited predispositions to thousands of acts, that far transcend the outward accomplishments, furnish the inner attitudes implicating objects that are not immediate objectives of the individual's act.

But the cortex is not simply a mechanism. It is an organ that exists in fulfilling its function. If these tendencies to action which do not get immediate expression appear and persist, it is because they belong to the act that is going on. If, for example, property is a social object in the experience of men, as distinguished from the nut which the squirrel stores, it is because features of the food that one buys innervate the whole complex

Digitized by Google

of responses by which property is not only acquired, but respected and protected, and this complex so innervated is an essential part of the act by which the man buys and stores his food. The point is not that buying food is a more complicated affair than picking it up from the ground, but that exchange is an act in which a man excites himself to give by making an offer. An offer is what it is because the presentation is a stimulus to give. One cannot exchange otherwise than by putting one's self in the attitude of the other party to the bargain. Property becomes a tangible object, because all essential phases of property appear in the actions of all those involved in exchange, and appear as essential features of the individual's action.

The individual in such an act is a self. If the cortex has become an organ of social conduct, and has made possible the appearance of social objects, it is because the individual has become a self, that is, an individual who organizes his own response by the tendencies on the part of others to respond to his act. He can do this because the mechanism of the vertebrate brain enables the individual to take these different attitudes in the formation of the act. But selves have appeared late in vertebrate evolution. The structure of the central nervous system is too minute to enable us to show the corresponding structural changes in the paths of the brain. It is only in the behavior of the human animal that we can trace this evolution. It has been customary to mark this stage in development by endowing man with a mind, or at least with a certain sort of mind. As long as consciousness is regarded as a sort of spiritual stuff out of which are fashioned sensations and affections and images and ideas or significances, a mind as a locus of these entities is an almost necessary assumption, but when these contents have been returned to things, the necessity of quarters for this furniture has disappeared also.

It lies beyond the bounds of this paper to follow out the implications of this shift for logic and epistemology, but there is one phase of all so-called mental processes which is central

Digitized by Google

to this discussion, and that is self-consciousness. If the suggestions which I have made above should prove tenable, the self that is central to all so-called mental experience has appeared only in the social conduct of human vertebrates. It is just because the individual finds himself taking the attitudes of the others who are involved in his conduct that he becomes an object for himself. It is only by taking the rôles of others that we have been able to come back to ourselves. We have seen above that the social object can exist for the individual only if the various parts of the whole social act carried out by other members of the society are in some fashion present in the conduct of the individual. It is further true that the self can exist for the individual only if he assumes the rôles of the others. The presence in the conduct of the individual of the tendencies to act as others act may be, then, responsible for the appearance in the experience of the individual of a social object, i.e., an object answering to complex reactions of a number of individuals, and also for the appearance of the self. Indeed, these two appearances are correlative. Property can appear as an object only in so far as the individual stimulates himself to buy by a prospective offer to sell. Buying and selling are involved in each other. Something that can be exchanged can exist in the experience of the individual only in so far as he has in his own make-up the tendency to sell when he has also the tendency to buy. And he becomes a self in his experience only in so far as one attitude on his own part calls out the corresponding attitude in the social undertaking.

This is just what we imply in "self-consciousness." We appear as selves in our conduct in so far as we ourselves take the attitude that others take toward us, in these correlative activities. Perhaps as good an illustration of this as can be found is in a "right." Over against the protection of our lives or property, we assume the attitude of assent of all members in the community. We take the rôle of what may be called the "generalized other." And in doing this we appear as social objects, as

Digitized by Google

selves. It is interesting to note that in the development of the individual child, there are two stages which present the two essential steps in attaining self-consciousness. The first stage is that of play, and the second that of the game, where these two are distinguished from each other. In play in this sense, the child is continually acting as a parent, a teacher, a preacher, a grocery man, a policeman, a pirate, or an Indian. It is the period of childish existence which Wordsworth has described as that of "endless imitation." It is the period of Froebel's kindergarten plays. In it, as Froebel recognized, the child is acquiring the rôles of those who belong to his society. This takes place because the child is continually exciting in himself the responses to his own social acts. In his infant dependence upon the responses of others to his own social stimuli, he is peculiarly sensitive to this relation. Having in his own nature the beginning of the parental response, he calls it out by his own appeals. The doll is the universal type of this, but before he plays with a doll, he responds in tone of voice and in attitude as his parents respond to his own cries and chortles. This has been denominated imitation, but the psychologist now recognizes that one imitates only in so far as the so-called imitated act can be called out in the individual by his appropriate stimulation. That is, one calls or tends to call out in himself the same response that he calls out in the other.

The play antedates the game. For in a game there is a regulated procedure, and rules. The child must not only take the rôle of the other, as he does in the play, but he must assume the various rôles of all the participants in the game, and govern his action accordingly. If he plays first base, it is as the one to whom the ball will be thrown from the field or from the catcher. Their organized reactions to him he has imbedded in his own playing of the different positions, and this organized reaction becomes what I have called the "generalized other" that accompanies and controls his conduct. And it is this generalized other in his experience which provides him with a self. I can only

Digitized by Google

refer to the bearing of this childish play attitude upon so-called sympathetic magic. Primitive men call out in their own activity some simulacrum of the response which they are seeking from the world about. They are children crying in the night.

The mechanism of this implies that the individual who is stimulating others to response is at the same time arousing in himself the tendencies to the same reactions. Now, that in a complex social act which serves as the stimulus to another individual to his response is not as a rule fitted to call out the tendency to the same response in the individual himself. The hostile demeanor of one animal does not frighten the animal himself, presumably. Especially in the complex social reactions of the ants or termites or the bees, the part of the act of one form which does call out the appropriate reaction of another can hardly be conceived of as arousing a like reaction in the form in question, for here the complex social act is dependent upon physiological differentiation, such an unlikeness in structure exists that the same stimulus could not call out like responses. For such a mechanism as has been suggested, it is necessary to find first of all some stimulus in the social conduct of the members of an authentic group that can call out in the individual, that is responsible for it, the same response that it calls out in the other; and in the second place, the individuals in the group must be of such like structure that the stimulus will have the same value for one form that it has for the other. Such a type of social stimulus is found in the vocal gesture in a human society. The term gesture I am using to refer to that part of the act or attitude of one individual engaged in a social act which serves as the stimulus to another individual to carry out his part of the whole act. Illustrations of gestures, so defined, may be found in the attitudes and movements of others to which we respond in passing them in a crowd, in the turning of the head toward the glance of another's eye, in the hostile attitude assumed over against a threatening gesture, in the thousand and one different attitudes which we assume toward different modulations of the

Digitized by Google

human voice, or in the attitudes and suggestions of movements in boxers or fencers, to which responses are so nicely adjusted. It is to be noted that the attitudes to which I have referred are but stages in the act as they appear to others, and include expressions of countenance, positions of the body, changes in breathing rhythm, outward evidence of circulatory changes, and vocal sounds. In general these so-called gestures belong to the beginning of the overt act, for the adjustments of others to the social process are best made early in the act. Gestures are, then, the early stages in the overt social act to which other forms involved in the same act respond. Our interest is in finding gestures which can affect the individual that is responsible for them in the same manner as that in which they affect other individuals. The vocal gesture is at least one that assails our ears who make it in the same physiological fashion as that in which it affects others. We hear our own vocal gestures as others hear them. We may see or feel movements of our hands as others see or feel them, and these sights and feels have served in the place of the vocal gestures in the case of those who are congenitally deaf or deaf and blind. But it has been the vocal gesture that has pre-eminently provided the medium of social organization in human society. It belongs historically to the beginning of the act, for it arises out of the change in breathing rhythm that accompanies the preparation for sudden action, those actions to which other forms must be nicely adjusted.

If, then, a vocal gesture arouses in the individual who makes it a tendency to the same response that it arouses in another, and this beginning of an act of the other in himself enters into his experience, he will find himself tending to act toward himself as the other acts toward him. In our self-conscious experience we understand what he does or says. The possibility of this entering into his experience we have found in the cortex of the human brain. There the co-ordinations answering to an indefinite number of acts may be excited, and while holding each other in check enter into the neural process of adjustment which

Digitized by Google

leads to the final overt conduct. If one pronounces and hears himself pronounce the word "table," he has aroused in himself the organized attitudes of his response to that object, in the same fashion as that in which he has aroused it in another. We commonly call such an aroused organized attitude an idea, and the ideas of what we are saying accompany all of our significant speech. If we may trust to the statement in one of St. Paul's epistles, some of the saints spoke with tongues which had no significance to them. They made sounds which called out no response in those that made them. The sounds were without meaning. Where a vocal gesture uttered by one individual leads to a certain response in another, we may call it a symbol of that act; where it arouses in the man who makes it the tendency to the same response, we may call it a significant symbol. These organized attitudes which we arouse in ourselves when we talk to others are, then, the ideas which we say are in our minds, and in so far as they arouse the same attitudes in others, they are in their minds, in so far as they are self-conscious in the sense in which I have used that term. But it is not necessary that we should talk to another to have these ideas. We can talk to ourselves, and this we do in the inner forum of what we call thought. We are in possession of selves just in so far as we can and do take the attitudes of others toward ourselves and respond to those attitudes. We approve of ourselves and condemn ourselves. We pat ourselves upon the back and in blind fury attack ourselves. We assume the generalized attitude of the group, in the censor that stands at the door of our imagery and inner conversations, and in the affirmation of the laws and axioms of the universe of discourse. *Quod semper, quod ubique.* Our thinking is an inner conversation in which we may be taking the rôles of specific acquaintances over against ourselves, but usually it is with what I have termed the "generalized other" that we converse, and so attain to the levels of abstract thinking, and that impersonality, that so-called objectivity that we cherish. In this fashion, I conceive, have selves arisen in human behavior

Digitized by Google

and with the selves their minds. It is an interesting study, that of the manner in which the self and its mind arises in every child, and the indications of the corresponding manner in which it arose in primitive man. I cannot enter into a discussion of this. I do wish, however, to refer to some of the implications of this conception of the self for the theory of social control.

I wish to recur to the position, taken earlier in this paper, that, if we recognize that experience is a process continually passing into the future, objects exist in nature as the patterns of our actions. If we reduce the world to a fictitious instantaneous present, all objects fall to pieces. There is no reason to be found, except in an equally fictitious mind, why any lines should be drawn about any group of physical particles, constituting them objects. However, no such knife-edge present exists. Even in the so-called specious present there is a passage, in which there is succession, and both past and future are there, and the present is only that section in which, from the standpoint of action, both are involved. When we take this passage of nature seriously, we see that the object of perception is the existent future of the act. The food is what the animal will eat, and his refuge is the burrow where he will escape from his pursuer. Of course the future is, as future, contingent. He may not escape, but in nature it exists there as the counterpart of his act. So far as there are fixed relations there, they are of the past, and the object involves both, but the form that it has arises from the ongoing act. Evolutionary biology, in so far as it is not mere physics and chemistry, proceeds perhaps unwittingly upon this assumption, and so does social science in so far as it is not static. Its objects are in terms of the habitat, the environment. They are fashioned by reactions. I am merely affirming the existence of these objects, affirming them as existent in a passing universe answering to acts.

In so far as there are social acts, there are social objects, and I take it that social control is bringing the act of the individual into relation with this social object. With the control of the

Digitized by Google

object over the act, we are abundantly familiar. Just because the object is the form of the act, in this character it controls the expression of the act. The vision of the distant object is not only the stimulus to movement toward it. It is also, in its changing distance values, a continual control of the act of approach. The contours of the object determine the organization of the act of its seizure, but in this case the whole act is in the individual and the object is in his field of experience. Barring a breakdown in the structure or function, the very existence of the object insures its control of the act. In the social act, however, the act is distributed among a number of individuals. While there is or may be an object answering to each part of the act, existing in the experience of each individual, in the case of societies dependent upon physiological differentiation the whole object does not exist in the experience of any individual. The control may be exercised through the survival of those physiological differentiations that still carry out the life-process involved in the complex act. No complication of the act which did not mediate this could survive. Or we may take refuge in a controlling factor in the act, as does Bergson, but this is not the situation that interests us. The human societies in which we are interested are societies of selves. The human individual is a self only in so far as he takes the attitude of another toward himself. In so far as this attitude is that of a number of others, and in so far as he can assume the organized attitudes of a number that are co-operating in a common activity, he takes the attitudes of the group toward himself, and in taking this or these attitudes he is defining the object of the group, that which defines and controls the response. Social control, then, will depend upon the degree to which the individual does assume the attitudes of those in the group who are involved with him in his social activities. In the illustration already used, the man who buys controls his purchase from the standpoint of a value in the object that exists for him only in so far as he takes the attitude of a seller as well as a buyer. Value exists as an object only for individuals

Digitized by Google

within whose acts in exchange are present those attitudes which belong to the acts of the others who are essential to the exchange.

The act of exchange becomes very complicated; the degree to which all the essential acts involved in it enter into the acts of all those engaged therein varies enormously, and the control which the object, i.e., the value, exercises over the acts varies proportionately. The Marxian theory of state ownership of capital, i.e., of exclusive state production, is a striking illustration of the breakdown of such control. The social object, successful economic production, as presented in this theory, fails to assume the attitudes of individual initiative which successful economic production implies. Democratic government, on the theory of action through universal interest in the issues of a campaign, breaks down as a control, and surrenders the government largely to the political machine, whose object more nearly answers to the attitudes of the voters and the non-voters.

Social control depends, then, upon the degree to which the individuals in society are able to assume the attitudes of the others who are involved with them in common endeavor. For the social object will always answer to the act developing itself in self-consciousness. Besides property, all of the institutions are such objects, and serve to control individuals who find in them the organization of their own social responses.

The individual does not, of course, assume the attitudes of the numberless others who are in one way or another implicated in his social conduct, except in so far as the attitudes of others are uniform under like circumstances. One assumes, as I have said, the attitudes of generalized others. But even with this advantage of the universal over the multiplicity of its numberless instances, the number of different responses that enter into our social conduct seems to defy any capacity of any individual to assume the rôles which would be essential to define our social objects. And yet, though modern life has become indefinitely more complex than it was in earlier periods of human

Digitized by Google

history, it is far easier for the modern man than for his predecessor to put himself in the place of those who contribute to his necessities, who share with him the functions of government, or join with him in determining prices. It is not the number of participants, or even the number of different functions, that is of primary importance. The important question is whether these various forms of activities belong so naturally to the member of a human society that, in taking the rôle of another, his activities are found to belong to one's own nature. As long as the complexities of human society do not exceed those of the central nervous system, the problem of an adequate social object, which is identical with that of an adequate self-consciousness, is not that of becoming acquainted with the indefinite number of acts that are involved in social behavior, but that of so overcoming the distances in space and time, and the barriers of language and convention and social status, that we can converse with ourselves in the rôles of those who are involved with us in the common undertaking of life. A journalism that is insatiably curious about the human attitudes of all of us is the sign of the times. The other curiosities as to the conditions under which other people live, and work, and fight each other, and love each other, follow from the fundamental curiosity which is the passion of self-consciousness. We must be others if we are to be ourselves. The modern realistic novel has done more than technical education in fashioning the social object that spells social control. If we can bring people together so that they can enter into each other's lives, they will inevitably have a common object, which will control their common conduct.

The task, however, is enormous enough, for it involves not simply breaking down passive barriers such as those of distance in space and time and vernacular, but those fixed attitudes of custom and status in which our selves are imbedded. Any self is a social self, but it is restricted to the group whose rôles it assumes, and it will never abandon this self until it finds itself entering into the larger society and maintaining itself there.

Digitized by Google

The whole history of warfare between societies and within societies shows how much more readily and with how much greater emotional thrill we realize our selves in opposition to common enemies than in collaboration with them. All over Europe, and more specifically at Geneva, we see nationals with great distrust and constant rebounds trying to put themselves in each other's places and still preserve the selves that have existed upon enmities, that they may reach the common ground where they may avoid the horror of war, and meliorate unendurable economic conditions. A Dawes Plan is such a social object, coming painfully into existence, that may control the conflicting interests of hostile communities, but only if each can in some degree put himself in the other's place in operating it. The World Court and the League of Nations are other such social objects that sketch out common plans of action if there are national selves that can realize themselves in the collaborating attitudes of others.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Digitized by Google

AGE AND YOUTH IN SOCIAL ETHICS

VICTOR S. YARROS

It is generally assumed that there is an "irrepressible conflict" between parents and children, or age and youth. Poets, essayists, novelists, moralists have written much on this dramatic theme, and perhaps never more positively or feelingly than during the great world-war and the unsatisfactory peace that followed it. Youth has charged age with heartlessness and cruelty, with greed and commercialism, with cynicism and contempt for spiritual values. We have been told that "old men make wars and young men do the fighting"—with all the tragic waste and sacrifice inseparable from armed conflicts. We have been told that old men control the foreign offices and diplomatic relations of states, and that their vanity, selfishness, callousness, and arrogance are responsible for most, if not all, of the contentions and animosities that beget war between nations. Youth has been urged, if not to overthrow the rule of age, at least to demand due recognition for itself and a fair share of authority and influence in public life, in order that idealism, generosity, pity, sympathy, and faith may find expression in national and international policies. Youth has been advised to revolt in literature and art against the pedantry, dogmatism, and intolerance of age, against Puritanism, hypocrisy, Grundyism, obscurantism. Youth occasionally has revolted—and with results presently to be discussed.

In view of the foregoing facts it may seem rash to put the blunt question whether there is any basis in history or in human experience for the assumption that there is an irrepressible conflict between age and youth. But one bold writer not only has asked that question; he has answered it in the negative. That answer should have caused—perhaps has caused—much

Digitized by Google

heart-searching among the young. It certainly must have given considerable satisfaction to the old.

The *New Statesman*, of London, the ablest and most level-headed of radical socialist weeklies, in a lengthy editorial on the age-youth question, wrote in part as follows:

> There are many people who cannot mention the word "youth" without conjuring up a sentimental picture of a young man, his eyes bright with idealism, his lips touched with prophetic fire—a flushed Shelley putting on a pair of seven-league boots in order to walk between luncheon and tea to the New Jerusalem. There are undoubtedly young men and women faintly resembling this picture, but they are not average young men and women. . . . . Wordsworth observed with considerable wisdom that the child is father of the man. He might have gone farther and said that the young man is father of the old man. The nice people mostly begin being nice in the nursery; the nasty people are nasty from nine till ninety. There are exceptions who improve or deteriorate with time; but the ordinary octogenarian has changed little in character since he was taken out of his cradle. . . . .
>
> Has there ever been an indictment of either youth or age, except a playful one, that was worth the paper it was printed on? The logical pessimist can indict both of them in a general scarification of the human race, but he can only indict one of them at the expense of the other by omitting all its distinctive and compensating virtues.
>
> It would be a melancholy thing if, when the fatal thirty had struck, we had nothing to look forward to but a slow decline. By thirty-five we should be sinking into regret for the irrecoverable past instead of looking forward with that cheerfulness that enables men to go on doing their best work.

Words of soberness, truth, and common sense, these! It is impossible to refute or challenge successfully the view expressed in the quotation. How, then, did the notion originate that youth is nobler, more idealistic, and more generous than age? How does it happen that so much nonsense has been written by gifted and thoughtful men on a non-existent problem?

Perhaps if we examine a few of the well-known books in which the alleged irrepressible conflict is exemplified, or portrayed, we may hit upon a solution of the riddle.

Digitized by Google

Take Turgenev's famous novel, *Fathers and Children*. It is considered to be a classic in the branch of literature we are discussing. It depicts in dramatic fashion the conflict between youth and age, radicalism and conservatism. But, as a matter of fact, neither the parents nor the children are representative types. The literary merits of the novel are great, but as a thesis or tendency story it is a failure. The hero is a social and moral "sport," an exceptional character. He fails to illustrate his own professed convictions. He claims to be a "Nihilist"—Turgenev invented that term—a materialist, an atheist, an enemy of all conventions and prejudices. He is ashamed of sentiment. He is at war with his parents, his society, his state. He scoffs at ideals, religious or ethical, and swears by exact science. And what does he make of his life? He sacrifices it in an absurd duel fought over a more absurd quarrel. His parents and relatives, on the other hand, are extremely conventional people who cannot be said to represent any intellectual ideas or philosophy of life.

Or take that remarkable book, *Father and Son*, by Edmund Gosse. Here, indeed, conflict is significantly portrayed—conflict between orthodoxy and liberalism, or heterodoxy, in religion. The father in this story is a commanding figure who inspires respect, if not sympathy. Mr. Gosse is rather harsh in the judgment he passes on his father, making little allowance for his sincerity, his hatred of sin, his conception of duty to his own family and to his Creator. But that is beside the point. The conflict in such cases is painful and often tragic, but is it a conflict between age and youth, or youth and age?

The same question may be asked after reading John Muir's *My Boyhood*, or Arthur Symons' *Preface to Life*. Both of these attractive personalities write movingly of their struggles and discontents in early life under the paternal roof, of their revolt against dogmatism, unlovely "goodness" and virtue, intolerance of skepticism and independent thought.

Digitized by Google

What most autobiographers and biographers who describe conflicts between fathers and sons over religion, or over moral standards, or over conceptions of law, government, property, fail to note, however, is the important fact that such domestic misunderstandings and clashes are mere incidents and episodes in a great social conflict in which old and young fight side by side in each of the camps and armies engaged. When father and son, or mother and daughter, happen to be in mutual opposition, domestic drama ensues. But there never has been a conflict between all or most of the parents, on the one side, and all or most of the sons, on the other. Never in history was age as such at war with youth as such in the realm of ideas and principles.

The conflict is always between conservatives of all physical stages and ages, and radicals of all stages and ages. No idea can be named, no matter how reactionary it may be, which is not ardently espoused by hosts of young men and young women. As to the radical, progressive, revolutionary movements known to us, or to history, the incontestable fact is that the intellectual leaders and practical pioneers in most of them, if not in all, have been men of mature or advanced age. In our own day, for example, Lenin, Trotzky, Tchitcherin, and their colleagues in the Russian soviet government are not young men, but men of middle age, and the strange Fascisto movement in Italy, as striking in its way as the Bolshevist adventure, is likewise led and inspired by men of mature years. In Great Britain, where the old "Manchester" liberalism is supposed to be dead and the future is said to belong to the Labor Party, or to a modified and reasonable variety of socialism, who are the new leaders, the guides and directors of strategy and tactics? Young men and women? No. Persons of middle and advanced age—Webb, Shaw, Olivier, McDonald, Snowden, Cole, Thomas, Henderson, Lawrence, Mrs. Bonfield, Clyne, et al. And if we assume, on the other hand, that there is hope in the advanced wing of the Liberal

Digitized by Google

party, which favors co-operation if not coalition with labor, who are the authoritative exponents of the new, progressive liberalism? Again, the answer is, men of middle age—Sir John Simon, Keynes, Masterman, Massingham, Spender, Hobhouse, Gardiner.

Nor is this age exceptional in respect of the maturity of its intellectual and politico-social leadership. Glance at the names of the radical and revolutionary leaders of the nineteenth century—Fourier, Owen, Marx, Bakunin, Blanc, Proudhon, Kropotkin, Reclus, Hyndman, Henry George. Not one of these men was young when he conceived and promulgated his particular economic or social gospel. Each of them, however, influenced a host of young men and women, and some of them continue to influence young men and women. Indeed, in all but a few instances the young radical Hotspurs echo and repeat the teachings of maturity and age; so that when they clamor for power and for the seats of the mighty they really clamor for a chance to carry out the mandates of age! Their terrible ideas are not their own; they have not felt or lived them; they have borrowed them from elderly writers. Thus the authority appealed to by embattled youth is, after all, crabbed age!

Antiquity, the Middle Ages, the Renascence period, in short every age, yield the same testimony. Socrates, Plato, Zeno, St. Paul, Luther, Erasmus, Bacon, Kant, Comte, Renan, Darwin, Spencer, Tyndall, Haeckel, Bergson, William James—all these innovators and founders of schools were mature or old men when they gave the world the fruits of their intellectual labors and patient research.

But enough on this point. The evidence is superabundant that there is no conflict, and that there never has been one, between the old as such and the young as such.

Some young writers have grudgingly acknowledged this fact, and have sought justification for the crusade of youth against age in the alleged discovery that youth is not a question of

Digitized by Google

years but of spirit, temper, and congenital bent. Thus it is asserted that only youth is capable of great, vital, original work, and when the work of "old masters"—men old in years when first proclaimed masters—is pointed out to these theorists, they hasten to explain that the old may be young in mind, responsive and sensitive to fresh currents, and therefore capable of competing with the rising generation. The shuffle and paradox in this modification of the original statement should be plain to all. Besides, what evidence is there for the notion that only the young in spirit are capable of producing first-rate work? None whatever.

That youth and age are dissimilar in some respects is undeniable. Youth is apt to be impulsive, sanguine, hopeful, ardent, while age is prone to doubt, irresolution, deliberation. Age has experience, which youth lacks, and for which there is no substitute. It is true that those intuitions, flashes of insight, which, according to Bergson, so often advance science and philosophy, are supposed to be more frequent in youth than in age, but Bergson himself recognizes that mental jumps, intellectual mutations and flashes have little value save as they occur to those steeped in and saturated with knowledge of the given subject advanced by such intuitions and jumps. "Happy thoughts" are not always happy, and the wiser one is, the more comprehensive his knowledge, the more at home he feels in a province of thought, the more apt is he to give birth to brilliant generalizations and fecund suggestions. He who has devoted twenty years to research, experiment, and study in connection with a given problem—the cause of cancer, the factors in evolution, the relation between nature and nurture, to take a few examples only—is more likely to hit upon a fruitful idea than the apprentice hand, no matter how active and alert his mind may be.

The fact is, nature in this "pluralistic universe," in William James's striking phrase, presents us with an ultimate paradox in this matter of co-operation amid conflict between youth

Digitized by Google

and age. The latter restrains and tempers the former; the former prods and quickens the latter. Life is inconceivable without the action and reaction upon each other of both sets of qualities—those of youth and those of age.

Now, the conclusions we have arrived at may seem rather unsatisfactory to many young persons of the insurgent type. They see no reason, they say, for accepting the world as it is. They claim the privilege of questioning everything, of reopening old controversies, of rescrutinizing documents and reweighing evidence. They object, they say, to ready-made religion, ready-made morality, ready-made politics, ready-made economic and social arrangements. This attitude is understandable, but what is usually overlooked is the fallacy that lies in the assumption that only daring progressives challenge existing institutions and beliefs. If the radical insurgents may—as they certainly may—question everything, surely reactionary insurgents may also question everything from their own point of view. If radicals may attack religion, marriage, property, the state, in the name of freedom and individualism, the reactionaries may attack toleration, equal suffrage, free speech, the referendum, trial by jury, labor unions, in the name of God, the church, society, unity. There are probably as many youthful royalists in France today as there are anarchists, as many fanatical religious bigots as there are intolerant atheists. If everything that is old is to be sent to the scrap-heap just because it is old, if there is to be a presumption against the accepted and established, what becomes of the reforms and concessions that have been extorted by democracy from tyranny, privilege, and caste—what of the right to question the reforms? Why not revert to slavery, to the Inquisition, to absolute monarchy, to universal ignorance?

Common sense and the average man's sense of reality have tacitly answered all these questions. The right to question is conceded, but the right to overthrow and destroy is not conceded. The young are free and independent intellectually,

Digitized by Google

but the laws and institutions that have been slowly evolved in the course of centuries must, on the whole, be respected by inquirers and investigators pending the conclusion of their labors and the readjustment of society in the light of new truth. "Revolutions do not go backward"—why? Because the preponderant sentiment will not suffer the unreconciled reactionaries wholly to undo beneficial work done by progressive men. In the same way, preponderant sentiment will not suffer the wanton destruction of institutions which, on the whole, fit human nature. Change is the law of life, says insurgent youth, and jumps to the conclusion that it is entitled to change everything at will. But it forgets that change has laws of its own, and that it is just as impossible to make changes arbitrarily as it is to forbid them by fiat of state or church or privilege.

We do not know what further evolution will do with the family, the state, the institution of property, though we may possess hints and catch glimpses of coming changes. But society is not likely to treat with much gravity the insurgent who fancies that, since changes are certain to come, he may forthwith proceed to violate every existing law relating to the family, the state, or property which he finds inconvenient.

In brooding over inconveniences and checks imposed by present arrangements, youth has the consolation of knowing that age is also conscious of maladjustments and earnestly devising correctives and remedies for social and moral evils. Nay, the more youth reflects on the way of life, the process of social and moral evolution, the more childish will appear to its own eyes the attempt to array the young against the old in any crusade or movement whatever. It is absolutely safe to say that if a given gospel stirs youth alone and leaves age cold, unsympathetic, and indifferent, that gospel is certain to be fundamentally unsound, and, conversely, any idea that should appeal to age alone and fail to enlist the interest and heart of youth would soon be discarded and repudiated by age itself.

Digitized by Google

"Much ado about little or nothing" will, upon examination, be found to be the just verdict on certain recent or contemporary "revolts" of youth in letters and in art, and incidentally in morals. Some youthful novelists and poets have raised the banner of realism and pessimism. They are said to have "dared to be candid, truthful, outspoken, honest." They have thrown reticence to the winds, have discussed sex clinically, and have despaired of man and civilization. According to them, the stream of human impulses, emotions, and thoughts is polluted and unspeakably filthy, and all professed ideals are lies and shams. Such writers reduce the human spirit to "complexes" of temptation, vice, shame, and infamy. Having thus psychoanalyzed man and found him coarse, lustful, mean, and ignoble, they insist on writing him down, together with his universe, as a wretched failure. They do not literally "curse God and die," but they treat man as an animal of unusual intelligence who has mastered the art of hypocrisy, and they are weary of this "mask," this assumption of virtue, this pretense of respect for some moral code, which to them are purely Pecksniffian poses and all the more offensive. They demand freedom for the animal and licentious man, and they demand freedom to portray him as such. And this is the only new feature of their philosophy. Pessimism is not new, and uncompromising realism is not new. The real quarrel of the rebellious and professional young is with the religious, ethical, or evolutionary conception of human nature, of civilization, of progress. Like Turgenev's Bazaroff, they take the name of science, but in vain. There is nothing scientific about their revolt. Science itself is a witness against them, for science is human, as is philosophy, religion, art, society, and industrial organization. What explanation has clinical realism or crude pessimism to give of the children of human brains and human imaginations—of cathedrals, of symphonies, of literary master-works, of beauty generally? What do they make of sympathy, of love, of

Digitized by Google

association, of service? How can "hypocrisy" account for self-sacrifice and martyrdom? Why are not ideals and spiritual values as real and authentic as appetites, vices, and crimes?

Decidedly, the social skeptics and nihilists of our own day, though they claim to be scientific, bold, truthful, and truth-seeking, are as prejudiced, conventional, arrogant, and superficial as the inveterate reactionaries whom they so vehemently denounce. Science lends no support to barren and dogmatic pessimism or to sweeping indictments of humanity. Science is eminently cautious and never loses sight of its limitations. Science, when it takes up social and moral problems, endeavors to be as exact as it is in the domain of physics, chemistry, and astronomy. It does not ignore or dismiss whole series of facts because narrow moralists have misinterpreted them. It seeks new and sound interpretations of facts. It tries to see human life steadily and to see it whole. It is not likely to reject anything because it is old or accepted; nor will it seize with undue avidity upon new notions just because they are new.

In life and in art alike, the method of science and of philosophy is diametrically opposed to that of the intolerant and destructive youthful radicals who are preaching and leading a foolish, unnatural revolt against age, against experience, against the products of racial and historic evolution. That method demands patient inquiry, accumulation and careful study of data, verification of tentative conclusions, experimental tests wherever possible. That method does not lead one to say: "Abolish marriage, the state, social control; laugh at reticence and modesty; scorn discipline and self-restraint; act on your impulses and give blunt expression to all your fleeting and vagrant fancies." That method says: "Study institutions and their origins; seek to understand the past; indulge in no facile and worthless generalizations regarding human nature; have respect for the instincts and common sense of mankind; exercise care in framing hypotheses and

Digitized by Google

theories; and do not hesitate to modify or discard them in the light of new evidence."

Whether one is young, middle-aged, or old, if one knows what science and scientific method are, and what philosophy is, he will apply that knowledge scrupulously to the study of morals, religious ideas, industrial systems, and judgments upon literary and artistic production or criticism, and he will not commit the foolish blunder of claiming a monopoly of wisdom, or sincerity, or courage, or idealism, either for youth or for age.

HULL-HOUSE
CHICAGO

Digitized by Google

REVOLUTION AS TAUGHT BY TAOISM

GILBERT P. REID

The two indigenous systems of ethics and religion in China are Confucianism and Taoism. They are two of the "three religions of China"; in fact the three are so closely interwoven that they together form the moral and spiritual substratum of the Chinese people.

The recognized head of Confucianism is Confucius, and, with him, Mencius. The head of Taoism is Lao tsze. This remarkable spiritual headship was in the same period of China's long and distinguished history or some 2,400 years ago.

Primarily both Confucianism and Taoism in their inherent greatness of thought and outlook existed before the time of Confucius and Lao tsze. They were not so much systems of religious faith, they were not so much religions, as they were current ideas, beliefs, practices, and principles. If China in those early days had any religion of her own—and she certainly had—it was an undivided whole. Ancient China knew no sectarianism and had no denominational differences. Moreover ethics and religion, politics and philosophy, things seen and things unseen, were all linked together.

In a previous number of the *International Journal of Ethics* (January, 1923), I discussed the bearings on revolution of the teachings of Confucianism. At this time I review what Taoism has to say concerning revolution. By making the two studies one can form some idea of the general attitude of the Chinese people, first, to war in general, and then to internal war or rebellion and revolution. For the most part the Chinese make no great distinction between a rebel and a revolutionist. It is not until a result has been reached that a distinction takes place. If one fails in his schemes against the government, he is a rebel and is in danger of the death penalty; if he succeeds,

Digitized by Google

he is glorified as a revolutionist and assumes the reins of power, while the man formerly in power is the one liable to death. So far as bloodshed is necessary for either war, rebellion, or revolution, so far can the three be classed together in all ethical considerations.

Taoism, different from Confucianism, does not teach revolution. Though living in an age of warring states, Lao tsze does not so much as refer to the overthrow of kings; still less does he give countenance to such actions. All that we can do is to draw certain conclusions from the teachings of Lao tsze, and thus learn whether he encourages or discourages revolution.

Lao tsze has important sayings on governments and rulers, but he has no such comprehensive system of political science as is found in the classics of Confucianism. His sayings are more of the nature of epigrams, and partake of the obscurity and mysticism of his whole religious philosophy. An epigram is often an exaggeration of a truth and for that reason Lao tsze is not easily understood. There is less practicality than in Confucianism, but really a truer conception of the inner truth, which giveth life.

In examining the teachings of Taoism on revolution, as on every other subject, we will give preference to the words of the great founder, rather than try to find the truth in modern forms of Taoism. The more we return to the beginnings of the different religions the more will unity and agreement be found to exist.

In examining the words of Lao tsze, as contained in the wonderful classic called *Tao Teh Ching*, we will make selection of those sayings which, in an indirect or even remote manner, give us some light on the serious fact of human history, that of recurrent rebellions and revolutions. It may be that the Chinese of today will be willing to learn from Lao tsze, as they have from Confucius, Mencius, and Tseng tsze.

Digitized by Google

One of his sayings may be translated thus:

If one is true to himself in looking after the affairs of the Empire, he may be entrusted with the Empire. If he loves himself [i.e., is mindful of his obligations] in looking after the affairs of the Empire, into his hands the direction of the Empire may be committed.

In this, as in the *Great Learning*, the emphasis is placed on the personal character of the emperor, on a realization of one's personal obligations in the whole empire. A sense of responsibility is necessary in a ruler, be he emperor, king, or president.

In another important passage, Lao tsze shows his opposition to the use of violence and military oppression.

If one assists his sovereign in accordance with Tao—the Law of Nature, the Way of Heaven—he will not make use of arms to coerce the Empire: this sort of thing is apt to have its own recompense. Where armies are quartered, briars and thorns grow; in the wake of a great army there come bad years. A good man is resolute, and no more. He ventures not to take by force. He is resolute, but not boastful; resolute, but not haughty; resolute, but not arrogant; resolute because it cannot be helped; resolute, but not violent.

In these words the founder of Taoism places himself on the side of peace, rather than of war; and in doing so, there is no "namby-pamby" sentimentality, but strength of character, knowing the legitimate limits of one's strength. It is better to follow the course of natural development—follow Tao—than to be strong to excess or press one's rights to extremes or resort to force and arms. These are principles diametrically the opposite of a bloody revolution.

Lao tsze continues:

Fine arms are inauspicious implements, hated by all things. Therefore he who holds to Nature's laws has no place for them. The Princely Man when at home honors the left; when using arms he honors the right [i.e., using arms is an inferior position]. Arms are inauspicious implements, not such as the Princely Man employs; he uses them when he has no alternative; peace and quiet he holds high. He takes no glory in a victory, for he who glories in victory delights in the massacre of men, finds the Empire too small for the gratification of his desires.

Digitized by Google

Such is Taoism as it was at the beginning, on the side of Tao, of Nature's laws, and against militarism, conquest, bloodshed. Such was the Princely Man then, such is the Princely Man still. The true Taoist is a quiet man, a man of peace.

Once again Lao tsze compares the Ways of Heaven with the pursuit of war. He says:

> If the Empire is controlled by Tao—by the inner Principle of the Universe—its fleet horses will be employed on the farm; when the Empire is without Tao, its war horses are bred on the plains. There is no greater sin than to covet; no greater calamity than to be discontented; no greater fault than to be ambitious. Therefore he who knows the contentment of content is always content.

In this teaching men are exhorted to self-restraint. War comes from unbridled passions; it stands rebuked in the presence of law which comes from heaven, which runs through all Nature, and reigns in the Princely Man. If men could only learn the contentment of content, what need would there be for appeal to arms or for going outside the realm of law and order?

Another characteristic teaching of Lao tsze is that of non-action, as expressed in two phrases "Wu Shih" and "Wu Wei." The idea is that of passivity, of silence, that the full force of Heaven's laws may take possession of the soul. It is a state of receptivity, rather than the self-assertion of the pushing spirit, or the constant struggling of the strenuous life. What one does, he does naturally, not with effort or violence. Such a one is unobtrusive, without ostentation or bustle, no busybody, never meddlesome.

Lao tsze applies this quality to the state. He says in one place, "When one has reached the state of passivity, there is nothing that he cannot do. If he would take the Empire, it will always be because he is quiet and unobtrusive. The obtrusive man is not fit to take the Empire." In modern language, the man must not seek the office, but the office the man. If one becomes emperor, let it be in a natural way, as the decree of Heaven.

Digitized by Google

This idea is enlarged in another place in the following language: "It is by uprightness that the country is governed, as it is by stratagem that war is conducted." But mere uprightness is not enough; there must be this quiet, unobtrusive spirit on the part of the ruler, as well as of the people. So he continues: "By passivity, by unconcern, one takes the Empire. How do I know this? Thus the more restrictions and prohibitions are in the empire, the poorer the people become. The more numerous and obtrusive the mandates and laws, the more there will be thieves and robbers. Hence the Sage says: "I do nothing, and the people reform themselves; I love tranquillity, and the people make themselves right; I have no concerns, and the people become rich; I have no desires, and the people of themselves revert to simplicity." In all this there is national prosperity by individual reformation, not by legislative enactment; through the workings of inner principles, not by excess of ceremonial requirements; by getting people to follow Heaven's way, not by aggravating them with human dictation. Dr. Paul Carus well expresses the meaning:

> Lao tsze requests the government not to govern, but simply to administer. Rulers should not interfere with the natural development of their people, but practice non-acting, non-meddling, non-interference, or, as the French call it, laissez faire, so that the people shall scarcely know that they have rulers. The less the welfare of the people is forced by artificial methods, the greater will be their wealth and prosperity.

In all this there is no suggestion of a possible revolution, the government is so good that peace is assured.

One other passage is cited in support of this theory: "When the government rules with quietness and without show, the people will be honest and loyal. When the government is prying, always prying, the people will be needy, always." This principle of religion is applied to politics. It is a principle taught by a deep thinker, and is contrary to the usual view of life, of religion, and of government. Whether we assent to it or not, we cannot but commend the thought and its power to pacify, amid all the warring elements of the world.

Digitized by Google

This reliance on self-effacement and non-assertion, and this opposition to militarism, are combined in one passage of striking phraseology. Lao tsze says:

> The most skilful fighter is not wrathful. The mightiest conquerors never strive. He who excels in using men is ever lowly. This is called ability in using men. This is called the glory of not-striving. This is called complying with Heaven, the ideal of the ancients.

This language of Lao tsze sounds like the language of Christ, it is a command to meekness, gentleness, without strife, envy, or anger. "Of such are the kingdom of Heaven." It is very different from the spirit and practice of revolution. As another has said:

> Force and evil are no remedy. Use those means, and we shall find we only move the trouble from one quarter to another, and the difficulty we apparently get out of in one direction has come home to roost in another, stronger than ever.

Lao tsze also gives his views concerning the death penalty, in fact concerning all punishment, which are instructive as to the value of revolutions. He says:

> When the people have no fear of death, why should it be used to keep them in dread? There is always one who may inflict the sentence of death. To usurp his functions in killing is to assume the rôle of the great Master Carpenter who fells the tree. Those who act for the Master Carpenter seldom fail to wound their own hands.

It is remarkable to hear such views from a Chinese thinker of over 2,400 years ago. According to such teachings, identical with the spirit of Christ, there are two classes of persons to be condemned and rebuked at the present crisis, one, those in the government, who in the name of martial law make life of little account, and sentence to death those who are suspected of revolutionary ideas, and offer rewards for the capture of revolutionary leaders, and the other class, who resort to assassination, and slay all who differ from them, that a government which they do not like may be overthrown. The higher the office one holds, the greater one's culpability in relying on the

Digitized by Google

death of foes to defend one's cause. China's conduct the last few years is a form of barbarism which Lao tsze could never palliate. In this respect we may well long for the good old days, or rather for the good old teachers.

There is one passage in which the troubles and disaffection of the people are traced to bad rule, but it is not likely that one who enjoined the mild and pacific spirit would countenance the horrors of civil war or fratricidal homicide. These are his words: "The people suffer from famine, because their superiors levy too heavy taxes; it is for this they famish. The people are difficult to govern, because their superiors are too meddlesome; it is for this they are difficult to govern." Here the officers of state have two faults, one of character—being greedy and oppressive—and the other of judgment—not knowing what to do and what not to do, being too officious. These faults should be corrected, but Lao tsze never suggests revolution as the remedy. Rather the evil planned for others will come back on one's self.

While the general character of the Chinese is more Confucian than Taoistic, there has always been a small class scattered throughout China who have caught the main ideas of Lao tsze's teachings, and have lived quite unobtrusive lives, loving peace and hating war.

INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF CHINA
SHANGHAI AND PEKING

Digitized by Google

OBJECTIVES VERSUS IDEALS

HENRY NELSON WIEMAN

For the most part tradition and illusion have shaped all our living. We prate much of ideals, but they have played only a small part in determining the manner of our response to the stimuli that assail us and that organic process of adapting ourselves to environment which we call living. The most popular ideals about which we hear most talk, belong with the illusions. As illusions they do shape our lives, but this is not what is ordinarily meant by the shaping of life through ideals. As illusions they enable us to conceal from our own consciousness the sordid motives which may actuate us. Or they serve to screen our consciousness from disagreeable facts in the environment. They help us to bolster up our self-respect; to glorify ourselves and others; to see things in a rosy light. It is plain, then, that these illusions, some of which are called ideals, and others not, do play a very important part in our living. Tradition, working in us in the form of habit, drives us on; but illusions brighten the path before us and make the going far more pleasant. Indeed, the false rosy light of illusion may make the path of traditional habit quite exhilarating. From earliest infancy the traditions of our time and people mold the organic process of our living into the form of certain habits. So our way of life is determined. But above us float illusions, some of which we call ideals, others we recognize to be nothing but pleasant fancies, while others we mistake to be facts. They are the pillar of cloud by day, and of fire by night, which float before us. Our system of habits is undoubtedly modified to some degree by these illusions, sometimes for the worse, sometimes for the better. But it is perhaps fortunate for us that the organic process is not too greatly under the control of these illusions.

Digitized by Google

What is the difference between an objective and an ideal? When an ideal begins to determine the actual organic process of living, so that one breathes, eats, digests his food, moves, sits, stands, in such a way as to sustain it, it is an objective. But a great many ideals, perhaps most ideals, as they are popularly conceived and portrayed, never could be objectives because, if the organic process were shaped by them, life would end. The vital status could not be maintained. Or, if the animal objectives could still be maintained, the human objective of enlarging the fulness and range of environment to which adaptation is made, would be rendered impossible, In short, a great many ideals as popularly conceived, are impossible, not because they are so high, but because they are so worthless. They are pleasant dreams with which to beguile the tedium. They are pleasant, not because they are so lofty, but because they provide a fairyland where certain of our repressed impulses can find imaginary fulfilment. These ideals are the stock materials with which some orators, some writers, and artists entertain the crowd. They enable us to forget our unpleasant surroundings, much as a drug might do. They inspire us, they exhilarate us, they console us, but they do not continuously and fully determine our striving and our doing. They are the ice-cream and cake of life. But the bread and meat consist of our objectives, both the animal and the distinctively human.

But when a civilization reaches maturity, as ours has done, and as the Graeco-Roman did, it calls for something more than ideals that entertain and inspire. It calls for a clarification of those facts by which and for which we live. It calls for objectives. As long as tradition sustains us, we can get along without knowledge of objectives. We can give our thoughts to the luxury of ideals; and because of the meager, mean, and impoverished life which tradition often imposes, these pleasant fanciful illusions are indispensable to make our living humanly tolerable. We must deceive ourselves with ideals in order to carry on. But when tradition breaks down, and we must

Digitized by Google

direct our own life according to goods which we have deliberately chosen, when we thus pass from drift to mastery, we must know our objectives. We must know that actual good, the conservation and increase of which constitutes the good of living. Pleasant ideals, illusions, and dreams, however valuable in the past, no longer suffice.

WHAT IS AN OBJECTIVE?

By objective we mean, not an end result, but some satisfaction which is maintained, and may be increased, by those activities which we call living. For example, a certain quantitative proportion of oxygen and carbon dioxide must be kept in the air-cells of the lungs. All our behavior, our rising, walking, sleeping, eating, heart beating, blood circulation, etc., are adjusted in such a way as to maintain this composition of the air in the air cells. This is plainly an objective of living in the sense that all our activities are controlled in such a way as to provide this condition. Reacting to circumstances in such a way as to maintain this condition is what is called adaptation to environment. Also, a certain temperature of the body must be maintained, and all our going and coming is adjusted in such a way as to keep this temperature without variation. This also is an objective. The same is true of a certain chemical composition of the blood. Here again all our organic processes, the metabolism of our food, as well as our thinking, our loving, our dreaming, our playing, our fighting, etc., are adjusted in such a way as to protect and sustain this condition. The same is true of the integrity of our organism. We strive to keep a whole skin. Our activities are all adjusted in such a way as to preserve the organism from harm. So this also is one of the objectives of living. So likewise with other vital conditions. The objective of living is to provide, preserve, and magnify the conditions which living requires. The objective of living is to preserve and magnify itself.

What we have described are objectives of animal living, and

Digitized by Google

humans share these objectives with the lower animals. But humans have also other objectives. We call the man-beast human because of that way of life which he sometimes pursues, and to which he may give himself in ever larger measure under proper nurture and favorable conditions. Man is sporadically human, but not consistently so. The objectives, then, which characterize human living, must not be represented as controlling the whole life of man; and at times they do not control any part of his living. At times, and perhaps for more of the time than is commonly thought, the purely animal objectives are sufficient to account for all that he does.

The animal objective is to preserve life while the human is to develop more abundant life. To live means to react to environment in such a way as to maintain such vital conditions as air in the air-cells, a certain composition of the blood, temperature, organic integrity, etc. To live more abundantly means to maintain these vital conditions in reaction to a more ample environment. To live humanly is to engage in the progressive organization of an ever more complex system of habits by which one reacts to an ever larger portion of the world. Distinctive human behavior is that continuous variation of behavior which provides for the needs of the organism in adaptation to an ever wider and fuller environment. The animal reacts to the environment only in so far as necessary to meet the needs of the organism; the human meets the needs of the organism in order to react to ever more of environment. This difference holds true, of course, only when the human is truly different from the lower animals. But he is not always different.

OBJECTIVES AND TRADITION

During most of the time our race has lived on this planet, men have not asked why they followed the beaten path before them, nor whether there were other better ways, nor whether the labor of going on was worth the cost, nor what the goods they sought. It was the path of tradition they followed;

Digitized by Google

and the system of habits, ground into them from earliest infancy, kept their feet in the narrow way. "Theirs not to reason why, theirs but to do and die." The tradition they followed was gradually accumulated throughout many generations without any particular plan or purpose. Or perhaps it would be more correct to say that the tradition had been developed throughout many years under many different conflicting plans and purposes. It always served in a general way to preserve the biological existence of those who followed it, for those who followed traditions that did not do this perished, and their traditions with them. No doubt these traditions provided for many other goods over and above the biological, but this they have never done consistently nor in the most economical fashion. Yet most men in all times and among all peoples have followed some such tradition.

On either side of the beaten way of tradition have been many pleasant things to be had. But for the most part men have turned neither to the right hand nor to the left. They have not even seen these pleasant things. They have seen only the road straight in front of them and the dust beneath their feet. They have been too busy to note anything else. They have been carrying such heavy burdens, or have been so sorely pressed to keep from being trampled under foot by the throng, that they have not had opportunity to lift their eyes and look around. They have not asked: Wherefore all this suffering and doing? What good are we conserving or creating? They have simply stolidly gone their way. If ever the question, What's the use, rose to the fringe of consciousness, they put it quickly from them. Such a question is too disturbing. It destroys all contentment in living. It takes the zest and force from all doing. It sometimes leads to suicide and insanity. It makes for social unrest and impairs the smooth working of the social machinery. Hence the question is abhorred both by those who profit by the established social order and by those who are oppressed by it.

Digitized by Google

But there have been a few rare times when the burdens borne have been lightened by machinery or slavery; and the absorbing attention to keep from being trampled under foot has been relieved by reason of a more stable social order and protection from foreign aggression. If such a time of prosperity and peace happened to coincide with a certain ripeness of civilization, in which the accumulated experience of the race could be transmitted to the individual in such manner as to give him insight and reach of thought, the great question has been raised: What is the good of living? Why this sacrifice? Why this devotion? Why follow this inconvenient or devious route? Why this custom or this form of conduct? Why suffer and toil? So arises the age of sophistication.

Now as long as this question concerning the values and objectives of human living is limited to a few only, who are very old and experienced, or have a peculiar philosophical bent, or are especially provided with leisure, it is not a serious matter. As long as tradition serves to shape the lives of the great mass of men during youth and middle manhood, the question concerning the objectives of human living is largely an academic one. But when sophistication reaches any large number of men, especially the youth and middle-aged, upon whom rest the loads of life and the control of the social process, and when these begin to criticize the traditional way, asking the why and wherefore of it, and examining to see if there be not some other better way, then the question concerning the good of living becomes a very urgent one. Then tradition begins to crumble and fails to serve as the stay of life. Then men are thrown forth into a great world where they must shape a course of their own according to what they may discover the objectives of life to be.

WHEN TRADITION CRUMBLES

There have been a few times in the history of mankind when civilization reached that ripeness wherein this question became urgent. We have mentioned the Graeco-Roman world

Digitized by Google

as such a time. Came peace and prosperity, the lightening of struggle for subsistence through slavery and taxation of conquered peoples, and, above all, that ripening of thought and experience which enabled the individual to look beyond the confines of his own traditions and consider other possible ways of life, and the good on either side which his traditional way passed by. So there arose much questioning concerning the goals and goods of life. Stoicism and Epicureanism, neo-Platonism and the mystery religions, Gnosticism and the Christian Fathers, all provided an answer by defining the goods which can be found in living. These answers all helped to sustain in part the social order and zeal of endeavor, or at any rate to give some intelligible objective to living. But they were not adequate even for their own day, as the history of events revealed. There was gradual disintegration and reversion to the level where tradition again became the guide and support of human effort and social co-ordination.

Whether it is possible to discover any objective in fact, intelligible to the human understanding, which can adequately take the place of blind tradition as the stabilizer and sustainer of human endeavor, may be an open question. We believe such an adequate objective can be discovered, pre-eminently through religious experience. But if it cannot, we ourselves have reached the hour of disaster, for we have come upon those times in which tradition begins to crumble and can no longer be trusted to guide and sustain human living. We are entering the age of disillusionment and sophistication, not for the old and wise alone, but for the young and middle-aged. We must, by thinking, discover objectives which can lure the mass of men and make life for them worth the living, which can sustain the enthusiasm of high endeavor and the solidarity of society. Otherwise human life must fail and break as tradition crumbles. Without such objectives of endeavor, and some unanimity concerning them, the zest of life will vanish and society disintegrate. Our world has outgrown the sufficiency of tradition.

Digitized by Google

Traditions still hold, of course; but the flood that threatens their stability is trickling over the top of the dykes, and beneath it the dykes are crumbling. The opening may widen and deepen and the torrent pour through. After us, perhaps, the deluge, unless there be channels ready and prepared to receive the waters of life. These channels must be prepared by thought which discovers satisfying objectives and fashions a way, wide and deep, leading to these objectives. The halo that once hovered over the state, the home, industry, the individual soul, the city, the country, is torn away. It is shown to be an illusion. The stark sordid facts are set before our gaze. The great values which once we thought we saw in these things are torn away in modern fiction and essay. There is for the present a zest and joy in tearing away fictions and laying bare the facts, unadorned and indubitable. But will this zest and joy continue? Not if the zest and joy consists merely in the tearing away of the illusions, for in the course of time there will be no more illusions to tear away. The joy of living can continue only if in the facts themselves can be found absorbing values. The prevailing skepticism, realism, disillusioning, is golden, because it sets the facts before us without the distorting haze of unreal ideals. But if we cannot find in the facts themselves that which holds us and lures us, if the childish delight of destroying shams is our only delight, our end is near.

A CLASSIFICATION OF OBJECTIVES

What specifically are these objectives to which we must adjust our endeavors? That is the incompletely solved problem of our time and of all time. When the whole world is groping it would be exceedingly presumptuous for one man to stand forth and declare that he knows what mankind has never yet succeeded in clearly discerning. But any sincere and deliberate opinion on the matter may be a contribution. Our statements, however, on a subject so vast, put into a few final paragraphs, must be so meager as to be scarcely intelligible

Digitized by Google

and probably not acceptable. Nevertheless, greatly daring, we shall essay to make a few statements.

The objectives of human living might be classified under the heads of scientific method, association, love, moral endeavor, aesthetic appreciation, and worship.

By scientific method we analyze experience in such a way as to discover those particular data in those particular time-space relations that will enable us to survey the fulness of the world about us; to control it more and more and adapt ourselves to it; but above all simply to comprehend it in clear and definite form. For instance, a satisfaction peculiar to man is found in simply knowing that this stellar universe in which we live is only one among many, and that the spiral nebulae beyond the abysmal void are other stellar universes like our own. The scope of our environment thus brought to our knowledge satisfies this deep urge in man for fulness of life. The range of the environment to which he reacts is thus magnified.

In association what we crave is the intimacy of that association which I have elsewhere called the personal group.[1] It is that group in which the thought and purpose of each is integrated with that of the others; in which each adapts himself to the unique individuality of the other; in which each arouses in the other something approximating the total system of impulses of which he is capable. Such association raises life to flood tide. In contrast to such association is that of the herd, the crowd and that mechanized adjustment that we find among motorists in congested street traffic, among the depositors, investors, directors, and attendants of a bank, in a factory, and in our industrial system generally, in which the activities of each are co-ordinated with that of the others like cogs in a machine, but without mutual understanding of purposes or personal recognition. In so far as our society is so organized

[1] "Personal and Impersonal Groups," *International Journal of Ethics*, July, 1921, Vol. XXXI, No. 4.

Digitized by Google

as to provide for, and magnify, personal association is human nature satisfied in its demand for more abundant life. It is plain that as purposes are integrated, or at least recognized, in the "creative process" of the group, the range and fulness of the world is opened up to us. If I enjoy fishing and my friend enjoys flowers and we can learn to share one another's interests or, if not that, at least to recognize that the world contains such things as interest the other person, our life is enriched. When we integrate the interests of others with our own, the abundance of life is multiplied. But impersonal co-ordination never does that. When I associate with the street-car conductor to get down town, he does not open up his world to me nor I mine to him. I pay him a nickel and am done with him.

Love is a very intimate and unique sort of association which we cannot here discuss for lack of space, but it enriches life also by bringing within the range of one's concern a great new world, not so wide in space and time as that revealed through other association, but more rich and concrete.

Moral endeavor is the development of those forms of conduct by which one adjusts himself to a great multiplicity and complexity of processes round about him and thus fulfils the objective of more abundant life. Conduct is moral just in so far as it integrates the purpose of the individual with the purposes of his group, and ultimately with all mankind, in such a way that the individual adopts as his own this total purpose of mankind in so far as it is sketched and suggested in the moral form of conduct.

Art and aesthetic appreciation is another form in which men seek the general human objective of reaction to an ever fuller and wider environment. Art brings to our awareness a certain rich compact flow of experience. The massive sensuous flow of experience is pouring over us and through us all the time, but we are not aware of it except for certain very few selected data which are necessary objects of attention in order to guide

Digitized by Google

our behavior in solving the practical problems of adaptation. With the exception of these few data the impingement of the total environment upon the total organism, going on all the time and constituting what we call experience, escapes our awareness quite completely. But in art certain portions of this rich stream of experience are brought to our awareness, not in the form of discrete data selected from the mass of experience by the mechanisms of biological survival, but in the form of a continuous flow of experience which is appreciated for its own sake. In music a certain stream of auditory experience is thus brought to awareness; in painting the stream of color experience; in sculpture the experience of material forms; in poetry the concrete symbolism of words and rhythm revive the sensuous experience derived from past situations and cause this to pour through our attentive consciousness in more or less of a continuous stream. Art may express ideas, concepts, but the concepts must be imbedded in a mass of sensuous experience, either immediate or revived from the past, and the ideas must serve to hold this experience before the attentive consciousness by suffusing it with some meaning.

Worship is our self-surrender to the cosmic process which we accept as our own personal concern though we cannot know it. The mystic worshiper—and that means almost any genuine worshiper—even more than the artist and aesthete, is aware of the flow of experience. This flow means for him, and means in actual fact, the cosmic process in so far as it immediately affects him at all or in so far as he immediately experiences it in consciousness. The worshiper differs from the artist and aesthete in that he does not select and exclude certain portions of experience in conformity to certain canons of beauty, taste, and technique of art. The worshiper is receptive to the total mass of experience in so far as he is able to attend to it at all. If this total mass of experience, signifying the movement of the whole universe, is discerned to be the expression of a personal God, this worship is greatly promoted, and the distinctively

Digitized by Google

human objective of life is much more widely and completely attained through religion. Whether or not the cosmic process be of this nature is a matter of fact to be discovered by all the powers of investigation at our command; but it cannot be accepted merely because we should like to have it so (fantasy), or because it would make a beautiful ideal (value judgment). The reasons why these two methods are impossible in this age of crumbling tradition we have already indicated. But religion is one essential form of the human objective in living, because in worship we anticipate that unattained abundance of life which is found when man lives the life of the whole world. But this is hardly possible unless man can live with God. Thus the problem of religion is one of the greatest we have to face in these times of crumbling tradition.

Occidental College

Digitized by Google

BOOK REVIEWS

THE OCCIDENT AND THE ORIENT. By Valentine Chirol. Pp. 228.

THE STABILIZATION OF EUROPE. By Charles de Visscher. Pp. 190.

GERMANY IN TRANSITION. By Herbert Kraus. Pp. 236. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1924. Each $2.00, postpaid $2.10.

These three small volumes contain much material for earnest reflection. They serve admirably the purpose of the Norman Wait Harris Memorial Foundation, namely, "the promotion of a better understanding on the part of American citizens of other peoples of the world, thus establishing a basis for improved international relations and a more enlightened world-order."

Sir Valentine Chirol, formerly director of the foreign department of the *London Times*, gives a kind of moving-picture glimpse of the peoples of the Middle East and of India and of the psychological as well as of the political factors involved in their relations with the Occident. One is made to sense somewhat the contacts and repulsions of two distinct civilizations, and to wonder whether the Occident may not have done more harm than good to the Orient. Such a book should be read in connection with Arnold Toynbee's still more suggestive volume, *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey.*

The lectures on *The Stabilization of Europe* afford a candid, illuminating account of the efforts of Europe since the Armistice to deal with the problems of nationality, of security, and of international communications. The practical relation of the League of Nations to these specific problems is set forth most clearly and fairly. A robust optimism and a generous idealism characterize Professor De Visscher's attitude.

In reading *Germany in Transition*, by Herbert Kraus, professor of international and public law and political science at the University of Königsberg, one has the uncomfortable feeling of listening to the revelations of a sensitive man who has been compelled by reason of unfortunate publicity to discuss intimate family matters of an embarrassing nature. Dr. Kraus with much tact and delicacy of feeling has touched on certain controversial subjects, and has succeeded in making one see how his fellow-countrymen have reacted to the bewildering events since 1918. He

Digitized by Google

indicates the effect of the pressure of outside factors such as the Treaty of Versailles and the reparation measures upon the psychology and the morale of the German people. He shows the tendencies of political thought and of partisan politics in Germany. Of particular interest is his treatment of the thorny problem of "war guilt." It is quite evident from his presentation of the matter that the attempt to compel the Germans to admit a guilt of which they are not intellectually convinced was as unethical as it was productive of most lamentable results. The readjustment of the Germans toward the peoples of other nations has been rendered infinitely more difficult. No matter what one's own convictions concerning the responsibility of Germany for the Great War, he cannot fail to realize from this exposition by Dr. Kraus that we are dealing with millions of fellow-human beings who are suffering from an aggravated form of neurasthenia superimposed on a depleted physical condition. One realizes that, whether right or wrong in their convictions, the Germans must be treated with serious consideration. They may not with prudence be treated either as criminals or as insane subjects fit only for punishment and solitary confinement. They must first of all be generously understood.

These three volumes serve in a striking manner to illustrate the practical nature of the problem of international understanding. The term is employed much too glibly and sentimentally. The process is too rarely comprehended. "To understand everything is to pardon everything," according to the French proverb. But to understand is not merely an attitude of sympathy; it demands a keen intellectual attitude, an ability to reason out clearly the basic problems that characterize each nationality. To do this well requires something more than printed data. We must know the psychological factors, how people think, feel, and live.

Montesquieu has said that the sentiment of justice was created before reason itself. This would seem painfully true of masses of peoples who respond sensitively to vague instincts of injured rights. Nothing is harder to understand or to cope with intelligently than this national ethical instinct.

Those who travel widely can help greatly in this great task of international understanding. Those who cannot must be content with, and grateful for, such illuminating expositions as are contained in these admirable lectures delivered at the Institute organized by the University of Chicago in the summer of 1924 upon the Norman Wait Harris Foundation.

PHILIP MARSHALL BROWN

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

Digitized by Google

THINGS AND IDEALS. By M. C. Otto. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1924. Pp. xii+320.

This book places the author in the front ranks of present writers on philosophy. This, not because it sets out a new philosophical system or advances new special theses, neither of which it claims, but because of its brilliant and inspiring reinforcement of a view of "things and ideals" that is steadily making its way in the world. In the author's own words, "The twelve essays of this book are devoted to a cause. They are intended to help make articulate a social philosophy which recognizes equally the reality of things and ideals and which aims to further their reciprocal interpenetration in the interest of human happiness."

Further specification of the nature of this relation between things and ideals is forecast in the warning that those "who absolutely refuse to seek in the world of change for the means of its redemption as well as those who are set in their denial of the reality or efficacy of anything but things, will do well to save themselves the irritation of reading the pages that follow." That there would be "irritation" is not to be doubted, for the author does not mince matters.

The chapter headings are: "Philosophy and Life," "Two Ideals," "Right for Right's Sake," "Might makes Right," "Right by Agreement," "The Self," "Science and the Higher Life—the Renewal of Warfare," "Science and the Higher Life—the Issue Developed," "Science and the Higher Life—Looking Towards Harmony," "The Soul," "The War and the God-Makers," "The Hunger for Cosmic Support."

The keynote of the book is sounded in the last phrase of the first of the above quotations: "Their (things and ideals) reciprocal interpenetration in the interest of human happiness." Taking its cue from the *de facto* failure of this interpenetration in the past and the consequent failure of human happiness, philosophy has too often celebrated and confirmed this failure by translating it into impassable metaphysical, logical, moral, and religious dualisms, which it has then attempted to heal by taking one member of the division as "real" and the other as "appearance," or by taking both as "appearances" of an inscrutable, nominal unity. In either case we are left with a number of disastrous splits in our world, such as materialism and idealism, terrestrialism and celestialism, science and values, a morality of might, of possession, and a morality of pure duty (or impure pleasure), a religion with a monarchical, imperialistic, tribal god of conquest or a religion with an algebraic deity which cannot be translated into any specific known values.

All these "cuts" have the common premise that ideals and values cannot be realized in a world of things, and that things are hopelessly alien

Digitized by Google

to ideals and values, the realization of which has been postponed to another world—an arrangement which has always played beautifully into the hands of those who have no concern for human destiny in this world or any other. To secure the social conditions which enable them to procure terrestrial success at the expense of others, they are quite willing, like Macbeth, to "jump the life to come." And the fundamental social condition of this success is that most of us shall continue to believe that ideals and values cannot be realized in the world of things. Hence we are encouraged "to fasten our eyes upon the sky that they may the more readily relieve us of things we would not otherwise surrender voluntarily and deliberately."

In this state of affairs Professor Otto finds the great opportunity and business of philosophy; namely, to teach and preach the condition of the Great Society to come on earth, where "sanctity of life, beauty of surroundings and creative opportunity shall be a general fact." The advent of such a society means that the morality of abstract duty—of "right for right's sake"—which can always be exploited to the ends of those who know exactly what they want (e.g., Bernhardi's appeal to Kant), and the "morality of might," which is the residuary legatee of the morality of "right for right's sake," must both be superseded by "the morality of agreement," of adjustment, and of co-operation, which aims, not at an absolute good, but at the best that we can see with the best eyes science can give us.

In the admirable chapters on "Science and the Higher Life" it comes out that one of the main things that has hindered "the interpenetration of things and ideals" is the fact that science has developed and stated itself exclusively in terms of "things"—things as metaphysically different from and independent of values and ideals. This leaves a dehumanized and mechanized "realm of nature," and throws ideals and values, i.e., the "higher life," into the supernatural. Science is left valueless and values scienceless. Hence "the adjective 'higher' in the term Higher Life is made synonymous with 'obscurer,' and the whole subject of ideals becomes a phase of obscurantism." Witness the popular method of disposing of the conflict between science and ethics and between science and religion by making the parties to the conflict "wholly incommensurable." By driving home this solution, Professor Otto shows that ethics and religion bereft entirely of things are left with nothing but empty concepts. He then shows (one could wish a little more fully) that science, ethics, and religion in their actual procedure constantly flout this "incommensurability." No teacher of ethics or religion can possibly stick to the empty abstractions. The values of integrity, courage, friendship, devotion, beauty—all are distilled from the world of things and persons in mutual interaction. And

Digitized by Google

further analysis shows that the things which constitute the subject-matter of science are *selected* and their laws formulated with reference to the various problems encountered in our efforts to attain a better life.

But until this is explicitly understood and recognized, until there is a change in the prevalent notion of both science and the higher life, until each ceases to cling to a sovereignty fatal to the other, the enterprise of building a better life will be heavily handicapped. With this recognition "the self" and "the soul" will cease to be indefinable, metaphysical entities to be saved (though as such they are not worth saving), and become centers of activity which from the world of things through the methods of science will create and enjoy, not primarily a world of private property, but the priceless values of companionship and art in which *all* shall share. With this recognition, the vague "hunger for cosmic support"—the central theme of all religion—will be seen as

> a deflection of the desire for fellowship with our kind. We shall turn from our sense of cosmic isolation to a new sense of human togetherness and so discover in a growing solidarity, in a progressively ennobled humanity, in an increasing joy in living the goal we have all along blindly sought and shall build on earth the fair city we have looked for in a compensatory world beyond.

For clarification of ideas and for renewal of courage, this book should be read by all—"professionals" and "laymen"—who are interested in the building of this City.

A. W. MOORE

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

A HISTORY OF POLITICAL THEORIES: RECENT TIMES. Essays on Contemporary Developments in Political Theory. Contributed by students of the late William Archibald Dunning. Edited by Charles Edward Merriam and Harry Elmer Barnes. New York: Macmillan Co., 1924. Pp. 12+597.

This memorial volume to Professor Dunning by thirteen of his former students brings up to date the account of political theories from where his three-volume history left it—the last quarter of the nineteenth century. While temporal continuity is thus assured, the change from a unitary to a multiple authorship and the growing complexity of the times have together succeeded in procuring for political theory a more concrete orientation than Professor Dunning himself was able to achieve. This change for the better stands out brilliantly in the generously comprehensive and yet remarkably fact-feeling chapter with which Professor Merriam introduces this co-operative study of the last half-century. Recognizing frankly that "political philosophy presupposes other standards," he presents

Digitized by Google

the matrix of recent political ideas in a brief but highly enlightening discussion of industrialism and nationalism, urbanism and feminism. Building upon these forces, he enumerates the outstanding recent groups, evaluates their intellectual equipment for political speculation—singling out as most noteworthy advances the development of statistical technique and psychological analysis—and then surveys in the large the actual progress that our short period has made in deepening political insight and in facilitating the political organization of human interdependency.

It is quite impossible here to do justice to the versatile factual content of the entire book. Ignoring the differential value of the several contributions, one may safely say that political theory has been pursued into the whole complex of modern life, and pursued with energy and high success. But rather than follow the pursuit, let us on the basis of it inquire what has been the ethical drift of political speculation in recent times. At least three tendencies may be isolated from the embarrassingly rich material presented: (1) dissatisfaction with formal theory as sterile; (2) consequent socialization of political thinking; and (3) growing recognition of the ethical nature of democracy.

1) This volume is but another one of the accumulating evidences that our period has come to look with suspicion upon the frequently observed tendency of theory to grow from pure, to purer, to purest. This tendency is regarded with suspicion not merely because theory must, to achieve the maximum refinement, be drastically divorced from the lives of the great majority of men, but also because it is at the same time cut off, in the life of even the theorist himself, from the welter of impulses and the tang of action that together constitute the warp, if not also the woof, of man's noblest spiritual habiliments. Ethics cannot look with untroubled complacency upon the development of thinking into an art for its own sake. Indeed, to establish an *entente cordiale* between ideals and things is its major task, as not a few ethicists conceive its task. No reader of the earlier volumes in this series can fail to note in this one a recession of the most formal theorizing and the substitution of a securer touch with non-ideational processes, a tendency that goes so far as to include not only a splendid chapter on race, by Professor F. H. Hankins, but one on geography as well by Professor Franklin Thomas. Professor C. P. Patterson's treatment of jurisprudence does arouse fear of a reaction to the more formalistic, but this only in method of treatment; for as regards content, even his chapter shows a swing toward a more social interpretation of law. Speaking generally, the recognition is always wholesomely near the surface that since political theory is derivative rather than primary experience, it must submit itself to other criteria than artistic symmetry or logical consistency.

Digitized by Google

2) This means that political theory has become socialized. Professor Harry Elmer Barnes presents the evidence in a chapter outlining the debt of political theory to sociology. The same humanizing influence is seen concretely at work in the rise of pluralism in political thought. Under the chaperonage of Hegelian monism, Right cast beseeching glances at Might; Might attended on Sovereignty; and Sovereignty was enamored of irresponsible and oftentimes capricious Will. The political pluralists have in this century made national thoroughfares hazardous places for such flirtations. Professor F. W. Coker treats cautiously, if indeed he does not minimize, this leaven of pluralism. The burden of proof is upon those who would deny practical hegemony to the sovereign state; but the pluralists, he is willing to admit, by demanding that any proposed exercise of this hegemony be justified by the foreseen social consequences into which it issues rather than by the unpredictable will from which it proceeds, have moved toward the humanizing of both the internal and the international relations of the state. As regards internal affairs, Professor Paul H. Douglas, in much the longest and one of the best chapters of the book, evaluates the various proletarian theories that have sought to make more generously available to common men the assets of civilization; and as regards external relations, Professor E. M. Borchard has shown the same socializing motif at work across national boundaries: the growing derivation of municipal law from public opinion and common sentiments, rather than from sovereign will, lays also a popular foundation for the increasing recognition and further creation of international law.

3) The ethical drift of political theory is in no way better indicated than by the changing conception of democracy. Let it be remembered that the last Dunning volume left off at a time when the enemies of democracy were bold in asserting with Maine and Stephen that it was merely another form of government, and when its friends, if they did not with Bryce openly admit this, were timorous in declaring that representative government is but the beginning of what democracy envisages. But during the intervening period, enemies and friends alike have advanced ground by recognizing in democracy a dynamic ethical ideal. This recognition is of great importance, for it makes more difficult the often repeated attempt to deter men from radical ends by pacifying them with means made harmless through disuse. Democracy as an ethical way of life, of course, remains to be attained; but openly to recognize this helps toward getting men to use the now available political means for ushering in a better economic and social order.

So abundant, however, is the material in this book that each reader may moralize after his own bent, as the reviewer has after his. Political

Digitized by Google

theory has yet to run: philosophers are still not kings, nor kings philosophers. Moreover, if Professor Herbert W. Schneider be right in his chapter on philosophy, so scintillatingly written as constantly to threaten to call attention to the advocate rather than to the law, neither philosophers nor kings are broken-hearted over their separation. Soaring justice must still be intrigued earthward.

T. V. SMITH

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

REASON AND MORALS: AN ENQUIRY INTO THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS. By Israel Levine, lecturer in philosophy at University College, Exeter. Glasgow: Maclehose, Jackson & Co., 1924. Pp. 177. Price, 6*s*. net.

This is an admirable statement of a point of view similar to that of Professor L. T. Hobhouse; but the author is an original thinker and not a mere commentator. The psychological factors of the moral life are treated in the modern method. The real is given a definite and interesting meaning, and the point of view of Professor Dewey, in keeping morals close to actual life, is accepted. Thus the first principle of ethics is said to be "security of life." Equality and democracy are discussed; economic determination is criticized; and only after thus dealing with actual issues does the author discuss the traditional views as expressed by Aristotle and Kant. The book is therefore an important essay in the formation of a theory of ethics which shall be more than commentary or historical criticism of ethical doctrines. The study of ethics does, indeed, seem to be in a parlous condition: for the new psychology and the wide knowledge of social history have not yet entered into the making of ethical theories, and, on the other hand, our social sciences and history still live upon very primitive moral conceptions. Dr. Levine has done a great service in breaking new ground; and he has made a real advance in ethical theory.

C. D. B.

THE IDEA OF THE SOUL. By John Laird. (Library of Philosophy and Religion). London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1924. Pp. 192. Price, 5*s*. net.

Professor Laird has recently gone from Belfast to the University of Aberdeen. He signs his preface in the University of California; so he is widely known. His work on the *Problems of Self* gave a definite realist account of facts among which Professor Laird maintains the self is to be found. In this new book he writes with his usual lucidity and exactness.

Digitized by Google

He reviews historically the chief opinions regarding the soul as "the principle of living things." He gives an account of modern psychological analysis and devotes a chapter to the discussion of moral personality. There is also a chapter on personal immortality. Professor Laird maintains that there is a psychical continuant, and he makes out a very good case for that; but he also treats this reality as in the relation of "partnership" with the body, and that is more obscure. It appears that Professor Laird lapses into metaphor when he says that the universe "sustaining the good" must preserve persons in existence after death. However, the book is most readable and very illuminating. The use of metaphor may be underrated in the philosophical tradition.

C. D. B.

THE ETHICS OF SOCRATES. By Miles Menander Dawson. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1924.

A well-known line of Milton tells us that from the mouth of Socrates issued forth

Mellifluous streams that watered all the schools.

Mr. Dawson seeks to illustrate this truth or truism by adding to the account of Socrates' teaching in Plato and Xenophon a selection of similar passages from the later Greek and Roman moralists, Aristotle, Cicero, and especially the Platonizing Stoics, Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius. These passages, well arranged under such rubrics as "Virtue Is Obedience to Reason," "Science, the Basis of Ethics," "The Soul," "Happiness Man's Goal," "The Future Life," "Character," "Education," "Duty to God," "Duty to Self," "Death," constitute a useful book of edification for the general reader and will help him to a vivid realization of the wealth and rationality of ancient ethical thought. The critical scholar might ask how much of this is certainly Socratic and whether the precise interrelations and differences of the various schools are always kept in mind. But the book is not intended for the specialist.

PAUL SHOREY

THE CONDUCT OF LIFE. By Benedetto Croce. Authorized translation by Arthur Livingston. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1924. Pp. 326.

Anchoring himself in a metaphysics of mysticism, Croce takes for granted most of the general implications of such a position, and then proceeds to a practical elaboration of everyday problems in ethics that virtually amounts to casuistry. These casuistries have admittedly been partly

Digitized by Google

implied in the Crocean philosophy, but are not strictly deducible therefrom. They result from practical observations on life, which Croce does not even attempt to unify for fear of making them artificial.

These essays strike one as a rather tedious combination of old, war-wearied Europe and Hegelian apologetics. The social misfits—criminals and wars—are integrated into historical progress (*svolgimento*) on the score that they are irritants to social reform and moral stamina. Nor is this apologetic lessened by that further damnable pretext that they elicit our sympathies. The curse of this position lies not in the slavery it demands and condones—social, industrial, even "white"—but in the subtler instrumentalizing of human beings which prompts slumming and charity balls. No ethical system is worthy of the name unless it purposes that all persons shall become responsible and free.

The same apologetic is offered for gambling and usury. And yet one feels that the trouble with a principle of "non olet" is that the same olfactory rule of accommodation applies in morals as in sense experience. It is, after all, Trinity's business to regard its income from wretched tenements as an open question, and for the Middle West to be continually excited about a League of Nations and child labor laws. What is even more important is to distinguish between the futile condemnation of past practices, and intelligent correction of the wrong. The author confuses the two.

The spirit of these essays, however, is sound: that after all, Morality should come down off her high horse and fight and play with the evils and passions she too often, to her harm, disdains.

C. F. TAEUSCH

STATE UNIVERSITY OF IOWA

SHORTER NOTICES

REICHLS PHILOSOPHISCHER ALMANACH AUF DAS JAHR 1924. Darmstadt: Otto Reichl Verlag, 1924. Pp. 480+52. Price, 12 M.

Reichl's *Almanach* for 1924 comprises almost twice as many pages as the issue of a year earlier, and this has enabled it to include a great deal of special material relating to Kant, to whose memory, very appropriately, the book is dedicated. As its frontispiece, it carries a portrait of the philosopher copied from a sketch made by Countess Charlotte Amalia Keyserling, about 1755. This represents the earliest of the portraits of Kant that have as yet come to light, and fortunately it was the work of a friend who was an artist of rare ability. Recent investigations have brought forth also other important material relating to the appearance, tastes, and habits of Kant in his younger years. Hitherto we have been inclined to think of him almost exclusively in terms of the paintings, busts, and characterizations dating subsequently to 1781, when he first achieved fame; these present a thoroughly formed, if not indeed already aged, personality, and

Digitized by Google

often they have so monopolized our ideas that we have strangely failed to realize that Kant too enjoyed a youth, with all the traits thereunto appertaining, that he underwent a long period of learning and habit formation, that he became an *elegante Magister*, a true aristocrat in the highest sense of the term, a uniquely respected and impressive instructor, enjoying intellectual and social relations not alone with colleagues, but with fellow-townsmen, with military officers, nobility, and business and professional persons of various nationalities. A clue to some recent literature bearing on these facts is to be found in the present *Almanach*. It contains also sections on such subjects as "The Humor of Kant," "Unfamiliar Anecdotes relating to Kant," "*Der elegante Magister*," "Kant's Impression upon the Youth of his Day," "Kant as Seen by His Contemporaries," and "Kant's Statements concerning Himself." Copied from one of Hippel's novels is a somewhat humorous account of an examination for entrance to the University in Koenigsberg, for this contains the first published statement (1779) of certain doctrines of the critical philosophy; from Hippel is taken also a description of "an evening in the society of old Koenigsberg," the company including Kant, Countess von Keyserling, and Frau von der Recke. Significant articles discuss the point of view and procedure to be adopted if we would gain a more thorough understanding of Kant's imperishable achievement; the doctrines contained in Kant's *Opus postumum*, brought out by Professor Adickes in 1920, and the significance they have for the interpretation of the earlier, well-known works of Kant; and the place and meaning of the "as-if" in the philosophy of Kant. To those unfamiliar with the important body of German literature that has in recent years centered about its problem, this last-mentioned article will afford a helpful, even though a somewhat abstruse, introduction.

> Even today we may say that, in the case of Kant, one must distinguish perhaps twenty varieties of the "as-if" and that their investigation, in connection with at least all the critical writings, is necessary, and must at some time be undertaken, not only if we would understand Kant, but if we would develop the logic of religion—a subject which, along with the logic of science, has hitherto been sadly neglected (pp. 124 f.).

The reader who works through the forty-eight pages following this assertion will at least agree that it is not entirely without basis.

Of the non-Kantian material in the volume, the most important by far is a one-hundred-and-sixty-page account, mostly in fine print, classifying and describing the very numerous philosophical journals in Germany which led a longer or shorter life (mostly the latter) during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, beginning with the *Acta Philosophorum* of 1715–26. In 1790, there were over a dozen philosophical journals; in 1814, not a single one. Other facts, similarly interesting and significant, emerge, but the central value of the study is, of course, bibliographical. Its task seems so thoroughly and so definitely done that, because of it alone, the *Almanach* should receive a place in every library where research work is being done in the field of modern German or European philosophy.

EDWARD L. SCHAUB

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY

THE THEORY OF GOOD AND EVIL. By Hastings Rashdall. 2d edition. New York: Oxford University Press, American Branch, 1924. 2 volumes. Pp. xxxv+736. Price, $6.00.

The first edition of this well-known work was published in 1907. The second edition differs from the first only in the inclusion of a few verbal corrections that

Digitized by Google

the author had made before his death. It is a fitting memorial to his ethical influence that Dr. Rashdall's solid treatise on fundamental ethical problems should by this new edition be made accessible to another generation of students.

T. V. S.

MODERN CLASSICAL PHILOSOPHERS. Revised and Enlarged Edition. By Benjamin Rand. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1924. Pp. xiv+893.

Professor Rand's well-known selections from philosophical classics, beginning with Bruno, are now extended to include important excerpts from six more recent philosophers: Lotze, Renouvier, Bradley, Royce, James, and Bergson. Otherwise the second edition remains the same as the first.

T. V. S.

ROMANTISME ET POLITIQUE. By André Jussain. Paris: Editions Bossard, 1924. Pp. 290.

Whatever definitive meaning M. Jussain may or may not have had in mind for "romantisme," he has successfully obscured it under a mass of irrelevant observations on medieval and modern literature, philosophy, and politics, behind a barrier of flashy but frequently misleading generalizations, and in seemingly contradictory statements as to the meaning of the term. On the whole, he seems to consider it as practically synonymous with the revolutionary temperament (see pp. 86, 251, 281, 283), but there is ground for believing that at times he is not satisfied with that none-too-narrow meaning. For example, in at least one place a sort of generic humanitarianism seems to be indicated (p. 201); again, an individualism which he erroneously attributes to Rousseau, an interpretation of Rousseau which he subsequently changes but without clarifying his terminology; again, with an idealism which disregards realities. Consequently, although we may be willing to agree with him that the tempering of the romantic theory in politics into a more workable system is a great problem, we are never quite sure precisely what sort of political thinking it is that is to be modified.

The lack of clarity with regard to the meaning of important terms is surpassed by the unscholarly methods by which he has secured his data and by his lack of objectivity of viewpoint. His sources are all secondary—with a few unimportant exceptions, all French, although he does not limit the scope of his study to France—and many of them are no longer considered to be thoroughly reliable, even though they do possess the merit of convenience of access and of a French translation. The animus against Germany is so pronounced that he speaks of the *criminelle complicité* and the *crime contre l'humanité . . . du fourbe Lloyd George et de l'imbécile Président Wilson*, who did not acquiesce in the complete subjection of that country. A frequent dichotomy of judgment, an undue sharpening of antitheses (cf. pp. 110, 111, 257), and the one-sided vie / presented of the political use made of arguments drawn from Roman law are further shortcomings of the book.

But if M. Jussain adds little or nothing to our understanding of the problems of politics, he has written a few bits of interesting and suggestive criticism of political speculations. Although his concluding chapter seems to have relatively little relation to what has gone before, it is well worth while as a separate and somewhat discursive essay upon certain sorts of political thought. There we find that the charming M. Jussain has expressed a number of sound opinions, not new, to be sure, not particularly incisive or likely to aid us very much in the

Digitized by Google

solution of the difficulties upon which he discourses, but for the most part expressed in a delightful style. But let him speak for himself:

> Il n'existe donc pas d'institutions parfaites en soi, mais seulement des institutions qui sont bonnes pour un temps et pour un pays, quelquefois pour un très long temps et pour un grand nombre de pays, suivant ce que le expérience en décide. Il n'en va pas autrement à l'égard des principes et des maximes politiques qui régissent la conduite des individus et des peuples.

B. F. WRIGHT, JR.

THE MIND AT WORK: IN STUDYING, THINKING, AND READING. By R. L. Lyman. Chicago: Scott, Foresman & Co. Pp. 349.

A source book and discussion manual for students of the high-school and college level, designed to introduce the student to effective methods of reading, studying, and thinking. It consists of readings, reading suggestions, questions, and class projects, and valuable lists of laboratory materials. Unlike the usual book on the subject, it is not made up of useful hints and encouraging advice, but it lays a foundation of general principles. It contains, for example, such selections as: "The Nature of Study," by F. W. McMurray; "The Formation of Good Habits," from William James; "The Analysis of an Act of Thought," from John Dewey; and "Accuracy in Observation and Statement," by Charles W. Eliot. Professor Lyman has organized his material skilfully and filled in the gaps with sections of his own which are not the least valuable part of the work. The readings are selected with an eye to literary style and appeal to the imagination, so that it can be read and enjoyed by students of all levels. The book has no bearing on ethics, except in so far as knowledge is virtue and the technique of knowing is morality applied.

E. T. MITCHELL

THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. By Everett Kimball. Boston: Ginn & Co., 1924. Pp. vi+785.

Based upon two earlier works of the author, this present book throws into one volume the description of local, state, and national government in the United States. The book is meant primarily for college students. The historical background is little stressed, but great emphasis is put upon the functioning of government in the three spheres, so as to display both their separation and their interrelation.

T. V. S.

CONTRIBUTIONS OF SCIENCE TO RELIGION. By Shailer Mathews, with the co-operation of William E. Ritter, Robert A. Millikan, Edwin B. Frost, Edward B. Mathews, C. Judson Herrick, John Coulter, Ellsworth Faris, Charles H. Judd, John M. Dodson, Charles B. Davenport, E. Davenport, C.-E. A. Winslow, Horatio Hackett Newman. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1924. Pp. vii+427.

In so far as ethics is socialization, this book represents something of an advance. Not that innumerable attempts at co-operation between scientists and theologians have not been made, but that usually each class has made the attempt in the absence of the other. It is a very unresourceful theologian that has not been able to get harmony between science and religion simply by branding whatever does not agree with his theology as "science falsely so-called." Equally unimaginative, too, has been the scientist heretofore who has not been able to save religion by making it mean, say, the spirit in which he prosecutes

Digitized by Google

his scientific work and branding the residue of theology as superstition. Here at last, however, the dean of a divinity school audaciously lets twelve scientists of varying eminence supply their own content for their several disciplines, and then attempts to show that what they have said is not only in keeping with the spirit of Christianity but contributes toward a new content as well.

There will be those who feel, however, that more than juxtaposition is necessary really to get oil and water mixed. And their suspicion will be nurtured toward conviction when they read that the theologian in a foreword to the various scientific articles declares that the modern religious world-view postulates, among other tenets, "God, the immanent personal reason, purpose and activity in the universe" and "Life after death as conditioned by the individual's character and relations with God." The fact that Professor Mathews does not go as far as he might to make the co-operation real does not mean, however, that he does not go a long way. He goes far enough to substitute in religion goodness for power and a democratic way of life on earth for an aristocratic ideal enshrined in the heavens. And to the ethically observant, such generosity will not pass without thanks. Where so much has been done, more may be expected.

T. V. S.

A HISTORY OF ETHICS. By Stephen Ward. ("World's Manual Series.") Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. Pp. 96. Price, 2*s*. 6*d*. net.

This little book contains portraits of philosophers and an interesting account of their lives, but not much in regard to the theory of ethics. It is not quite clear whether in his own mind the author distinguishes between moral practices, and ethics or the theory of morality. Perhaps there is such a thing as a "voluntary ideal," but what possibly can be the meaning of the statement that "the forces of the state," whatever they may be, are "always largely composed of sheer momentum"?

C. D. B.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF CHARACTER. By Edgar Pierce, Ph.D. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1924. Pp. xi+435.

It is the aim of this book "to discover a philosophic basis for a scientific psychology of character which will preserve the validity of scientific law and the moral value of life." This basis is found in a metaphysical theory which Dr. Pierce characterizes as "pluralistic idealism." Drawing upon idealism on the one hand and upon current realism on the other, he frames a theory of reality as mental, made up of a plurality of minds. While the monads of which reality is made up are all of the same fundamental character, the aggregation of monads gives rise to new qualities; bodies and minds are communities of monads. The aggregation of monads, and so the creative advance of nature, is secured by the operation of purpose, which is present even in physical elements. The ultimate explanation of character is in non-materialistic terms; so the moral value of life is preserved. The material world is made up of those aspects of reality which are common to many minds and "to the object," and the laws of the behavior of which are fixed. Science has provided in the material world a field of unlimited extent within which its results are valid. This book merits reading alike on the score of the scholarship which it exhibits and the excellence of the style in which it is written.

C. F. ARROWOOD

Digitized by Google

IDEALISM AS A PHILOSOPHICAL DOCTRINE. By R. F. A. Hoernlé, professor of philosophy, Johannesburg, South Africa. (Library of Philosophy and Religion.) London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1924. Pp. 190. Price, 5s. net.

Professor Hoernlé is known by his *Studies in Contemporary Metaphysics*. He is well aware of all the realist attacks upon idealism, and he gives them due weight in this new volume. The historical method is followed, beginning with a new interpretation of the value of Berkeley's thought, but the aim of the book is to give to the student a sort of map of the chief features in contemporary idealism. The author distinguishes two chief kinds of idealism, calling them "spiritual pluralism," with which the name of Professor McTaggart is connected, and "absolutism." The book is an admirable introduction to philosophy, but it suffers a little from being too much concerned with the philosophers of the past. The preliminary discussion of the meaning of the words "idea" and "idealism" is excellent. The treatment of Hegel is very clear; but there is a danger lest the student of philosophy should think that philosophical knowledge consists in commentary upon the doctrines of the dead. In this way philosophy is prevented from living the natural life of science or even of poetry. It becomes theological.

C. D. B.

NUOVI ORIZZONTI DELLA PSICOLOGIA SPERIMENTALE. By A. Gemelli. 2d edition. Milano, Italy: Soc. Ed. "Vita di Pensiero." Pp. 383. Price, 18 lire.

This is not a systematic treatise, but a series of essays showing the place and value of experimental psychology. It is significant for us outside Italy because it shows that there is scientific work being done in Italy on psychological problems, and that Croce and Gentile do not entirely dominate their native land. Gemelli gives abundant references to the literature of the subject, and perhaps too much space is given to reporting upon experiments which have been already described by other authors. But the intention of the author evidently is to show that definite results of a genuinely psychological character can be derived from experiment. His historical review of the study of abnormal psychology is very interesting, and he makes some good contributions by way of criticism in his discussion of the psychology of the judgment. Details are given of some experiments undertaken by the author and of their results.

C. D. B.

THE SCIENTIFIC APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY: SELECTED ESSAYS AND REVIEWS. By H. Wildon Carr, professor of philosophy in the University of London. London: Macmillan & Co., 1924. Pp. 278. Price, 12s. net.

Almost all the essays in this volume have been published before in periodicals, and they are connected only by the very slightest thread; but they all refer to contemporary theories of philosophy, chiefly those of Bergson and Croce. Professor Carr writes well and has a great skill in interpreting the idealist school of thinkers; but he omits rather too obviously any reference to the modern realists, who might be supposed to provide some evidence of "the scientific approach to philosophy." It is strange to find Croce even in the precincts of such an approach; but indeed the greater part of the book has no bearing on the problem of the relations between philosophy and science. Professor Carr firmly believes that Einstein's theory is philosophical and that "relativity" implies relation to a "subject" in the Hegelian sense of that word. This is a mistake of interpretation: the relation between any two moving points is of course fundamental to the problem as to the character of the motion of each, but it would

Digitized by Google

probably puzzle Einstein to read Professor Carr's words that "the principle of relativity is the recognition that observed facts cannot be understood without taking into consideration . . . . the objective conditions of the observer's mind." Bergson fills many pages of these essays, and does not thereby appear any more aware of the scientific aspects of philosophy. The immense omission of all reference to "values" in Bergson's theory of mental process is not accounted for; and yet Professor Carr follows the old idealist tradition in accusing science of abstraction and claiming that philosophy is concrete. Its concreteness appears to be consistent with the omission of relevant factors, which any scientist would avoid. The more literary essays on the tercentenary of Pascal and on Descartes show Professor Carr at his best.

X. Y. Z.

SPECULUM MENTIS, OR THE MAP OF KNOWLEDGE. By R. G. Collingwood. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924. Pp. 327. Price, 12*s.* 6*d.* net.

This is a most attractive and interesting version of the neo-Hegelian philosophy. Mr. Collingwood begins with a very cogent argument as to the character of philosophy; he perceives and very well states the defect of our contemporary civilization in its lack of spiritual or emotional unity. For him, as for the Greeks and the scholastics, philosophy should not be a mere body of scientific truths, but a living and unifying attitude or spiritual expression. He discusses art, religion, and science as three stages or aspects of the full life of the mind; and he then, in the manner of Croce, passes to history in the peculiar neo-Hegelian sense of the word and to philosophy. He ends, as in duty bound, with the Absolute. The usual results of interpretation in uncanny sense begin to appear when the author deals with religious "truths," for he will have it that they are somehow true. He is angry about "rationalism," for he says that it should not assume that religion "means what it says." Alas! one is not able to assume that about the neo-Hegelians. On page 249 we are told that "in philosophy subject and object are identified"; and the unregenerate may then suppose that philosophy is a muddle. The trouble with the looking-glass into which Mr. Collingwood takes us is that everything changes into everything else, as the best of the Oxford philosophers, "Lewis Carroll," saw that it would in that shadowy world. But Mr. Collingwood quotes on his title-page the old assertion that "we see in a glass darkly." His work is valuable for its hints and criticisms and his "asides," but his main thesis has the weakness of Croce's airy imaginings.

C. D. B.

INTRODUCTION TO MODERN PHILOSOPHY. By C. E. M. Joad. Oxford: University Press, 1924. Pp. 110. Price, 2*s.* 6*d.* net.

This is a very interesting account of modern realism, neo-idealism, pragmatism, and the philosophy of Bergson. It contains portraits of the chief modern philosophers. The author gives a rather abrupt view of realism, but has included a long study of Mr. Bertrand Russell's views and some comment upon them; and Croce is dealt with very fully and sympathetically. With regard to Bergson, the use of metaphors in his statement of the case is properly emphasized. Indeed, anyone who desires a brief introduction to the chief schools of thought in contemporary philosophy will find this little book most useful. It is not a mere summary or record; it is a critical restatement which in the main is sympathetic to all the theories discussed.

C. D. B.

Digitized by Google

YOGA AS PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION. By Surendranath Dasgupta, Ph.D. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co.; New York: E. P. Dutton, 1924. Pp. x+200. Price, 10*s*. 6*d*. net.

Although the philosophy expounded in this book is the one Indian system that has real parallels with modern scientific thought, there has never been any adequate treatment of it in English apart from the author's previous studies. Even the term Yoga is generally understood rather in its application to Vedantic pantheism. Metaphysically the Yoga and Sankhya philosophies are only two different modifications of one common system of ideas, and the work involves a discussion of both. It may at first sight seem strange that the atheistic Sankhya, and the Yoga that makes devotion to God the easiest means of salvation, could be combined. In both of them the universal cosmic matter is *prakrti* with its three constituents in equilibrium. When the equilibrium is disturbed, the evolution of the universe begins, materially as well as mentally, for "matter on the one hand, mind, the senses, and the ego on the other are regarded as nothing more than two different kinds of modifications of one primal cause, the *Prakrti*." This would surely have pleased Herbert Spencer, but what would he have said at finding behind all this an infinity of souls (*purushas*)? These are ultimates, spiritual atoms inserted in a system of evolving and involving matter. The aim of the souls is not union with God, for there is no Brahma apart from the totality of souls, but complete dissociation from matter. The doctrines which the Yoga system added to this are not so important as may appear at first sight. The Yoga God is no First Cause or Final End, but merely one great *purusha*, who is free from matter, and who benignly aids other souls in attaining the same purpose. How far this change was due to practical religion, or how far it was felt to be logically necessary, might be further discussed. There are several important chapters on evolution, but they have little to do with the modern theory. It is not clear why Darwin should be mentioned. Surely he never expounded any "general form of the evolutionary process," but confined himself to biology. We are told that accidental variation is a "seeming departure from the causal chain." What evolutionist would admit that? Western evolution starts from the mind and matter that we know, but Yoga never had a transmutation theory at all. It had the theory of the elaboration of an *Urstoff*, and this, whatever Spencer and Haeckel may say, does not yet constitute science for the evolutionists. The fact of a God in Yoga, who if not the ultimate reality is at least a person who can be prayed to, has opened the way to a great development of ethical theory and mystical practices. These practices can only be exercised under the training of a teacher, but the psychical states can be described, and the chapters thereon form a most illuminating account of the chief form of Indian mysticism. The whole work forms an authoritative exposition of the subject by one who is a complete master of all the original authorities.

EDWARD J. THOMAS

CAMBRIDGE, ENGLAND

STUDIES IN VEDANTA. By Rao Bahadur Vasudeva J. Kirtikar. Edited by Rukund R. Jayakar. Bombay: D. B. Taraporevala Sons & Co., 1924. Pp. viii+194. Price, 14*s*. net.

This work consists of a series of essays written at various times by the author, an Indian judge. Their special interest lies in their being not the investigations of a historian of philosophy, but the studies of a modern educated Hindu of wide religious sympathies, to whom the pantheism of the Vedanta was his religion and guide of life. The author's thought thus moves much more in religious conceptions than in metaphysical distinctions, and he seeks to answer not

Digitized by Google

so much the objections that critics find in first principles, as their inferences as to what practical conclusions are to be drawn. He finds that there is only one ultimate reality, and repudiating the "unscientific conception of creation," he holds that the world originated from the Word, and this Word is Brahman. So far from Vedanta striking at the root of all morality, he claims that it has an ethical ideal at least as high as the Christian, if not higher. One chapter is on asceticism. He is undoubtedly right in rejecting the popular view that practices of self-mortification are characteristic of Hinduism or are authoritatively taught. Not only are there charlatans in any religion, but the sect which is best known for such practices is one that has rejected the Vedas.

The chapter on mysticism is particularly interesting, but it is strange that the author should speak of European prejudice against mysticism. It may be suggested that the real enemy is not Europe, but a certain type of thought that is destructive of all religious values, whether found on the banks of the Thames or the Ganges. But even such thinkers have the right to ask how a system logically holds together, and here they will not find much help. The author appeals to dualistic and non-dualistic schools of Vedanta, and even includes the apparently irreconcilable systems of Sankhya and Yoga. But the book, in spite of its limitations, tells us what Vedanta means to a Hindu, and should help to abolish the barren criticisms that are due to a misunderstanding of the terms and concepts under discussion.

EDWARD J. THOMAS

CAMBRIDGE, ENGLAND

WOMAN IN WORLD HISTORY: HER PLACE IN THE GREAT RELIGIONS. By E. M. White. London: Herbert Jenkins Ltd., 1924. Pp. 416. Price, 8*s.* 6*d.*

Women's movements in recent years, though vibrant with energy and will, have lacked steadiness, strength, and dignity. Broad historical perspective and sound philosophical background, the product of calm scholarship, are slowly being secured. A decided contribution to these foundations is furnished by Miss White's latest book, *Woman in World History*. For many years mistress in girls' secondary schools, and in recent years lecturer in civics, London County Council, author of *The Philosophy of Citizenship* and numerous articles, she brings to her task a comprehensive interest and wide reading.

For purposes of organization she has limited her treatment to woman's position and contribution as revealed in the great religions. But she interprets "religion" in the widest sense, so as to include (*a*) the life and sayings of the founders, (*b*) the sacred writings, (*c*) the customs, institutions, and literature connected with the religion, and (*d*) the conditions of life where the religion flourishes. The view presented is therefore as comprehensive as could well be managed in the limits of one volume. The author has aimed at an appreciation and understanding of the ideas, customs, and institutions rather than at criticism of them from an advanced point of view, and this essential fairness has been well maintained throughout.

Years of study have gone into the preparation of the book, and the libraries have been ransacked in the effort to bring the survey up to the standards of thorough scholarship. Sources, however, appear to be limited to those in the English language. Within this field the bibliography and references are impressive, and her use of material critical. While the professional reader may find too frequent use of the well-worn illustrations, he must remember that the book is not intended for him alone.

Since it is a survey rather than a study of a problem or set of problems, the writer does not feel required to establish any theories or to make any sweeping

Digitized by Google

inferences. A number of generalizations are suggested, however, in the concluding chapter. "No *deliberate and general* suppression of womanhood has been attempted." Social and economic factors have forced a division of labor and a diversity of spheres, and there has been a lack of appreciation of woman's sphere and capacities. Against this situation restless spirits have frequently rebelled. But from earliest times honor has been paid, consciously or unconsciously, to womanhood—as witnessed by the female deities in Egypt, Babylonia, etc., and Mary worship in the Middle Ages. And as civilization advances, there has been an increased estimation of the feminine qualities of intuition, devotion, morality, and refinement. "History, considered as evolution, shows that everywhere men and women have worked and suffered and risen together—the masculine has co-operated with the feminine in their slow advancement." "The whole history reveals a great growth of the *human* spirit struggling against material obstacles and its own shortcomings; throughout this growth woman has shared in the struggles and failures and successes; her part has been distinct from, yet parallel with man's."

E. T. MITCHELL

BOOKS RECEIVED

ADAMS, GEORGE P., and LOEWENBERG, J., editors. Essays in Metaphysics. University of California Publications in Philosophy, Vol. V. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1924. Pp. 220. Price, $3.75.

BONAR, JAMES. Malthus and His Work. London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1924. Pp. x+438. Price, 12*s*. 6*d*. net.

CARVER, THOMAS NIXON. The Economy of Human Energy. New York: Macmillan Co., 1924. Pp. xiii+287. Price, $2.50.

CASE, CLARENCE MARSH. Outlines of Introductory Sociology. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1924. Pp. xxxiv+980.

CHIROL, SIR VALENTINE. The Occident and the Orient. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1924. Pp. xi+228. Price, $2.00, postage extra.

CONGER, GEORGE PERRIGO. A Course in Philosophy. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1924. Pp. xi+603.

DAWSON, MILES MENANDER. The Ethics of Socrates. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1924. Pp. xxi+361.

DE VISSCHER, CHARLES. The Stabilization of Europe. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1924. Pp. xi+190. Price, $2.00, postage extra.

FOX, PAUL. The Reformation in Poland: Some Social and Economic Aspects. Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science. Series XLII, No. 4. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1924. Pp. viii+153.

FUNG, YU-LAN. A Comparative Study of Life Ideals. Shanghai: Commercial Press, Ltd., 1924. Pp. xii+264.

GETTELL, RAYMOND G. History of Political Thought. New York: The Century Co., 1924. Pp. xi+511. Price, $3.75.

GULICK, CHARLES A., JR. Labor Policy of the United States Steel Corporation. Columbia Studies in History, Economics and Public Law. Vol. CXVI, No. 1, Whole No. 258. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1924. Pp. 200.

Digitized by Google

GURSWITSCH, GEORG. Fichtes System der Konkreten Ethik. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1924. Pp. 375. Price, *gch* 12 M.; *gcb* 14 M.

HARRISON, SHELBY M. Public Employment Offices. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1924. Pp. xvii+685.

HEERMANCE, EDGAR L. Codes of Ethics: A Handbook. Burlington, Vt.: Free Press Printing Co., 1924. Pp. viii+525. Price, $4.00.

HOERNLÉ, R. F. A. Idealism as a Philosophical Doctrine. London: Hodder & Stoughton, Ltd., 1924. Pp. 189. Price, 5*s*. net.

JOAD, C. E. M. Introduction to Modern Philosophy. London: Oxford University Press, 1924. Pp. 110. Price, 2*s*. 6*d*. net.

KIRTIKAR, VASUDEVA J. Studies in Vedanta. Bombay: D. B. Tarporevala & Sons, 1924. Pp. viii+194. Price, 14*s*. net.

KRAUS, HERBERT. Germany in Transition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1924. Pp. xi+236. Price, $2.00, postage extra.

KROPOTKIN, PRINCE. Ethics, Origin and Development. New York: Dial Press, 1924. Pp. xvi+349. Price, $4.00.

LEVINE, ISRAEL. Reason and Morals: An Enquiry into the First Principles of Ethics. Glasgow: Maclehose, Jackson & Co., 1924. Pp. xii+174. Price, 6*s*. net.

MACKENZIE, H. MILLICENT, M.A. Freedom in Education. London: Hodder & Stoughton, Ltd., 1924. Pp. 182. Price, 5*s*. net.

MERRIAM, C. E., and BARNES, HARRY ELMER. Political Theories: Recent Times. New York: Macmillan Co., 1924. Pp. xii+597.

MILBURN, R. GORDON. The Theology of the Real. Williams & Norgate, Ltd., 1925. Pp. xiv+264. Price, 10*s*. 6*d*.

MILLER, HERBERT ADOLPHUS. Races, Nations and Classes. "Lippincott Series in Sociology," edited by E. C. Hayes. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1924. Pp. xvii+196.

PIERCE, EDGAR. The Philosophy of Character. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1924. Pp. xi+435. Price $4.00.

QUIN, MALCOLM. Memoirs of a Positivist. London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1924. Pp. 252. Price, 10*s*. 6*d*. net.

RAND, BENJAMIN. Modern Classical Philosophers. Revised and enlarged edition. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1924. Pp. xiv+893.

RASHDALL, HASTINGS. The Theory of Good and Evil. London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1924. 2d edition. Pp. xxxv+736. Price, $6.00.

RICE, STUART A. Farmers and Workers in American Politics. Columbia University Studies in History, Economics and Public Law. Vol. CXIII, No. 2, Whole No. 253. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1924. Pp. 231.

RICHARDSON, DORSEY. Constitutional Doctrines of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science. Series XLII, No. 3. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1924. Pp. xii+105.

ROSS, W. D. Aristotle's Metaphysics: A Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924. 2 volumes. Vol. I, Pp. clxvi+366; Vol. II, Pp. 528. Price, 48*s*. net.

SHAVER, ERWIN L. The Project Principle in Religious Education. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1924. Pp. xix+375.

SMITH, GERALD BIRNEY. Principles of Christian Living. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1924. Pp. ix+212. Price, $2.00, postage extra.

Digitized by Google

STERN, WILLIAM. Person und Saehe. Band I: Ableitung und Grundlehre. Leipzig: J. A. Barth, 1925. Pp. xx+434. Price, 14.60 G.M.

STERN, WILLIAM. Person und Saehe. Band II: Ableitung und Grundlehre. Leipzig: J. A. Barth, 1923. Pp. xx+272. Price, 9.60 G.M.

STERN, WILLIAM. Wertphilosophie. Leipzig: J. A. Barth, 1924. Pp. xx+474. Price, 159 M.

TSANOFF, R. A. The Problem of Immortality. New York: Macmillan Co., 1924. Pp. viii+418. Price, $3.00.

WARD, STEPHEN. A History of Ethics. London: Oxford University Press, 1924. Pp. 96. Price 2s. 6d. net.

WHITE, E. M. Woman in World History: Her Place in the Great Religions. London: Herbert Jenkins, Ltd., 1924. Pp. 416.

Digitized by Google

THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS

Volume XXXV JULY 1925 Number 4

NATURE AND SPIRIT[1]

EDMUND H. HOLLANDS

"When the way of Earth accords with that of Heaven, and that of Man with both, all things prosper. The good will of Heaven is seen in fair weather and fertile fields; its anger, in earthquakes, storms, and famine. The voice of the people is also the voice of Heaven." This, or something like this, is what pious men believed and said in China, perhaps four thousand years ago. And in the same way the Greeks, before the age of questioning, thought of the *Horai,* Justice, Peace, and Fair Order, as principles operating both in the orderly course of Nature and in that made known in the laws of the tribe and the city.

We look back at these beliefs as evidences of naïve simplicity, and say in our clumsy way that men then were identifying the laws of morality with those of Nature, or their own inner life with the external succession of physical phenomena. The truth rather is that they did not identify, because they did not recognize a possible contrast or opposition. These ancient beliefs represent a profound conviction, the inevitable strength of which is apparent as soon as we consider it clearly and without sophistication. How could it be otherwise, if Nature is indeed our parent, than that the parent-stock should corroborate and support the essence of its offshoots; that our perfection should be its proper flowering, and its effluences

[1] Read as the president's address at the Annual Meeting of the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association, held at the University of Illinois, April 9–11, 1925.

Digitized by Google

and motions continuous with every pulse of our life, moral and physical alike?

We might expect something like this to be the belief of all who explain man by Nature. But in our own times it has been the "naturalists" themselves who have uttered the sharpest contradictions of this creed. Listen to Thomas Huxley, in 1893:

> The practice of that which is ethically best—what we call goodness or virtue—involves a course of conduct which, in all respects, is opposed to that which leads to success in the cosmic struggle for existence. . . . . Let us understand once for all that the ethical progress of society depends, not on imitating the cosmic process, still less running away from it, but combating it.[2]

Hearken to a still more poignant note of sadness and divorce, ten years later in date, from Bertrand Russell:

> How, in such an alien and inhuman world, can so powerless a creature as Man preserve his aspirations untarnished? A strange mystery it is that Nature, omnipotent but blind, in the revolutions of her secular hurryings through the abysses of space, has brought forth at last a child, subject still to her power, but gifted with sight, with knowledge of good and evil, with the capacity of judging all the works of his unthinking Mother. . . . . Blind to good and evil, reckless of destruction, omnipotent matter rolls on its relentless way.[3]

A mystery indeed, even a paradox, and as such to be explained only by a great change in men's thought of Nature. The ancients who accepted simply and without qualification the continuity of man's natural and spiritual life thought of Nature's law as something that knew exceptions and might be broken—though in the end it always prevailed against the monster or the rebel. The stars in their courses fight against Sisera—but Sisera may fight back, though at his peril. Thus the identification of the natural law with the moral was possible without nullifying the latter by a mere identity of all that is with what ought to be.

[2] Huxley, "Evolution and Ethics," Romanes Lecture.

[3] Russell, *The Free Man's Worship*.

Digitized by Google

But there came a time when men ceased to think of Nature as *Alma Parens*, and natural necessity, no longer simply dominant, became all absorbing. Now nothing can happen within Nature which is not "natural." This is the Nature of Galileo —and of Kant—and of modern science. "Nature," says Galileo, "is the sum of those true and necessary things, which could not possibly be otherwise."[4] And Kant, "Nature is the existence of things, in so far as it is determined by universal laws."[5]

This view of Nature has become so indispensable, and therefore so inveterate, that to many men any alternative seems inconceivable. But I would maintain that it is itself the counterpart and projected image of a certain state of the soul. It was true of the medieval man, as of the Greek—the "evil" in things apart—that to him Nature was something to be accepted, contemplated, sympathetically appreciated, rather than something to be subdued to the control of man. The things there had a "nature" and life of their own, which went its own way by a hidden current, or maintained itself essentially unchanged, so long as the thing endured. Like ourselves, they might be enslaved, but their souls would remain their own. Their "essences" and "qualities" and "forms" were not to be exhausted by any definition. Each thing *is* what it is. There is truth in the feeling of the child, as it broods over pebbles or flowers with a deep sense of Being and of mysterious Distinction, or a solemn pondering of what they really mean. We talk of the abstractness of scholasticism; but what it meant, at least, with all its clumsy-sounding essences, and haecceities, and quiddities, was loyally to confess the reality of the individual.

Now I am very well aware that various labels, intended to express the excessively antiquated and supposedly irrational character of such a view as this of what men call "Nature,"

[4] Galileo, "Dialogo," *Opere*, I, 174; Cassirer, *Erkenntnisproblem*, I, 389.

[5] Kant, *Prolegomena*, sec. 14.

Digitized by Google

may be applied. Some will murmur—or shout—"survival of primitive animism." Others will say that the pondering of hidden meaning, or the sense of symbolic value, is a symptom of idleness or passivity. The grown man turns his pebbles and flowers into instruments of action, and learns what they really mean by doing something with them. Still others—quite rightly—will point out the inadequate knowledge of mathematics as having much to do with the subordinate place assigned to quantity and relation in the ancient conception of the natural world. And there will be some to indicate politely the likelihood of a defensive complex and a substitution fantasy to save the fantast from the unpleasant recognizing of a kind of world which he does not like.

The kind of world which the fantast does not like! But is there any such world? The world we know has to be seen or imagined; it is always a "fantasy"; and the point of view from which it is seen or fantasized is always taken by some election of the fantast. This is as true of the world the scientist sees as it is of the world seen by the poet. But the world of modern science has become so huge and so complex that we lose ourselves in its multiplicity, and forget that, like every perspective, it had a point of origin in the gaze of its first beholders.

What the choice was which determined that point of origin in this case, and with it the directing lines of all the long labor of projective construction which has been the task of three hundred years, may be seen very clearly in the statements of Galileo and of Hobbes, his disciple. It is a choice for analysis of a sort which will make possible the control of Nature by man. The defining hypothesis which determines the method, and therefore its results, is about as follows: If men are to control Nature, they must be able to predict and foresee. This means that they must be able to deduce the consequent phenomena from any given state of phenomena. But exact deduction is mathematical deduction. Consequently, the given phenomena and their consequences in every case—

Digitized by Google

that is, the whole of "apparent" Nature—must be exhausted by mathematical analysis, and what cannot be "mathematized," as, for example, sense-qualities, is "unreal" or "subjective."[6]

This hypothesis proceeds from a predilection very characteristic of the Renaissance, the desire for power. It is the choice of Faust as he turns his back on the traditional wisdom of the ancient schools. In the case of Galileo and that of most of his greater successors, it has been accompanied by the conviction that this is also the way to knowledge and insight, since pure intelligibility is mathematical intelligibility. But even now—or now more than ever—the many appreciate the results of such an analysis in terms of control rather than in those of understanding, and sympathize with the scientist as an engineer rather than as a theorist.

And as often happens, while the thoughts of the mass of mankind are mistaken in detail, their feelings have a certain broad truth of aim and tendency. It is interesting to look back at some of the objections of the Scholastic and other adversaries of the "new philosophy of Nature." Wrong as they were sometimes in supposing that guesses at teleology could do the work of investigation and experiment, or that the application of mathematical analysis must be altogether external and abstract, there were some of their contentions which, speaking philosophically, were just. They were right in insisting on the ontological status of sensible qualities as immediately known; and they were right in feeling that no general law can exhaust the whole meaning and interest of any individual thing. But the radical empiricism which attaches itself to the individual in this way leads straight toward some sort of mysticism, noble or base, futilely absurd, or the germ in feeling of a new life in thought or action.

We can see very clearly the limitations of the "scientific" view, and also its sources, when we think of it as applied to

[6] E.g., see Hobbes, *Concerning Body*, chap. i, sec. 6; chap. vi, secs. 1 and 5.

Digitized by Google

human beings. Whenever what we desire is to manage and control men in the mass, we are satisfied with statistics, engineering, or general laws of behavior, the more quantitative the better. The architect who wishes to know just what elevator capacity an office building must have to handle its crowds at the rush hours needs to know such things as average speed of walking, average cubic capacity, average weight, presumable common occupation or errand. He does not need to know the private preoccupations or tempers of the inhabitants of his beehive. Any manager of men in the mass—the administrator, the officer, the foreman, the politician—is not interested in what they are as individuals, so long as a rough general control is adequate for his purpose. We feel no objection to this in the case of the architect or the engineer, who have quasi-physical situations to meet; but we resent it as an insult when, as is so often the case, the propagandist, the politician, or the professional manager supposes that some routine procedure will be quite sufficient to lead us, individually, in the way in which he desires us to go. And our resentment is so much the hotter as the values involved are matters of intimate concern and appreciation. Efforts to sell one oil stock may be mildly annoying; the rough-and-ready book agent is either amusing or exasperating; but the man who tries to "sell" religion is infuriating. These people, we feel, may know a little about human nature; but for them to suppose that they know enough is an insult to it in general, and especially to us in particular.

How different is the attitude of the artist, the lover, or the friend! And how different is the man they see! The difference in attitude and interest has made a profound difference in insight, and we are sure that the individual's nature and value are not exhausted or expressed in general external relations. We value him for what he essentially and qualitatively *is*, and not for the use to which he can be put, or even for what he does.

Digitized by Google

Now in this human application we are quite ready to accept as valid both of the attitudes which I have been describing, and the views of human nature which they carry with them as both measurably true, though the second obviously has a far deeper truth than the first. But in the case of Nature at large we commonly take what we call "science," which has issued from the desire to control, as telling us what Nature really is; whereas "poetry," which has issued from the need to appreciate, to sympathize, and to comprehend, is commonly regarded as beautiful but objectively unreal.

Is this division not a great cause for the lack of calm and poise, the felt presence of inner conflict and disunion, which has been noticed as distinguishing the temper of the modern man from that exhibited in classical literature? The classical man might feel very differently in regard to Nature, according to mood or occasion; he never thought of doubting his deep inner identity with it, heedless though it might seem of his woe or joy, nor did he ever think of controlling it, except in very partial and limited ways. As has been said, Nature for him was there to be contemplated, to be understood if possible, but not to be subdued. And the attitude of the medieval man—except for the Christian intensification of the conflict between flesh and spirit, and its projection into external Nature—was much the same. But since the Renaissance, Western mankind has set out for the conquest of the natural world, and the organized tactics and strategy of that conquest, with their various corollaries, has become its truth. The demands of thought and action are to be satisfied by the sciences, which are true. Those of feeling and imagination are to be satisfied by poetry, which is beautiful but not true.

This is precisely the line taken by Tyndall in his once-famous "Belfast Address." And what is it but the mid-Victorian revision of the twofold truth doctrine of the early Renaissance—except that "truth" is now become the exclusive property of the sciences? Well meant as Tyndall's sug-

Digitized by Google

gestion was, it reveals a fundamental defect in the civilization which produced it, a grievous division in the souls of men. Seriously adopted, it separates science from the concrete life of intelligence, and reduces poetry at best to a gracious ornament of life, or a delicate comment on human motives and desires. None of the greatest poetry could have been made by men who believed this. And in its last consequences, it leads straight to the cynical conclusion that science is the developed technique for the satisfaction of human desires, while philosophy is the technique for their justification. Indeed, something very like this is the actual though unavowed program of some who believe that we "have brought it excellently far indeed." But for others, more sincere or more thoughtful, deanimated Nature, the fantasm and echo of man's desire for mastery, has overridden and negated his other desires, and so produced the dualistic pessimism expressed by Huxley and by Russell.

The return to unity must be sought in feeling, thought, and action. We must rediscover the deep levels at which the life that is in us is felt as one with the life in Nature. The mystics of all ages have asserted that the lost unity was recoverable, in a higher form, by a felt apprehension of our real identity with external Nature in some Ancestral Being or Primal Self. To the man who attains this cosmic consciousness, they declare, his separateness from the objective world becomes a provisional and educative illusion; he sees in that world the work and experience of a self-possessing and enjoying Spirit with which he has become as one, and which is the common life of all that he has hitherto taken as separate, himself included. What was at first dimly felt becomes knowledge, and he is sure (to use the words of a modern mystic), that "all these beings and personalities must root down in one ultimate Life and Intelligence; all of them in the end and deep down must have a common purpose and object of existence—

Digitized by Google

and in that thought there is liberation, in that thought there is rest."[7]

The type of immediate feeling and conviction which underlies such ideas as these is, of course, often explained as a psychological accident of our nature, possessing no such metaphysical significance as is mistakenly given to it by the mystics. I wish to maintain, on the contrary, that it is a perfectly normal phase of experience, not to be explained away, of which any adequate philosophy must take account; and that, in fact, some immediate feeling, assurance, and decision of this general type underlies and precedes all definite, organized thinking, including that kind of thinking which ends by denying it. Finally, I believe that it may be maintained that any effort to organize all our thinking and all our experience—in a word, any complete philosophy—must ultimately make use of some sort of "feeling" and "intuition."

When I say that this experience is perfectly normal, I do not mean that most of us enjoy it in any developed or explicit form. But we all possess it in rudiment and germ, and it is as essential and ultimate a constituent of human experience as what we call "sensation." We all see colors and hear tones, though we cannot all get out of them what the artist does in one way, or the scientist in another. But the sensing itself is an ultimate act. Neither the apprehension nor the apprehended quality, e.g., "red," can be reduced to terms of anything else, and, specifically, not to terms of physical stimulus or physiological process. The sense-quality is there, it is presented, and it must be taken account of as real. Its value is not merely evidential and symptomatic, as indicating the presence of certain natural processes and relations; but it has a nature and value of its own. For the purposes of metaphysics, the sense-qualities and their aesthetic values have a prima facie reality and importance; they are metaphysically

[7] Edward Carpenter, *The Art of Creation*, p. 34.

Digitized by Google

primary, not secondary or tertiary. And natural science itself at present seems ready to discard the Galilean tradition to the contrary as having served its day.

In a word, when we once begin to attend to the qualitative aspect of experience, we note that the qualities are there, and that they are what they are, explain them by supposed causes or conditions as you will. We note further that they cannot be identified with these causes or conditions, either as to nature or as to value.

Now in much the same way as men usually hear sounds and see colors, so they also have the sort of sense or feeling which in a few develops and expands into mystical intuition or cosmic consciousness. The organ of this rudimentary sense is apparently the whole man. It presumably has its physiological basis in the general life of the organism, and is to be classed psychologically under "coenaesthesia." But it is coenaesthesia objectified. It is, in this rudimentary form, a vague but massive sense and feeling of Unitary Being, a Being in which other things and I are continuously though not indistinguishably one. When it is somewhat more developed, it brings with it a considerable enhancement of emotional value, by imparting to the observer the apparent stability and calm of Nature in the large, and to observed Nature the responsiveness and animate enjoyment of the observer. Beyond this, it expands or intensifies in some instances into the cosmic consciousness described by Bucke, the third stage of consciousness of Carpenter (who has given one of the best accounts of it), or the *unio mystica* of the Christian saints. But in its simplest form, I believe it is universally and constantly present, the perpetual ground bass of all our varied experience. And in this form, it is not only normal but indispensable. The individual in whom it is markedly lacking, however unimpaired his logical powers, is likely to be emotionally unstable, and ineffective in action.

In regard to the extremer and fully developed form of this

Digitized by Google

affective sense of union with Being, or what is usually called "mystic intuition," and the question of its significance or truth, I do not mean to say much here. It appears to me entirely normal, in the sense that it is the intensification of an experience which we all have, and that it is fruitful. In those who possess it, it appears to be not only a tranquillizing and stabilizing influence, but an actual source of light and power. The discussions of it have been too often influenced by the pretensions made to its possession by ignoble and self-seeking charlatans, or by too exclusive attention to the instances of it in connection with a given religious tradition. The independent mystics deserve more consideration from psychologists and philosophers than they have hitherto received; especially those of our own time. Such men as George Russell in Ireland, Edward Carpenter in England, and Walt Whitman in our own country, all of them remarkable in different ways both for literary powers and for practical influence, have given us explicit accounts of this experience and its effects which cannot be denied or despised, and which ought not to be neglected. And in the case of the two former, this experience has been made the basis of a reflective theory or philosophy which is logically as well as aesthetically and ethically impressive.

These men are, to be sure, primarily poets or seers rather than philosophers. But they illustrate what I believe to be true of all the greater philosophies as well—that all the great constructive systems have had their source, avowedly or implicitly, in some immediate assurance, some direct apprehension or feeling of union with reality. It is this that gave their authors what might be called "metaphysical courage," what Hegel called *der Mut der Wahrheit*. What was feeling becomes idea, and the idea expands into its appropriate system, often to lead back into enriched feeling again, whether as "return to the One," or as the *amor intellectualis Dei*, or as the *Geniessen des Absoluten Geistes*.

Bergson has argued that all philosophies arise from intui-

Digitized by Google

tions, that their discursive logic is, as it were, secondary and derivative. But it should also be noticed that these intuitions are predilections, that they are feelings in the affective sense. Parmenides had a religious devotion to Being. Plotinus loved the One, and knew It in his own soul before he came to union with It as the First. Spinoza had set his heart on attaining *aliquid aeternum;* it was a certain good, he felt sure to begin with, whether it could be attained or not. His delight was in Eternity and Totality. Blessedness lay in coming to "a knowledge of the union which the mind has with the *whole* of Nature," and in having "*many* others" come to this knowledge with him.[8] It is perfectly clear from what he says in the *Treatise on Improving the Understanding* that it was such assurances and elections as these which underlay and produced the definitions, axioms, and postulates with which the *Ethics* begins, and which it then proceeds to develop. They are not arbitrary or unmotivated, as has sometimes been objected; they are the ideas which his feelings and intuitions have produced as their appropriate expression. The mystical roots of Plato's and of Hegel's philosophies are not so readily laid bare in a brief statement. Here I can only suggest that Plato was absolutely certain of the Perfect, and that Hegel was possessed by the self-realizing energy of Spirit. In short, the finished metaphysician is a man who is fundamentally certain of what he means himself, and therefore of what things mean. His metaphysic is a continuous comment upon things, a translation of them into his fundamental meaning. His affective certainty and adhesion becomes a logical certainty, the theme which he develops into a whole symphony according to his skill. He finds the secret of the universe in his own heart, and the image and echo of his spirit everywhere.

If the objection arise—as, of course, it does—that this makes the procedure of the metaphysician highly arbitrary as compared with that of the scientist, I must return to my for-

[8] *De Intellectus Emendatione,* I (ed. Van Vloten and Land), 6.

Digitized by Google

mer statements, and complete them by certain conclusions as to the nature of all theorizing. In the first place, then, and again, the general method of the natural sciences has itself arisen from two predilections—the desire for power over Nature, and the preference for the mathematical type of order and intelligibility. And all general and method-determining hypotheses have a similar origin, in the choice or preference of some good to be attained in action or set before the spirit in speculation. But further, and most inclusively, every kind of knowledge, from perception on, has a like connection with feeling and interest.

In what follows, to be brief, I shall mean by "good" any quality or condition immediately appreciated or enjoyed; by "hypothesis" any principle of order and connection in experience, whether in perception, in ordinary thinking and acting, or in the most inclusive theorizing, and whether we are reflectively aware of this principle or not; and by "fundamental" or "methodical hypothesis" a principle of this kind controlling a wide range or important type of theorizing, as in the case of the sciences. The thesis to be maintained is, then, that every hypothesis is rooted in an interest in some good.

In the case of perception, this good is often something to which the individual is natively or hereditarily predisposed, e.g., locomotion, and in that case the hypothesis is unconscious or preconscious, but presumably arose from feeling in the past. Thus, the infant learns to reach and grasp and walk out of its native enjoyment of such activities, and in doing so learns to perceive the spatial relations and objects connected with them. If he grows up in the midst of modern civilization, he learns to perceive cars and trains and other like things out of his natural interest in motion and in moving about himself. The savage child, looking at such things for the first time, would not see them as the definite things we do, because, while he has the interest, it has not in his case yet become connected with these elements of sense. I am reminded of the instance,

Digitized by Google

used by James in a different connection, of the boats of Captain Cook and the Sandwich islanders. The islanders were absorbingly interested in the ship's long boats; but to the great ship itself they gave as little heed as to a mountain or to a tree in the forest.

Of course, the whole process of perceiving is vastly more complicated than this schematic account. And, in particular, the parts played by one's native tongue, and the social system in which one lives, must be pointed out in this connection. Words, customs, institutions, common activities, all supply what might be called perceptual models for the child, into which native interests have already flowed and become set, and which now become preformed moulds and centers of application for his own interests. And the class of distasteful objects raises a question. I can only suggest in passing that distaste and aversion sometimes appear as the negatives of positive interests, and sometimes as also connected with what were once positive interests, but are contrary to the interests now preferred.

In short, at the core of every perception of a definite object or thing there is an interest, faint, customary, or traditional as that interest may now be in many instances. Without selective and grouping interests, no things, but a welter of sense-qualities. And back of the interest, or constituting the interest, is a feeling.

In the case of the particular sciences, a brief mention of three examples from the most transparent of them, mathematics, must suffice for this occasion. It seems quite clear from Burnet's reconstruction of Pythagorean mathematics that it was an original interest and preference for spatial forms and patterns which determined the dominance of geometry over arithmetic in ancient mathematics, with all its fateful consequences. Descartes' intense interest in unity of method led him to work out the "combination of algebra with geometry" which produced analytic geometry. And in the case of

Digitized by Google

Leibniz we can see how the need to satisfy both his interest in rigorous logical continuity and his interest in respecting and recognizing concrete individual difference produced the Calculus as its appropriate mathematical expression.

This brings us back to the fundamental or methodical hypothesis. Every such hypothesis must meet two requirements. First, it must define or imply a procedure which makes the analysis of the presented phenomena possible. From mere presentations they become data, and then these data are analyzed into "elements." What are data is a matter of selection, and what are to be taken as elements is also a matter of selection. And selection implies interest, and a principle of choice. Second, it must set the "elements," thus analytically defined, in a unique and unequivocal order or pattern. This is what theory or explanation means. The explanatory principle must determine the place of each and every element in relation to all the others. Any inability to define elements, on the one hand, or looseness of relation, on the other, is a sign of inadequate hypothesis, of vague or inconsistent principles.

Note that we do not go beyond the experience which is in process of interpretation for confirmation by some external reality. When we speak of verification by fact, we must remember that what the relevant facts are is determined by our hypothetical principle. So-called "correspondence" is a symptomatic result of truth, not a cause of it. The theory stands or falls as one, principle and facts together. Any theory is valid which sets the "facts" in the significant order prescribed by its own principle, so as to express the value or meaning for which it stands.

Notice also that the qualities of experience are not reduced or removed. Some aspect of them is selected as elemental or fundamental by the hypothesis; but what is meaningless, irrelevant, or unreal from one point of view, may have a wealth of meaning from another. The machines of Nature, as Leibniz said, are so fashioned that our analysis of them can

Digitized by Google

never discover "a part which is not itself a machine"; that is to say, which is not itself a system supporting an interest or idea.

It follows from this that we cannot form an adequate philosophy of Nature, either human or physical, by the use of any one type of theory, more particularly of the natural-science type. There are as many valid theories, each in its own way and kind, as there are possible significant orders or patterns. And there are as many possible orders—logical-mathematical, mathematico-physical, ethical, aesthetic—as there are fundamental wills and powers in the spirit which is in man and beyond man. Everyone who apprehends the ideal in any degree or form is to that extent a metaphysician. The philosopher must take account of every phase of knowledge and of culture, of the products of the arts as well as of those of the sciences, and accord some ontological status to the formative ideas of each and every one of them.

Some ontological status, since the web of logical or aesthetic order is always on the background of some categorical affirmation, an assertion, implicit or express, of some good, a selection of value, which makes possible a judgment of purpose defining the unity within which alone the order may be discovered, invented, or created.

But a good has to be felt before it is judged. And all our immediate apprehensions and feelings of good arise from the depths of our own spirit, and take form there before we impute them to Nature. We find in Nature what we are prepared to find. If our desire is for power, it presents itself as our potential instrument or obstacle; if we love, it responds in beauty; if we seek for truth, it exhibits the order of its intelligible principles.

Thus experiences of the mystical type are absolutely fundamental and prior to all developed intelligence. And the theory which arises from this is the theory of theories, the absolutely basal and indispensable theory implied, willingly or

Digitized by Google

not, in all other theories whatsoever. That theory is that the essence of the reality to be known is present in some degree in the depths of our own inner life, as self-possessed and self-enjoyed, so that in the end we are one with it. There are times when even to state this as true seems a cruel mockery of human folly and human sorrow. But it always returns upon the mind because it is the radical meaning of the life it seems to mock, the very source of tragedy and comedy. And if it is true, then it is only reasonable to expect that in some instances and some men this unity of being may become itself a direct experience, with a specific quality of its own, and, in the ancient phrase, the one return to the One.

May I quote a very familiar passage?

> That which gives truth to what is known and the power of knowing to the knower you must regard as the Idea of Good, the origin of science and of truth so far as that is known; and beautiful as both truth and knowledge are, it is more beautiful still. . . . . [And] the things known not only obtain from the Good their being known, but also their being and their essence. Yet the Good is not Essence, but far transcends it in dignity and power.[9]

I would like to believe that all that I have said is in harmony with these words of Plato.

UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS

[9] *Republic* 508–9.

Digitized by Google

GROUP ORGANIZATION AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR

F. C. BARTLETT

I. INTRODUCTION

At first sight, the ways in which a man's behavior within a social group is determined may appear to be far too complex to admit of discussion in terms of psychological principles. For every group, for every man, and for every occasion it may seem as if a special case must be made. But there are types of determination, just as there are typical groups and typical persons, and it is interesting and important to examine these.

What a man is in society, and what he can do therein, depend in part upon his own temperament and personality. But they also depend, to almost as great an extent, upon the external environmental conditions of group life, upon facts of social history, and directly upon the mode of organization of the group itself. The man directs his own social behavior; at the same time factors outside him dictate it, and the final result, together with all that follows from it, is due to a complex intermingling of conditions very varied in their source. The study of this interplay opens up at least four general problems, each of which is of very great importance, for we may investigate the position and conduct of the individual in society:

a) as it is determined by the mode of organization of the group of which he is a member;

b) as it is affected by fundamental social relationships within the group;

c) as it is constituted by inter-group relationships, and

d) as it is influenced by the temperament and character of the person himself.

In the present paper I propose to confine my discussion to the first of these four problems, and to deal only with the ways

Digitized by Google

in which social behavior is determined directly by the modes of organization of the group.

II. A DEFINITION OF A GROUP

Everybody agrees that a group is not merely a collection of people. Half a dozen persons meeting haphazard in a railway carriage, each one buried in his own newspaper or book, do not constitute a group. But if one of the half-dozen begins to talk of some topic of current interest, and the others join in the discussion, a group is immediately formed. The group is one having a very unstable membership, which is liable to change every time the train stops, and is very likely to be swiftly scattered. Nevertheless it is undoubtedly a true group, for the collection of people has become, for the time being, an organization.

A group, in fact, is *any collection of people organized by some common appetite, instinctive or emotional tendency, need, interest, sentiment, or ideal.* The essential character is the organization, and one of the best general ways of differentiating one group from another is by reference to the different typical organizing tendencies that are at work. I think the enumeration which I have given in the definition is a complete one, and, further, that the order in which the organizing tendencies have been placed represents literally an order of emergence in the course of social development itself. Thus, the most primitive groups are always organized by appetite, instinct, emotion, or temporary need; the most highly developed, by ideals. This could, I believe, readily be shown to be the case by detailed discussion, but throughout the present paper I shall assume that the order which I have stated corresponds fairly well to an order of social development.

III. THE INSTINCT GROUP

The most primitive type of group, then, is the one which is organized by appetite or instinct, by some dominant and violent emotional tendency, or by some powerful need. In con-

Digitized by Google

temporary society, the group that centers about a fashionable and passing craze often approaches this primitive type very nearly in some of its psychological characters. All such groups reflect directly, in their reaction upon individual members, the nature of the organizing agency itself. This is one of the numerous reasons which make it desirable that a psychologist who sets out to study society should begin by an investigation of primitive forms of group life. For if we know how appetite, instinct, emotion, or temporary need affects the mental life of the individual, we immediately have a basis for understanding how it influences social behavior in this early type of group.

Let us, therefore, ask what are the outstanding characteristics of behavior when appetite, instinct, or emotion takes charge of individual conduct. These have been thoroughly discussed in recent psychology, and as to some of them, at least, there is substantial agreement.

First of all, the resulting behavior very often has every appearance of being thoroughly adapted to the demands of some concrete situation. Appetite, instinct, and emotion all seem to be fitted to certain specific situations, and the conduct to which they give rise to be so adapted to the demands of those situations that, viewed from without, it often seems to bear almost all the marks of purposiveness.[1] Yet at the same time there is no evidence whatever that in any but the most rudimentary sense, if even in that, is the fitting of the behavior to the situation consciously determined. Appetitive, instinctive, and emotional conduct all have reactive significance, but the adaptiveness which they display does not necessitate any articulate plan.

In the second place, it is important to remember that the determination of behavior by a single appetite, emotion, or in-

[1] At the same time it must be remembered that, owing to psychological conditions with which we need not here concern ourselves, appetite, instinct, and emotion may all come into play in situations to which they are not well adapted. This constantly produces circumstances in which the purposive character of the resulting behavior seems to have disappeared.

Digitized by Google

stinct is a purely theoretical case. In actual life there are always competing tendencies. Competition for the determination of conduct is dealt with in different ways at different levels of mental development. At the level which we are now considering, it is apt to lead to severe conflict, and the controlling appetite, emotion, or instinct must have first place or none. Thus variations which express alternative tendencies are very likely to be violently crushed, and the behavior shows, not indeed a complete, but certainly a relative fixity.

At the same time other tendencies may remain, as well as the one, or the group, that takes the lead. These other tendencies are still to some extent effective, and the third point to notice is that their effectiveness depends, in the most direct manner possible, upon their psychological likeness, or nearness, to the dominant tendency. Thus, for example, pugnacity seems to be far more closely and inherently related to hunger than it does to curiosity. In all human conduct a number of different tendencies are at work. These can be arranged in a kind of hierarchy of importance; and at lowly levels of mental organization, the rank of any tendency which has a part in the life of the individual is determined by its psychological effectiveness in aiding that tendency which takes the lead.

Now it is interesting to note that practically without modification each one of these characteristics signalizes social behavior within the primitive group. The psychologist who has confined himself to his own proper realm, the study of the mental life of the individual, can at once make certain pronouncements upon the problems of social behavior at a lowly level. The primitive group, whether it is controlled by appetite, instinct, emotion, or pressing need, reacts, within a limited range of specific situations, in a perfectly appropriate and harmonious way.[2] But the fitness of the behavior is not

[2] Though, as I have already remarked, differences between situations may be badly discriminated, so that unfitting reactions may be made. Emerson somewhere talks of being "wrong-headed in the right direction"; primitive behavior is perhaps more apt to be "right-headed in the wrong direction."

Digitized by Google

realized reflectively. It is simply expressed in action. Moreover, it is apt to be expressed with remarkable and sudden unanimity, as if its passage from one member to another within the group did not depend on any ordinary means of communication, such as the use of overt signs. Thus W. H. Hudson, in writing of how a herd will often turn ferociously upon some distressed member, says: "The violent and fatal impulse starts simultaneously into life and action, and is contagious, affecting all members of the herd like a sudden madness."[3] And, once more, he tells how

some gregarious animals, particularly birds, live together in the most perfect peace and amity; and here no leader is required because in their long association together as a species in flocks they have attained to a oneness of mind, so to speak, which causes them to move or rest, and to act at all times harmoniously together as if controlled and guided by an extraneous force.[4]

Hudson illustrates this by referring to the "wandering bands" of birds which are often to be found in South American forests. "The great Amazonian forests . . . . appear strangely silent and devoid of bird life, and it is possible to wander about for whole days without seeing or hearing birds. But now and then the surrounding trees and bushes appear suddenly swarming with them."[5] Within such groups each bird or each species seems to have its own task. "The bustling crowd," says Bates, "loses no time and is always moving in concert, each bird is occupied on its own account in searching bark, or leaf, or twig. In a few moments the host is gone, and the forest path remains deserted and silent as before."[6]

Not only in these, but in many other cases, the social behavior of the individual member of the group appears to be determined by influences which spread with extraordinary rapidity, and in a curiously subtle manner, throughout the whole group. Thus the group reacts unanimously, and it al-

[3] *The Naturalist in La Plata*, fifth edition, 1912, p. 335.

[4] *Ibid.*

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 254. [6] Quoted from Hudson, *ibid.*

Digitized by Google

most looks as if the practical problem by which it is confronted had been carefully considered, and a generally accepted scheme of conduct elaborated. No such rational process has, however, been involved.

Again, the instinct- or emotion-determined group, though it is very subject to disintegration, is very intolerant of divergences from the general nature of the response adopted. Just as conflicting tendencies or emotions are apt to produce violent warfare, so the instinct or emotion group violently opposes any tendency to turn to a new form of reaction. The "sudden deadly rage" with which a herd will sometimes turn upon and rend to pieces a distressed or wounded companion is probably a case in point. It is singularity of response that attracts their attention and awakens their ferocity. For singularity of behavior within the group of this kind is bound to lead to a disintegration of the whole group, and there is, at this level, only one way in which disintegration can take place naturally and properly, namely, by the satisfaction of the instinctive or emotional tendency which is the center of the organization. When such satisfaction has been secured, the group may harmoniously scatter, but *other* disintegrating tendencies are strongly resisted. To this, in all probability, is due no small part of the strength of the tendency to conservation which all students of primitive groups have emphasized, and which particularly signalizes the group in its next stage of development.

Finally, the hierarchy of rank, if any exists, within the social group at this level follows immediately from the degree to which the individuals concerned manifest the appetite, instinct, emotion, or need by which the group is organized. Leadership does not yet exist as an institution; that belongs to a later stage. But leaders emerge from the generality solely by virtue of their share in the organizing agency of the group itself.

The best illustrations of this point are to be found in those

Digitized by Google

groups belonging to contemporary society which most closely resemble the earliest kind of social grouping in their general psychological character: the groups formed about some more or less temporary fashionable craze, or for some specific and relatively fleeting purpose. The leader of the fashion group is the person in whom the particular drive which brings together the group is the strongest, and the ranking of the various individuals within the group is determined in the same manner. In university society, for example, groups of this sort spring up like mushrooms, and often as quickly die. The ranking of individuals within such a group is apt to be strikingly different from any ranking of the same persons in more permanent social relationships. This is not to be wondered at, for it is determined in the main directly by the degree to which the individual concerned partakes of the organizing tendency—some particular form of self-display, or some special aberration of sport, say—of the whole group. We may see precisely the same direct determination of ranks in groups formed for some special purpose of exploration, or of hard bodily achievement. Of the porters chosen to take part in the 1923–24 expedition to Mount Everest, Captain Bruce writes: "To those of us responsible for their selection it was a difficult task picking out the best with nothing but appearance to go by." It was only during the difficult period of camping and marching across Tibet that the men fell into final ranking. The tests then endured,

> of a nature unnecessarily severe, enabled us unerringly to separate the sheep from the goats. The faces so doubtfully scanned at Darjeeling six weeks before now read like a book. Townee, who till now seemed to value himself above his comrades and give himself airs, fades into the background. The real natural leaders stand out, and the others fall into their proper places.[7]

Who are the "natural leaders"? In the simplest form of group, they are those who possess to the highest degree, or

[7] *London Times*, Thursday, July 17, 1924.

Digitized by Google

with the greatest strength and persistence, those very instinctive, emotional, or other organizing factors which are the basis of the group itself. For within such group there is no *institutional* hierarchy of ranking.

In society as we know it, however, the ranking of individuals is often a more complicated matter, and the institutional method may, for example, perfectly well coexist with the simpler and more direct method which I have just discussed. Many sycophantic groups are interesting illustrations of this. The individual who is in the center of such a group often occupies his position by virtue of an institution, and independently of his peculiar personal characteristics. But the persons who cluster about him occupy their relative positions by virtue of their skill and adroitness as courtiers. In one respect such a group is like the instinct type of social organization, but in the other it is like the second type, to which we will now turn our attention: the interest-and-sentiment group.

IV. THE INTEREST-AND-SENTIMENT GROUP

It is hardly necessary to point out that there is no sharp line of demarcation dividing the type of social organization which has just been considered from the interest-and-sentiment group. Particularly when we try to take illustrations from contemporary society, as I have done, it will often appear that a group which in one respect belongs to the first stage, in other respects belongs to the second. It is, for example, a leading and important character of all interest groups that they arise as a differentiation of some larger social grouping. Precisely the same thing is true of the fashion group, or of the exploration group, though I have taken these as examples of groups organized by need, emotion, or instinct. I propose, in fact, to use the term "interest group" in a somewhat technical sense, to refer to a social organization which is essentially a differentiation from a larger social grouping, and which persists within this larger unit for a period longer than

Digitized by Google

the satisfaction of its *immediate* organizing agency would seem to require. The tendency which brings the interest group first into existence may be intermittent; nevertheless the group continues. The original organizing tendency may seem to die away altogether, yet still the group goes on.

When we turn to the groups organized by interests and sentiments, we find that a great change has taken place. The simple psychological study of the organizing agency of the group no longer suffices. For this there are two main reasons.

First, as I have just remarked, an interest group invariably arises as a differentiation of some larger social unit. Now this by itself might mean very little. It applies to a great many of the ephemeral groups of our own society, and yet these can often truly be considered as very similar to the instinct group in their main psychological characteristics. The point is that the interest group learns the secret of permanence. And the fact that it persists as a differentiation of a larger society, even when its own immediate organizing agency is not violently in operation, means that the particular interest which is involved does not work alone in determining social behavior. From the point of view of social organization, there are at least two groups always to be considered: the interest group, and the larger group within which it has grown up.

The second important point becomes clear when we consider how the interest group secures its permanence. The secret lies in the development of institutions. Here, again, we can see how gradual, in actual social life, is the transition from the instinct group to the type of social organization with which I am now dealing. In veritable fact, so far as is known, there never has been a group wholly devoid of conventions and institutions. But there is a broad and most important distinction between the type of group at one end of the scale where, not the institutions and customs as such, but the drive that has taken the primary share in their production mainly

Digitized by Google

determines social behavior, and the group at the other end of the scale where, whatever may have been the original drive, conventions and institutions themselves now take the lead in directly conditioning behavior. In the second type of group it is far easier to study directly the influence upon social behavior of the institutions which grow up about the interests than it is to express such conduct immediately in terms of the interests themselves. While the social forms and functions of appetite and instinct are very much what their individual forms and functions are, interests, on the other hand, possess forms and functions specific to their social expressions.

For example, a group may be formed chiefly through the organizing influence of some outstanding appetite or instinct. But, as has already been pointed out, the complexity of human nature and human environment speedily brings other factors into play, and there is no instance in which group behavior is for long periods determined by a single instinctive drive only. In the course of satisfaction of the primary organizing tendency, others may be aroused. These, if they cannot be made to serve the ends of the primary tendency, may be violently crushed. But there are many instances in which so complete an antagonism as this does not occur. The new tendencies, being to some degree, or in some way, consistent with the primary one, take a share in the control of social behavior.

Thus, in the pursuit of its end a food-seeking group constantly has to face danger. The typical danger responses are, however, such as to hinder successful food-seeking, and this collision helps to make the danger situations particularly interesting to the members of the group. Their attention being attracted to the danger, very soon special precautions are taken to deal with it in such a way that the search for food may be least hindered and best facilitated. Now at this stage it is exceedingly likely, as we have seen, that such precautions will spread with great speed throughout the group, and pro-

Digitized by Google

duce common modes of reaction. As such, they are then subjected to the strong social influence of conservation, and they swiftly harden into institutions.

There is, indeed, hardly any known group which does not possess its danger or fear ritual. Such ritual, however, shows wide divergences from group to group. It is never simply due to interest in danger worked upon by conservation. It is always the outcome of such interest arising in certain specifically social situations, which vary from one group to another, and emerging in specifically social expressions. Now, precisely what institutions emerge must be due in part to the interplay of the interests, feelings, and thoughts of the individual members of the group. But to disentangle all of these, giving to them each its exact share in the final result, is an impossible task. Further, even if we could do this, our analysis would be imperfect. For some contribution to the final achievement comes from the nature of the group itself, considered as a unit. Thus it becomes necessary to take the institutions themselves and show how they react directly upon the social behavior of the individuals concerned.[8]

This is the fundamental reason why any social psychology which is to be more than mere speculation must be conducted largely on the basis of an intensive study of the special group. For a *detailed* consideration of the problems of social behavior, a psychologist must be well acquainted with the peculiar customs and traditions of special groups. Nevertheless there are *some* general conclusions which may be derived from a purely psychological consideration of the effect upon behavior of the factors of interest and sentiment.

Two points are particularly important: the first follows from the differentiating function of interests, and the second from the place occupied in the interest group by institutions.

[8] For a further justification of this view, which in my opinion is fundamental for the development of a sound treatment of social psychology, see my book, *Psychology and Primitive Culture* (Cambridge, 1923).

Digitized by Google

Interests, and the sentiments which cluster about their pursuit, whether they occur in the life of the person or are expressed in that of the group, possess a differentiating function. They define the individual, and the institutions and traditions to which they give rise particularize the group. Thus all interest-and-sentiment groups are differentiations within some larger community. Not only is this the case, but, owing to their strongly institutional character, these groups possess a persistence which the appetite or instinct group cannot have. Thus the status of the individual within the interest group is apt to be less rigidly determined by the agencies which most immediately organize the group. A possibility of appeal grows up from one group to the coexisting larger group, though of course such an appeal is by no means invariably made. An interest group is defined by its own peculiar institutions and customs. If an individual member ignores the institutions or breaks the conventions, he at once attracts the more-or-less severe displeasure of his fellows. But he can now appeal to an authority outside the strict limits of his own group, either to the larger community, or perhaps to some other interest group.[9] Such a possibility of appeal often, in fact, leads to the setting up of a special mechanism which represents the genuine beginning of public justice. The priest group and the warrior group each stands for a social development of particular interests. But both may belong to the same social whole, and an individual, scouted by the one, may appeal to the other.

We have remarked how the most primitive type of group often turns in a violent and devastating manner upon any member who deviates from the general behavior. At the human level of organization in particular, however, a custom of appeal very soon grows up. The appeal is not the same thing as the control exercised by the "natural leader" who, because of his strength, curbs and corrects refractory followers. In the

[9] As when, in our own society, for example, a man expelled from a club or a college has an appeal at law.

Digitized by Google

appeal, initiative rests partly, not with the leader, but with the ordinary member of the group. The psychological basis of the appeal is that there is now more than one set of customs, each with its own group organization behind it, which can be held to regulate behavior. If one set is outraged, perhaps a second set is at the same time honored and observed. So any "wrong" committed inside a special group is no longer dealt with by that group alone.

> The headman or the elders of a village are prepared to listen to complaints, to decide whether a wrong has been done, and, if so, what the reparation ought to be. The injured party may appeal to them if he pleases, and it may be that the aggressor will abide by their decision.[10]

Right of sanctuary is in essence an appeal from the vengeance of one special group to the mercy of another.

Exactly similar processes are to be seen at work in our own society. A sporting group is a typical interest group, differentiated from a larger community, but having its own peculiar traditions and conventions. If a member of such a group outrages those conventions and traditions, his behavior is generally violently condemned by the others, who call him "no sportsman." Thereupon he commonly seeks justification by appealing to other conventions of a wider group. His social conduct is in this way not wholly determined by the peculiar organizing factors of his own special group.[11]

These considerations are genuinely psychological, for they are concerned with results which always follow the appearance of interests upon the field of mental life. Interests are derived processes. They are built up on instinctive and orig-

[10] Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution* (London, 1918), I, 98. For numerous examples see the same volume, pp. 125 ff.

[11] There are some excellent illustrations of this in Mr. H. de Selincourt's novel called *The Cricket Match* (London, 1924). Here we are shown how jealousy and feuds arise within a rural cricket club and disturb the harmony of the group. The men concerned justify themselves by an appeal to a wider political or social grouping, but are strongly condemned within the club itself. In the warmth and rigor of a difficult cricket match, both the jealousy and the condemnation disappear. Once more the club is wholly ruled by the immediate need of the moment—to win the game—and is a group of the first type.

Digitized by Google

inal difference tendencies, while once any interest has been developed, it may itself facilitate the formation of further interests. Consequently any conduct that is dictated by specialized interests bears some relation to the more general tendencies upon which the interests are constructed, and may also possess a close working relation to other specialized interests. The conduct is thus not under the sole control of the main directing interest. To some degree it is regulated by the wider tendencies also, and in many cases by other interests. There is an appeal to factors lying outside the limits of the interest which is most immediately concerned.

But in the second place, the freedom of determination which the emergence of the interest group secures is not very great. The main reason for this is also a psychological one. However interest groups may be developed, their special functions speedily tend to give rise to permanent institutions. Sentiment then clusters about the institutions of the group, very much as it gathers about the material which is dealt with by the main interests of the individual. All the special circumstances which lead to the differentiation of the interest group from a larger community arise in the pursuit of appetite, or instinct, or need, or in the course of the emotional outburst which originally organized the larger group. They are consequently circumstances about which feeling tends notably to cluster. Both the modes of reaction and the feelings which accompany them tend to be conserved, the former becoming institutions and customs and constituting a large part of tradition, and the latter giving birth to social sentiments. All the institutions of the interest group become the center of varied feelings, and the interest group is the clearest case in the whole field of social organization in which sentiments take the predominant place. Wherever sentiment takes the lead, there, for reasons which I will discuss more fully presently, divergence from ordinary social behavior is relatively slight.

Thus, although, within the interest group, an appeal is

Digitized by Google

always psychologically possible, the necessity for such appeal is less great than might be expected.

A further important conclusion follows from this. As in the primitive type of group, though now it is secured by a less simple mechanism, so in the interest group there is often a hierarchy of ranks. Once this is set up, it tends itself to become one of the characteristic institutions of the group. It then shares in the nature of other institutions at this stage of social growth, and itself becomes the center of sentiments. Consequently it changes but little with lapse of time. In the primitive group, it is the leader rather than leadership that counts. In the interest group, leadership as an institution comes to the front.

This, as may readily be seen, is a social device—not by any means usually the product of reflective analysis—of very great importance. The group now is dependent for its integrity less upon the vagaries of personal character, and an inefficient leader may, within wide limits, be compensated for by a strong institution of leadership. The way in which, within certain groups, ranking is in a manner largely independent of personal qualities can be seen almost every day. Religious groups, crafts groups, war groups are all outstanding illustrations of social organization founded upon interests. Such groups are no doubt very likely to become involved in a further step of social development, and to be shaped by the social influence of ideals. But in so far as they are true sentiment groups, they are all of them social organizations in which rank is institutional, definite, and persistent.

V. THE IDEAL GROUP

In many ways the most interesting of all the steps of social development is the gradual growth of groups organized by ideals. For this is a process which is vigorously going on in our own days, so that on various grounds it may be said to be our own main contribution to social development. It has often

Digitized by Google

been maintained that the chief marks of modern, as opposed to ancient, society are the much greater differentiation of grouping which characterizes the former, and the larger size of the modern community as compared with those of earlier days. These two things together mean that while the first main step in advance is the differentiation of special interest groups, the second is the reconciliation of the diverse interests and of the different social organizations which they produce. Such reconciliation can be taken as the broad defining mark of social organization by ideals.

Psychologists have given less attention to ideals than their importance in individual mental life and in social conduct merits. For this neglect there are two main reasons. First, it is only recently that psychology has seriously attempted to study the determination of conduct, and secondly, since it has done so, it has been far too exclusively preoccupied with the importance of affect. An ideal invariably possesses a strongly marked intellectual component, and in the sense in which I propose to use the term, it may be defined as *an organization of ways of regarding a situation, of feeling in respect to that situation, and of reacting toward it in such a manner as to make the situation practically desirable.* Obviously there is a very close relationship between ideals and sentiments, and our discussion may best be continued by a comparison of these two.

A sentiment is generally agreed to be an organization of feelings, or of emotions, about some object or some idea. The sentiment grows up because some interesting object or idea is persistently presented to the attention, or persistently occurs, in a variety of more or less exciting circumstances. Thus different feelings and emotions, clustering about the same object or idea, enter into an organization by virtue of which they acquire a characteristic new affective character. The sentiment, then, in its psychological nature must possess a more or less stable center of reference.

Digitized by Google

Now we have seen that in social organization it is in the interest group pre-eminently that social functions are prone to harden into institutions, which then bulk very largely in the determination of rank and conduct within the group. Even if the group changes its membership, the institutions are maintained, and, being both interesting and persistent, they regularly become the center of sentiments. But sentiments are always turned chiefly toward the past, and the social sentiments form no exception to this rule. They draw their strength from history. They depend on persisting features in group organization, and are apt to be the stronger, the more peculiar and clearly differentiated the group's special functions are. They help to stabilize all kinds of devices—uniforms, hidden formulae, catchwords, flags, symbols of every sort—for maintaining the past. Feelings are mental parasites. They must attach themselves to something, and preserve that to which they attach themselves with as little change as possible. Thus in a world which is in general ceaselessly moving, they constantly weaken their own hosts. The sentiment-governed individual and the sentiment-organized group both lose in adaptability what they seem to gain in inner cohesion. And when they do break down, the smash is apt to be complete.

The ideal, just as much as the sentiment, demands that an interesting situation, object, idea, or group of ideas shall be presented again and again. The situation, however, is no longer merely or mainly a center about which a variety of feelings are grouped. Its *significance* comes uppermost, and so its relationship with other situations may be realized, and a reconciliation of different ways of regarding it and of reacting to it may be sought.

A sentiment which has often been discussed is that of friendship. Friendship demands that we repeatedly meet or think of some person toward whom we have an interest of an attractive kind. The various feeling and emotional attitudes

Digitized by Google

which have characterized our relationship to this person thus get organized together, acquiring in this way a peculiar flavor. But if at the same time our ideas about this person in his varied relationships to us enter into the organization, and we try to find some comprehensive manner in which these may all be built together and expressed, something beyond sentiment is present in our friendship. And if also we see how his reactions to us and ours to him can be reconciled and shown to have a general direction which we regard as desirable in practice, the sentiment becomes truly an ideal. We see our friend as student, sportsman, man of affairs, husband, father, companion, and so on, and our attitude to him is now as much determined by what we think of him in all these relationships as by what we have more or less unreflectively felt for him. It is not merely that we find some general formulations which sum up his past conduct as student, sportsman, and the rest, but that at the same time we see that his and our past and present conduct trend in a direction that we desire. It is characteristic of ideals as they operate in life that we can never finally define the direction toward which the varied behavior they concern is going. Nevertheless, the direction is there, and is, however vaguely, realized. All this may be put very briefly in the statement that sentiments in no way depend upon formulations, whereas that is precisely what ideals do depend upon.

Another very important distinction must be made. There is a kind of ideal which remains essentially concrete. It arises when we find a way of formulating and reconciling the varied behavior, say, of a particular person, his relations to us and ours to him, and of finding in them some trend which is to be encouraged and desired. There is another kind of ideal which has to do, not with a particular kind of behavior, a special person, or a well-defined group, but with conduct in general, with humanity, with social organization as such. Both come from the reconciliation of differences: the first from a reconcilia-

Digitized by Google

tion of different relationships entered into by the individual or group who is the object of the ideal, the second from a reconciliation which also unites a number of different objects.

Doubtless it should go without saying that commonly sentiments are mistaken for ideals, and, less commonly perhaps, ideals for sentiments. When any large cause wins widespread popular approval, the leaders may or may not be actuated by ideals, but the bulk of the populace will respond by way of sentiment, though that is rarely the name given to their response. It was so with the popular agitation against the slave trade, it is so with very much of the popular approval and disapproval of the League of Nations. There is no line sharply separating sentiment from ideal, and in particular it must always be remembered that while ideals are, from the psychological point of view, unmistakably intellectual and practical, they always grow out of sentiment, and retain a basis of feeling.

As factors in social organization, ideals arise only when there is already a differentiation of groups, but they have reference, not primarily to the maintenance of the institutions of a particular group, but either (*a*) to a reconciliation of the different institutions of a special group, and an attempt to formulate their desirable future development, or (*b*) to reconciling and similarly interpreting the institutions of more than one group. It is as if the sentiment group has "integrity" as its watchword, the ideal group "union." The sentiment looks back, the ideal forward. The sentiment maintains what has been and is, the ideal seeks to determine what will be. Nearly all vigorous and effective groups within the modern nation are mainly ideal groups; all nation groups are at present mainly sentiment groups.

What are the chief effects of organization by ideals upon social behavior? Since ideals involve a synthesis of different institutions and often of different groups, they lead to an even greater complication in the determination of social conduct.

Digitized by Google

Yet, as before, certain important principles emerge from a purely psychological study of the character and effects of ideals. Of these I propose at present to call attention to two only, and in doing so I shall be concerned mainly with the type of ideal that involves a reconciliation of different groups.

First, social behavior takes another step toward freedom in the ideal group. Social ideals arise largely from the fact that different and often competing groups in the community possess a common membership. The individual, determined in his social reactions by the institutions, conventions, and customs of one special group, is at the same time in part determined by the different institutions, conventions, and customs of another special group, of which he is also a member. One of three things then happens. The individual relinquishes his membership of one group; or he determines strict limits within which alone a given set of conventions are to be allowed to operate, so that those of one group never come into touch with those of another; or he evolves a mode of behavior which reconciles the demands of both groups. It is for social psychology to discover the general conditions under which each of these results must follow, though hitherto little has been done to make them clear. Whenever the different demands are reconciled or built together, a new mode of social response is achieved. When this has been carried out by reflective thinking, and when the new mode achieved is considered to be practically desirable, social behavior has been determined by ideals. Thus the appeal from one group to another, possible at the level of the interest group, becomes a definite and accepted mode of meeting difficulties in the ideal group. It is in the ideal group that actual mechanisms of appeal are reflectively constructed. All co-operative societies, all unions of varied crafts or trades, all boards of arbitration, Whitley councils, and the like are devices, for the most part reflectively fashioned—though nobody ever foresees all the details of their organization—of the ideal group. They are

Digitized by Google

modes of securing social integration, and of enlarging the range of facts which determine social behavior.[12]

It is not merely an enlargement of the range of facts determining behavior that gives to the ideal its function of promoting freedom. The man who is determined by many conditions may be very little more free than the man who is determined by but one. The many conditions must be integrated, given a systematic character and a definite trend. It is because the psychological nature of the ideal is to fashion just such an integration that a man may be essentially more free in the ideal group.

In the second place, social ranking in the ideal group tends once again to become a matter more of personality than of institutions. In a sense, this represents a reversion to a characteristic of the appetite or instinct group. But now rank is determined, not by the dominance in a person of the particular appetitive or instinctive drive which is the basis of the group organization, but by the degree to which he is capable of reacting to the synthesis which ideal organization effects. Both in the instinct group and in the ideal group, it is not the *institution* of leadership that counts, but the qualities of the leader. Those qualities are, however, very different in the two cases. In the instinct group it is the avid fighter, the greedy eater, the violent lover or hater or worker who comes to the top. In the ideal group, the leader is the man of practical insight, who seeks to weave all the multitudinous threads of a complex social life into a single pattern, to turn all the streams

[12] But we must remember, first, that in times of social strain ideal organization is very liable to revert to an earlier form where interests and their attached sentiments conflict, or imperious needs war one against another; and, secondly, that wherever an ideal is mainly concerned with a reconciliation of the different conventions of a *single* group, there the freedom secured is only a freedom within the group, and in interactions with other groups behavior may be even more narrowly determined than before. The last point is an important one, and has been illustrated in our own society by many recent strikes, and also by the precise manner in which the work of particular craftsmen may be regulated by a union.

Digitized by Google

of tendencies that seek expression into a single general direction.

VI. CONCLUSION

Beginning, then, with the instinct group, we pass through a study of the interest group, and at length arrive at the group organized by ideals. Social ranking is first a matter of the degree to which single tendencies, or systems of tendencies, of the instinctive or emotional kind are possessed by the individuals concerned; then it becomes institutional; finally it is settled by the reactive capacity of individuals toward social integrations. It is more fluid in the first and last stages than in the intermediate stage, and this is mainly because the interest group is also signally an institutional and sentiment group. Throughout, social conduct becomes gradually freer, first because a wider range of determining conditions comes into play, but finally, and as a far more important matter, because the conditions determining social conduct not only are more diversified, but are reconciled one with another, and contemplated as possessing a single general trend.

I have written as if the instinct-and-appetite group were one, the interest-and-sentiment group another, and the ideal group a third, each separate from the others and sharply defined. Everybody knows that it is not so. There is no historical group that has not already achieved a certain amount of differentiation; there is no community with varied interest groups but shows some glimmer of ideal organization; there is no ideal group which does not constantly relapse into and rest upon sentiment. The stages I have discussed are stages in an order of development. In life, the new is built out of the old, but none knows when, and the old and the new abide together. The differences that I have considered are real differences, though they join in life more closely than can be shown in an essay.

ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE
CAMBRIDGE

Digitized by Google

FEES AND CHARGES AS AN INDEX OF PROFESSIONALISM

C. F. TAEUSCH

The significance of professionalism in our modern social life may be measured by the fact that more than one thousand "codes of ethics" and "standards of business conduct" have emanated from professional and business organizations in the last few years. Nothing like so widespread a social movement of this sort has occurred since the Middle Ages, when the *Genosse* was the unit of social organization and the guild the most powerful social agency.

Since that time the then prevailing pluralistic social philosophy has given way to a monism of nationality and common law. The "Reception" of the Roman law on the continent of Europe obliterated the *coutumes* of the French provinces and eventuated, at the beginning of the last century, in the institution of the Civil Code. Working its way up north, this same Roman law developed into the German imperial code in 1873, supplanting in great degree that variegated and complex structure, German municipal law. Earlier, William of Normandy had dealt the feudal hierarchy of England its death blow and established a political and military basis for the common law. Nations were hammered and welded out of polyglot Europe: first England, then France; Italy in the sixties of the last century, and Germany in the seventies. Nor must it be forgotten that America in the sixties was ironing out certain persistent doctrines of states' rights. Previous to this, John Marshall had asserted the principle that the incidence of taxation and the expression of loyalty were direct relations between the newly created government and its citizens, without the intermediation of the states or other social subdivisions. We are now pausing on the threshold of a

Digitized by Google

League of Nations, the high-water mark, if not the culmination, of monism in political, legal, and social philosophy.

In the meantime the virtues of nationalization and of the instituting of the common law have perhaps reached a maximum of appreciation. Fairness and uniformity of administration are real achievements in modern civilization; but can there be aptness and thoroughness of social administration if the political territory be large and the interests of society diverse? Is not some measure of pluralism and local option, of self-regulation of special interests, essential to social welfare? Have we taken careful philosophical account of the social movements of the last six centuries? Even if we have, is it the function of philosophy merely to shout the pæan of praise after the battle, or to sing a swan song over decaying civilization? Already social cross-currents may be detected; if left alone, or with intelligent direction, they may cut a new channel and mold the earth "more nearly to the heart's desire." Is philosophy ready to lead the way, to sound the clarion call to intelligent action? Better that its prow be first through the new terrain, than merely to provide a resting place for croaking frogs among the rushes of forsaken and neglected bayous and lagoons. Are we ready for changes in the social order, especially in the sense of being able to salvage the best of the past and to stabilize the forces of the future?

To attempt the solution of this problem, or even its formulation, in a single paper is almost futile. But diagnosis is a prerequisite to intelligent prognosis, and diagnosis is largely a matter of detecting symptoms.

The thousand and one codes of business and professional ethics are symptomatic results of a complicated and deeply rooted social movement. Among the many symptoms there displayed, one essentially definite, objective, and often measurable criterion of current social-ethical attitudes is the manner in which the professional and business man secures his income. It is the purpose of this paper to regard the assessing

Digitized by Google

of fees and the collection of charges as a significant index of the place occupied by professionalism in the social order, both as it exists and as it ought to be.

We shall assume at the start that the professional man is to be distinguished from the amateur by virtue of his superior ability and training in a particular field of activity. This superiority entitles him to charge for his services. Not only is this prerogative granted and secured to him by law, but by the public as well in its recognition of the desirability of seeking his services. What then differentiates the professional man from the business man? Clearly the priority of rendering services to the assurance of fees and charges. A business man does not lose caste if he refuses goods or credit to a purchaser if the latter cannot guarantee payment for same. A professional man in similar circumstances is obligated to render his services and to subordinate considerations involving payment.

This does not mean that professionalism is obligated to a sentimental and absolute idealism in its ethical conduct. It does not, for example, preclude a man from considering the financial possibilities of various professions before entering one as a life-work. Furthermore, a successful professional career, in the sense of the performance of services, entitles a man to a relatively superior income. But this superior income is to be measured over a considerable period of time; the principle which justifies such an income does not apply to every particular professional service rendered. It may be said that some business men are farsighted enough to stand temporary losses in order to secure more permanent and more extensive gains. In such a case, and in this respect, the business man cannot be distinguished from the professional man. Professionalism demands that service be prior to the payment for same, and that the amount and quality of services should not be measured by the amount of the prospective fee or the certainty of collecting it.

Digitized by Google

Granted the argument so far, an issue of transcending importance arises. Shall the income of a professional man be based primarily on the value of his services "as rendered" or "as received"? Shall a large fee be collected for the professional gesture which saves a life or a reputation? Are extraordinary services to be requited by smaller fees if the case is lost? Not only have the various professions failed to establish their scheduled charges on some such basic principle, but their confusion of these two alternatives is bringing several professions and many a professional man into disrepute. Too often the situation is as follows: when the patient lives, the charge is for services as received; although the patient's stamina, vitality, and immunity contribute considerably to the cure. But if the patient dies, the result is said to be due to causes over which the physician had no control, and the charge is then based on services as rendered. So also the lawyer charges the wealthy man on the basis of services as received, while the poor man is charged for services as rendered. One is reminded of Aesop's fable of the bats who were now birds and then beasts as the tide of battle changed. Evidently the most unsatisfactory situation is the vagueness attaching to the basis for charging fees. Much of the irritation of client and patient can be attributed to this ambiguity. If both bases are to enter into the professional charge, each should be defined. Otherwise, business and the professions will eventually have on their hands the public regulation of prices and fees.

Fees based on services as received lead to vicious situations. Such a basis assumes the ability of a professional man to measure the benefit derived by patient or client. By allowing the professional man to appropriate forces over which he has no control, it encourages hocus-pocus and the incantations of the medicine man, and makes a mystery of ignorance. Sentiment can thereby be played upon, also, especially when it is asserted that life or the inviolability of the body are at

Digitized by Google

stake, honor or reputation or liberty are secured. Furthermore, the financial standing of people is judged by the appearance they make; in which case an unfair burden is thrown upon those who are capable of utilizing and displaying to best advantage what they have. On the other hand, a premium is placed on fee-dodging, which can be as artful a practice as tax-dodging. Finally, there is something unwholesome about a social order in which a group or an individual presumes to judge as to the economic rating of others in order to justify professional charges. The only situation in which charging for services may depend on the basis of benefits received is where the amount involved is objectively determinable, and then only if the percentage to be charged has a sufficient professional sanction to appear in the published schedule.

The published schedule is the logical implication of the principle of charging for services as rendered. It includes a number of intangible factors, chief among which is the matter of overhead. Into this factor enters not only the more obvious item of availability of services, but also the expense of college preparation, the earlier "lean" years of apprenticeship, intermittent periods of inactivity, charity cases, and the failure to collect fees. Any professional man who fails to take all of these items into account in his charges and fees is a menace to his profession, and conceivably to the economic order. It is here that an apparent conflict arises between professional interests and the welfare of society. Individuals and society are interested in preventing overcharging; often this interest fails to acknowledge the ineffable items which enter into the making of rates, and the public regards price-cutting as a boon. The professional and business man, on the other hand, will not, if he is wise, tolerate price-cutting; the published schedule is a minimum scale, but professionally and ethically permits of increased charges. Given the privilege to practice

Digitized by Google

thus, the professional man by implication is obligated to guarantee his individual services as rendered, and those of his group; otherwise, he cannot be expected to be so obligated. On the other hand, if society demands of professional men such a guarantee, by implication it should allow him to control his fees without legislative or social interference. And the published schedule of minimum fees is the inevitable conclusion of such an arrangement. This permits of higher rates for qualitative superiority, another important intangible factor. Two alternatives thus are open to professional men who achieve distinction and thereby attract a large clientèle. Either to establish an organized group or firm of practitioners, large enough to accommodate the clientèle, or to increase rates so as to reduce the clientèle. Either is ethically justifiable; the latter especially if accompanied by a considerable amount of charitable work.

We are now in a position to consider certain particular problems which arise in connection with the charging for professional services. The retainer fee is not only justified on the basis of the very best of professional principles, but in one particular form—where, for example, the physician is paid while the patient is well, or the lawyer when the client has no litigation on his hands—Plato himself would be satisfied with doctors and lawyers. The contingent fee, on the other hand, is severely to be condemned. It tempts the professional man to urge his services unduly on the public; as when the lawyer encourages the prospective client to engage in unnecessary or unjustifiable litigation, or when the doctor advises a major operation, or when the engineer induces municipalities to initiate projects which are uneconomical or wasteful. The gambling element introduced into professional relations by the contingent fee breeds the very conditions which it is to the interest of every profession to avoid. Professionalism, by allowing the contingent fee, is exploitive; on the other hand,

Digitized by Google

by preventing conditions it is meant to cure, every profession is suicidal. The solution of this paradox is in some such positive form of charging as is represented by the retainer.

One test of a profession is in the attitude toward the gratuitous work it does, especially in connection with charity cases. The indigent prisoner, the poor patient, and the unfortunate student, all call for the same kind and degree of professional skill as is exercised in behalf of those who are able to pay generously. Many such cases are now taken care of by organized efforts. The public defender is in many places at the service of persons involved in lawsuits involving less than certain specified amounts. Certain medical associations —of a county, for example—assume the obligation of caring for the poor. The work is fairly apportioned; and the amount granted by the county—which is about one-third of the scheduled charges—is used as a fund for the professional advancement of the organization. Where, however, there is no such organized handling of gratuitous services, each professional man is obligated to perform services needed, when approached by client or patient. Even where such organizations operate, there is ample opportunity for individual gratuitous work. In no case is a professional man warranted in refusing services because of the inability of the client to pay. The loss occasioned thereby should enter as an overhead factor in the published schedule.

It is now apparent why underbidding the accepted or published schedules of rates is unprofessional and antisocial. It shifts the competition from quality of service to amount of fee, thereby encouraging the "quack," the "shyster," and the "fly-by-night" merchant. At present it is illegal to organize for the purpose of fixing rates; social intelligence has not yet developed to the point of recognizing a sound and fair principle. A candid examination of the economic and professional relations involved forces one to the conclusion that the enforcement of a minimum published fee is the only ethical

Digitized by Google

course for the professions to pursue. The conflict between these two social forces presents an interesting problem to philosphy; a problem which is rendered difficult by the turbid ignorance, especially on the part of the professional clientèle, of the exact issues and interests involved.

Finally there is the matter of splitting of fees, rampant at present among medical practitioners because of two great changes in the profession: the passing away of the general rural practitioner, and the drift into the cities and into specialization. The resultant splitting of fees is a surreptitious form of advertising, of solicitation, and of underbidding, all of which in their more flagrant forms are condemned by the best professions. Will the law have to be called in to regulate this matter? If called in, will it operate or will it complicate our social pattern by another field of unenforcible legislation? If it is not called in, or if it is ineffective, can the medical profession prevail against the growing social irritation at its practices? Recently we have witnessed the virtual temporary wrecking of the oyster business through a similarly dilatory wakening of social consciousness. Perhaps the profession may even be broken up from within. Mr. Ford's hospital methods have at least rocked the profession to its foundations. Strange that professional groups do not recognize the responsibility and privilege of exercising their prerogatives and anticipate social friction by a fair administration of the relations between professional men and their clients. At no point is this problem so acute, or so capable of objective and delicate measurement, as in the case of professional fees. The method of assessing professional charges is at once a functional expression and a symptom of the social philosophy of the professions.

Just what are the ethical situations involved? (1) Every profession becomes obligated to exclude all such candidates and expel such members as are unwilling to assume the responsibilities of professional conduct. (2) The golden rule is written into social relations in an objective, determinable,

Digitized by Google

functional, intelligent, and practical sense. (3) Every professional man becomes in a real sense his brother's keeper; for no profession can afford to jeopardize its dignity by allowing any of its members to bring it into disrepute. (4) Only within the functionally homogeneous group can there develop the more subtle types of individuality and personality; only so can a maximum of social liberty be attained. (5) The result is a desirable social pluralism, a richly variegated social heterogeneity.

The Greek would smilingly accept these ethical principles. But what of the Roman who scowlingly demands, "What has become of conscience and the sterner types of individual morality?" Let us admit with him that his morality is better than the ethics of the Greek. But let us insist that morality cannot be attained except through the instrumentality of social ethics. Let us reassure him that professional and business men, like Saul, may be induced to seek after their ethical beasts of burden in order that they may wonderingly return with a moral kingdom.

STATE UNIVERSITY OF IOWA

Digitized by Google

THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF EQUALITY IN THE LIGHT OF EVOLUTIONISM

T. V. SMITH

In a former article in this *Journal*[1] I argued that after the decline of the natural-rights emphasis in America, the primary basis for an equalitarian philosophy was during most of the nineteenth century a transcendental derivation of personality. Still confining the discussion to America, I propose in this article (1) to trace briefly the decline of this transcendental bias, (2) to sketch the rise in American thought of a more empirical conception of the human individual, and (3) to indicate in part what modification of our traditional doctrine of equality is demanded by this newer way of conceiving human nature.

I

Evolutionism is the key word for one who would understand the metamorphosis of American thought from the nineteenth century into the twentieth. Nowhere better than in the rise and development of scientific psychology can we observe the change. During the lifetime of William James, psychology cast the soul over as ballast and put out upon the stream of consciousness in the general direction of the port of behaviorism. As some academic wag has remarked, "psychology first lost its soul, then its mind, and finally has lost consciousness altogether." Under the same urge, moreover, both psychology and sociology seem to be in a good way of losing their instincts.[2] When psychologists are fleeing from the ready-made soul in one after another of its assumed

[1] *International Journal of Ethics*, XXXV, 164–188.

[2] The voluminous literature now directed against instincts, in both psychology and sociology, but incarnates anew the motivation that since Locke's attack upon innate ideas has sought to put the control of human nature into human hands.

Digitized by Google

guises, it is clearly time for social scientists to be casting about for a less ghostly ally. Postponing to later pages the general development of this point, two practical reasons may now be adduced for the inadequacy of the ready-made soul as justification for belief in human equality.

1. This theological core of individuality conceived as measurable affords no adequate basis for equality, because in so far as "souls," "minds" have been found measurable, they have proved unequal; and (2) conceived as immeasurable, the soul affords no safe basis, because so conceived it has historically purchased a formal, general equality, but at the price of real specific opportunities. As to the first defect, the fact that observation showed men to be unequal did not historically prove seriously embarrassing so long as observation confessedly could not get at the essentials of men. The basis upon which equality was asserted to rest was merely pushed beyond the pale of confessed inequalities. In this way the natural-rights philosophy of the eighteenth century, by being ever ready to appeal from "antiquity to antiquity more remote," gave equality an asylum by furnishing it a temporal inaccessibility; the religious philosophy that paralleled and supplanted this view, in like manner, gave equality security by furnishing it with a psychological and theological asylum inaccessible to any but God, who, of course, never betrays man's deepest desires. To achieve definite results in the onslaught against fixity the very sanctuary of the soul must be invaded and inequalities be shown to reach to the nethermost essence of man. This is, of course, not a question that can be absolutely settled on empirical grounds; but it is interesting to note that applied psychology, through an ever more imposing technique of mental measurement, is invading the very lair of the soul to disclose functional differences in the rational processes as significant as those observable physical differences long admitted to constitute gross inequalities, as far as they went. It is difficult for even the most blinded democrat

Digitized by Google

to laugh out of court as a hobby of scholarly theorists a process whose significance is so demonstrable as to convert the American military to its universal use during the late war.[3] Nearly two million men were measured, were classified on the basis of the results, and were put to serving military demands, each according to his measure. Instead, indeed, of each counting for one and nobody for more than one, an A might count for a half-hundred D's, and some must needs be counted out altogether. Only equals were treated equally; inferiors were put on "kitchen police" or given discharges the "honorable" nature of which depends upon one's philosophy of life. Education and industry have since the war so widened the field of the experiment as to provoke the remark that if the deeds of the soul are to be held more important than traditional words about the soul, then souls simply are not equal; for they function with every varying degree of efficiency from genius to idiocy. Even though the soul be regarded as given, it nevertheless, in so far as measurable, suggests inequality rather than equality.[4]

Only the old expedient remains of holding that the inequalities revealed through observation and any possible measurement are superficial, and that in their inaccessible essentials men are immeasurable and consequently equal. How far such faith can go may be seen in this pious declaration by a theological equalitarian.

> Men are declared to be equal because it is discovered that all men, the least as well as the greatest, have or may have access to the Infinite. . . . . Infinity plus a million is seen to be no more than infinity plus one. If it were not for religion, democracy would be inconceivable; for if a man's soul is measurable and transient, democracy is ridiculous.[5]

[3] Yerkes, "Psychological Examining in the U. S. Army," *National Academy of Science*, Vol. XV.

[4] A growing tendency since the war to examine the emotional factors in personality gives promise, in the opinion of some psychologists, of plumbing even more intimate depths of human personality.

[5] Ferguson, *The Religion of Democracy*, p. 36.

Digitized by Google

While such logic may prove men equal, modern students know that it is not the kind of equality that converts extravagant superfluities of the rich into a more adequate bread supply for the undernourished poor. The history of such an apologetic for equality is refutation enough. There is a classic example of its meaning in America. Apologists for African slavery put down without a twinge of conscience that the slave and the master were equal precisely in this sense: they both had infinite souls, and before God there was no difference between black and white, between bond and free.[6] For as regards "the right to serve God according to one's own conscience, the poorest slave on earth possesses this right—this inherent and inalienable right; and he possesses it as completely as the proudest monarch on his throne."[7] Equality that arises from this basis, then, is such equality as is thoroughly compatible with slavery. And while perhaps no contemporary example of quite such obvious flagrance exists, the logic of industry is at times strangely reminiscent of the logic of slavery. For the unskilled laborer to ask for bread and receive a ballot is more removed in time than in essence from Cotton Mather's slave's receiving "leave" to attend church instead of his liberty. Equality that is so infinite in scope does not fit finite cases; it dispels them. Such equality is merely formal and, by becoming an instrument of exploitation to the superior and a source of compensation to the inferior, it functions to make impossible any real equality. This is the reason why Professor Tufts, in speaking for modern men, declares: "We are not satisfied with formal phrases of equality because we see

[6] No doubt it was this anti-social use to which the conception of "equality before God" (see my earlier discussion on this point, *International Journal of Ethics*, XXXV, 180) lent itself that helped to motivate the modern radical change in the very conception of God. (Cf. Dean Mathews' discussion of "Democracy," *Dictionary of Religion and Ethics*, p. 128.)

[7] *Cotton Is King*, p. 329.

Digitized by Google

so many abstract uses of the term, wherein the old equality straightway turns into inequality."[8]

The equality of men, as based upon their measurable aspects, proves thus actually untrue; as based upon their immeasurable souls, socially unsafe. This practical dilemma itself was enough to make the conception of a given soul an object of suspicion. This growing distrust, long developing in psychology, has found its way into every field of modern interest. Even ethics is fast becoming secularized. And what is more to be remarked on, theology has felt the influence: in some quarters being merely alarmed, in others impressed, and in still others, converted. Political and social theories have remained longest immune; but a conception that is being discarded in every other field does not promise well as an abiding foundation for political and social progress.

II

Before we can intelligently settle the question of equality, we must needs discover what modern criticism holds man to be. Souls lost, all lost? or men naturalized, men equalized? Let us see what wreckage modern thinking has wrought in America and what reconstruction is possible. When Galileo set free the notion of change by declaring that the earth moves he started a commotion that has not yet subsided;[9] and when Darwin, catching the spirit already abroad in physical

[8] *Biblical World,* XLVIII, 9–14. The outstanding example of Professor Tufts's statement is the use to which "freedom of contract" has been put in industry. It often happens that such "freedom" means to the laborer but an enforced trading-off of his birthright for a mess of verbal pottage. To get "effective personal freedom," as the British Labor Party phrases it, American laborers have had on occasion to argue *against* freedom of contract, e.g., *Holden* vs. *Hardy,* 169 U.S. 391.

[9] Consider these burning prophetic words of Father Inchofer, a contemporary of Galileo! "The opinion of the earth's motion is of all heresies the most abominable, the most pernicious, the most scandalous; the immovability of the earth is thrice sacred; argument against the immortality of the soul, the existence of God, and the incarnation should be tolerated sooner than an argument to prove that the earth moves."

Digitized by Google

sciences, "conquered the phenomena of life for the principle of transition," he soon made it evident that a complete transformation of our philosophy of human nature was inevitable. A glance at the past will make this necessity clear.

As early as Plato, men had become disillusioned as to trusting their dearest hopes to realization in a world of change and uncertainty and discouraged as to the possibility of controlling such a world to their own ends with the instruments of control that were then available. This did not mean, of course, a giving up of their hopes, a discountenancing of their dreams; it meant rather a turning to indirection for that which direct means failed to secure them.[10] Since beauty is often disfigured on earth by a foul body, there must be—on no less compulsion than that of human desire—a Somewhere glorified by "beauty shining in brightness." And what was true of beauty was for the same reason true of all other values. And from concepts of value, logical motives taking up where aesthetic and ethical motives left off, the asylum was extended to all class names, though the primary motivation was clearly indicated by Plato's reluctance to admit such concepts as "mud" and "hair." By the same laws of migration that in America intermittently set the faces of the many toward any newly discovered El Dorado of gold or of oil, all the more desirable qualities migrated into Plato's happy Elysium of Ideas. Where a man's treasures are, there will his heart go also: unchangeable, stable, and ideal, these conceptual classes came naturally to constitute a superior kind of reality of which the world that flows by the senses is hardly more than a mere appearance. But, of course, if this superior reality is to have meaning, or is to function for human kind, there must

[10] "If no site be found on earth for the Platonic city, its constitution is none the less recorded and enshrined in heaven. . . . . What in the sensualistic or mystical system was called reality will now be termed appearance, and what there figured as an imaginary construction borne by the conscious moment will now appear to be a prototype for all existence and an eternal standard for its estimation."—George Santayana, *The Life of Reason*, I, 80.

Digitized by Google

be assumed a certain organ in man which, outreaching the feeble senses, will possess him of the True, the Beautiful, and the Good. Recollection served this beneficent function in Plato's scheme. Under the touch of Aristotle's genius these class names came to be more earthly and neutral, as befits the scientist and logician, but not a whit less real. They took on the natural-science form of species fixed and discontinuous, possessing attributes the essential ones of which the human reason must discover or remain forever ignorant and impotent. If Aristotle succeeded at all in bringing these fugitives back to earth, Christianity sent them all the further into the heavens. Not only was thus the two-world view standardized for the future western world, but its acceptance was assured by its being made into a religious orthodoxy with sanctions as terrible on the one side as they were beatific on the other. Mediating between these two worlds, the specious and the real, stood human intelligence—reason, conscience, soul—whose function was also made a matter of orthodox determination. This was the heritage which practically unchanged in its fundamental aspects the modern world came by in due course of time. It became thus the framework also of American thought.

It was of course precisely because the work of Darwin was eventually seen, both in Europe and in America, to have implication for this hoary idea-system that accounted for the universal interest in, and the widespread popular distrust of, his conclusions.

The very title of Darwin's first book—*The Origin of Species*—was enough to arouse the deepest distrust. Those two words had not been on speaking terms since Plato's day: one of them seizes the very essence of the world of becoming; the other the very essence of the world of being. And whatever relationship had been found between the two worlds was quite the logical and ethical opposite of what Darwin's title implies. In short, species had no origin. To insinuate that

Digitized by Google

they had was so to infect the real objects of true knowledge with flux as to destroy them. To destroy the arches of a bridge that connect it with one side is to render useless its connection with the other side. Since the noblest organ of human nature, reason, does not function in the world of becoming, to destroy the changelessness of the objects of knowledge was to deprive reason of a job. And since the essential attribute of man is rationality, the only remaining moat that protects the citadel of the soul is not too wide for pious fear to jump. And so even before Darwin explicitly applied his doctrine to man—*The Descent of Man* was not published until twelve years after *The Origin of Species*—the opposition had based itself squarely upon the traditional conception of the individual. This view had been doubly sacred in America, as a glance at our early philosophy will show.

The early problem of American thought may be advantageously regarded as arising from the honest acceptance of two incompatible beliefs by the colonists. On the one hand, they brought with them the principle of liberty rooted deeply in a doctrine of natural rights and eventuating in a consistent emphasis upon the individual. But on the other hand, they brought with them the principle of authority rooted deeply in a religious reverence for a deity whose sovereignty was simply without reservations and heading up in a doctrine of human insignificance. If we follow even cursorily the early phase of this struggle between these incompatible beliefs, we shall see that it was the principle of authority that gained the first round of a conflict that even yet appears perennial. And this principle of authority connects directly with that view of man and his world which in a foregoing paragraph we have hastily derived from Plato or beyond. With this point in mind, consider the implication of John Cotton's reply to Roger Williams. When Williams complained that he had been driven out of Massachusetts for following his conscience, Cotton's long-since famous apology was: "The erroneous party suf-

Digitized by Google

fereth not for his conscience, but for his sinning against his conscience."[11]

Here is our ancient view well set out. Truth, like the Platonic Beauty, is a finished somewhat furnished ready-made to man. It lies about; but lest it should lie unnoticed, man has been provided with an organ, conscience, that discovers infallibly to him this furnished truth. It lieth so beyond man that walketh to direct his steps that without this double provision—secure metaphysical truth and psychological equipment guaranteed to get at it—he were hopelessly lost. The exoneration of God, as well as the salvation of man, depends in the last analysis upon some such faith; and so the persecuted no less than the persecutor accepts the premise. But the premise accepted, the conclusion is hard to avoid. Since truth is given and conscience is furnished, whoever does not see truth is either a fool or dishonest. Roger Williams was confessedly no fool. He must, therefore, be dishonest: he was deliberately refusing to follow his conscience. Such men deserve to be punished. It is a matter of no concern to us that Williams might have replied in the very same language to Cotton had his plea been logical consistency rather than religious toleration; but it is a matter of primary concern that even in pioneer America the individual was oriented in a ready-made world, was adapted to it by a ready-made organ, and was made responsible for the way these mutually adjusted cogs functioned.

If we turn hopefully from the outworking of the principle of authority to that of the principle of liberty, we shall find fruit of the same flavor. Consider the Declaration of Independence as an official statement of the American doctrine of liberty. Here one judicious glance will reveal the situation to be exactly parallel with the religious one just noted. The appeal is to the self-evident truths there enumerated. That men have certain rights is so self-evident that a wayfaring man

[11] *The Bloudy Tenent washed and made white,* etc., chap. x.

Digitized by Google

cannot overlook the fact. Since the situation is political rather than religious, reason, rather than conscience, becomes the organ, though otherwise the two terms were practically synonymous for the age. The British king was careless of American lives, disrespectful of American liberty, and utterly disregardful of American happiness. But he was confessedly no fool. Then he must be dishonest, and therefore unfit to rule over honest colonists who saw truth and sought it. It is a matter of no concern to us here that George III applied the same inherited view to the colonists; but it is of primary concern that even liberty in early America was grounded on absolutistic foundations, the true nature of which were to appear in the Federal Constitution.

It is well for us to remember that, though our forefathers clearly saw that they could not establish and maintain the dignity of the English throne and peerage in the forests of America, they did not see the similar incompatibility of believing in a hand-me-down individual functioning in a static world while they were engaged in the challenging task of constructing a social order in a world where every day brought the unexpected and where individual initiative and flexibility and spontaneity counted daily as the difference between life and death.

The early American thinker whose philosophy indicates most clearly a feeling for this incompatibility was Benjamin Franklin, latest in the world's memory as he was earliest in our secular philosophic annals. The fact that Franklin became our first internationally known citizen tended to supplant the erroneous belief that America had no thinkers by the equally erroneous belief that all American thinking was preoccupied with the practical. Nothing could be farther from the truth. Franklin was not quite typical of early American thinking. No people have been more inclined to run to romantic excess. This tendency is seen in the fact that nowhere else in the world has been found a people who took

Digitized by Google

more literally and enthusiastically to utopias. Consider how long Americans have taken literally and seriously the Jewish-Christian compensatory dreams contained in the Apocalypse. Consider the number of Brook Farms America has begotten and regretfully buried. Consider how in our day Mr. Bryan's eloquent word pictures of the ideal republic and of the grandiloquent guerdon that awaits the saintly man, move popular audiences to tears. Finding themselves in a land where countless situations baffled control, early Americans, like the early Hebrews, converted the scarcity and want of actual fact into the milk and honey of gratifying imagination; finding money scarce and luxuries infrequent, they fled to a land in which the very streets were paved with gold; finding doctors few and deaths common, they fled to a fairer land in which there was no death at all; finding themselves prematurely old from manual toil by day and secret tears by night, pioneer women fled at least on Sundays to a land where God would wipe all tears from their eyes, where youth would never fade, and where both an ideal lover and beloved would be provided. Alternating, however, with these moments in which mind ran to compensatory excess in religion and to a corresponding sentimentalism in fiction and art, were the moments in which thinking must face the specific problems on which tomorrow's bread depended.[12] Franklin was pre-eminent in the latter type of thinking, and gave abroad to America the reputation that he himself sustained at home. It is quite probable, however, that had the reputation fitted America as it fitted Franklin, the conquest of this vast continent would have been even more rapid than it was.

To leap from Benjamin Franklin to William James need

[12] Santayana has very well synthesized these two types of thinking in his remark that "the American is imaginative; for where life is intense, imagination is intense alone. Were he not imaginative he would not live so much in the future. But his imagination is practical, and the future it forecasts is immediate; it works with the clearest and least ambiguous terms known to his experience, in terms of number, measure, contrivance, economy, and speed. He is an idealist working on matter."—*Character and Opinion in the United States*, pp. 174–75.

Digitized by Google

not tax any disciplined imagination. From James to John Dewey the road is longer but better lighted. It is in Dewey on American soil that Darwin's much beclouded insight comes to philosophic maturity. The shadow of a long tradition fell upon Darwin himself to obscure his keen vision with the overbelief that reality is static and that truth is an abiding relation between a given universe and a ready-made soul. In a passage both humanly poignant and intellectually pathetic Darwin declares that the "horrid doubt always arises, whether the convictions of man's mind, which has been developed from the mind of the lower animals, are of any value or at all trustworthy." But Dewey, standing on Darwin's shoulders, frees Darwin's insight for every field of living. Species, standing historically for ultimate realities, are no longer seen as changeless entities, but as processes in the flux. And since the senses are able to lay hold upon such phenomena, the question must needs arise as to the function of reason. Since the soul with its rationality is the equipment man has boasted for making connection with the static reality that was assumed to lie beyond the data of the senses, with that metaphysical counterpart invalidated, reason becomes but a pathetic gesture toward the void, a lonely hand stretched out to empty air. That passing, this itself is bound to go. Both gone, what remains but a biological organism—a growing, decaying process negotiating through its senses with a changing, flowing world? Since man is what he is by virtue of an unbroken development from lower forms of life, whatever distinguishes him from these forms must have been attained in the process of evolution itself. Man's interest, if he would understand himself, is thus shifted to, and fixed upon, the process. And rather than looking for an "essential attribute" within to account for his assumed superiority, man must henceforth look to such observable characteristics as his erect posture, his opposable thumb, and most of all to his use of language.

This colossal achievement in insight could be made much

Digitized by Google

more impressive if the story were told in detail from Franklin to James. In religion we should see Edward's cry for sanctified men supplanted through many stages by Ames' demand for a democratized deity.[13] In philosophy we should see Emerson's spiritual Over-soul, which partially eclipsed the individual, caught up into a logical Absolute, which almost entirely swallowed the individual, and then again the individual emerging to mark the passing of the Absolute with the mocking epitaph, "The real is temporal, and the temporal real."[14] We should see Josiah Royce, individualistic scion of America's last frontier, recapitulate the whole story of German idealism and forebode the passing of its absolutistic emphasis as he progressively hits upon "rationality," upon "experience," and finally upon "community" as best descriptive of "reality." We should see John Fiske pour the new wine into the age-old bottle, and his spiritual progeny pathetically repeat the process even down to 1925. But this is not the occasion for the complete story. It ends in our time with the full-fledged recognition in John Dewey and many others that in spite of all illusions born of wounded desire *man is an animal.* And it is with this end-product, rather than with the detailed process of American thought, that we are here concerned.

Man, when thus honestly accepted as an animal, is seen not to be primarily rational at all,[15] but to be fundamentally

[13] Edward Scribner Ames, *The Psychology of Religious Experience.*

[14] Cunningham, *The Philosophy of Bergson,* p. 159.

[15] No better example of the case of rationality need be sought than the way the infant became credited with a ready-made soul. Men were found upon occasion to act reasonably. The child, who is father to the man, must also be rational—*ex nihil, nihil venit.* But since the infant does not act rationally, the soul must be not only ready-made but passive as well, waiting until at accountability it finds itself! This deliberate but unobservant reading back into earlier stages of subsequent developments is the most inveterate type of philosophic perversity that hangs over as a relic of a world so static that it could not possibly produce anything new. Surely it is easier to conceive a new product to arise in the temporal process than to conceive the puling infant as rational. So to stretch "rationality" not only ruins a good term, but may also ruin a perfectly good infant.

Digitized by Google

active and emotional, like other animals. Out of his active struggle in a reluctant, if not hostile, environment have arisen whatever further characteristics he may have. While man is not primarily rational, he is secondarily so. He is an animal who on occasion becomes ideational. That is, from being an animal that is propelled *vis a tergo,* as when directed by impulse or habit, man becomes on occasion an end-guided animal. The future as a determiner is substituted for the past and the present. But ideas, like all other human characteristics, have been born of the struggle for a livelihood. This functional relation of ideas to activity is clearly indicated by the sort of occasion on which they occur and by the use they serve in the situation out of which they arise. Ideas are the counterparts of inhibited activity. As long as the instinctive responses of the human organism function smoothly, man does not have recourse to the response called thinking; but once these forms of activity are estopped, ideas arise, serve as stimuli for releasing the inhibited activity, and cease to exist once the other types of responding to the environment are normally restored. The enormous economy of such technique in the struggle for existence cannot be overemphasized. The survival of man indicates the use of such a variation; the progress of man indicates its revolutionary economy; and the awe with which man has hypostatized and deified ideas shows the magic of their functioning.[16] But even if ideas be taken as being man's peculiar characteristic, evolution counsels us to learn the value and function even of ideas from their genesis, and not to rob life of its richest product and activity of its most effective control by making purely into contemplative objects what, being born of the struggle, should serve in the struggle.

[16] Cf. Emerson's lines:

"Better it is than gems or gold,
And oh! it cannot die;
But thought will glow when the sun grows cold,
And mix with Deity."

Digitized by Google

But ideas are capable of being induced by other means than by actual confrontation with the physical situation that in all its sternness would produce immediate death if the initial response were not correct. Problems may be set vicariously by others, and ideas be thus induced. That is, in the foregoing individualistic account of the struggle for existence, a very important element has been omitted. Neither men nor most other higher animals have faced the environment alone. Most animals have lived more or less in groups and have survived because of this fact. With peculiar urgency has this necessarily been true of the human species. Because of the ever lengthening infancy as one ascends the scale, social mediation between the helpless infant and the non-social environment becomes utterly necessary. It is the by-products of this necessity that are here to be emphasized. Even as Saul went to look for asses and found a kingdom, so long before the human organism is able to cope single-handed with his world he is made the recipient, willy-nilly, of all the group's ways of reacting, is provided with the most intimate and profoundly significant of all group habits—the talking habit, with a full kit of verbal tools—and is fitted out entire with beliefs ranging from the simplest meanings that outrun his momentary experience to the most time-defying theologies and theodicies.

It is upon this verbal inheritance that we must for a time dwell; for it is upon the technique which renders it possible that social scientists are more and more depending for a genesis of the self about which equality is finally to be asserted or denied. Action follows only upon stimulation: not because the organism is passive and must be prodded into activity; rather because activity cannot be *überhaupt,* but must be connected with some specific situation. And while the organism may be surcharged, as in the case of well-formed habits, nevertheless it demands some sort of a releasing stimulus as an antecedent to activity. Stimulation is normally thought of as from the outside, and undoubtedly most activity is thus initiated in

Digitized by Google

organic forms. Activity, moreover, is not only a consequent of stimulation, but becomes in a certain sense a function of the stimulus. Who wields the stimulus controls the organism. This is an elementary fact to all trainers of animals. As one ponders over the far-reaching control that the stimulus exercises over the reaction and thus over the organism that reacts, he is bound to see the enormous potency that would be introduced into the conduct of any animal who should acquire a flexible mechanism for *self-stimulation*. It would clearly mean an enlarged field of stimulation and thus a liberation of initial conduct, with effectiveness guaranteed through power of subsequent self-correction. It is obvious, on the one hand, that no sub-human animal has this power in any marked degree; and it is equally obvious, on the other hand, that this very capacity is the secret of man's superiority over other forms of life. The dignity of man, as Professor Mead so happily phrases it, consists in the double fact that he can call upon himself and that when he calls upon himself he finds himself at home.

It is not that there is anything magical about the power of speech. If magic were our reliance, then needed we not to have come so far to find a basis for selfhood. And yet something suspiciously like magic has been the reliance of social theorists up to our day. Since turning from a transcendental derivation of individuality, most theorists have put their trust in a supplanting social derivation, the common word to describe the technique for which has been "imitation." It has been the vogue with sociologists and social psychologists alike, and from their sanction has passed into popular speech: it is often said as yet that the child gets his personality by inheritance and by imitation. There remains to be pointed out, however, a mechanism whereby imitation can produce this marvelous result. Imitation indeed presupposes the existence of the self in which it is said to result. Not until the mechanism is indicated shall we be much nearer the heart of

Digitized by Google

our mystery than we were when we derived souls from God. And not even the modern social group is as effective a magician as was the ancient deity.

It is doubtful whether our clarification and substantiation of such a mechanism has kept pace with our assumption that such a mechanism is actually at work in the formation of personality. So far as this assumption rests upon facts, they seem for the most part to converge upon the language habit as the most promising mechanism whereby human organisms grow into human personalities. Certain it is that the ability to talk carries with it not only social potentiality but an enormous addition of power in self-direction as well. We can tell ourselves what to do; indeed, so do our senses intersect that we cannot give directions to another without at the same time instructing ourselves. The utility of the vocal mechanism for the development of individuality is clearly seen in the observation recently made by his father upon a four-year-old of my acquaintance. Sitting up in bed in the early morning, he was practicing on an imaginary piano. Pausing after each exercise, he addressed himself authoritatively: "Do it again!"[17] And then he proceeded to obey his own commands through many repetitions. That a human organism could ever become a person without some such mechanism for self-direction is everywhere questioned, and in all truth seems highly improbable. Helen Keller furnishes us an interesting bit of empirical evidence upon this point. She writes:

> Before my teacher came to me, I did not know that I am. . . . . I did not know that I knew aught or that I lived or acted or desired. . . . . I never viewed anything beforehand or chose it. . . . . My inner life, then, was a blank without past, present, or future, without wonder or joy or faith. . . . . Since I had no power of thought, I did not compare one mental state with another. So I was not conscious of any change or process going on in my brain when my teacher began to instruct me. . . . . When I learned the meaning of *I* and *me* and

[17] For this illustration and for other indispensable considerations I am indebted to a doctoral dissertation at the University of Chicago by Dr. J. Goodwin Locke.

Digitized by Google

found that I was something, I began to think. Then consciousness first existed for me.[18]

It is admitted that no such evidence is finally conclusive. Indeed, let it be said again that further light rather than continued dogmatism is needed to determine the precise mechanism and the manner of its functioning whereby the organism becomes a person.[19] Future studies, however, can the more easily converge upon this precise task because of the common agreement among social scientists that the soul of man is a social achievement rather than a divine or natural gift.

We have come thus in our historical sketch to a promising culmination of the undeviating emphasis in America upon the individual. From a purely mystic or purely utilitarian assertion of his importance, we have reached what purports to be an empirical account of the way the individual arises in experience. Starting as an active physical organism in a physical environment, each member of the human species acquires a "soul." The group is the source, the vocal gesture, the most probable mechanism. While our knowledge of the mechanism awaits completion, the precise nature of this "self" is not to be dogmatized about. Its origin we believe to be temporal and empirical; the mechanism of its genesis is now conceived in concrete terms; and its functions are open to scientific observation and description. In the face of this, it seems gratuitous to assume it to be an independent entity, simple and substantial. In advance of further knowledge, it need not be assumed to be anything more than the biological organism directing its own activity through a technique that becomes

[18] Helen Keller, *The World I Live In*, pp. 113–17.

[19] It is the psychological and the philosophical behaviorists that have advanced our knowledge farthest in this direction. I wish to acknowledge especial indebtedness to Professor G. H. Mead. See his earlier article, "A Behavioristic Account of the Significant Symbol," *Journal of Philosophy*, XIX, 160 ff., and his very recent account, "The Genesis of the Self and Social Control," *International Journal of Ethics*, XXXV, 251.

Digitized by Google

more describable with further study. And as for the future, let the self be acknowledged whatever it is found in experience to be. With this restatement in empirical, dynamic form of the genesis and nature of the self, let us briefly contrast the traditional view of the soul. The old contention insisted upon deriving selves from a common mold; so does the new account, with an important difference. But the rigid metaphysical and theological mold of the former has become the social and flexible matrix of the latter; and with this change, a soul so transcendentally derived that it could never adapt itself to the exigencies of earth and time has become a self socially constituted and adaptable, therefore, to the vicissitudes of the social process. The old contention insisted upon an inexpugnably given somewhat so fixed as to inhibit any thought of fundamentally changing it and as to discourage any thoroughgoing effort at re-making the social and natural order, which also became infected with its rigidity.[20] The newer conception has also its biological given, but its given is plastic enough to raise hope that something may be done progressively to eliminate the undesirable elements of man's inheritance. Indeed, "man's supreme inheritance," as Alexander[21] phrases it, is the possession of a guidance capable of transforming the biological as well as the physical and the social given. Its given serves as a challenge to change rather than as a summons to resignation: the ideal of pious acceptance connected with the old view is supplanted by an energizing belief in the extended efficacy of human effort. For while at any given time the self is, to borrow Professor Tufts'

[20] The well-known fragment from Anaximander is the classic statement, in ethical form, of this fixedness applied to nature. "Things perish into those things out of which they have their birth, according to that which is ordained; for they give reparation to one another and pay the penalty of their injustice according to the disposition of time." (Bakewell, *Fragments*, p. 3.)

Does not the modern expression "to get even" hark back in connotation to a fixed order to disturb the equilibrium of which was thought to forbode man's undoing?

[21] F. M. Alexander, *Man's Supreme Inheritance.*

Digitized by Google

phraseology,[22] "habit," it is also "adjusting activity," and in life's active give and take, "the soul," as Professor Woodbridge so graphically puts it, "is the world as each man sees it."

III

It is, then, about this self-directing animal organism that our present problem of equality centers. Are individuals thus constituted, equal? There are three possible answers. Carrying on our democratic tradition, we may unqualifiedly assert actual equality, or, daunted by apparent facts, we may as unqualifiedly deny men equality. Or finally, in keeping with what is commonly believed to be the practice of philosophers, we may, having met a difficulty, make a distinction—that is, we may redefine equality so as to make it a matter of more-or-less rather than of all-or-none. At any rate, it is obvious that the matter is of such moment for democracy as to warrant us in taking serious counsel with ourselves as to what our final answer shall be.

However much we are inclined to have done with our problem in keeping with democratic sentiment, we are deterred from giving as our answer the "everlasting yea" by two considerations. There are, first, the stubborn facts. Men do not at first glance seem to be equal in any assignable manner. And what is more perturbing to the democrat, they do not seem any more equal on sober second thought than at first glance. Indeed, the longer one thinks it over the more certain does it become that men are not just what the term "equality" suggests. And the more specific the analysis, the more obvious the discrepancy. These observed facts are strengthened, rather than weakened, by evolutionary theory. The process that has transformed the inherited hierarchy of discrete species into a modern continuum with functional divisions for convenience rather than metaphysical entelechies has as a clear implication gradations within each species.

[22] *The Philosophical Review*, XV, 361–79.

Digitized by Google

If the human species, for instance, be surveyed with intelligence as the *fundamentum divisionis,* do we not go up to persons of average intelligence from idiots, imbeciles, morons, and from average intelligence on up to genius? And any other principle of division would yield a similar diversity within the same species. So clear does all this seem upon reflection that one might well say that while Americans have traditionally *felt* themselves to be equal, they have never *thought* themselves to be equal. And this contrast between feeling and reflection leads to the second consideration that gives us pause when we would answer the question affirmatively. It is the use to which the doctrine has at times been put. It is not likely that men would overlook such observable facts to assert such a non-verifiable conclusion were there not at work some ulterior motive. Feelings are capable of making a camouflage sufficient to hide the most unacceptable of practices. There is that in man, as Hobhouse observes, which "makes him cling to the semblance of right most of all when he is rejecting the reality."[28] Any concept, when crowned with the halo of some transfiguring emotion and endued with power from some *idola tribus,* may cover with a pious but poison barrage whole areas of human activity. Man grows naturally shy of emotionalized concepts when he sees that under the spell of even the democratic concept of equality the elemental liberties of men can be conjured away into a heaven-blessed slavery, as in the old South. In other fields of life also equality has been found capable of serving but to mark the spot where privileges indispensable for a decent life lay buried: a shining mausoleum towering above pulverizing bones. But these considerations have been sufficiently exploited in foregoing pages. Deterred, then, both by observable facts and by the questionable practices of many who have overlooked these facts, we find ourselves unable to give an unqualifiedly affirmative answer.

[28] *Morals in Evolution,* I, 64.

Digitized by Google

But we are also deterred from giving an unqualifiedly negative answer. The first reason why we cannot is that we are not willing to give up a shibboleth that has been at strategic times as effective in action as has equality. Regardless of its factual accuracy, we know that emblazoned on democratic banners it has been one of those electric words that have challenged the indifferent, awakened the neutral, inflamed the zealous. "Mankind are more disposed," as our historic declaration of faith goes, "to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed." We are not willing to sacrifice this effective stimulus to a type of action the need for which is perennially recurrent in a world where lethargy finds a host in corpulent women and sluggish men. Indeed from the Revolution down, the concept has really been used more to challenge action than to state a fact. This certainly is not the time to give it up, unless we have grown faint-hearted regarding our American experiment in democracy. For only within our generation has the battle been anything like won for the *machinery* of democracy. If the assertion of equality has helped to win the machinery, it ought also to be effective in using it to achieve fullness of life. It is certainly no time to give up a weapon in battle when with the continued use of the weapon, but only with it, victory is actually in sight.

If we, however, are to be quite frank with ourselves, we must indeed know that this imminence of a fruitful use of the democratic machinery is precisely the reason for the weakening in some American quarters of equalitarian sentiments. The participation in social policies which as a weapon has come into the hands of Tom, Dick, Harry, and even Susan and Lummox is loaded with dynamite if it can be made to function democratically. Not only is this true as regards property interests where 2 per cent of our population owns some 60 per cent of our wealth,[24] but it holds of fields as sacred

[24] King, *The Wealth and Income of the People of the United States*, p. 80.

Digitized by Google

to sentiment as property is to calculation, of family permanence, of industrial management, of religious practices. These are delicate matters for the present generation; but democracy is a dangerous experiment in every generation to interests that look either to the few or to the past for their justification. But if the action to which equality as a shibboleth stimulates is ever justifiable—and historically we have officially declared it so—then there seems every logical reason for exploiting the equalitarian impetus, now that the testing time has come.

This preliminary scouting ought already to have given the clue to our problem. The difficulty—an old and ever recurring one in any dynamic society—arises from the necessity of applying to one situation a concept that arose out of, and got its meaning from, another active context. We are not sufficiently conscious of the fact that our new knowledge about human nature implies and demands a new theory of concepts.[25] Such a philosophy of language as would undertake, for example, explicitly to justify using the concept "God" so as, willy-nilly, to throw theists and atheists together would simplify the task of the social scientist. To reinterpret the concept of equality so as to conserve its functional value for the new with which it must live is our only recourse if we are able to save for the future this slogan so meaningful in the past. The novelty of our situation consists not merely in substituting for a transcendental derivation of a ready-made individual an evolutionary genesis of a dynamic organism, but also in pronounced economic and populational changes that have made individuals, however conceived, less needed and desired than ever before in America. This latter type of change is clearly indicated by our newly acquired willingness to restrict immigration and by the evident determination of both the more edu-

[25] A promising beginning toward such a philosophy of language is found in Bronislaw Malinoswki's supplement to Ogden and Richards' *The Meaning of Meaning*, a chapter entitled "The Problem of Meaning in Primitive Languages." See also Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, chap. v.

Digitized by Google

cated and the more wealthy classes to restrict the size of their families through voluntary birth control. This metamorphosis that in a half-century has converted birth control from a sin against God into social respectability, and restriction of immigration from disloyalty to both country and mankind into a popularly approved federal statute, is a change that appears more revolutionary the more one reflects upon it. In such a society individuals are not so invaluable, to say the least, as any longer to inhibit invidious comparisons between them. Notions of social superiority more easily arise from such a situation than from the enforced co-operation in a pioneer land.

Considering the whole situation and all the facts, we shall be obliged to choose the third alternative and say that individuals are not equal in the old sense, primarily because they are not individuals in the old sense. Starting with this fundamental admission, we shall seek, as it were, "a moral equivalent" for equality. That is, we shall seek to find the functional meaning for the newer conception of individuality of what was originally claimed by the term "equality." Our problem now is initially one of methodology. Our procedure may be formal or concrete. Let us first notice the formal ways of reinterpreting the concept of equality.

Beginning with the most formal, it might be helpful to indicate explicitly a certain verbal ground for calling men equal. Human beings, as talking animals, awake to consciousness to find themselves in possession of words that apply indiscriminately to many objects and beings, because of course a common type of reaction has been found more or less adequate for the whole class. These class names perform more than one function. They serve man as a technique for unifying what otherwise would often prove baffling because of its multiplicity or complexity. In this way they are instruments of economy in man's mental life. Under the influence of the will-to-overlook-differences man is thus enabled to treat dif-

Digitized by Google

ferences for the time being as non-existent. But this treating differences as non-existent does not render them non-existent except to that mood and for that specific purpose. Nothing, however, is more common to the will-to-unify than the tendency to generalize the unity that is found to exist for a specific purpose and to make it descriptive of a reality that remains statically what it was found momentarily to be. And there is every degree of this tendency, from that manifested by the temporary sophist who camps on a general term to prove his point up to that manifested by the abiding mystic who sees nothing in this teeming world except the Eternal One. The very fact, however, that the common term "man" is applied to all creatures of a certain class does not settle the question of equality. "All the human beings on the planet," as Lewis Mumford observes, "are a unity only for the sake of talking about them."[26] Universals, unifying words in language, serve only to show that for specific purposes differences may be overlooked and a formal unification be secured out of motives of economy. The procedure turns on what Mr. Skudder Klyce would call a "verbal trick,"[27] useful enough in its place, no doubt, but of no further significance for our present purpose.

A less formal and more significant procedure would be to treat equality as an ethical and political fiction. Such indirection appears at times the most intellectually economical way of reaching a goal of action that by common consent is good. At least it has been on the whole the way whereby law has settled down from precedent to precedent. Since the results that follow from treating a corporation as a person appear on the whole just, it is efficient to treat it as a person, regardless of how much it may differ in other (for the time being irrelevant) respects from a person. "Thus corporations are said to have nationality, are treated as alien enemies, are known as inhabitants, and are granted diplomatic protection. . . . . The fic-

[26] *The Story of Utopias*, p. 304.

[27] *Universe*, p. 1.

Digitized by Google

tion is due merely to the fact that a corporation is granted by law rights and duties identical with those of a person."[28] The end desired is clear; this procedure is found to be an efficient means to it; but since it does certain violence to our knowledge as a whole, we confess that injustice by admitting it a fiction, but one practically justified. By its fruits, rather than by its roots, we judge it. This is a helpful way to deal with the concept of equality. But since the justification for any fiction lies in its results, we have already indicated the direction we are to look for a more material treatment of the concept of equality.

The very reason, indeed, for desiring to treat equality as a fiction rather than as a falsehood consists in the fact that the concept is functionally useful without being statically true. It is useful because we are still in need of the type of action which the concept has historically motivated; it is not quite true because it describes a dynamic individual as though he were static. The modern emphasis is not so much upon what an individual *is* as it is upon what he can *do*. That is, the "essential" characteristic of man has changed from essence to function—man is what he functions as.

All this means, of course, that were we inclined to answer outright that men are actually unequal, we should still not be estopped, as were our predecessors, from considering *on its merits* the further question, whether men ought not still to be treated *as if* equal. But rather than deny that men are equal, it has seemed historically fairer to say that the term has lost its original significance through the changing conception of the human individual to which the term is applied. It was quantitative before, because applied to a static object; but now that the object has become dynamic, the question as to equality of these activities is in a certain sense irrelevant. We no longer inquire whether men were created equal, or whether they are actually equal, or whether we ought to make them

[28] R. Demos, "Legal Fictions," *International Journal of Ethics*, XXXIV, 44.

Digitized by Google

equal. But of the individual dynamically conceived we now inquire whether equality of treatment produces the social and natural consequences that we want. The shorthand claim of human equality is, therefore, true for us if it functions truly, and this will be determined primarily by the efficiency with which the claim promotes the major good of the situation that motivates the claim. This is the meaning that remains for the old concept when it is used to describe this functional individual moving in a constantly changing world. If equality of treatment produces consequences of maximum desirability, then the treatment is justified, regardless of whether men were, or are, or ever shall be, equal in the old sense. In seeking, however, to resolve this "if," we challenge the interests and emotions of men even more than their intelligence. Whether men should be given equality of treatment depends, in all truth, upon the kind of world one wants. And even if all argument upon this point were destined to end in such incompatible tastes as to defy further analysis, there are weighty considerations that a democrat might urge in favor of functional equality before the final impasse is reached. These considerations may best be grouped under a discussion of the value, intrinsic and extrinsic, of co-operation, and must be presented at another time.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Digitized by Google

BECCARIA AND PUNISHMENT

W. C. DE PAULEY

Men live first and think afterward, and slow as they have been to clarify the principles by which they live, in few fields of study have their ratiocinations been more labored than in the attempts to arrive at a consistent theory of punishment. The wonder is that while parents control children, and states lead criminals to the gallows or the lethal chamber on every day of the week, there is no generally accepted theory by which they justify these restrictions on personal liberty, varying, as they do, from the least to the greatest of penalties. Not only is it difficult to interpret the moral emotions aroused in the populace by criminal action, but the circumstances attending crime and its restrictions are so numerous and so diverse that it is well-nigh impossible to enumerate and classify them. Crime and its punishment are so complex that the investigator is carried against his will from his own field, whatever it may be, through the whole gamut from theology to—shall we say? —sociology.

The ethical approach may be looked upon as concerning itself with three interdependent and complementary elements: the state and its law; the character of the criminal; and the readjustment of the second to the first. Punishment is a means whereby this readjustment may be effected.

Whether we hold a Hobbist, or a theoretic, or any other view of the essence of that state, we shall, at least, be agreed that the body politic is the necessary social medium in which alone the mere individual can reach the potential values of his nature as *homo sapiens*. Nor need we concern ourselves as to the merits or demerits of either the Aristotelian conception which subjects the good of the individual to the good of the state,[1] or the Thomist conception which subjects the good of

[1] *Pol.* i. i. 12.

Digitized by Google

the state to the good of the individual;[2] we can admit that both the state and the individual depend on one another, and that they attain their highest development *pari passu*. Without corporate life the individual is stunted, and without the developed individual the state is maimed.

The ethically good man is he who arranges his motives in accordance with their values as means to the good end which he would attain and, by a rational and studied choice, selects the most valuable in his own case. The state, therefore, will attempt to provide such a social medium as will best insure the development of free members. This end it can most readily secure by issuing the least possible number of positive commands. Minute directions promulgated in order to secure a harmonious society produce not free men, but obedient automata. It is probably true that the modern state does not do as much as it might in suggesting and guiding its citizens toward a better manner of life; the maxim that it pays to advertise might be as useful to the moral as to the business life. But however that may be, the state ought to interfere with individual action when wrong motives have led to individual actions anti-social and criminal in their results, if its aim is to secure the greatest possible freedom consonant with the least possible interference. The state, having decided just what are the fewest possible laws which will insure its permanence and development, checks, that is, punishes, in accordance with them that individual whose conduct arises from motives which prevent the development of the will's freedom. It deters men from crime, as Bentham says, by teaching them to associate penalty or pain with certain specific acts. Instinctive action with its accompanying emotions must be sublimated, a transformation none save the criminal can possibly work; the office of the state will be to present an obstacle to unreasoned and anti-social action by uniting with it as a consequence for the criminal that experience which will offset the satisfaction of his proposed end.

[2] *De Reg. Princip.* i. 1.

Digitized by Google

It is to Beccaria and John Howard that society and its criminals owe the reformation of the theory and the methods of punishment. The eighteenth century gave us Kant and a relentless retributive theory, and also Beccaria, whose thought, though influenced by utilitarianism, shows no tendency to minimize the dignity and majesty of the law. On the one hand Kant emphasizes the worth of the criminal as a person, which forbids us to punish him with a view to the good of the state; on the other, Beccaria looks to that bond of justice which cements men together, and demands that the criminal should be punished in order that he and other men may be deterred from future crimes. Kant believed that the criminal is debased if he is made a mere means to another's good; Beccaria, that he is debased if he is made to suffer a greater penalty than is required to hold society together. Kant looks to the past; Beccaria echoes the sentiment of Hobbes that "we are forbidden to inflict punishment with any other design than for the correction of the offender, or the direction of others."[3] It remained for Hegel, who saw that the will is not a ready-made faculty, but the whole man in the process of his development, to soften the *lex talionis* of Kant by adding two modifying elements, namely, the deterrent and reformative; whereas Beccaria, undazed by a transcendental conception of the source of law, enunciates a theory of punishment whose humaneness does not vitiate its justice.

Beccaria's short and epoch-making little volume, *Crimes and Punishment,* is written round the preventive theory, which he states in the following words: "The end of punishment . . . . is no other than to prevent the criminal from doing further injury to society, and to prevent others from committing the like offense."[4] He would arrange a scale of crimes determined solely by the measure of harm they cause to society, so that "the first degree should consist of those which immediately tend to the dissolution of society, and the last, of

[3] *Lev.* i. xiv.

[4] *Crimes and Punishments* (Eng. trans., London, 1779), p. 43.

Digitized by Google

the smallest possible injustice done to a private member of society."[5] To each crime there will be assigned a definite penalty. In his view, it is a mistake to measure either crime or its penalty by the intention or even the mental disposition of the criminal, since subjective standards would be impracticable. An objective standard can be observed by affixing to a crime the penalty assigned on the basis of the amount of harm it does to society.[6] If his political theory is Hobbist, his psychology is associationist, and, like Bentham, he would deter by accustoming us to associate with a crime its precise and peculiar degree of punishment. For this reason, penalty ought to follow as soon as possible upon crime, so that a lasting association may be formed in the mind of the intimate connection between them.[7] And, again like Bentham,[8] he would try to make the penalty analogous to the crime, so that violence would be associated with corporal punishment, and robbery with fine.[9] If punishment were only swift and sure, the man under storm of temptation might be led to weigh the necessary consequences of his act against the immediate good it might bring to him, and be prevented.

It is doubtful whether Beccaria has made the most of the preventive or deterrent aspects of punishment. If, as he says, punishment ought to be as mild as possible consistent with the maintenance of the state, the view of Bosanquet would seem to be applicable, which would determine the degree of penalty to be assigned to a crime by the likelihood of its becoming a precedent. "If a lighter punishment deter as effectively as a heavier, it is wrong to impose the heavier. For the precise aim of state action is the maintenance of rights, and if rights are effectively maintained without the heavier punishment, the aim of the state does not justify its imposition."[10] Beccaria's

[5] *Op. cit.*, p. 22.

[6] *Op. cit.*, p. 29.

[7] Bentham, *Works*, p. 326.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 407.

[9] Beccaria, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

[10] *The Philosophical Theory of the State*, 3d ed., p. 212. See also *Some Suggestions in Ethics*, p. 203.

Digitized by Google

principle would be satisfied if he were able to associate with a crime the least possible penalty which would deter people from committing it.)

Important as it is to deter people from crime, we cannot be content simply to equate the terms "punishment" and "deterrence," and claim that there are no other principles involved when we punish. Deterrence, or prevention, tends to emphasize the emotion of fear, and a society of free men is actuated by other motives. A criminal is deterred in the highest sense, and in the whole man, when he has learned to act from the highest motives of service and co-operation. He is deterred, in short, when he is reformed. It is clear, therefore, that unless we associate with the deterrent element, another, the reformative, punishment cannot be expected to satisfy its end. The criminal is a potentially good citizen; if it were not so, and his nature were merely a complex of instinctive and impulsive reactions to external stimuli, we should lock him up, or muzzle him; we should not punish him. Accordingly Plato makes Protagoras say:

> If you will think, Socrates, of the nature of punishment, you will see at once that in the opinion of mankind virtue may be acquired; no one punishes the evildoer under the notion, or for the reason, that he has done wrong—only the unreasonable fury of a beast acts in that manner. But he who desires to inflict rational punishment does not retaliate for a past wrong which cannot be undone; he has regard to the future, and is desirous that the man who is punished, and he who sees him punished, may be deterred from doing wrong again. He punishes for the sake of prevention, thereby implying that virtue is capable of being taught. This is the notion of all who retaliate upon others either privately or publicly. And the Athenians too, your own citizens, like other men, punish and take vengeance on all whom they regard as evildoers; and hence, we may infer them to be of the number of those who think that virtue may be acquired and taught.[11]

Now although the theorem which concludes Beccaria's treatment does not notice the reformative element in punishment, he recognizes that crime can be eradicated only by curing the

[11] *Prot.* 323.

Digitized by Google

criminal. The theorem reads: "That a punishment may not be an act of violence, of one or of many against a private member of society, it should be public, immediate, and necessary; the least possible in the case given; proportioned to the crime, and determined by the laws." No doubt if punishment is to be determined by the laws, it will be rational, and, therefore, capable of being understood by rational beings; but Beccaria is explicit in several passages. He believes that the most certain method of preventing crimes is to perfect the system of education,[12] and, in a passage almost Platonic, he tells us that:

> Ignorance may indeed be less fatal than a small degree of knowledge, because this adds to the evils of ignorance the inevitable errors of a confined view of things on this side the bounds of truth; but a man of enlightened understanding, appointed guardian of the laws, is the greatest blessing that a sovereign can bestow on a nation. Such a man is accustomed to behold truth, and not to fear it; unacquainted with the greatest part of those imaginary and insatiable necessities which so often put virtue to the proof, and accustomed to contemplate mankind from the most elevated point of view, he considers the nation as his family, and his fellow-citizens as brothers; the distance between the great and the vulgar appears to him the less as the number of mankind he has in view is greater.[13]

Lastly, the state is under obligation to deter men from crime by reforming them. The very existence of society as an organism, composed of free men, is at stake when the criminal is likely to go unpunished. Justice, the cement which gives the body politic coherence and stability, is comparable to the nervous system of a physical organism. Once it becomes diseased, the body decays and mortifies. For this reason, a third element introduces itself, which, for want of a better name, we call the retributive. The criminal acts, and society *must* react. Its reaction is a condition of its existence. To society punishment is a hypothetical imperative, with the emphasis on the imperative. Thus Beccaria says: "It is upon

[12] Beccaria, *op. cit.*, p. 174.

[13] *Op. cit.*, p. 171.

Digitized by Google

this, then, that the sovereign's right to punish crime is founded, that is, upon the necessity of defending the public liberty, intrusted to his care, from the usurpation of individuals; and punishments are just in proportion as the liberty preserved by the sovereign is sacred and valuable."[14] Again, "the laws receive their force and authority from an oath of fidelity, either tacit, or expressed, which living subjects have sworn to their sovereign in order to restrain the intestine fermentation of the private interests of individuals. From hence springs their true and natural authority."[15] We reform, therefore, or attempt to reform, criminals by raising them to the realization of the nature of the social compact under which they live.

We have read our Plato to little advantage if we have not seen that behind the preventive and reformative ends of punishment there lies the retributive; for although he destroyed, once and for all, the *lex talionis* idea of punishment which runs through his predecessors, the tragedians, he saw that the state is under an obligation to punish crimes. Not only does he say that punishment is not to be inflicted because the criminal has done wrong, he is careful to add that the state ought to aim at the "deserved punishment."[16] Indeed, if criminals go unpunished, the laws do not maintain the bonds which keep the state intact.[17] And in the passage in the *Gorgias*, where the medicinal aspects of punishment are so strongly championed, he is careful to show that we owe to the criminal his punishment; for if a wrongdoer is allowed to go unpunished, the state perpetuates his evil, and so "to do wrong and not to be punished is the first and greatest [evil] of all."[18] But in case it may be objected that Plato's theory of the state, as the reflection on earth of the eternal principle of justice laid up in the heavens, gives him the cue for a transcendental background in his punishment doctrine, we must recall his statement in the

[14] *Op. cit.*, p. 7.
[15] Beccaria, *op. cit.*, p. 13.
[16] *Laws* 934.
[17] *Laws* 921.
[18] *Gorg.* 479.

Digitized by Google

Crito, where the citizen is regarded as bound by a social contract to obey the laws of the state, his parental guardian, unless he can convince them that its commands are unjust.[19] If the citizen elects to live in a community, he is bound by its laws; when he breaks them, the community is obliged to punish him. We may not stand by and see a curable criminal remain in his crime.[20]

Thus it is clear that while Beccaria puts in the foreground prevention as the end of punishment, it is no less clear that he believes that the criminal is to be reformed, and that once crime shows its face, it must be cut down. No less than Montesquieu does he believe that "in moderate governments, the love of one's country, shame, and the fear of blame are restraining motives, capable of preventing a multitude of crimes."[21] Not the least of his merits is that he was not carried away by a soft humanitarianism to deny the obligation pressing upon the state to conserve its existence.

The best commentary on the principles advocated by Beccaria is the life of John Howard, who translated into action the spirit of his "benevolent" inspirer. Appointed sheriff of Bedford jail in 1773, immediate contact with the disgraceful conditions prevailing not only among the criminals but even among the detained awaiting trial, suggested to him the idea of undertaking a tour throughout the British Isles and the Continent with a view to collecting evidence on the conditions to which the condemned and the accused were obliged to submit. The simple account of his experiences entitled, *The State of the Prisons in England and Wales, with Preliminary Observations and an Account of some Foreign Prisons and Hospitals,* was written in 1777, and the facts disclosed reveal the magnitude of the progress made since his day in the matter of prison reform. He found that prison-keepers in some cases contrived to defraud their victims of the allotted rations, and,

[19] *Crito* 51. [20] *Laws* 731.

[21] *The Spirit of Laws* (Eng. trans., T. Nugent), p. 88.

Digitized by Google

in certain cases where water was unavailable, were known to supply their unfortunate victims with no more than three pints each day. Jail fever was rife; prisoners were lean and naked; and before release was granted, were obliged to pay fees to the jailer or clerk of assize. A man might languish for weeks in confinement until his case was tried, and, if discharged unconvicted, might depart a victim to disease. Howard's emphasis is laid on the reformative and preventive aspects of punishment; there was no occasion for a practical reformer to press for the necessity of punishment in days when it was unjustly severe. Believing that men are capable of becoming assets to society if only they be not hardened by brutality, he pleaded for a gentle discipline. *Parum est coercere improbos poena, nisi probos efficias disciplina* was his motto. The ideals of the man are portrayed in his considerate conviction. One passage will disclose his aim.

> The notion that criminals are ungovernable is certainly erroneous. There is a mode of managing some of the most desperate with ease to yourself and advantage to them. Many of them are shrewd and sensible; manage them with calmness, yet with steadiness; shew them that you have humanity, and that you aim to make them useful members of society; let them see and hear the rules and orders of the prison, and be convinced that they are not defrauded in their provisions or clothes by contractors or gaolers. When they are sick, let them be treated with tenderness. Such conduct would prevent mutiny in prisons, and attempts to escape, which I am fully persuaded are often owing to prisoners being made desperate by the inhumanity and ill-usage of their keepers.[22]

These were the sentiments which ultimately won the day in the British and Irish Parliaments, and Howard, who voiced them, will never be forgotten by men who are striving even now for a more general and adequate treatment of our unfortunate criminals. The ideal punishment is that which will serve to write the justice which inspires it within the hearts of those who know it not.

ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE, WINNIPEG

[22] Howard, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

Digitized by Google

THE GREATEST HAPPINESS REGARDLESS OF NUMBER

ANDERSON WOODS

The want of unity in the standard formula of Utilitarianism as declared by Bentham, "The greatest happiness of the greatest number," makes it fatally defective as a statement of the ultimate end. Instead of one such end, the statement seems to contemplate two: (1) the maximum amount of happiness, and (2) the maximum number of people to enjoy it. But two final aims cannot coexist unless they can be proved at all points consistent. This perfect consistency, in any case, it would require infinite time to show. In the particular case under consideration, inconsistencies arise very quickly. It is easy enough to conceive of circumstances under which an increase in population would mean a decrease in aggregate happiness. Long before such a crisis as that is reached, confusion appears in conduct, for all courses cannot be equally conducive to increase in numbers and increase in happiness, and it becomes necessary all along the way to decide between measures in which these tendencies respectively predominate. It may not, indeed, have been in the minds of our utilitarian fathers that anybody would ever attempt to influence the growth of population; Bentham doubtless referred merely to a desirable width of diffusion of happiness among people then and at any future time existing. Be that as it may, the criterion not only fails to furnish any guidance in matters affecting the growth or limitation of numbers, but further fails to provide a rule for distribution even among the numbers assumed to exist.

It is my purpose here to advocate striking out of the old formula the phrase, "of the greatest number," as irrelevant

Digitized by Google

and confusing; undertaking to show how such revision simplifies the general argument on behalf of Utilitarianism.

It is assuredly not the intention to deny the great importance of a proper distribution of the *means* of happiness—which, by a slight liberty (which I claim is justifiable), I will call, for short, wealth, including spiritual as well as material means of happiness. Indeed, the subject-matter of ethics is chiefly made up of the discussion of this question and its applications. This distribution is to be looked on, however, not as end or as part of the end, but as means. It involves principles of great moment, but subordinate to the great principle. When a given distribution of wealth is right, it is so only because it tends to the maximum sum of happiness;[1] whenever its tendency is to defeat that end, it is wrong.

Let us suppose (to simplify the illustration by escaping from social complications) a shipwreck and a landing by two men upon a far-away island. They have between them a store of bread which must be used carefully, though sufficient to maintain health until the expected coming of rescue. In all but circumstances most remotely possible—only theoretically possible, perhaps it should be said—the distribution of this bread would affect the general sum of happiness. Assuming each of the two men to require about the same amount to keep up his health, and the health of one to be about as conducive to general happiness as the health of the other, yet it is obviously untrue that to take from A half of his share and give it to B would benefit B as much as it would injure A. The results would be the underfeeding of A and the overfeeding of B, or, if B were not actually harmed, he would in no case receive a benefit equal to the harm sustained by A. Nor would the disproportion thus caused be limited to the immediate effects produced, but it would be carried as well into remote effects; as, plainly, A's health being injured, a lowering of efficiency could be expected in the performance of whatever

[1] I should prefer "pleasure," but for want of space to justify.

Digitized by Google

duty he might be obligated thereafter to discharge toward other men, without any balancing increase of efficiency on the part of B. Under such circumstances the moral course of the distributor is clear. But, assume that the act of taking from A and giving to B, instead of injuring both, or injuring A much and benefiting B only slightly, would cause as much benefit (happiness) to and through B as it would prevent to and through A, so that the happiness directly and indirectly produced on the one side would be as great as that directly and indirectly destroyed on the other; in that case the inequality of distribution would be of no importance whatever. It would have no effect upon the general sum of happiness.

It might be suggested that in a case like the foregoing imaginary one, where no other criterion of distribution is in evidence, the criterion of equality is proper to be applied. But if so it could well be answered that if the criterion were of importance in such a case it would have to be considered in all; and that the fact of its inconsistency, in practical situations, with the Utilitarian objective of the greatest aggregate happiness shows it to be without proper place in Utilitarian theory. We thus seem to be thrown back upon the simplified principle that the *means* of happiness (not happiness itself) should be distributed in such way as to cause the largest augmentation of happiness.

This question is not much complicated by considerations of merit and blame; because Utilitarians have long held that rewards and penalties are but means to the general good, operating by way of encouraging actions favorable to such good and deterring from actions having the opposite tendency. In the foregoing assumed case of an exact balance of consequences there are taken into account such indirect consequences as encouragement of good conduct and deterrence from bad.

What has not always been so clearly comprehended is that not only legal justice, evincing itself mainly in useful

Digitized by Google

punishments, but our feeling of the need of some sort of equality in the ordinary conditions of individual lives—be it only equality of opportunity—is likewise a mere derivative of the general Utilitarian aim. It is this sort of justice—the notion of equity or equality in general, apart from such cases as call for exceptional action on the part of the state—which, to quote a happy colloquialism of Dr. Montague, "has always given the Utilitarians trouble." It has usually seemed to them that in addition to the ethical rule that happiness should be made as great as possible in total quantity, another rule exists, of equal authority, providing for some sort of division of the total quantity among individuals.

Now, it is quite plain that this notion as to a requirement of just distribution has hampered greatly the proof or justification of the general doctrine of Utilitarianism. I will attempt to describe the way in which this has been brought about; and with that in view will restate several familiar definitions.

Hedonism, the doctrine that pleasure or happiness is the ultimate good, is of two kinds: (1) psychological or descriptive, i.e., showing that men in fact do and must seek happiness as their ultimate good; (2) ethical, asserting that because that is what men do and must do, it is what they *ought* to do. Again, hedonism, whether descriptive or ethical, is divided into individual and universal; the first relating to the happiness of the particular person, the second, to that of all. Individual ethical hedonism, teaching that each may or should seek his own happiness, has been rejected by the moral opinion of the time, except where consistent with universal ethical hedonism—styled Utilitarianism—the doctrine that each should seek the happiness of all. But, while the premise of individual ethical hedonism is individual descriptive hedonism, there is no corresponding premise for universal ethical hedonism; since the individuals making up society are not seen to be naturally seeking the happiness of all. No satisfactory

Digitized by Google

solution of this difficulty seems ever to have been given. Mill's attempt in this direction is indicated in the following passage:

> No reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable, except that each person, so far as he believes it to be obtainable, desires his own happiness. This, however, being a fact, we have not only all the proof that the case admits of, but all which it is possible to require, that happiness is a good; that each person's happiness is a good to that person; and the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all persons.[2]

after which I should quote the following discussion based thereon, from Dewey and Tufts' *Ethics:*

> It clearly does not follow that because the good of A and B and C, etc., is *collectively,* or aggregately, a good to A and B and C, etc., therefore the good of A and B and C, etc., or of anybody beyond A himself, is regarded as a good by A—especially when the original premise is that A seeks his own good. Because all men want to be happy themselves, it hardly follows that each wants all to be so. It does follow, perhaps, that that would be the *reasonable* thing to want. . . . . But the difficulty is that there is no chance, upon the hedonistic psychology of desire, for this rational conviction to get in its work, even if it be intellectually entertained. The intellectual perception and the mechanism of human motivation remain opposed. Mill's statement, in other words, puts the problem which hedonistic utilitarianism has to solve.[3]

Has not this confusion resulted from an undue stress upon mental individuality? After all, there seems no reason why ethics, as a science largely concerned with the subjective, cannot contemplate mind in the abstract or universal, just as physical science, in dealing with such an entity as matter, is not limited to individualized portions thereof, but may treat generally of the properties which one mass possesses in common with all others. Taking this reasonable view, why can we not regard the general or universal mind as taking for its natural aim, happiness? If we can do this, we shall surely find psychological or descriptive hedonism serving as a justi-

[2] *Utilitarianism,* chap. iv, par. 3.

[3] *Op. cit.,* chap. xv.

Digitized by Google

fication of universal ethical hedonism in the same way as that in which it has heretofore been assumed to serve in support of individual ethical hedonism.

The idea of mental individuality stands for a thing quite real, so long as the idea is held in its proper relations and its significance is not perverted. We must concede that mind, like matter, is divisible into parts; and when a part means something—that is, when a reason is seen for making one division rather than another — then the parts so separated acquire individuality, or in other words, a degree of segregation and distinction. Thus, a planet is an individualized portion of matter, and so, by a different sort of distinction, is a stone. It is quite as proper to divide mind and to distinguish its different portions, and it is especially legitimate to make use in this connection of the most obvious distinction, that between portions of mentality manifesting themselves through individual human bodies. But as a planet is vested with individuality only by virtue of its distinctive relations to other things, in the same way the so-called individual mind derives its individuality only from certain distinctive external relations.

Thus, we find the conception of mental individuality (dealing, as we are, more specifically with that aspect of mind called sensation, or feeling) deriving its initial support from the fact that pleasures or pains can be caused only through the nervous system of the individual organism. This fact should not, however, lead us to forget that it is indeed only *through* the organism, not *to* it, that the causative force directs itself. No one has ever located the conscious being in which the sensation takes final lodgment, or any part of it, spatially in Jones. We speak of a pain felt *by* Jones; this is sufficiently accurate for ordinary purposes, but it might be more philosophically exact to call it a pain felt *through* Jones.

The sensory system of an organism in its relation to mind at large may be likened to a mere conduit, one of many,

Digitized by Google

through which mind receives sensory impressions. Consider these various conduits as occupied in transmitting pleasure-producing currents to a general receptacle; it becomes of first importance to see that the current is applied to the several conduits in accordance with their respective capacities so as to fill the receptacle within the shortest time. This simile sets forth the first criterion of a Utilitarian distribution of wealth among persons—that it shall be distributed in proportion to the respective capacities of the distributees to utilize it.

But it is to be borne in mind that it is wealth, the means of happiness, which is to be distributed. No distribution can be made of happiness itself; in a strict sense that is not capable of individual appropriation, or of sustaining any effect other than enlargement or diminution.

Of course, this first criterion for the distribution of wealth is not an end of the matter. There comes in at this point an additional fact in support of mental individuality; the fact that a sensory current transmitted through a given organism elicits reaction, primarily, from the same organism. This identity between the medium receiving and responding is a circumstance of great importance to Utilitarianism in application, which must take into account all the consequences of an act, indirect as well as direct. It is necessary to supplement the first criterion of distribution referred to above with a secondary consideration of the effect upon general happiness produced by reactions from the persons receiving wealth. Hence arises our system of rewards and penalties of various kinds, legal, economic and other, founded upon so-called merit and blame, yet referable in the ultimate to utility in the production of happiness. Nevertheless, that the body of Jones receives a physical impression which causes a sensation, and that a motor response thereupon comes from the body of Jones, does not locate the sensation itself as within such body, or as property of Jones in the ordinary sense. Here the familiar ideas of location and possession fall down, having been

Digitized by Google

extended from their original use in reference to physical circumstances by figures of speech so old that we have forgotten them to be such.

We have now seen how a superemphasis has been placed upon the ego, by way of the common notion that happiness is something to be divided among persons and to be in measure appropriated and possessed by them. We have now to observe in another direction how the conception of an individual mind has been given an unjustified prominence.

This is seen in the fact that, while the notion of equality among men, above referred to, has long prevailed—witness the saying, "Everybody to count for one, and nobody for more than one"—no serious effort seems to have been made to extend this theory of equality into the association of elements composing the man himself. While Jones is not deemed one with the surrounding world of mind, somehow all the varied and contending components of his own mental being are without difficulty held to be one. Yet, if there is a chain binding together more closely the parts of the so-called self than any binding the selves into a larger whole—it only binds *more* closely, and not so *differently* as to make inapplicable among the parts of the self any principle of just distribution applying among the selves regarded as units.

It is worth while to repeat at this point the following language from Hume:

> It is evident that the identity which we attribute to the human mind, however perfect we may imagine it to be, is not able to run the several perceptions into one and make them lose their characters of distinction and difference which are essential to them. It is still true that every distinct perception which enters into the composition of the mind is a distinct existence, and is different and distinguishable and separable from every other perception, either contemporary or successive.[4]

Not only is Hume's statement true of perceptions (construing the word either narrowly, or broadly, as he seems to do), it is as true of sensations, and of the desires to which the

[4] *Treatise of Human Nature*, Book I, Pt. IV, sec. 6.

Digitized by Google

sensations minister. Each of these mental things is a distinct unit, and the fact that a particular unit is associated more intimately with certain others does not deprive it of its membership in yet larger groups, or in the universal association of things of the same kind. Nor, if a fair or just distribution of benefits is desirable among groups, can it be seen why the same is not desirable among the units making up the respective groups.

Though ethics has never, so far as I know, considered the distribution of satisfaction among intrapersonal desires as a problem of intrapersonal justice, bearing a strict analogy to justice of the interpersonal kind; it has nevertheless dealt with the problem after a fashion. It has, for instance, admonished the individual to form his conduct into a coherent plan, with reference to his future as well as his present states of desire; reminding him that his indulgence of today's desire ought to be limited by a consideration of what he will desire tomorrow, or years hence. Now, by what means is the individual induced to restrain a present for the sake of a future impulse? Without wishing to become entangled in a dispute over technical terminology, I shall be understood if I answer —the representative faculty, the imagination. By the aid of this faculty one is enabled to experience at the present moment a modicum of the pain or pleasure of a supposed future state, this modicum being sufficient to influence action. Well, there can be nothing novel in a reference to the plain likeness between the imagination as it thus operates for the future need of the self, and as it operates in the service of another person. The two processes from beginning to end are practically identical. We may concede it easier, "other things equal," to imagine a future state of one's own feeling than a state of another's feeling; but it often requires no large inequality in other things to reverse the comparison. Apart from the obvious case of family affection, one may apprehend more vividly the suffering of another not bound to him by any special tie,

Digitized by Google

when present and before his eye, than his own of similar degree expected ten years later, and may be the more readily influenced to action by the former prospect. So that we often have the factor of intervening time making a larger severance between two entities of desire than the circumstance of connection with different physical organisms.

In opposition to the analogy here drawn between the relation of mind at large to the self and the relation of the self to one of its own components, it may be pointed out that the self lives in a closed section of the mental universe, holding no communication with other parts of such universe except through the medium of the physical environment. But to this it may be replied that no less is true of the components of the self. Communication between parts of the same self, whether in form of memory, connecting earlier and later states, or in form of consciousness of simultaneous sensations, does not take place except as the brain functions; and the nerve matter serving as intermediary here is quite analogous to the physical structures, inorganic though they be, connecting those larger mental units known as selves.

Now, if this unwarranted stress upon individuality can be abandoned, the result can be nothing less, it seems, than to simplify tremendously the general argument for Utilitarianism. If the desire of the individual for his own happiness is a valid premise for *individual* hedonic ethics, then, when it is seen that such desire belongs to the individual in no sense different from that in which it belongs to mind or conscious being in general, it can be used as well in support of *general* hedonic ethics. (Of course, this is not denying that the validity of the premise in either case may still be open to dispute.) As apropos of the extent to which the problem is thus simplified, let us consider the following query from Sidgwick:

> Grant that the ego is merely a system of coherent phenomena, that the permanent identical "I" is not a fact but a fiction,[5] as Hume and his

[5] Unfortunate word! The "I" is not a fiction, unless the statement that the sun rises and sets is one.

Digitized by Google

followers maintain; why, then, should one part of the series of feelings into which the ego is resolved be concerned with another part of the same series, any more than with any other series?[6]

The foregoing "Why should it?" can be answered very simply: it should *not*. At least, if a closer connection exists and a greater concern is felt, the difference is in degree and not in kind. For Sidgwick's question there is now substituted the question why any unit of feeling should concern itself with any other unit of feeling, forming a part of its own or of any other series, and how it is brought so to concern itself.

Utilitarian writers have quite commonly undertaken to separate the consideration of the justification of Utilitarianism from that of its sanctions. The *is* and the *ought to be* have been seen and presented in sharp distinction. Confronted with the psychological assumption without which the whole system would have fallen, that each man in fact seeks his own happiness, the problem has seemed twofold: first, to prove that men ought to seek the general happiness, and, second, to induce them to do it.

Before arguing that the two lines of endeavor just mentioned in reality lead to the same end, attention should be called to the contemporary conception of evolution, as furnishing at least the *sanction* of the ideal of maximum happiness. The double process of elimination of the unfit and cultivation of the fit, recognized as everywhere going on among organisms, is readily seen to prevail as well among the parts of organisms—within the group of phenomena known as the individual, as well as outside of it and in the larger group composed of the same and other individuals. As the sympathetic and socially efficient person is fostered, while his antithesis is forced out, so, within the ego, only those desires flourish, in the long run, which get along well with their fellows, all others being repressed and crushed. The growth of the power of representation in feeling, by which altruistic action is induced, goes on by virtue of the struggle between

[6] *Methods of Ethics*, Book IV, chap. ii.

Digitized by Google

desires, members of a universal system, limited in their gratification, just as organisms are limited, by the objective environment upon which they must feed. In this struggle the strongest prevail, as elsewhere. So we find that in the world of desires, as in the world of organisms, there is continual progress in the direction of the greatest gratification of desire.

For this gratification the term "happiness," in its true Utilitarian use, is only a convenient and conventional term. Let us waste no time in squabbling over terminology. That a particular desire tends toward its own gratification is indeed obvious. It is not so readily seen, since we do not so readily think in universals, that what is true of a particular desire is equally true of desire in the mass: that the maximum of gratification, pleasure, happiness (whatever you may choose to call it, so long as we understand each other) is the aim of *general* desire, and therefore the end toward which evolution in conduct inevitably proceeds.

Thus to describe the necessary course of development in the field of conduct is to picture, in the only way in which (in broad outline) it can ever be pictured, the sanction of right conduct. It is to show, without reciting details and expedients of time and place, how individuals are constrained more and more to act for the general good; or, more exactly, how the parts of the one great series constituting the general system of desire are brought to concern themselves with the remaining members of the series. This is all that any sanction can be required to do or conceived of as doing. It is true that no finished moral state is supplied at any given moment. But a finished moral state, or a finished state of any kind, is both impossible and inconceivable. Manifestly, there are no bounds to the amount of happiness that can be conceived to exist; how, then, can there be any bounds to the nicety of adjustments which tend to increase happiness? Not only is progress all that is possible, it is all that is even conceivable, as the result of any sanction that can be imagined.

Digitized by Google

Now, this inevitable sequence in events which constitutes the only sanction for good conduct, likewise appears as its only justification, the only proof of the moral imperative. The True and the Good are inseparably united. "Whatever is, is right." It is axiomatic that to the extent that we learn what is going to be, we find it useless to struggle against it; but this passive willing is not all. Upon a little reflection it becomes equally clear that to the extent of our holding in consciousness the causal relation of our acts to a given end, that end becomes purpose. When and to the extent that we visualize the great end, we cannot help willing that end or directing our lives in its furtherance.

Nor is this getting the cart before the horse, by making conduct precede purpose. It is by no means to say that when the end is discovered and adopted as purpose the conduct is left no different from what it would have been if the discovery had not been made. The conduct in that case would have been different; but the discovery was to have been made. The coexistence of freedom and necessity grows less and less of a paradox as thinking moves in the direction of the Absolute. To the individual the two things seem incompatible, because of his experience of conflict between will and law; but to the universal mind, will and law are the same. As knowledge reaches out toward the general scheme, will and conduct follow. Knowledge of the end, and will thereto, work in a beneficent circle, and it is idle to speculate as to whether the True brings about the Good, or the Good, the True.

BROOKLYN, NEW YORK

Digitized by Google

BOOK REVIEWS

THE ETHICAL BASIS OF THE STATE. By Norman Wilde. Princeton University Press, 1924. Pp. 236.

Professor Wilde, modestly disclaiming originality in this essay, has set out to study some of the major ethical aspects of the problem of the state. He has admirably succeeded in this enterprise. The book provides a clear and illuminating statement of the philosophical issues which underlie historical and contemporary interpretations of political organization. This perspective of the ethical problems of the state fills a genuine need; it is the sort of thing that students, both elementary and mature, will be grateful for.

The four chapters of Part I are historical, giving a broad sketch both of the historical fortunes of the state as a social structure, and the theories and ideals which reflect political organization at varying periods of its development. The intimate and mutual interdependence of social structure and of ethical and political reflection is steadily kept in view. Plato, Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau are chosen as representatives of "classic" theories of the state, and the difficult task of presenting in brief compass a description of their political philosophies which is both clear and adequate, is achieved with signal success. In the chapter on "Present-Day Theories of the State," the contrast between monism and pluralism is justly chosen as the guiding thread. The account of the basic contentions of Bosanquet, Duguit, and Laski, as representing present-day theories, is again a model of clear exposition for which many students and readers will be grateful.

Part II presents an analysis of the central ethical concepts and problems of political organization: the "Social Will, Rights, and Duties," the "Nature and Purpose of the State," the "Problem of Sovereignty," the "Organization of Justice," "Liberty and Democracy"—these chapters aim straight at the main issues, keeping in view the wider perspective of political and social philosophy as a whole. The author's general position is that of a tempered idealism, the idealism which sees in the state the necessary and the rational instrument for the organization of justice. His sympathies are rather more with monism than with pluralism. But his refusal to go the full length of Bosanquetan absolutism and monism is the consequence of asserting first, that the social will is essentially a *task*,

Digitized by Google

an "ideal to be worked out," and not a deeper and completely actual reality, and secondly, Professor Wilde repeatedly comes back to a position which, in a significant sense, must be characterized as "individualistic." Thus, "although we have discarded the conception of social atomism, we must not ignore the truth that the ideal of social welfare is a community of free and responsible persons, whose happiness is essentially self-wrought. The fact that the highest development of this ideal can only be attained through training and a favorable social environment should not blind us to the truth that what the state can do in the furnishing of these is to be regarded as merely the preparation of conditions, on the basis of which individuals must work out for themselves their own moral fortunes" (p. 153). How far, then, in the direction of a conservative individualism and liberalism, after the manner of Mill, does the author go? At times he is very close to Mill, as when he says that "the problem of liberty is thus the problem of the discovery of the individual, and the freeing of him from the various concentric social layers that threaten to stifle him and impede his action. He has to be dug out not merely from his national, but also from his class group, and given the chance to be himself" (p. 194). Elsewhere, however, the emphasis appears to be placed upon the objective values and ends in terms of which selves are to be defined, rather than these being defined in terms of selves, even if ideal. Thus, "our important decisions seem to be more objective than this (i.e., discovering the true self) to be concerned with matters more weighty than the quality of our private selves. Not the fortunes of the self, but the building of the world, seems the important thing and the end toward which our serious efforts are directed" (p. 95). And "that social unity is the condition of the highest personal unity" is the gist of the telling criticism of the pluralistic ideal of the functionalists. That ideal fails because it implies that man is a bundle of separate interests and unrelated activities, and there is no way of avoiding the competitive collectivism which would repeat "all the evils of nineteenth-century individualism" (p. 178).

Professor Wilde's position would then appear to be this. As against any form of pluralism he would champion the cause of unity, but the unity which is implied in the constitution of human interests and their adequate organization is an ideal and not a reality, a task rather than a fact. But the difficult problem still remains as to the reasonable grounds upon which it may be urged that the imperative of unity be recognized. Professor Wilde, it appears, cannot avail himself of any appeal to a "real will" of the Hegelian stamp. That would involve the confusion of fact and ideal, and it tends to blunt the clear contour of self-conscious indi-

Digitized by Google

viduals. It is rather to the existent forces in the present situation which are "already instinct" with the ideal, and to the fulfilment of the "implicit purpose" of the present reality, that our loyalties are ultimately due. One might press the difficulty and ask Professor Wilde whether this does not, in the end, equally with Hegel and Bosanquet, confuse the real and the ideal. For one is bidden to be loyal to what the present *is* to become, and reality lodged in the future is as such no less real and no more ideal than one whose being lies wholly in the present. But the failure to solve this difficulty can hardly be charged up as a serious shortcoming of a book which has, with great lucidity and force, provided us with a most helpful analysis of the ethical problems of the state.

GEORGE P. ADAMS

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

THE PROBLEM OF IMMORTALITY: STUDIES IN PERSONALITY AND VALUE. By Radoslav A. Tsanoff. The Macmillan Company, 1924. Pp. ix+418.

Here is a study of the problem of immortality that offers to the reader much food for reflection. The book is a survey of "some of the more significant theories of human destiny in the history of thought, as related to the theories of human nature on which they are based." The conviction underlying the historical approach is that it is a valuable introduction to "the better understanding of the nature of value and personality" (p. vii).

The task which the author set himself has been accomplished in a very happy manner. The historical survey is scholarly and is presented in a style that enlivens the argument. Poetical, religious, and philosophical thought are all brought under tribute; and the various attitudes to the problem are studied with painstaking care. Of course, as the author himself explicitly states, there are omissions; it is particularly unfortunate that the philosophic mystic was not permitted to speak more freely. But the main attitudes are fairly adequately represented in the survey, and the sundry methods of approach are given consideration, at least indirectly. As far as it goes, I know of no better compendium of the historical side of the problem than is to be found in this book. The chapters on materialism, pluralism, and absolutism are especially interesting and suggestive.

The last chapter of the book, entitled "Value, Personality and Destiny," suggests in outline the author's constructive views. As a result of the considerations there noted, the author thinks, "we find ourselves

Digitized by Google

justified in believing that worth-attainment, striving after perfection, conservation of value, moral aspiration, cannot be frustrated in the universe. We reflect that they are all essentially personal in character; that, unlike material things, persons are not in any sense compounds, but individualized systems; that if value is to be conserved, the character of the universe must include personal immortality" (p. 373). "We demand personal immortality because we do not admit the ultimate frustration of value" (pp. 373–74).

It is to be hoped that in his further study of the problem (promised in his preface) the author will take pains to make more explicit the main drift of his argument, particularly with reference to the troublesome and slippery question of the "objectivity" of value and its bearing upon the conception of immortality. Despite his explicit denial, he seems at times to be verging upon the traditional "longing" for immortality as if that were a potent reason why personal immortality should be postulated. The author is unquestionably right in making value central, but I question whether he has succeeded in stating precisely in what sense it is central. But until the author has had occasion to draw out the implications of his historical study, extended criticism of his constructive suggestions is unfair to him and presumptuous on the part of the reviewer. Meanwhile it must be said that Professor Tsanoff has succeeded in giving us a vivid, scholarly, and stimulating survey of some of the more important expressions of man's interest in his destiny.

G. Watts Cunningham

University of Texas

Instinct: A Study in Social Psychology. By L. L. Bernard. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1924. Pp. 550.

Human science is undoubtedly advancing. Naturally this advance is spiral rather than linear. Not only is the subject-matter infinitely complex and many-sided, but unlike the materials of the non-human sciences, the particular happenings, as well as types of phenomena, are important. Accordingly, even the isolation of the data is difficult. Where is the line dividing ethnological from historical, or better still from sociological, data? The present volume, being a discussion of instincts, raises the question not only of the relationship between sociology and social psychology, but also the connection between individual psychology and biology. Because human phenomena, on the side of behavior at least, are historical, psychological, and biological, the slow and uneven progress of the human sciences can be accounted for to a certain extent on the basis

Digitized by Google

of the confusion of the different kinds of descriptive facts and interpretative principles involved. Whatever slight progress, therefore, that is made in the human or social sciences is unfortunately correlated with a great many missteps and retracings.

To take the case of sociology. No doubt sociologists date the scientific development of their discipline from the time that it began to incorporate psychological principles as a method of study and interpretation. But unfortunately with this annexation of psychological principles sociology entered upon one of its most serious missteps. Taking over psychological principles really meant that the sociologist thought of himself as coming into possession of elements that could be used as ultimate causes and explanations of the phenomena with which he dealt. These principles were, of course, the instincts. They were presumed to be the springs of human action capable of explaining the facts of social organization in the first place, and all of the accruing conditions and circumstances of human living. Obviously this was a mistake. With the increasing development of historical and statistical methods and facts, the simplicity of such explanations clearly proved to be misleading. In recent years also the psychologist himself has discovered that instincts are not above suspicion as actual facts. They are easily found to be sheer biological abstractions. One of the recorded advances in the social sciences and especially in sociology is the correction of this error.

Here then is the problem of the present book. Professor Bernard undertakes a study of the nature of instincts with a view to ascertaining their place in the field of sociology. Accordingly, to the attack upon instincts because they are merely hypotheses, that they are not concrete facts, that they cannot be experimentally studied, and finally that an objective psychology has no place for them, the author adds in the present work an onslaught based upon the value of instincts for social improvement and control. The problem of instincts, therefore, in this volume is handled from the standpoint of the relative contribution of inheritance and environment to the development of social institutions and the control of social phenomena. That instincts exist Professor Bernard does not doubt. That they have great value in the complex development of human society he denies. His work consists for the most part of a careful study of the misuse of the conception of instincts and its untenability in accounting for the intricate phenomena of social life. Instincts he believes are the bases and foundations of such phenomena, but their complex development is a matter of habit formation. Professor Bernard's conception is based upon the old Spencerian psychology. Accordingly, he believes that instincts represent only biological or neural bases for simple

Digitized by Google

action and that for complex action to occur, "mental" processes must also take place. Indeed such mental processes are somehow presumed to be the outcome of, and built upon, these neural activities.

While Professor Bernard's rejection of instincts as the causes of conditions of complex human life can only be applauded, his grounds for doing so do not merit the same approval. Furthermore, these very grounds foretell an unsatisfactory issue in the adequate handling of the facts of social life. While it is true that the sociologist may have a different attitude toward the whole instinct problem than other students of human phenomena, it may be safely assumed that the interests of sociology are best served by an ascertainment of, and a reliance upon, the most veracious facts available at any particular time. Accordingly, Professor Bernard's belief that sociology must take account of instincts, although they are not important, is not a felicitous addition to his argument. If he means by instincts the mere functions of neural mechanisms, then what possible connection can they have with the complex human phenomena which is the subject-matter of sociology?

Two methodological dangers may be pointed out as attending upon the retention of instincts in one's sociological thinking. In the first place, one is always in peril of making instincts into animistic powers or forces. Or, if not, one reduces sociological facts, in their psychological phases at least, to sheer abstractions. If Professor Bernard has escaped the animistic peril he has calmly embraced the other. In detail, he reduces the whole gamut of complex human behavior to "habits" that have displaced or grown up upon instincts. Is this a fair conception of the infinite variety and richness of complex human responses to all the stimuli conditions and circumstances which surround human individuals? The second danger arising from an improper apportionment and organization of biological human facts is to overlook entirely the actual human circumstances that constitute social life. The instinct conception as a biological or psychological basis for social phenomena misleads us away from the infinite complexity of actual cultural and historical facts which are not only the data of all human sciences but are sufficient for all explanatory dealings with human phenomena. Commerce with instincts or biological bases for social phenomena is like attending to the materials out of which the walls of the theater are built and thereby missing all the intense and copious drama that is in process on the stage. Or worse still, it is like accounting for or explaining the drama in terms of the material of the walls.

Our criticism of the volume before us indicates clearly the need to distinguish between psychic-sociology and social psychology. The pres-

Digitized by Google

ent work, being concerned with psychic principles of human conduct, belongs to the former rather than to the latter type of study. Social psychology can be clearly distinguished from psychic-sociology in that the former is exclusively concerned with the historical acquisition of all cultural behavior on the part of the individual in concrete interaction with actual institutional things, persons, and circumstances. Social psychology developed on the basis of such concrete psychological events has no use for forces or powers, or biological abstractions, even if they consist of judiciously selected neurology. For such psychology, mental life is in no sense a development of "psychic" process on the basis of biological mechanisms, such that complex psychological behavior is called psychic while simple psychological conduct is termed biological. It is the province of such a social psychology to exhibit the cultural interaction of persons which constitute so much of the data of the social sciences. Only social psychology, it is submitted, in conjunction with other disciplines, can be of real worth to sociology and its sister sciences. Social psychology, and not psychic-sociology, is the discipline that can supply the data and principles constituting the thought, feeling and other psychological facts which contribute to the progress of the human sciences.

J. R. KANTOR

INDIANA UNIVERSITY

PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. By J. R. Kantor, Professor of Psychology, University of Indiana. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1924. Pp. xix+473.

This is the first of a large, two-volume work which aims at an exhaustive survey of the psychologist's intellectual domain. There are two possible procedures for an undertaking of this order. The ambitious interpreter may plunge into the living, functioning science and evaluate its concepts and its programs in the settings and under the requirements which have given them birth. Or he may remain aloof from the intricate and embarrassing enterprises of psychological investigators and seek to set in order the wider generalizations and post-rationalizations of his science. Professor Kantor has in the main followed the latter procedure. As a result—and it is the result rather than the process of examination that he gives us—he has stated in elaborate detail a systematic viewpoint for psychology which seems to him to square with life at large and with certain implied philosophic necessities.

In the present volume we find a statement of what the author believes the primary data of psychology should be. This is followed by a

Digitized by Google

careful and enlightening discussion of personality and its development. Then there are treatments from Professor Kantor's special standpoint of a number of the psychological categories among which are attention, perception, implicit action, association, knowing, feeling, and habits. In the second volume, according to the publisher's announcement, we shall have discussions of other categories and also a treatment of abnormal behavior.

Dr. Kantor speaks of his general standpoint as "organismic psychology." This name seems to be chosen because of the writer's high resolution to abstain from unwarranted abstractions which dissect the organism unto death. It seems to be chosen also because of the centrality in the Kantorian system of the notion of adaptation and adjustment.

Because of the importance of adaptation in Kantor's viewpoint, we may classify this branch of psychology as a type of functionalism. Of course the conception of adaptation may be a dominant feature of radically different psychological viewpoints. In one case adaptation may be accepted as the most fundamental fact for psychology, and left undefined. Thereafter it may be used as an explanatory principle. This is the functionalism of Kantor, though it must be admitted that he does not use that term. "Is it not a fact," he says in his discussion of reflexes, "that the specific pathways involved in any reaction are involved because certain muscles or glands need to function?"(p. 143). And in another place: "The general integration of behavior we might say is due to the necessity to adapt to many related objects in a given time" (p. 322). From such a view the existence of a need becomes the explanation of its satisfaction. There is another possibility for functional psychology. Adaptation may be taken to be the dominant problem of psychology rather than the dominant principle. An explanation for failure or success in achieving purposes then becomes sought for in facts describable in non-purposive terms. While few writers, if any, have maintained with complete consistency the program demanded by this second type of functionalism, there has been a strong leaning in this direction. The attempt of experimental psychologists to find some explanation for the fixation of successful responses other than in terms of their success is only one of many evidences of this. But, so far as the reviewer can make out, Kantor feels no necessity for entering into this second type of functionalism. For him adaptation is central fact and central explanatory principle. In analyzing beyond the adaptive act the psychologist, according to Kantor, divides his real unit of study. And the organization of the adaptive act is, itself, a function of the fact that the act is adaptive.

Professor Kantor's descriptions of psychological phenomena are consistently in terms of stimulus and reaction. But he can in no sense

Digitized by Google

be accused of having developed a "muscle-twitch" psychology. Neither can he be accused of having left out of his psychology many facts because they fail to fit his descriptive devices. He conceives of the psychological reaction as including much more than mere bodily movement, and he conceives most varieties of what are sometimes called mental activities as falling within this broad category of reaction. Where a conventional psychological category has been understood in a number of ways Kantor accepts the interpretation which best stands translation into the terminology of stimulus and reaction, but this can hardly be called scientific ruthlessness. It is quite in accord with the general spirit of the times even as exemplified by psychologists of a relatively contented sort. A fair appreciation of the procedure employed by Kantor may be had from a consideration of a few of his definitions. Attention, according to his statement, is action which increases or actualizes the stimulational function of some objects or conditions to which the individual is exposed. (This is not quite Kantor's language.) "Perception is the traditional name given to the psychological activities in which explicit stimuli functions operate. Otherwise stated, perceptual activities are those in which the person reacts to explicit stimuli" (p. 250). The translation into terms of stimulus and response is especially clear in the definition of feeling reactions. "In effective behavior then, the response or the action to the stimulus is not performed upon the stimulus but upon the acting person himself. In other words, the peculiar fact about feeling responses is that instead of the person producing some effect upon the stimulus object, the person himself is affected" (p. 346). But Kantor carries his stimulus-response program far beyond definitions. He has translated psychological phenomena into these terms not only consistently, but also exhaustively. Certainly no other writer has written as elaborate a psychology in the language of stimulus and response. Because of a certain remoteness from psychology as a living and going concern, the value of many of Kantor's classifications and distinctions must remain for some time in question. Nevertheless the whole system is full of keen, if informal, observation, and remarkably free from speculation. Indeed it is considerably freer from speculation than many a system of psychology based upon observations of a less informal type.

Before leaving off this characterizing of Kantor's system it would, perhaps, be only just to let the author of the system himself sum up its nature. "Organismic psychology," he tells us, "is based upon the premises that we must never admit anything into our scientific thinking but that which can be actually observed. Nor must we assume for our convenience that the part is the whole. The value of this viewpoint lies in the fact that only actually occurring phenomena are observed, and as

Digitized by Google

complete a description of the facts as possible is made the basis for interpretations. Basing our investigations upon this platform, we consider the subject-matter of psychology to be the concrete reactions which an organism makes to its stimuli surroundings. Naturally all the varieties of surroundings are considered; so that organismic psychology considers as part of its subject-matter not only the simple behavior to natural stimuli, but also the complex adaptations to social and human institutions. For the organismic hypothesis there exists no mind-body problem, for these terms are considered as metaphysical abstractions and do not represent any real fact. The organism is a complex psychological machine and not a union of discrete elements or stuffs. Moreover the cause of the organism's reactions are not brain or mental conditions, but the needs of the organism as dictated by the surrounding objects and events. . . . ." (p. 30). This is a truly courageous program, but one which is not carried very far into practice. If it were, Kantor's work would hardly merit the consideration which it actually does merit. If Kantor really kept close to the fullness of actual life, he might achieve a literary or artistic result, but he would hardly produce a psychology. His work, when once it gets under way, is, however, full of abstractions as a scientific work needs must be. His abstractions differ from the more customary ones of psychology, but they are quite as abstract.

It is encouraging to study such a serious attempt at systemization of the facts, methods, and problems of psychology as that of Professor Kantor. No one who is deeply interested in the trend of theoretical psychology can afford to pass by this exhaustive and sophisticated treatise without reading it for himself. Nevertheless, one should guard against assuming this work to be the one logical outcome of the functional and objective movement which has been so prominent in psychological thought in this country. Among the many issues raised by Kantor there are alternatives to his own views which he seldom mentions, and these alternatives are often to be found only in the more detailed writings of the psychological investigator.

EDWARD S. ROBINSON

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

ULTIMATE VALUES IN THE LIGHT OF CONTEMPORARY THOUGHT. By J. S. Mackenzie, L.H.D., Cambridge, LT.D., Glasgow, Emeritus Professor of Philosophy in University College, Cardiff. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1924. Price, 5*s*. 6*d*. net.

Professor Mackenzie contributes this volume to Hodder and Stoughton's "Library of Philosophy and Religion," which has already secured the services of several distinguished writers. The title is faithful to the

Digitized by Google

book. The writer's aim, briefly, is so to clarify the meaning of value that we shall be able the better to find our way to the valuable. He first gives fifty of his pages to establishing an attitude toward reality; then fifty more to showing in the light of it what value is; while the last forty pages are devoted to "application" of the idea so arrived at.

The important question is, of course, what meaning of value the writer emerges with, and how he relates it to reality. And we venture to think that the interest which gets the fullest flavor and refreshment from his answer to these questions will be an interest, not in Dr. Mackenzie, nor in any writer as a single writer, but in a school.

As is well known, Dr. Mackenzie is an idealistic writer who is of a school. The contemporary world has produced "idealisms" of its own. Idealism is a leading *motif* in philosophy in Italy. It is a formative influence in certain recent developments in German psychology. It is at the root of a powerful strain of philosophy of religion in America. But the same modern world which has been calling forth these amongst its other philosophical crop, has, as it happens, been also thereby steadily beating down upon the head of an obdurate older "idealism" which was a school and had direct Hegelian and Kantian roots. And the exigencies of the modern world, the chase of philosophic fashions, has had the peculiarly interesting effect of stirring the representatives of that school into a certain late-blooming youth and exhilarating freedom of speech. The piquancy of the situation is that there is a tradition in this group of writers —to whom Dr. Mackenzie fully belongs—of speaking responsibly; witness Dr. Bosanquet's characteristic remark that he always felt as if his thoughts were almost more the utterance of his friends than they were any property of his own. Green, Caird, Wallace and their brotherhood were all like this. They wrote with a habitual care and distinction, as in the eyes of all the world. People nowadays write a philosophical book with about as much anxious care as they would write a letter to the newspapers. They would put more responsibility into an after-dinner speech than we into an article for the journals. Now, a great deal of this spirit is in Dr. Mackenzie. Everyone who reads his work can feel it. And although at one place in this little book he refers to his rôle as a "more or less bewildered sinner," he is most unfair to himself in speaking so. There is nothing bewildered about his utterances. He walks with all his usual certainty of tread, up to and past the point at which he begins to pull away from the familiar idealistic tradition along a curve of his own; which point, as we have implied, is where his reflections begin to become decidedly interesting. We shall not attempt to pronounce as to the validity of his departures. We must leave that to students of his recent writing. Enough if we can point out in what they seem to consist.

Digitized by Google

The burden of his argument—and up to this point, we take it, his school is speaking—is that value has its reasons that "reason"[1] knows not of; and that by virtue of these it stands vindicated. If we ask, incidentally, what the values under discussion are, we find toward the end of the book that creative imagination and the objects in which it rejoices stand forth as the central, typical, perhaps the ultimate, ones. And so long as these mainly represent *the values to be vindicated,* the "wind of the argument" wafts us along smoothly. But there comes a point where the reader begins to feel himself glide into another attitude, in which he finds himself thinking of these as if they were *themselves the vindication* of our higher values generally. To one reader, at any rate, this sums the intention, more or less, of the book. And if so, one wonders what is stirring.

If so it is an interesting departure; but it rather suggests a retreating before the storm. Such a position can hardly yield a philosophy of value, in the sense of giving to the valuable a habitation and a standing in the domain of "what is." But there we must leave the problem with only this remark, that there hardly seems to us to be a real road this way to where Dr. Mackenzie wants to go, or any way except via the old, battered, hard-driven conception of "the whole." And to think to assist the whole by taking the position that we have as good a right to accept Imagination's version of it as Reason, is not, we fear, to accomplish anything. If the real is to be valuable, or the valuable real, then it would seem the question to be asked of this hypostatised valuable-real which we have up for judgment is not "Are you the whole as Imagination yields it, or as Reason sees it, or as the Understanding gives it," but simply, "Are you the whole?" in the straightforward literal sense. In other words, the question we must ask of it, is "When we get at what is, and when we get at all that there is, do we find it to be anything like you?"

J. W. Scott

Cardiff, Wales

The Theology of the Real. By R. Gordon Milburn. London: Williams and Norgate, Ltd., 1925. Pp. xiv+264. Price, 10*s.* 6*d.* net.

This book is a queer medley of frank critical thinking, apologetic theology, and fanciful speculation. The three are hopelessly intermingled in each chapter, yet on the whole the first predominates, hence the book is well worth study by those who champion scientific thinking in religion as elsewhere.

These diverse characteristics are well illustrated by Mr. Milburn's section on sexual ethics. Here we meet a startlingly frank admission (for a theologian) of the inadequacy of the traditional sex taboos to meet

[1] "Reason," i.e., the "Understanding" of the Hegelian tradition.

Digitized by Google

either the temporary or the permanent features of the sex problem, together with a readiness to analyze the situation frankly in all its challenging aspects and to consider quite radical programs for its betterment. Some aspects of Mr. Milburn's own hypotheses, however, strike one as a bit fanciful, in view of the lessons of the history of morals, in particular that of the undeniable spiritual values closely intertwined with the institution of monogamy. Not only would he permit a supervised liaison in the form of a trial marriage, preceded by occasional sex relations as preliminary even to that, but he would authorize occasional intercourse "as an expression of warm friendship which falls short of real love, but without [the man and woman] actually living together and sharing a common life." The apologetic theology appears in his manifest inability to entertain these radical proposals without an attempt to justify them historically as consistent with a "Christian" attitude. "If we look as strictly as we can to the spirit and teaching of Jesus himself and ask whether this harmonizes better with freedom for unmarried persons to love sexually, or with Puritan propriety, the almost self-evident answer seems to be, with the former." Of course Mr. Milburn's New Testament exegesis must be left to the theologians for detailed criticism. We may, however, note in passing that the only fact our author offers to substantiate the self-evidence asserted is that, apart from declarations on adultery and divorce, Jesus made but one utterance on the subject of sexual ethics, namely, that celibacy is not suitable for everyone (Matt. 19:11f.).

The main strength of the book lies in Mr. Milburn's attempt, without covertly assuming religion to be an illusion, to examine religious data in the light of a full biological and psychological equipment, and to discover some of the specific laws of cause and effect revealed in them. His interest and method are in the main scientific, that is, he seeks to explain and secure practical control for specifically religious ends, and he would pursue the inquiry by objective observation and experiment. Some gaps in his historical orientation should be noted; especially would he profit by greater familiarity with Kant's analysis of the relations of science and religion, and with the implications of behavioristic psychology.

E. A. BURTT

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

RACES, NATIONS AND CLASSES. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DOMINATION AND FREEDOM. By Herbert Adolphus Miller, Ph. D. Philadelphia: J. P. Lippincott Co., 1924. Pp. xvii+196.

In this brief volume Professor Miller is concerned with the social effects of the current widespread struggle for domination which is absorbing

Digitized by Google

so large a share of the attention and energy of many races, nations, and classes. A very considerable literature has already appeared dealing with these conflicts. However, the author points out that by far the larger portion of this literature is colored, if not wholly dictated, by the interests and hopes of some of the parties to the struggle. Science itself has been compelled to fight in the ranks alongside superstition and psuedo-science in the defense of groups now striving to maintain or secure ascendancy. An impartial examination of the entire problem is urgently demanded, according to Professor Miller, since group animosities are on the increase and portend further disasters.

In the study of the social complexes which characterize the present conflicts, the author uses many psychoanalytic concepts. Dominant groups struggle to maintain their present control in spite of the logical weakness of their pretensions; on the other hand, submerged groups fail to realize adequate expression for fundamental group urges and therefore compensate in numerous ways. In both cases characteristic forms of group psychopathology develop: superiority and inferiority complexes, pathological patriotism, the oppression psychosis, and so on. So much emphasis is placed upon the psychopathic aspects of social conflict that the reader must be on guard lest he get the impression that all conflict is psychopathic.

The discussion has a practical as well as a scientific purpose: "The greatest problem is to discover some way in which the disease can be cured" (p. 2). Professor Miller eschews panaceas. He does, however, strongly argue for open and free discussion of group relations. This, he believes, will lead to a release of much of the psychological tension within the groups and at the same time make evident to their members the illogicality of the group myths. Group accommodation is therefore to be hastened by the cathartic effect of a rational analysis of the experiences out of which group conflict grows.

Such a program, I believe, encounters one major difficulty. Does a group in conflict willingly entertain facts or theories which will weaken its morale? Do we not thrust back from us unwelcome truths which call into account our established prejudices, our recognized interests? Logic, reason, pure science are poor weapons indeed with which to do battle against the blind loyalties and hot passions of men-in-the-mass. One of the commonest forms of group behavior is a more or less conscious refusal to face the facts when they endanger group prerogatives.

A vast field has been very rapidly surveyed in this small volume, a field that is worthy of the most thorough exploration. The potency of the analytic concepts which Professor Miller uses leads us to hope that he

Digitized by Google

will undertake a more elaborate social analysis of group conflict. One wonders what were the reasons for abandoning the method of presenting rather full case materials so effectively used by the author in collaboration with Dr. Park in *Old-World Traits Transplanted.*

ERLE FISKE YOUNG

A COURSE IN PHILOSOPHY. By George Perrigo Conger. New York: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1924. Pp. 603.

PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY. By G. Watts Cunningham. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1924. Pp. 453.

INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY. By George Thomas White Patrick. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1924. Pp. 463.

AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY. By James H. Ryan. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1924. Pp. 399.

Probably never before have so many significant works introductory to philosophy appeared in one year. It is an indication of a vigorous interest in the restatement of the problems in the light of new movements of thought, particularly those most closely related to the implications of the great development of the physical and the social sciences. It is also symptomatic of the increasing place philosophy is coming to have in college instruction and in the reading of the general public. Philosophy is the endeavor to achieve a comprehensive view of life and its meaning, upon the basis of the results of the various sciences. In the midst of ever increasing specialization in different fields of knowledge the demand increases for some satisfactory outlook upon the entire scheme of things. It is notable, too, that the authors of these works, while representing quite different systems of thought, generously and candidly present the claims of rival systems with abundant references to the extensive literature of all. Thus is exemplified the definition of philosophy as "reflective thinking and discussion" of the world.

Conger's work is characterized by encyclopedic citations of philosophers and bibliographies. It is a convenient handbook of data in which may be found the names of all important thinkers in the whole history of philosophy, with dates and concise characterizations of their contributions. This extraordinary power of condensed and illuminating interpretation is one of the most valuable features of this excellent book. It sets out with an attractive presentation of the implication of philosophical problems in the fields of imaginative literature, economics, and politics, personal conduct, art, science, and religion. The genesis of the modern systems of idealism, naturalism, realism, and pragmatism is set forth on

Digitized by Google

the background of the earlier history of thought from the days of the Greeks. Part III is an analysis of these theories in terms of epistemology, metaphysics, aesthetics, ethics, and religion. An extensive appendix gives the author's philosophy of "epitomization." For beginners the constant statement of the positions of rival schools concerning the main problems tends to be confusing, and requires on the part of the instructor skilful assistance to avoid the impression that philosophy is largely a clever marshalling of different points of view and difficult arguments without commensurate fruition. For example, in considering the relation of mind and body, at least four arguments are given for each of the theories of interactionism, parallelism, and epiphenomenalism, then the criticisms of each position by advocates of the other theories, and finally the author's own comments and criticisms are presented. There is a similarly balanced array of opinions concerning evolutionism and opposing positions, concerning mechanistic and vitalistic biology, and concerning behavioristic versus animistic psychology. The sections on "Conduct Theories of Ethics" include eugenics and euthenics, which, together with the treatment of religion, illustrate the broad scope and fresh handling of current problems. The book is provided with an index which is a model for its detail and arrangement.

Professor Cunningham offers an introduction which is marked by unusual clarity and directness of style. He speaks from the general position of idealism but sets forth other points of view with sympathetic understanding. Often he balances the arguments and leaves the reader to his own conclusions. This is sometimes apparently done for pedagogical purposes but also quite frankly at times because the author recognizes that the questions are as yet beyond any generally accepted solution. Or, as in the case of the relation between beauty and goodness, he says: "Once more we find two extreme views with reference to the question before us, and, as usual, we shall probably discover that the truth lies in a synthesis of the extremes."

Part I emphasizes a point on which all present-day philosophers show commendable zeal, namely, that philosophy springs out of common, everyday experience of life, and is not a thing apart; that it keeps close to the spirit and results of science, and is not a matter of fanciful conjecture or subjective individual opinions. Part II states the intellectual enterprise in terms of its nature as judgment, its certainty, and its assumption of the principle of causality. In comparing the mechanical and the teleological conceptions of causation attention is called to the fact that the former involves a rigid determinism while "the latter admits a degree of spontaneity and seems to involve a determinism less unyield-

Digitized by Google

ing." In dealing with this problem in relation to mind the author appears to favor the theory of emergence, which may furnish "a satisfactory and final solution of the vexed problem of the mind-body relation" (p. 304).

Part III deals with the problems of matter: its qualities, and the nature of space and time. Part IV discusses evolution, biological and social. Part V opens with a historical survey of mind including the behavioristic view. The mind-body problem is set forth in terms of the interactionist and the parallelistic and the emergence theories. Part VI is devoted to values, aesthetic, moral, and religious. The working distinction between judgments of fact and judgments of value is employed, but with explicit recognition that these two types of judgment are not to be conceived as too sharply separate and distinct from each other. While the opposing array of arguments is impartially and carefully stated concerning the freedom of the will, the existence of God and immortality, the reader gets the impression that the author himself, if pressed, would accept indeterminism, the moral argument for theism, and an inclination to the belief in immortality. The writer of such a book, which is designed to stimulate philosophical reflection in his readers, must decide whether that end is best attained by an impersonal and detached presentation of the rival systems of thought or by generous advocacy and defense of the position to which his mature reflection has brought him. Perhaps the latter method will generally be more humanly interesting and not less quickening.

Professor Patrick has written an introduction to philosophy which embodies the results of a lifetime devoted to philosophy. His book is mellow with a very human, personal flavor, while it also presents the reasonings and the contentions of the various schools. It not only asserts that philosophy deals with life, but it proceeds to do so. "Who is there," he asks, "that has not at some time or other thrown down his textbook and found himself wondering, 'Oh! What's the use? What's the difference? What's it all for? What's the value of it all? Now philosophy has just this for its task—to try to answer these insistent and persistent questionings of the human mind as to the use, meaning, purpose, and value of human life." The five divisions of his work treat of cosmological inquiries, ontological inquiries, the philosophy of mind, the theory of knowledge, and the higher values of life. Ample references are appended to each chapter, and the fields of the different sciences, both physical and social, are fully represented by the most recent literature. Questions such as the origin of life, the meaning of evolution, pessimism and optimism, the search for the soul, behaviorism, the problem of God, are treated in their historical as well as in their contemporary discussion. The author states his own views and opinions as his own with conviction and feeling. He

Digitized by Google

has used the method of rather extensive quotation from authorities which is often a means of leading students into further acquaintance with them than the bare references would induce. This is a book which is likely to be read in other than classroom and academic circles.

Professor Ryan, of the Catholic University of America, presents his book as an introduction to the subject for groups of immature students, and therefore frees it from technical terms and difficult discussions. He avows the position of dualistic realism, and adds, "The author is a realist, in the sense that he believes firmly in the reality of an external world," and in "the distinction between subject and object, spirit and matter, man and God as primary to all metaphysics." This position he carries through the discussion of the fields of metaphysics, the theory of knowledge, ethics, and religion. The instrumentalism of Dewey and the views of Bertrand Russell are stated and refuted. Extensive references to the works of representative thinkers of various modern schools are appended to each chapter.

E. S. AMES

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

SHORTER NOTICES

OUTLINES OF INTRODUCTORY SOCIOLOGY. By C. M. Case. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1924. Pp. xxxvi+980.

This book is one of the type known variously as "readings," "selections," "sourcebooks," or "casebooks."

The present book is fully up to the standard set by the best of its class. It is well-edited, and provided with chapter introductions which will help orientate the student with regard to the material. Within the limits of what he thinks properly belongs to sociology, Professor Case has chosen his selections with a minimum of bias. The questions for students seem to the reviewer unnecessary, if not detrimental. The chapter bibliographies are brief but well-annotated. There is an excellent index, and an extensive general bibliography. The selections are arranged in four parts—"Social Evolution," "Social Origins," "Social Processes," and "Social Problems," constituting respectively approximately one-sixth, one-fourth, one-fifth, and one-third the content of the volume.

From other than a pedagogical point of view, the chief interest in this volume lies in Professor Case's stimulating and suggestive General Introduction, in which he gives his views as to the nature and foundations of the sociology to be. He takes no trouble to conceal his conviction that the sociology of the past is in great part sterile. But he refuses to map out categorically the place and content of a new sociology. "The practically important thing," he says, "is to distinguish between sociology as a category in a rigidly logical classification of the sciences, and sociology as a movement." Sociology, he holds, "may indeed prove to be the leaven in the social sciences which while leavening the whole lump with more liberal, broad, and truly human point of view, is destined itself to disappear" (p. xxi). Again, he likens sociology to a courtyard through which the specific social sciences "must pass to

Digitized by Google

and fro in bringing their more or less separate inquiries to a common point of view" (p. xxii). Sociology, that is, is to be a sort of liaison officer. With this general position the reviewer has no quarrel, though it is perhaps not different *in toto* from some of the older conceptions of the function of sociology. The real question, of course, is whether the sociological "movement" can show the credentials and qualifications essential to this exacting office. Sociology is, in short, to be essentially a working partnership between anthropology (or ethnology) and social psychology. And we have the reason for the inclusion of so much anthropological material (pp. xxxiv, xxxv). At this point room for debate appears. For it looks as if this partnership aimed at a restraint of trade. Case, following too docilely, perhaps, Kroeber and Lowie, appears to hold, in the General Introduction, though not consistently thereafter, that biology and psychology have no place in the sociological movement, and are not even to be regarded as parts of the foundation of sociology, save in so far as knowledge of these fields is valuable to any social-science student (pp. xviii, xxix). Sociology, like the special social sciences (the technological economists are likely to demur at this) deals essentially and exclusively with human culture, that is, with attitudes, values, institutions, in the "super-organic" plane. Comprehension of culture, it is held, cannot be had "by combining the viewpoints of the physical, biological, and psychological sciences." It "has to be studied by analyzing it on its own ground and in its own terms, and not by extending over it the notions and terms arrived at in the sciences which study the lower, if not simpler, orders of phenomena." If this means simply that sociology is to avoid the short-circuiting analogies and the premature "laws" and generalizations of the older writers, no exception can be taken to it. But if it means that sociology is to proceed in indifference to the ascertained facts of biology and of behaviorism, a demurrer must be entered. Culture may be "a closed system" within the super-organic plane, but that does not prove that social phenomena have no causal connections with the "mental organic" and the "vital organic" planes. Within the cultural plane itself orientation with regard to any phenomenon may be had by analysis of its contemporary relations in one dimension and its historical background in the other. Thus the places of social psychology and of culture history are determined. But the phenomena also has causal roots in the planes *below*, and we need to know them. Complete orientation is thus three-dimensional: contemporary cross-section analysis (logical and statistical), historical knowledge, and knowledge of the mechanistic nature of the phenomenon—a knowledge which we can get from behavioristic psychology and the sciences upon which it in turn is founded.

This Case himself later recognizes, in his introduction to Book II, on Social Origins, where, however, he unfortunately uses the term "origin" in the dual senses of "beginnings" and of psychological causation. He recognizes it also by including some of the selections he does: selections on Thomas's "fundamental wishes," on the physical bases of the wishes (Berman), on the psychology of primitive justice (Meade). He specifically states (p. 162) that the psychological point of view is presented in the chapters on primitive social organization, foundations of government and law, and the social roots of religion.

The probability is that he has been impressed too much by the attitude of the anthropologists and has given in too much to the claims of the Boas school, whose members, because they have found that the "racialists" misuse biological analogies and concepts, forthwith assert that biology has no relation to anthropology. Be that as it may, Case consistently keeps biology out of his book. And the present situation being what it is, we do not feel disposed to criticize him too adversely for so doing.

Digitized by Google

Barring the inclusion of the "social problems" extracts that go to make up the last third of the volume, Professor Case has put together a book which should have wide use. The matter from his own pen leads one to hope that he will write more.

A. B. WOLFE

OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY

PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT OFFICES: THEIR PURPOSE, STRUCTURE, AND METHODS. By Shelby M. Harrison, in collaboration with Bradley Buell, Mary La Dame, Leslie E. Woodcock, Frederick A. King. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1924. Pp. xvii+685. Price, $3.50.

This volume represents a comprehensive study by the Russell Sage Foundation of the purpose, structure, and methods of public employment offices in the United States, with some attention to Canada. It brings up to date by careful field observation exactly what is being done in this field by public agencies, and the methods by which they are done. It was undertaken out of regard for the importance of proper placement of all who work, and lends understanding both by authoritative description and by suggestions for betterment. Not merely the economist and social worker will find here food for thought, but also all who see the basic importance for good living of the problem of having men not only at work, but at work in jobs that furnish both a living and a life.

T. V. S.

THE PROJECT PRINCIPLE IN RELIGIOUS EDUCATION. By John Leslie Lobingier. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1925. Pp. xiv+177. Price, $1.75, postage extra.

The project principle, which has become standard in general educational practice, is here analyzed anew and applied to church schools for the purpose of promoting better feeling between races and of establishing better relations between nations. Not only are suggestions for general guidance furnished, but much concrete material is provided.

T. V. S.

ARISTOTLE'S METAPHYSICS, a revised text with Introduction and Commentary. By W. D. Ross, Deputy Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Oxford. 2 Vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924. Price, 48*s* net.

If anything could be final in commentary upon Aristotle, this edition of the *Metaphysics* would be. Mr. Ross has already placed all scholars in his debt by his masterly treatment of the new Oxford translations of Aristotle; but in this new edition of the *Metaphysics* we have a sort of conclusion and summary of all recent Aristotelian scholarship. The introductory essays give a clear and persuasive account of the old controversy about the "real" Socrates. Mr. Ross is against Professor Taylor, and he succeeds in showing that Plato, and not Socrates, was the greater philosopher. The summary of Aristotle's doctrine on metaphysics and theology is admirably done. The notes on the text (which are all printed at the end of each volume) are preceded by a useful analysis of the argument. The notes themselves are very full, but they assume a certain facility in following Greek, and are therefore designed for serious students. The philosophical criticism of the introductory essay is admirably clear, and the mistakes of Aristotle in regard to the proofs for the existence of his God are candidly admitted. Mr. Ross also avoids the danger

Digitized by Google

of "reading into" Aristotle the controversies and assumptions of a later date. Altogether, this edition of the *Metaphysics* should effect some improvement in the discussion of the history of Greek thought.

C. D. BURNS

LONDON, ENGLAND

CHRISTIAN MISSIONS AND ORIENTAL CIVILIZATIONS. By Maurice T. Price. Shanghai, China: privately printed, 1924. Pp. xviii+578.

This volume constitutes, in the language of Professor Park, who writes the foreword, "a natural history of missionary propaganda." It is a disinterested attempt to find out the ethical influence upon Orientals of the religious contact furnished through the modern missionary movement. Regarding the missionary as a carrier of one way of life, with its entire conceptual machinery, to people of another way of life, the author sees missionary work as a process of "culture-contact and cross-fertilization of cultures." The volume as a whole constitutes a singularly objective study in social psychology, as it describes one after another the very complicated types of response to western culture of non-Christian groups. Students of ethics and of sociology, as well as other well-wishers of mankind, may approach this book with full assurance that here they will find description and analysis, rather than Christian apologetics.

T. V. S.

A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW. By W. E. Hall. Eighth edition by A. Pearce Higgins (Whewell Professor of International Law in the University of Cambridge). Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924. Pp. 952. Price, 42*s.* net.

The first edition of this treatise was published in 1880. In the third edition, in 1889, the author said that he looked forward "with much misgiving to the manner in which the next great war will be waged." The preface to the seventh edition (issued in 1917) is reprinted in the present edition; but it has already become strange in some of its judgments. Now we have the eighth edition, containing 94 new pages. A whole chapter has been inserted describing the structure of the League of Nations, and in different parts of the book there are further references to the working of the League. In a sense, therefore, this book indicates the line along which the nations are developing; and the fact that a pre-war treatise is still useful and illuminating shows that the Great War did not destroy the growth of peace nor even interfere with its main principles. Professor Higgins's additions make the book indispensable for any library of reference on international affairs. Quite recent events are discussed: for example, the convention on maritime ports, of 1923, and the Corfu episode, and a short statement is given of the present status of Egypt and of the international position of the British Dominions. Throughout the book there is the feeling for the gradual growth of moral standards and moral practice which is chiefly of interest in this matter to students of moral philosophy. In that way the work of Hall and Pearce Higgins is more than a legal guidebook; indeed there may be more material for moral philosophy in the discussions of actual issues in this book than in many treatises on ethics. So much, indeed, is contained in this book that it may be unwise to criticize; but it seems strange that international lawyers are still able to avoid discussion of capital invested under foreign jurisdiction and of the new regulations of labor as between states. Economic issues have not yet been sufficiently woven into the texture of diplomacy, but they are always affecting the moral practice of the agents of states.

C. D. BURNS

Digitized by Google

THE YIDDISH PRESS. By Mordecai Soltes. New York City: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1925. Pp. 242.

This volume is a comprehensive study of the structure and function of the Yiddish press in New York City. Data as to the number of readers and their distribution, as to the scope of the editorials, the extent to which they are read, and as to their civic bearing are contained in the study. The general conclusion is that the Yiddish press is an Americanizing agency in New York City.

T. V. S.

STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF DAVID HUME. By Charles William Hendel, Jr., Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Princeton University. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1925. Pp. xv+421.

These studies constitute an attempt at a more adequate reconstruction of Hume's intellectual development with respect to his main metaphysical problems. Professor Hendel's thesis, made generally plausible by careful documentation, is that the key to this reconstruction is Hume's persistent interest in religion, coupled with his early sense of the invalidity of the current efforts to justify the prevailing conception of God as First Cause. The book is expository rather than creative, yet the reader will find some chapters, notably those on the "Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion," suggestive contributions to Hume literature. The question is apt to occur: does Professor Hendel recognize fully enough the unstable character of Hume's moods (except for his literary ambition), the importance of which in general is brought out clearly?

Exact scholarship and a printer's task well done add to the pleasure with which one peruses the volume.

E. A. BURTT

THE ECONOMY OF HUMAN ENERGY. By Thomas Nixon Carver. New York: Macmillan Co., 1924. Pp. xiii+287. Price, $2.50.

Professor Carver presents here, in a volume of convenient size and in a popular form, ideas that are already familiarly associated with his name. In the belief that human energy is the form of value to which all valuables reduce, he organizes his ethical and economic thoughts around this as his theme. His treatment is of interest to the general reader and to younger students, for he succeeds in keeping close to human life and all its interests in a generous discussion of material that differentiates itself into the numerous social sciences.

T. V. S.

CHRONICON SPINOZANUM. Tomustertius. Hagae Comitis: Curis Societatis Spinozanae, 1923. Pp. 376.

The Spinoza Society presents here the third of its annual volumes of essays on the life and philosophy of Spinoza, the series having commenced in 1921. The same constructive purpose and high standard of scholarship revealed in the previous volumes are still animating the editors.

Three Americans take part in the symposium: Professor M. R. Cohen, with a paper on the contemporary worth of Spinoza's *amor dei intellectualis*, which had been read before the American Philosophical Association; Professor F. Thilly, on Spinoza's doctrine of freedom of thought and speech; and Professor H. A. Wolfson, with a further instalment of his projected book, *Spinoza, the Last of the Medievals*. As an aid to the historical interpretation of Spinoza in the light of medieval Jewish philosophy, Professor Wolfson's

Digitized by Google

work is invaluable. Among other essays of particular significance may be mentioned Borkowski's historical and textual commentary on the *Short Treatise,* Decoster's and Terrasse's discussions of Spinoza's method, and J. H. Carp's comparison of the social philosophy avowed by Spinoza in the political writings with that implied by the position developed in the fourth book of the *Ethics.*

E. A. BURTT

HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT. By Raymond G. Gettell. New York and London: The Century Co., 1924. Pp. xi+511. Price, $3.75.

It is a distinct advantage to have in a single volume an account of political thought from the earliest time down to the very present. Professor Gettell is as up-to-date as Bolshevism. Considering the purpose for which one goes to a history of thought rather than to material from which the history is written, it is astonishing how little a student misses in this single volume that he gets in such a creditable longer history as Dunning's. To cover the whole field in one book is an achievement; but to take constant account of the concrete orientation, institutional and otherwise, of various theories is highly praiseworthy. This volume in doing both will serve with admirable adaptation a long-standing need in colleges and outside colleges, wherever men seek present political guidance from past thought and experience.

T. V. S.

THE PERSISTENT PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY. Fifth Revised Edition. By Mary Whiton Calkins. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1925. Pp. xxvi +601.

In this new edition Professor Calkins has brought her well-known analysis of modern philosophy quite up to date with almost a hundred additional pages devoted to contemporary philosophy. The three current schools, realistic, idealistic, and pragmatic, are set out in their various subdivisions with arguments for and against.

The chief merit of the new chapter on twentieth-century philosophy, as of the work as a whole, lies in its clear organization into definite parts for students of very complex material. Some students are satisfied with the food as thus pre-digested; but others are led beyond the neat ordering into the complex richness of the philosophers in all their disarray. As seen from the vantage point of this further study—to which the book is meant to lead—the chief shortcoming of the book is that in its zeal for arguments it oftentimes flies over the argument. This fault is not so much attributable to the author as to her material. If all philosophers revealed their motivation as openly as did James or as covertly as does Professor Calkins, in her closing remarks on immortality, the task of interpreting their philosophy would be much simpler than Miss Calkins finds it.

T. V. S.

THE PRINCIPLES OF CHRISTIAN LIVING. A handbook of Christian ethics. By Gerald Birney Smith. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1924. Pp. ix+212. Price, $2.00; postpaid, $2.10.

This book is professedly intended to promote the application of experimental and historical procedure to the examination of Christian conduct. It is neither an exposition nor an evaluation of empirical method in ethics. The scientific point of view, that morality is an evolving adjustment of man to concrete social problems, is frankly assumed to be the most satisfactory approach to ethical investigation. The purpose of the work is to indicate the consequences for Christian behavior of a scientific definition of morality. The inter-

Digitized by Google

est of the author is to suggest what kind of human activity is the most Christlike in a world in which economic, sociological, political, and even religious phenomena are in constant change. That the standpoint of the volume is functional rather than formal is evident in the author's opinion that the chief value of Judaism lies in its humanism and not in its legalism; in his interpretation of the Kingdom of God as a social order; in his distrust of other-worldliness in Protestantism; in his conception that conscience has a history; and in his theory that sin is a failure due to psychological, physical, and social conditions. The latter half of the book discusses the Christian's relation to his church, family, vocation, recreation, property, economic order, and state. He briefly, but openly and fairly, analyzes such problems as Sabbath observance, church unity, birth control, amusements, the distribution of wealth, war, and internationalism. His solutions for these ethical issues are stated in an interesting, instructive, and inspiring manner. He finds his way out of the moral difficulties through the avenue of an heroic utilitarianism. Although Mr. Smith almost entirely avoids the philosophical terminology characteristic of traditional texts on Christian ethics, he does not hesitate to ascribe universal implications to morality. His interpretations of freedom, incentives to right living, and Christian idealism are decidedly indicative of metaphysical thought and interest. When he searches for the "what" of morality, Mr. Smith appeals to science. When he seeks the "why" he resorts to religion. The standard of the true Christian will be scientific, and his sanction religious, "because the constant experience of relationship with Jesus brings the deepening conviction that in the Christlike spirit we have the best possible equipment for making our ethical inquiries with a due regard to all human values, and the surest means of commanding that emotion of loyalty which gives carrying power to moral action" (p. 6). The book will not satisfy a student who would acquaint himself with the intricacies of moral theory, but it will admirably serve one who desires to obtain the results of ethical scholarship in a plain and practical form. Appended to seventeen of the eighteen chapters in the volume are helpful questions for class discussion and well-chosen bibliographical lists.

D. L. EVANS

THE SOCIOLOGY OF REVOLUTION. By Pitrim A. Sorokin. Lippincott Sociological Series. J. B. Lippincott Company, Philadelphia and London, 1925. Pp. xii+428.

The author of this volume has had the good fortune (as a sociologist!) to be present during the social cataclysm which has been in progress in Russia for several years. By further good fortune he has been able to escape from the revolutionary inferno after making many valuable scientific observations. His interest in revolutions is therefore personal as well as scientific. Having reached Czecho-Slovakia safely, Professor Sorokin undertook a comparative study of revolutions in order to answer several major questions. What changes does revolution bring about in the behavior of people and in their psychology, ideology, beliefs, and valuations? What is the effect of revolution upon the composition of the population? Upon social structure? Upon fundamental social processes? What are the causes of revolution? In short, the author deals with the phenomena of revolution from the point of view of natural science; he shows its characteristics and traces its "natural" history. Recourse to the great revolutions of the past is had, but not as a method of explaining the present; indeed, contrary to common opinion, "the past is to be explained through the present."

The author's theory of revolution is simple, extraordinarily so, when we take into account the range and complexity of contemporary theories of

Digitized by Google

human behavior. He reviews briefly the views developed by Galton, Loeb, Berman, James, Ribot, Freud, MacDougall, Watson, Tarde, Small, *et al.* He finds in all these theories the belief that human behavior is "determined" in definite ways. That is, they view man as a mechanism controlled both from within and from without by forces which are only in part rational. Therefore, taking an eclectic attitude and seizing upon the simplest possible dichotomy, human behavior consists of *unconditioned reflexes* (inborn instincts) and *conditioned reflexes* (acquired habits). Repression of these reflexes occurs through war, famine, economic exploitation of the mass, artificial class barriers, and so on, and leads inevitably to revolution. The direct result is the "biologization" of behavior. That is, the unconditioned reflexes gain ascendancy, not merely in isolated individuals (as in the case of crime), but in the multitude. Professor Sorokin is careful to say that his approach is scientific and not sentimental. Yet, perhaps quite naturally, he is impatient and even severe when dealing with the arguments evolved by the apologists of revolution. True, they also are products of revolution, and their pseudo-logic is characteristic of revolutionary situations. Yet should not much of the rack and ruin of revolution be charged up to their perverse beliefs and behavior? One's righteous indignation makes it difficult to maintain a wholly objective attitude toward them and their deeds. The author believes that revolution is morally unsound, since it violates the very canons of social progress: "It violates human nature and contradicts the fundamental instincts; it attempts reform without a previous scientific study of social conditions; it does not first perform its experiments on a small scale; and it is not legal and constitutional! In short, it is a perversion." If we are to be as intelligent about the ordering of our social life as we are about bridge-building and cattle-breeding, it is necessary to understand the forces at play in the social world. Professor Sorokin assists us measurably in that task. While not organized to do so, his carefully documented argument does help us answer several practical questions looking to the future. What are the signs of the times which will enable us to foresee revolution? What are the measures by which we can forestall or control its course?

ERLE FISKE YOUNG

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

BOOKS RECEIVED

AIYAR, B. R. RAJAM. Rambles in Vedanta. Madras: S. Ganesan, 1925. Pp. 888.

BAKER, ELIZABETH FAULKNER. Protective Labor Legislation, With Special Reference to Women in the State of New York. Columbia University Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law, Vol. CXVI, No. 2, Whole No. 259. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1925. Pp. 467.

BAKER, D. J. NOEL. The Geneva Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. London: P. S. King, Ltd., 1925. Pp. x+228. Price, 9*s.* net.

THE BOOK REVIEW DIGEST. Edited by Knight, Marion A. and James, Mertice M. New York: The H. W. Wilson Co., 1925. Pp. A–16, 723.

BRYAN, ROBERT T., JR. An Outline of Chinese Civil Law. Shanghai: The Commercial Press, Ltd., 1925. Pp. VI+92.

BURNS, C. DELISLE. Industry and Civilization. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1925. Pp. 278. Price, $3.50.

BUXTON, L. H. D. Primitive Labour. London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1924. Pp. viii+272. Price, 7*s.* 6*d.* net.

Digitized by Google

CADDICK, DAVID W. Political Principles and Motives. London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1925. Pp. xii+97. Price, 3*s*. 6*d*. net.

CALKINS, MARY WHITON. The Persistent Problems of Philosophy. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1925. Pp. xxvi+601.

CHRONICUM SPINOZUM. Tomus Tertius. Hagae Comitis, Curis Societatis Spinozinae, 1923. Pp. vii+376.

CONFERENCE FOR THE CONTROL OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN ARMS, MUNITIONS AND IMPLEMENTS OF WAR (League of Nations). London: Constable & Co., Ltd., 1925. Pp. 244. Price, 7*s*. 6*d*. net.

DENNES, WILLIAM RAY. The Method and Presuppositions of Group Psychology. University of California Publications in Philosophy, Vol. VI, No. 1. Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1924. Pp. 182. Price, $2.00.

ESSAYS IN METAPHYSICS. Lectures delivered before the Philosophical Union, University of California, 1922–23. University of California Publications in Philosophy, Vol. V. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1924. Pp. 220. Price, $3.75.

FOSSUM, PAUL R. The Agrarian Movement in North Dakota. Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, Series XLIII, No. 1. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1925. Pp. vii+183.

GHANDI, MAHATMA. A Guide to Health. Translated by A. Rama Iyer. Madras: S. Ganesan, 1923. Pp. xv+114.

GHANDI, MAHATMA. Ethical Religion. Translated by A. Rama Iyer, with an appreciation of the author by Rev. J. H. Holmes. Madras: S. Ganesan, 1922. Pp. 64. Price, *As*. 8.

GOODSPEED, THOMAS WAKEFIELD. The Story of the University of Chicago, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1925. Pp. xv+244.

GOODSPEED, THOMAS WAKEFIELD. The University of Chicago Biographical Sketches, Vol. II. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1925. Pp. ix+298. Price, $3.00, postage extra.

GULICK, CHARLES A. Labor Policy of the United States Steel Corporation. Columbia University Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law. Vol. CXVI, No. 1. Whole No. 258. New York: Longmans Green & Co., 1924. Pp. 200.

HALL, WILLIAM EDWARD. A Treatise on International Law (8th Ed., by A. Pearce Higgins). Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1924. Pp. XLVII+952. Price, 36*s*. net.

HARRISON, H. D. Industrial Psychology and the Production of Wealth. London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1924. Pp. xii+184. Price, 5*s*. net.

HENDEL, CHARLES W. Studies in the Philosophy of David Hume. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1925. Pp. xv+418. Price, $4.00.

HOWARD, CLIFFORD. Sex and Religion: A Study of Their Relationship and Its Bearing upon Civilization. London: Williams and Norgate, 1925. Pp. xiii+201. Price, 6*s*. net.

KAUTSKY, KARL. Foundations of Christianity. New York: International Publishers, 1925. Pp. 480. Price, $4.00.

KEYSERLING, COUNT HERMANN. The Travel Diary of a Philosopher. Translated by J. Holroyd-Reece. New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1925. Vol. I, pp. 338; Vol. II, pp. 400. Price, $10.00.

LOBINGIER, JOHN LESLIE. Projects in World Friendship. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1925. Pp. xv+177. Price, $1.75, postage extra.

MAL, LALA KANNOO. The Aphorisms of Narada. Madras: S. Ganesan, 1923. Pp. x+57. Price, *As*. 8.

MAL, LALA KANNOO. The Sayings of Tulsidas. Madras: S. Ganesan, 1923. Pp. 52. Price, *As*. 8.

MAL, LALA KANNOO. The Sayings of Kabir. Madras: S. Ganesan, 1923. Pp. 49. Price, *As*. 8.

NAVILLE, ADRIAN. Liberté, Egalité, Solidarité. Lausanne: Librairie Payot & Cie, 1924. Pp. 124.

Digitized by Google

NETZ, GEORGE BERKELEY, Leben und Lehre. Stuttgart: F. Frohmann's Verlag, 1925. Pp. 248.

ORCHARD, W. E. Foundations of Faith (II Christological). London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1925. Pp. 195. Price, 5s. net.

OVERTON, GRANT. Portrait of a Publisher and the First Hundred Years of the House of Appleton. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1925. Pp. 96.

PITT, ST. GEORGE LANE FOX. The Purpose of Education. London: Cambridge University Press, 1924. Pp. xxiv+92.

PRICE, MAURICE T. Christian Missions and Oriental Civilizations. A Study in Culture Contact. With Foreword by Robert E. Park. Shanghai: 1924. Pp. xxvi+578.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF SOCIAL WORK, Toronto, Ontario, June 25–July 2, 1924. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1924. Pp. vii+652.

PRYSE, JAMES M. Prometheus Bound. Los Angeles: John M. Pryse, 1925. Pp. 209. Price, cloth, $2.00; leather, $3.00.

RASHDALL, HASTINGS. The Theory of Good and Evil. London: Oxford University Press, 1924. Vol. I, pp. xx+312; Vol. II, pp. xv+464. Price, $6.00.

READ, CORRETH. Man and His Superstitions. Cambridge: The University Press (2d Ed.), 1925. Pp. xvi+228. Price, 12s. 6d. net.

REVUE NEO-SCHOLASTIQUE DE PHILOSOPHIE. Louvain: Institut Superieur de Philosophie, 1925. Pp. 128. Price, 21 fr.

RICHARD, PAUL. The Wherefore of the Worlds. Translated by Aurobindo Ghose. Madras: S. Ganesan, 1923. Pp. 120.

RICHMOND, MARY E., and HALL, FRED S. Child Marriages. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1925. Pp. 159. Price, $1.50.

RUSSELL, BERTRAND. What I Believe. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1925. Pp. vii+87. Price, $1.00.

SELEKMAN, BEN M. Employes' Representation in Steel Works. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1924. Pp. 293. Price, $1.50.

SELEKMAN, BEN M. Sharing Management with the Workers. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1924. Pp. xix+124. Price, $1.50.

SELEKMAN, BEN M., and VAN KLEECK, MARY. Employes' Representation in Coal Mines. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1924. Pp. xxxv+454. Price, $2.00.

SOLTES, MORDECAI. The Yiddish Press. An Americanizing Agency. New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1925. Pp. 242.

SOROKIN, PITRIM A. The Sociology of Revolution. Lippincott Sociological Series. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1925. Pp. xii+428.

SINGH, SADHU SUNDAR. The Search after Reality; Thoughts on Buddhism, Hinduism, Muhammedanism and Christianity. Pp. 105. Price, 3s. net.

SMITH, J. M. POWIS. The Prophets and Their Times. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1925. Pp. ix+277. Price, 11s. 6d. net.

STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS. Edited by the Department of Philosophy of Columbia University. Vol. II. New York: Columbia University Press, 1925. Pp. 377. Price, $3.00.

WALKER, REV. THOMAS. What Jesus Read. London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1925. Pp. 125. Price, 4s. 6d. net.

Digitized by Google